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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 “Forcing women to cover is a goal of fanatic Islamists who missionary their creed among 
us[…]This turns the headscarf into a political symbol that cannot be tolerated for 
teachers[…]Different from the headscarf, the Christian cross belongs to our Western 
culture, to our traditions, and symbolises here brotherly love, tolerance and maintenance 
of fundamental human values.” (Peter Windruff, deputy of the Social Democrat Party in 
Baden-Württemberg, Germany, extract from a parliamentary debate on the new school 
law, February 4, 2004). 1 
 
“Can women freely don and remove headscarves, or is it an indispensible part of their 
identity? Many women perceive it like that. Then it is comparable to ethnicity, social class 
or sexuality and no Minister would ever ask a judge to privatise these characteristics. I 
object that the Minister forces women to distance themselves from something that is 
inalienable to them.” (Femke Halsema, deputy of the Green party in the Netherlands, 
extract from a parliamentary debate on religious symbols in the court, November 7, 2001). 
 
“Need I remind you that in some countries in the 21st century, women cannot escape 
sanctions up to death penalties? In Iran, they are threatened with stoning, in Afghanistan 
with execution, in Bangladesh, to be burned with acid. In France, even if the reasons for 
wearing the headscarf are plenty, it remains the symbol and instrument of discrimination. 
To accept this challenge to the mixed school is to allow the exemption to certain 
educational rules (Annick Lepetit, deputy of the Socialist Party in France, extract of 
parliamentary debate on the new Secularism law in public schools, February 5, 2004). 
 
In various European countries, public and political controversies have emerged, focusing 
on Islamic head and body covering.2 As the above quotes illustrate, however, politicians 
from similar party families across countries can respond differently to the same issue, 
framing in fundamentally different ways the relation between state and religion, the roles 
of women, and the principles of equality and non-discrimination. This dissertation 
discusses the different ways in which French, Dutch and German politicians have 
deliberated the issue of Islamic head and body covering. But also within countries, 
politicians differ in the meanings they attribute to the phenomenon of veiling, and the 
related concepts of religion, secularism, gender, nationality and ethnicity,  arriving at 
varying conclusions as to how to regulate Muslim women’s religious dress. In order to 
understand how fundamentally contested issues become implemented as policy, this 
dissertation offers a comparison of the changing institutional, historical and political 
contexts of France, the Netherlands and Germany.   
The first debates about Muslim women’s dress emerged in the late 1980s, 30 years 
after the arrival of the first labour migrants and their families from Islamic countries in the 
1960s.3 Today, Europe’s 13 million Muslims constitute the continent’s second largest faith 
                                                           
1
 All translations from German, Dutch and French to English are mine.  
2
 Only in Southern European countries like Spain, Italy and Greece, female Islamic head and body 
covering has, so far, not become contentious. Only few debates occurred about the Turkish 
minority in Greece. See www.veil-project.eu.  
3
 It must be noted, however that Muslim minorities have already lived for centuries in the Balkans. 
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community, making up 3.5% of the overall population. The European Muslim community 
is characterised by a highly diverse mix of ethnicities, politics, languages and cultural 
traditions.4 In addition to France, where the headscarf has long been a contentious issue, 
the last decade has seen equivalent debates in the Netherlands, Germany, United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Austria. These debates occur at a time when economic globalisation, 
immigration and EU integration increasingly challenge nation-states’ control over their 
increasingly multicultural and multireligous citizenry.  
The controversy about female Islamic head and body covering must therefore be 
situated within a wider context – that of European nation-states reconfiguring and 
reconsidering public institutions and cultural practices that once historically constituted the 
nation, but are increasingly perceived to be at risk in the present global context of 
increased multicultural and multireligious societies and the process of European unification 
and expansion. The changing demographic threatens the established notions of democracy 
and religion, public and private, freedom and equality, and people’s understandings of 
gender and sexuality. In this light, the debates about headscarves and face veils can be 
considered, as Christian Joppke (2009) already noted, a mirror of identity for European 
nation-states reconfiguring themselves. 
The nature and object of the debate differs across Europe: in France and Turkey it 
has predominantly focused on students’ headscarves; German and Swiss debates centre on 
public school teachers; the Netherlands and the United Kingdom focus on the Islamic face 
cover. Also policies differ (see Skeje, 2007: 130 for three different policy regimes across 
Europe). This raises the question why Muslim women’s cultural dress has become, in 
varying degrees of intensity and timing, so controversial, and why countries have 
developed such differing policies to the same phenomenon. 
It is sometimes suggested that, first, the visibility of headscarf-wearing women can 
explain the contentiousness of the issue or policy differences between countries, but 
numbers are not much helpful. A poll in the French Elle magazine writes that 14 % of 
female French Muslims wear headscarves5 (other estimates are 2 or 3%, see Gaspard & 
Khosrokhavar, 1995), meaning that despite the fierce national debate on the issue, only a 
small minority of Muslims actually wear headscarves. In Germany, where approximately 
3.5 million people are Muslim, estimates are similarly low.6 This is in contrast to the 
Netherlands, where an estimated 25 % of young Dutch women of Turkish descent, and 40 
% of young Dutch women of Moroccan descent, wear headscarves - in a country where 6 
                                                           
4
 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2006), Muslims in the European 
Union. Discrimination and Islamophobia. Because most Muslims in Europe have arrived as 
postcolonial or as labour and family migrants, statistics are based upon migrant’s ethnicity and 
nationality, and the number of Muslims in their country of origin. Throughout this dissertation, I 
will likewise refer to Muslims who are Islamic on grounds of ethnic descent or nationality, even 
though I realize that this says nothing about the extent to which they are practicing Muslims or 
identify with their religious beliefs. Moreover, Muslims include converted majorities but the 
debates studied in this research mostly focused on Muslims with an ethnic minority background. 
5
 ‘Sondage exclusif: Intégration, voile et droits des femmes… Ce que veulent les musulmanes’, 
Elle (December 15, 2003) : 78-94. The poll did not taken into account ethnic, age or religious 
differences among Muslims.  
6
 ‘Mit Kopftuch aussen vor?’ Schriften der Landesstelle für Gleichbehandlung- gegen 
Diskriminierung (2008). No exact numbers are known. 
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% of the population is of Muslim origin.7 Yet, the most accommodating policy measures 
remain in the Netherlands and, as subsequent Chapters will explore, this contrasts with the 
situation in France. The numbers not only fail to explain differences in policies, they do 
not match the intensity of the debate either: an estimated 0.02 % of the Dutch population (a 
few hundred women) wear Islamic face covers yet this type of dress has caught much 
public and political attention (Vermeulen, 2006: 13; Moors: 2009). In France, where the 
Parliament and Senate have accepted a ban that aims to prohibit face veils in public 
institutions, the number is estimated at less than two thousand (0.001 % of the 
population).8 
A second popular explanation is that restrictive policies emerge from the backlash 
against multiculturalism that has taken place in Europe. In 2006 67 % of the Dutch 
population believed there was a clash between Dutch culture and Islam, particularly 
concerning gender relations, and more than half of the Dutch population thought Islam 
constituted a threat to Dutch national identity. But so far, the changing public opinion in 
the Netherlands on Islam has not yet crystallised in anti-headscarf policies.9 The European 
Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) noted in 2006 a significant 
number of incidents in the Netherlands illustrating fear or prejudice towards Islam or 
Muslims. Those range from insults and threats to physical acts of violence and the setting 
of fire to mosques. Similar incidents occurred in France and Germany.10 Events like 
September 11 seem to be correlated with an increase in racist attacks against Muslims in 
the Netherlands, particularly the murder of the Dutch filmmaker and Islam critic Theo van 
Gogh by a radical Muslim in November 2004.11  
Yet, headscarf policies have so far still been far more accommodating in the 
Netherlands than in France and Germany. France prohibits all signs that ‘ostensibly’ show 
pupils’ religious affiliation in public schools, as well as the religious display by teachers 
and other public officers. Half of Germany’s sixteen federal states prohibit teachers’ 
headscarves, with five federal states making exceptions for Christian and Jewish religious 
                                                           
7
 SCP jaarrapport 2007: 268-274, partly based on Survey Integratie Minderheden (SIM) 2006. A 
telephone poll executed in France, the Netherlands and Germany among Turkish migrants of the 
first and second generation likewise suggests that in the Netherlands the largest number of Turkish 
Muslim women cover: 50 percent of female Sunnite respondents in the Netherlands wear 
headscarves, compared to 40 percent in France and 30 percent in Germany (Ersanillii, 2010: 58). 
8
 A research executed by the French Minister of Interior Affairs between August and December 
2009 estimated that 1900 women in France wear the face veil, among whom 270 living in its 
overseas territories. Most were living in (poorer districts of) cities in the region Ile-de-de France. 
AN no. 2262, Gerin, A. & Raoult, E., Rapport d’information au nom de mission d’information sur 
la pratique du port du voile integral sur le territoire national (January 26, 2010). 
9
 Public poll of Motivaction (2006), ‘Zo tolerant is Nederland’, executed among 1020 Dutch 
citizens: http://www2.motivaction.nl/153/d:179/Nieuws/Artikelen/Zo-tolerant-is-Nederland/ 
(Retrieved October 7, 2010). Another public poll with similar results among 1084 Dutch citizens 
was executed by TNS Nipo (2004), ‘Gevoelens van autochtone Nederlanders t.o.v. allochtonen en 
Moslims’. 
10
 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2006), Muslims in the European 
Union. Discrimination and Islamophobia.  
11
 Van Donselaar, J. and Rodrigues, P. (2004), Annex. Monitoring racism and the extreme right, 
sixt report: Developments following the Murder on Theo van Gogh (Amsterdam/ Leiden: Anne 
Frank Stichting/Universiteit van Leiden). See also: van Donselaar, J. (2009), ‘Inzake 
Islamophobie’, Brants, C. & van der Poel, S. (red.), Diverse kwesties: liber amicorum prof. Dr. 
Frank Bovenkerk.The Hague: Boom publishers: 13-26. 
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dress and symbols. The Netherlands largely tolerate headscarves for pupils, teachers and 
public servants except in the police force and for court personnel. Even though a negative 
public opinion on Islam unquestionably creates more space for populist parties to call for 
the restriction of the ‘Islamisation’ of public space, country differences remain in actual 
policies concerning Muslim women’s religious dress. The question is also still open why 
this debate focuses on the headscarf and face covers. Why are other Islamic practices, like 
Muslim men’s beards or dress, not so contentious and subject to regulation? 
Throughout this dissertation, I will use ‘hijab’ as an umbrella term for different 
styles of Muslim women’s dress, and use ‘veiling’ as a verb for different practices of 
female Islamic head- and body-covering.12 When necessary, I will differentiate between 
the ‘headscarf’, which covers (parts of) the hair and neck, and the ‘face veil’. Face veils 
both include both the burqa (a loose garment that covers the whole female body including 
a grid before the eyes) and the niqab (a face veil that likewise covers part of the face but 
still leaves the eyes visible).13  
In order to explain differences between the policies developed in France, the 
Netherlands and Germany, this research builds upon a wide range of empirical studies on 
the hijab that have tried to explain policy debates.14 Most headscarf research consists of 
single country studies, focusing on Germany (Altinordu, 2004; Berghahn, 2008; Fogel, 
2007; Mahlmann, 2003), the United Kingdom (Davies, 2005), Belgium (Coene & 
                                                           
12
 The word ‘hijab’ in Arabic means ‘curtain’ and should not be equated with the headscarf, which 
is translated as ‘khimar’. There are two parts of the Quran where the word hijab is related to female 
dress, but different theological interpretations exist whether these parts must be interpreted as an 
obligation to cover parts of the female body. In addition to Surah 33, verse 59 where the Prophet is 
commanded to tell his wives to make their outer garments to hang low on them so as not to be 
recognised and insulted, another quranic texts that is often referred to is Surah 22, verse 31. It 
reads: ‘And say to believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that 
they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what (must) ordinarily appear thereof; 
that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display their beauty except to their 
husbands, their father […] their sons […] their brothers. Or their women.’ (quoted from 
McGoldrick, 2006, originally from A Yusuf Ali (1983), The Quran – Text, Translation and 
Commentary (Maryland: Amana Corporation): 904-5). See for feminist readings of those parts of 
the Quran: Badran, 2008; Barlas, 2002; Göle, 1997; Mernissi, 1997; Wadud: 1999. 
13
 I do not intend to deny the variety in styles of dress, in motivations to wear it, the meaning it may 
carry in different times and contexts, nor the contestability of the practice as a religious duty (see: 
El Guindi, 1999; Oestrich, 2004; Gaspard & Khosrokhavar 1995; Karakasoglu, 2000; 
Klinkhammer 2000; Killian 2003; Boubekeur 2004).   
14
 I only discuss here empirical studies that have focused on explaining public policies in a West-
European postcolonial context. Other studies on the hijab issue in present-day Europe have focused 
on the construction of gender, race and religion in national public and political debates and how 
this enables and constrains certain subjectivities (Duits & van Zoonen, 2006; Cesari 2006; Geisser, 
2003; Karakasoglu, 2000; Lutz, 1996; Nieuwkerk van, 2004; Nordmann, 2008; Rocheford, 2002). 
Without systematically analysing who was involved in constructing dominant meanings of the 
hijab, how such meanings were contested and fragmented in counter discourses, or changed over 
time, these works tend to overlook the internal dynamics and heterogeneity of country’s discourses 
on the hijab (but see Lorcerie, 2005; Oestrich, 2004; Tevanian, 2005). A second stream of research 
exists of ethno-graphic studies of Muslim women’s own motivations to wear the hijab (Bartels, 
2005; Boubekeur 2004; Franks, 2000; Gaspard & Khosrokhavar 1995; Jessen & von Wilamowitz-
Moellendorff, 2006; Klinkhammer 2000; Killian 2003). See for the hijab question in colonial and 
postcolonial North African countries and Turkey: Ahmed, 1992; Arat, 2005; El Guindi, 1999; 
Göle, 1997; Mernissi, 1991. 
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Longman, 2008; Longman, 2003), the Netherlands (Loenen 2001; 2006a; 2006b; Saharso, 
2003; Saharso & Verhaar, 2006; Verhaar & Saharso, 2004), or France (Bowen, 2007a; 
Dot-Pouillard, 2006; Ezekiel, 2006; Labourde, 2005, 2006; 2008; Lorcerie, 2005, 2008; 
Scott, 2005; 2007; Thomas, 2006). These works have greatly enhanced our understanding 
of the controversy, illustrating that the construction of the hijab as a political problem is a 
power struggle over meaning. From this research, it also appears that meaning-making 
struggles are shaped by nationally specific (but contested and changing) political histories 
and institutions of gendered and ethnicised citizenship and state-church relations. Because 
these single country studies are not comparative in nature, however, they are unable to 
show which assumptions were taken for granted in one country that are not so obvious for 
actors in other countries. Or, conversely, which similar meanings may have shaped the 
debates despite different national political histories and despite different policy outcomes.  
Most comparative studies on the headscarf issue have explained countries’ different 
policies and jurisprudence, without systematically scrutinising and comparing the 
discursive politics which shaped the policy-formation process within their institutional 
settings (Brems, 2006; McGoldrick, 2006; Molokov-Liederman, 2000; Shadid & van 
Koningsveld, 2005). Some sociological studies do exist that focus on comparing policy 
discourses, such as between Germany and France (Amir-Moazami, 2007; Joppke, 2009; 
Kastoryano, 2006), France and the Netherlands (Reysoo, 1992; Coppes, 1994; Kuijeren, 
2001), France and/or Germany and the United Kingdom (Amiraux, 2003; 2007; 
Liederman, 2000; Poulter, 1997) or the Netherlands and Germany (Saharso, 2007). Those 
studies have shown a relation between national political histories and the particular 
framing of the issue. But because they do not systematically compare the policy-making 
process, it remains unclear how national institutions and policies shape policy debates and 
outcomes. 
This dissertation seeks to further examine this link between countries’ different 
political histories and institutions and the policy-making process around the hijab. 
Policymaking is understood here broadly as a process of converting social reality into 
policy-related issues that governors need and can act upon, and convincing others of one’s 
representation of reality. In the words of Maarten Hajer (1995: 15): “policymaking is in 
fact to be analysed as the creation of problems, that is to say, policymaking can be 
analysed as a set of practices that are meant to process fragmented and contradictory 
statements to be able to create the sort of problems that institutions can handle and for 
which solutions can be found. Hence policies are not only devised to solve problems, 
problems also have to be devised to be able to create policies”.  
In order to explain policies on the hijab, this dissertation therefore analyses the 
ways in which the hijab was framed in the political realm as a paradigmatic symbol of 
problems requiring a policy response, understood here as all rules or law-like regulations 
communicated by governments following policy deliberations in the legislature, courts and 
other public arenas. Government refers to the agencies of highest public authority and 
decision-making, in France and the Netherlands at the national level and in Germany also 
at the level of the federal states, from here: Länder. Policy responses comprise court 
decisions, laws and regulations, executive orders, clothing directives or guidelines, or 
official declarations of authorities. They also include authoritative declarations not to act 
(‘policy silences’) (Weldon, 2002: 11).15  
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 Note that this dissertation does not analyse the actual implementation and evaluation of policies. 
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Yet, these meaning-making struggles do not occur in a vacuum. As the opening 
citations illustrate, politicians of parties with similar socio-democratic ideologies may 
interpret the hijab differently, reaching different conclusions about how to respond to it. By 
drawing on different traditions of citizenship and state-church relations, parties and actors 
can attribute different meanings to principles such as state neutrality, and to values such as 
religious freedom or equality. Also within countries, actors may differ in the definitions 
they give to the problem of the hijab and the solutions they suggest. While some framings 
of the issue may not lead to much controversy in a country where the hijab is easily 
accommodated, they may fundamentally challenge another society’s institutional histories 
and power relations. In other words, whether or not the hijab becomes a contentious issue 
depends on the different meanings that actors attribute to this dress form and to what extent 
such meanings challenge the existing institutions, cleavages and relations of power of that 
particular country. 
The central thesis of this dissertation is that national institutional and policy 
histories offer specific opportunities and constraints, which shape how issues are 
constructed as problems within the political realm, giving rise to particular policy 
solutions. However, going beyond static, structural approaches towards understanding 
countries’ different policy outcomes, this dissertation takes a political-process approach 
that focuses on the actors involved in those framing contests, the shifting power they have 
to push for their construction of reality, and the legal-institutional setting in which these 
policy-formation processes take place. This dissertation focuses on three institutional 
settings as particularly relevant structures in shaping policy processes on the hijab: 
institutionalised state-church relations, institutions of citizenship and migrant 
incorporation, and gender machineries and policies, as well as their underlying cleavages. 
These three institutional settings, understood as internally heterogeneous, instable and 
contested, are considered to be of particular relevance to debates on the hijab issue. 
Because veiling is a religious practice brought to Europe through migration, it is subject to 
countries’ national cleavages, ideas on, and regulation of, first, religion and, second, 
immigrant incorporation. Third, because veiling is a contested religious duty that only 
applies to women, it is also subject to countries’ cleavages, institutions and policy legacies 
of regulating gender relations and women’s emancipation.   
In order to scrutinise the effects of countries’ cleavages, institutional structures and 
policy legacies, and power constellations on policy-making processes on the hijab, this 
dissertation builds on a comparative framework. It systematically compares the 
parliamentary debates on the hijab in France, Germany and the Netherlands. These three 
countries are all members of the European Union, are all social-welfare states, and all have 
a substantial number of Muslims among their citizenries with different ethnic, national and 
migration backgrounds.16  
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 In 2000, the High Council for Integration (HCI) estimated that 4.155.000 Muslims live in France, 
while current estimates are around the five million (6-8% of the total population). The HCI 
provided the following estimates for the distribution of Muslims by country of origin: 1.550.000 
from Algeria; 1.000.000 from Morocco; 350.000 from Tunisia; 315.000 from Turkey; 250.000 
from Sub-Saharan Africa; 100.000 from Asia; 40.000 French converts; and 100.000 from other 
regions. Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (2000), l‘Islam dans la République. In the Netherlands, the 
majority of Dutch Muslims (estimated at 920.000 in 2004, 5,8 % of the total population) are of 
Turkish (320.000) or Moroccan (285.000) origin. A significant minority is of Surinamese origin 
(32.000) while other minorities comprise of Dutch c
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Apart from these similarities, sufficient variation exists between the three countries. 
As will be discussed in the theoretical Chapter, they have often been represented as ideal-
typical examples of states that have practiced different integration policy models. France 
has often been discussed as a civic-universalist model; Germany as an ethno-cultural 
model; and the Netherlands as a multicultural model (Brubaker, 1992; Castles, 1995; 
Kastoryano, 2002; Koopmans et al., 2005). The policy legacies of the three countries 
regarding religion have likewise been contrasted, with France being presented as a 
secularist state-church model; Germany as a corporatist state-church model; and the 
Netherlands as a pillarised, accommodative model (Berghahn, 2007; Ferrari, 2002; Fetzer 
& Soper, 2005; Monsma & Soper, 2009). Also in regard to institutions and policy histories 
of gender equality, country differences have been observed, even though this incipient 
research field has not developed ideal-typical models (McBride & Mazur, 1995, 2010; 
McCammon et al., 2001; Ferree, 2008; Mazur, 2003; Mazur & Zwingel, 2003; Outshoorn 
& Kantola, 2007). The selection of these three countries for this comparative study will 
thus enable me to analyse to what extent differences in policy responses can be explained 
by the structuring effects of particular political histories of interpreting, institutionalising 
and governing religious, ethnic and gender differences on policy debates on the hijab.  
The policy debates and policy responses will be analysed from the onset of the 
debates in each country (starting with the Netherlands in 1985) until 2007, a period that 
includes several important national and international events such as September 11, 2001. 
Such a comparison over time allows for an explanation that is sensitive to changes in 
policy debates and responses within countries and hence to possible trends of convergence 
between countries.   
 
 This thesis therefore aims to answer the following two research questions: 
 
1. What differences and similarities exist in the framing and policy responses to the 
hijab in France, the Netherlands, and Germany and how have these developed over 
time from 1985 until 2007? 
2. To what extent can institutional structures, divergent policy pasts of state-church 
relations, migrant incorporation and women’s emancipation, and shifting party 
constellations explain differences in the framing and regulation of the hijab?  
 
The study uses similar data for all three countries: a qualitative frame analysis of all 
parliamentary documents on this issue, complemented with jurisprudence that shaped 
policy responses and media extracts.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
and former Yugoslavia. Phalet, K. & Wal, J. ter (2004), Moslims in Nederland. Religie en 
Migratie: sociaal-wetenschappelijke databronnen en literatuur, SCP werkdocument 106a (Den 
Haag). The majority of German Muslims (3.5 million, 4 % of the total population) is of Turkish 
origin (1.9 Turkish nationals and 565.000 naturalized migrants, a significant part of whom are 
Alevi (400.000-600.000)). Other Muslim minorities are migrants from Morocco (79.794), Tunesia 
(24.533), Bosnia-Herzogovina (167.000), Afghanistan (65.630), Pakistan (35.081), Iran (80.000) 
and Iraq (80.000): Berghahn, S. & Rostock, P. (2007), Country Overview Germany. Unpublished 
country report for VEIL, a 6th framework project of the European Commission. In addition to those 
ethnic differences, there exist significant differences in the migration background of the Muslim 
population, with a majority of French Muslims being post-colonial migrants while those in the 
Netherlands and Germany arrived as labourmigrants (see chapter 5). 
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Outline of the book 
The book is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I will elaborate on my theoretical 
framework and methodology. I will explain how I combine institutional theories of 
citizenship and migrant incorporation, and of state-church relations with a political-process 
approach focusing on framing and agency. I will also incorporate insights from 
comparative gender politics to analyse the gendered nature of state institutions, laws and 
policies, which may explain the different ways in which policy debates on the hijab were 
gendered. I will also explain the ways in which I collected the data for this research, and 
my specific methods of interpretative policy analysis: frame analysis.  
The rest of the book is divided into two parts, each consisting of three chapters, and 
a conclusion. In the first Part, Chapters 3 to 6, I will compare the characteristics of each 
country’s general opportunity structures (Chapter 3), as well as the issue-specific 
opportunity structures of state-church relations (Chapter 4), citizenship and migrant 
incorporation policies (Chapter 5), and gender machineries and policies (Chapter 6). I have 
made this analytical differentiation between three institutional settings in order to discern 
to what extent they enable or constrain the framing, regulation and practice of the hijab as 
a religious, ethno-cultural or gender symbol and practice. In reality, these institutional 
regimes and policies intersect. Religion, ethnicity and gender cannot be seen as merely 
additive. Neither of them can be prioritised abstractly, because they are articulated by each 
other in concrete social relations and hence in policy discourses (Yuval-Davis, 1995: 8). 
Nonetheless, for analytical purposes, I have formulated separate hypotheses in each of 
these chapters for the impact of each issue-specific opportunity structure on the policy-
making process in the three countries over time.  
In the second Part, Chapters 7 to 9, I will analyse the politicisation of the hijab in 
France (Chapter 7), the Netherlands (Chapter 8) and Germany (Chapter 9) respectively, 
focusing on the actors involved, the framing of the issue and different and changing policy 
responses. The concluding section (Chapter 10) provides a comparative overview of 
differences and similarities found in the framing and responses to the hijab, and draws 
conclusions regarding the hypotheses advanced in Chapters 3 to 5. Here I will answer my 
main research question, namely, to what extent differences in policy debates and policy 
responses to the hijab can be explained by a country’s general and issue-specific 
opportunity structures. In this final chapter, I will also reflect upon the strength and 
weaknesses of my theoretical framework and give some suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 2. Theoretical background: governing religious, ethnic and 
gender differences 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will discuss the literature that has informed the theoretical framework I 
have created to explain the differences in policy debates and policy outcomes on the hijab 
between France, the Netherlands and Germany. First, I have relied upon insights from 
comparative empirical sociology on immigrant integration and state-church relations. 
Scholars working within this neo-institutionalist tradition have developed several ideal-
typical ‘regimes’ of citizenship and of state-church regulations. A ‘regime’ clusters 
countries based on their dominant institutional patterns and policy logics (Lister et al., 
2007: 2). The literature has shown that country-specific state-church and citizenship 
regimes shape present-day policy responses to multicultural challenges, such as the hijab.  
Nonetheless, since the hijab is not only about religious and ethno-cultural 
differences but also about gender differences, I have also incorporated insights from 
comparative gender policy studies to scrutinize the possible path-dependent effects of 
gender equality institutions and policies on policy responses to the hijab. Moreover, in 
order to explain differences within countries and changes over time in policy responses, I 
rely upon political-process theories to take into account the role of shifting power 
constellations and governmental structures on the policy-formation process, including 
framing theories that focus on the discursive ways in which actors negotiate with 
institutions to construct certain hijab policies.  
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I will discuss the 
state-church and migrant incorporation regime literature, as well as the comparative gender 
literature that has informed my thinking on this issue (2.2). Secondly, I will present and 
elaborate upon the political-process model I use to explain national differences in policy 
debates and responses to the hijab (2.3). In the third section, I will discuss my research 
design and methods, elaborating upon the sources used and my particular methodology of 
analysing policy debates (2.4 to 2.6). 
 
2.2 State responses to multicultural challenges 
The ground-breaking work of Roger Brubaker (1992)17 has motivated the development of 
various ideal-typical ‘regimes' or national models of citizenship and integration in an 
attempt to both map and explain countries’ different  migrant integration policies 
(Alexander, 2001; Castells & Miller, 1993; Castels, 1995; Entzinger, 2000; Koopmans & 
Statham, 2000; Kastoryano, 2002; Koenig, 2003: 155ff). Although the terms used for the 
different policy regimes vary, as do the methods of classifying countries into groups, the 
                                                           
17
 Brubaker (1992) compared citizenship policies for foreigners in France and Germany, 
establishing that the former had relatively open naturalisation rules while the latter easily granted 
citizenship only to people sharing the same ethnic origins. Brubaker argued that the differences 
between those two countries’ policies could be attributed to their particular paths of nation-
building. Different conceptions of citizenship and belonging embedded in each country’s 
institutions and ways of thinking and talking about membership (‘cultural idioms’) would exert 
path-dependent effects on present-day migrant integration processes. 
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literature points to three different models that measure the degree to which countries grant 
immigrants access to equal citizenship, and the extent to which they accommodate cultural 
group difference (see Koopmans et al., 2005; Saharso, 2007).    
France can be seen as a prototypical example of the civic-assimilationist model. 
Religious and cultural differences are not fostered. Immigrants born in French territory are 
easily granted citizenship rights based on the ‘ius-soli’ principle of birthright citizenship, 
though they are expected to accept common values and principles. Germany is often 
regarded as a prototypical example of the ethno-cultural model, where citizenship is based 
on the ‘ius sanguinis’ principle, meaning determined via the citizenship of one’s parents. 
Migrants who are not ‘ethnic’ Germans not only face high barriers to citizenship but are 
also pressured to adapt to the host culture. The Netherlands is conceptualised as 
exemplifying the multicultural model whereby immigrants can claim citizenship on 
grounds of the ius soli principle, but where they are also able to seek protection for specific 
“group rights” due to the country’s promotion of cultural and religious diversity. 
(Koopmans et al., 2005). This citizenship-regime theory suggests that because social 
reality is structured by pre-existing ideas about a nation’s self-understanding, the 
Netherlands would be more open to accommodating or institutionalizing claims of 
religious or cultural recognition, such as those related to the hijab, than would France and 
Germany. Moreover, due to the French emphasis on a shared Republican national identity 
that denies ethnic and racial differences, France would not seem likely to promote the 
proliferation any cultural differences, whereas Germany’s ethnonationalistic national self-
understanding would lead it to foster only the cultural values and expressions of majority 
ethnic groups. 
Recently, comparative research on countries’ responses to the religious needs and 
identities of immigrants has turned away from an exclusive focus on citizenship and 
integration policies and begun to examine institutional patterns of state-church relations. 
Because citizenship and integration policy models have primarily focused on immigrants’ 
political, social and civil rights and liberties, or subsumed religious claims of recognition 
in more general treatment of migrants’ ethno-cultural identities, they have tended to 
downplay the importance of the religious rights and demands of Muslim migrants. In this 
light, several models now group countries according to the relationship between religion 
and politics. Fetzer & Soper (2005: 16, 18) have argued, for instance, that state-church 
models function as “institutional and ideological resources for Muslim activists,” and that 
they “determine the types of religious demands that Muslims have proposed, the response 
of various actors to those needs, and the public policy that the states eventually adopted in 
the area of Muslim religious rights”. 
Legal scholars often focus on the constitutional relationship between state and 
church (Berghahn, 2007; Ferrari, 2002). In this typology, France and the Netherlands are 
both categorised as ideal-typical examples of systems of separation that neither recognise a 
state church nor finance religious worship. Germany is considered an example of a 
corporatist or ‘concordatarian’ system, whereby state and church officially cooperate via 
specific legal provisions. Finally, there are countries with an established state church, such 
as the United Kingdom and Norway. 
Sociological research has developed more complex state-church models that go 
beyond the formal legal status of religion to take into account underlying philosophical 
principles, governing traditions and historical policy legacies (Fetzer & Soper, 2005: 7; 
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Modood & Kastoryano, 2006; Koenig, 2003; Monsma & Soper, 2009: 10-11). In this 
realm of the literature, France is seen as a prototypical example of the strict church-state 
separation model, whereby state neutrality is assumed to be best achieved through a hands-
off approach to religion: only when the state does not identify with any religion, abstaining 
from recognising and funding religious groups, can it guarantee each individual’s freedom 
of religion. The Netherlands figures as an ideal-typical example of the (structural) pluralist 
model, where state neutrality does not entail a strictly secular hands-off approach, but 
rather recognises and funds all religious and secular worldviews on an equal footing. 
Germany is typically characterised as an example of both the pluralist model and the 
(multiple and informal) established church model. Such states selectively recognize and 
cooperate with certain officially recognisedreligious communities, investing them with 
several state or public functions, disadvantaging non-established religions in the process. 
This literature on the institutional structures of church-state relations leads us to 
expect that hijab-wearing women would experience more favourable treatment when they 
wear religious symbols in public in the Netherlands and Germany where the state 
recognises religious group manifestations in public space, rather than in France, where 
religious groups are expected to separate their faith from participation in public 
institutions.  
 
Three different points of critique on ‘models’ or ‘regimes’ as explanations for country-
specific policies: 
Three insights from the criticism that has been applied to regime theories generally show 
why a more dynamic and even more issue-specific theoretical model is required in order to 
explain national differences in the politicisation and regulation of the hijab.  
First, these theories run the risk of using overly simplistic images of national 
regimes, failing to take into account internal complexities and variations in policy. 
Integration policies may differ for various categories of migrants or for different domains 
(state, market, welfare and culture), and they can also change over time. Simplistic 
typologies that do not take into account this internal complexity are inadequate for the 
explanation of country differences in policy responses (Entzinger, 2000; Freeman, 2006). 
In a similar vein, countries’ state-church regimes have been recognised as internally 
heterogeneous and fairly ambiguous (Bader, 2007b; Bowen, 2007b; Maussen, 2009). John 
Bowen (2007b: 1004) has argued that national models are historical products consisting of 
“multiple lines of reasoning and emotions” that may be articulated in political struggles, 
thereby shaping policy outcomes. He thus suggests that scholars take into account the 
historical cleavages underlying internally complex models by considering institutions, 
policies and historical traditions as ‘cultural resources’ upon which actors may draw for 
political purposes. Rather than using crude models, this literature pleads for historically 
sensitive analyses of the confrontation between the modern nation-state and religious 
groups, the outcomes of which have resulted in particular national civic and political 
cultures that shape the relationship between the state and the individual without necessarily 
representing stable, homogenous and coherent policy regimes (see also Sengers & Sunier, 
2010). Matthias Koenig (2007: 912) likewise encourages scholars to move “beyond the 
crude typologies of national ‘models’ by taking into account contradictory elements of 
institutional arrangements and their situation-specific interpretations.” 
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Second, models can also be seen as too deterministic and static, a point illustrated 
by their failure to predict the liberalisation of Germany’s citizenship policies, which now 
grant citizenship on grounds of the ius soli principle to children born of non-ethnic German 
parents. Roger Brubaker (1992:186) argued, for instance, that “France and Germany 
continue to define their citizenries in fundamentally different ways because they have been 
doing so for more than a century.” He wrongly concluded that “in Germany, there is no 
chance that the French system of jus soli will be adopted; the automatic transformation of 
immigrants into citizens remains unthinkable in Germany”. Dutch integration policies have 
also seen a shift away from multiculturalism, which is similarly hard to square with static 
categories of typological regimes. Related to this second point of critique is that national 
migration integration and state-church models are themselves subject to change, because of 
the increasing multi-level governance of citizenship and religion, and related processes 
such as (economic) globalisation and post-war immigration.18 In other words, when 
analysing countries’ institutional frameworks of citizenship and state-church relations, we 
must not only take into account internal heterogeneity but also shifts over time, as well as 
the influence of transnational opportunity structures on national policy-making.  
Third, current models of citizenship and migrant integration have been criticised 
from a very different angle. Gender scholars have pointed out that models have mostly 
remained gender-blind (Lister et al., 2007; Munday, 2009; Siim & Squires, 2008). Various 
scholars have illustrated how the timing and nature of the acquisition of (civic, social-
economic and political) citizenship rights varies between male and female migrants, due to 
the gendered nature of citizenship and the gendered character of migration processes 
themselves. Varied and changing gender roles for men and women, institutionalised in 
political and social institutions and cultural practices, have shaped the ways in which 
migrants can become citizens, reunite with their spouses, pass their nationality on to their 
children, access the labour market, claim social rights to welfare and healthcare, or seek 
asylum as they flee gender-specific persecution. While countries like Germany are 
generally seen as ideal-typical examples of a restrictive, ethnocultural citizenship regime, 
gender scholars have pointed out how citizenship laws were more lenient for foreign 
female spouses marrying native German men than for foreign male migrants, even as these 
women were simultaneously excluded from the labour market (Sainsbury, 2006). 
Similarly, until 1964 Dutch women who married foreign men automatically lost citizenship 
rights, while foreign women marrying Dutch men automatically obtained Dutch citizenship 
(Bonjour, 2009; Hart, 2003; van Walsum, 2008). This illustrates that culturally informed 
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 In this light, various scholars have questioned the relevance of the nation-state as the appropriate 
unit of analysis. Post-national scholars have argued, for instance, that international human rights 
regimes challenge the sovereignty of the nation state in defining the rights and duties of migrants 
(Soysal 1994, 2000; Sassen 1996; 2003). Migrants would subsequently increasingly benefit from 
anti-discrimination intervention by transnational and supranational institutions, such as the Council 
of Europe and its European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), or the European Union and its 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). Soysal (1994: 157) notes that this international human-rights 
regime functions as an important alternative opportunity structure for migrants to claim rights, even 
though she is aware that the actual exercise of universal rights is still tied to the nation-state where 
immigrants must claim their rights. Other scholars like Christian Joppke (2007) have rejected the 
idea that nation-states have lost sovereignty due to external, international developments and argue 
that the challenge comes from within, when domestic actors, particularly courts, would push the 
state to adhere to international human rights, leading to processes of convergence in immigrant 
integration policies. 
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family and gender roles, in which men are seen as the head of the household and women as 
followers of their husbands, have shaped - and continue to shape - citizenship and 
immigrant integration policies.  
Since the hijab is worn by and prescribed only for women, we may expect that 
politicians deliberating and regulating this particular issue will be influenced by national 
ideologies, policy legacies and institutions regulating gender relations. Kathrin Zippel 
(2006: 6), for instance, speaks of country-specific gender ideologies - notions of sexuality 
and gender equality based on ‘gender difference’ or ‘gender sameness’ - as potential 
factors shaping the understandings of public issues and emerging policies. Other scholars 
working in comparative gender studies have drawn on the neo-institutionalist tradition by 
developing so-called ‘gender regimes’ that reflect and explain differences in the 
perceptions of women and men’s appropriate roles in society and related ‘public’ and 
‘private’ spheres. Building upon Esping-Andersen’s classification of ‘welfare regimes’ 
(1990), traditional accounts of gender regimes have compared the extent to which 
countries’ family, tax and labour-market policies affect the typical treatment of women as 
housewives and men as breadwinners. A classical distinction is made between the 
‘breadwinner’, ‘modified/weak male breadwinner’, and ‘dual-earner’ regimes (Lewis, 
1992; Hobson, 2000; Jenson, 1997; Sainsbury, 1999; Knijn & Kremer, 1997; Pascall & 
Lewis, 2004). France, the Netherlands and Germany are often represented as moderate 
male-breadwinner models, with social and welfare policies granting benefits for women 
primarily in their roles as wives and mothers, though France has a longer record of 
advancing women’s full-time work than the other two countries.  
Yet the critique that applies to migrant integration and state-church models also 
applies to gender models. Not only do such static gender regimes fail to account for 
changes in policies over time, they also downplay the diversity within countries’ gender 
policies and governing strategies. Due to the narrow focus on women’s roles as caregivers, 
most gender regime typologies fail to explain countries’ different (non-)responses to other 
claims of gender justice, such as those of body politics (Outshoorn, 2001), political 
representation (Jenson & Valiente, 2003), gender-based violence (Weldon, 2002), or 
sexual harassment (Zippel, 2006). Comparative gender research shows that path-dependent 
effects seem to correspond by policy sector more than by country, because states’ gender-
equality policies and strategies likewise differ within the same country from one field to 
another and change over time (McBride & Mazur, 2010: 259). Additionally, states’ 
policies and governing strategies may differ from one group of women to another, by race 
or ethnicity, class, religion or sexuality (Brush, 2000). More complex typologies of gender 
regimes have therefore focused on different levels of policies, practices and institutions, 
accounting for their different conceptions of gender and gender relations, as well as the 
best strategy for advancing the status of women (Walby, 2004; 2007).19 Such complex 
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 Sylvia Walby (2004; 2007) has developed a more complex typology of gender regime, studying 
the constitution of gender relations at various societal levels and in different sectors and domains. 
Her typology not only takes into account the regulation of the market and household, but also civil 
society (social movements, knowledge-institutions, media) and polity (states). She differentiates 
between domestic and public forms of gender regimes (and three trajectories of transition from a 
domestic to a public form: welfare-state led, regulatory-policy led and market-led), which may lead 
to different degrees of gender equality and different conceptualisations of ‘men’ and ‘women’, 
depending on the domain of analysis (politics, market, civil society, or family). 
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gender regimes do not allow for straight-forward hypotheses concerning our expectations 
of countries’ policy patterns on the hijab.   
In short, the literature suggests that policymaking around the hijab will be 
influenced by country-specific institutions of state-church, citizenship and integration, and 
gender, but that there is still much leeway for actors to change and depart from historical 
institutional patterns by referring to different, and possibly contradictory policy legacies 
when mobilising for policy alternatives. In fact, by emphasizing the path-dependent nature 
of top-down institutional structures, in which deep-seated ideas have paramount power, the 
regime literature tends to downplay the important role of actors’ agency in policy 
formation processes and the processes and mechanisms through which institutions are 
transformed into actual policy. Some scholars have shown how the ‘French republican’ or 
the ‘Dutch multiculturalist model’, more than describing social reality, is used by political 
actors as stereotypical and normative models to legitimise or discredit certain policies. 
Using simplistic models that insufficiently historicise the development, changes and 
contradiction of countries’ institutions therefore runs the risk of constructing highly 
idealised normative models that hinder empirical observation and obstruct policy learning 
across national borders (Bertossi, 2009; Duyvendak & Scholten, 2009; Entzinger, 2000; 
Favell, 1998; 2003). Moreover, policy discourses about citizenship, the nation, and 
multiculturalism are often highly gendered, because women often function as symbolic 
‘border guards’ and protectors of an imagined national, ethnic or religious community. 
Overlooking the gendered nature of institutions and cultures may fundamentally downplay 
their influence on present-day policy debates on immigrant integration where women find 
themselves caught in a ‘clash of civilizations’ rhetoric (Andreassen & Lettinga, 2011; 
Kofman, 2005; Longman, 2003; Lutz, 1996; Lutz, Phoenix & Yuval-Davis eds., 1995; 
Phillips, 2007; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Yuval Davis et al., 2005).  
In order to understand the causal effect of institutions, Veit Bader (2007b: 879) 
therefore concludes with the suggestion that, even though we cannot do away with 
models20, social scientists need to pay more attention to the actors involved in policy-
formation processes and the ways in which they give competing meanings to institutional 
patterns. He argues “the task of social science is to describe and explain these predominant 
and oppositional normative institutional and policy models, their actual impact on policies, 
and their effect. This includes the analysis of the power relations between the different 
(coalitions of) actors constructing and using such models, or ‘discursive frames’- 
politicians, judges, philosophers, and social scientists as public intellectuals, journalists 
etc.- and their impact on public discourse.[…] Indeed, established or institutionalised 
patterns, like principles and rights (of religious freedoms, for example) have been and have 
to be continuously re-interpreted and re-framed, and framing depends on competing 
discourses of incorporation, on discourse coalitions and power relations, and on crucial 
events” (2007: 879). 
  
                                                           
20
 Veit Bader (2007b: 879) argues against the static nature of the current citizenship and state-
church model, but also notes that we cannot do away with them, because “historical and 
comparative research is in need of explicitly constructed typologies” to “help to reduce this 
(unstructured) complexity (of the relationships, dimensions and indicators) in a controlled and 
reflexive way”.  
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2.3 A political-process approach to explain policy responses to the hijab 
Building further upon this suggestion to study the impact of previously implemented laws 
and policies on today’s policy outcomes by analysing how actors actually use institutions 
(referring to both public policies and political institutions: Hall & Taylor, 1996), this study 
adopts a political-process approach to explain policy responses to the hijab in France, the 
Netherlands and Germany.  
The political-process approach considers policy responses as the outcome of a 
dynamic process of policy formation, unfolding over time and involving interactions 
between several actors in competition with each other over the course of action. In order to 
capture the political context in which such political struggles and dynamics occur, social 
movement scholars have developed the concept of ‘Political Opportunity Structure’ (POS), 
referring to the ‘consistent – but not necessarily permanent – dimensions of the political 
environment that produce incentive for collective action by affecting people’s expectations 
for success or failure’ (Tarrow, 1998: 77). The concept has mainly been used to explain 
country differences in the frequency, timing and nature of social movement mobilisation, 
and the success these movements have in influencing policies. The basic idea is that the 
capacity of ‘outsiders’ or ‘challengers’ to the state to mobilise and influence policy 
outcomes is both enabled and constrained by their structural institutional and political 
context, the POS.  
Descriptions of the POS differ between scholars. Kriesi et al. (1995) discern four 
general aspects of the political context that shape political contention, and which 
particularly affect social movement strategies, levels of mobilisation, and outcomes of 
mobilisation processes. These include:  
• national cleavage structures within a polity (also called conflict structures, 
Koopmans, 1995: 14). These are historical fault lines along which socio-political 
conflicts have evolved, and may continue to evolve if cleavages are politicised. 
Kriesi et al. derive the term ‘cleavages’ from Stein Rokkan. He characterized 
cleavages as particularly strong and long-standing conflicts that have emerged out 
of state-formation and nation-building processes and the industrial revolution. 
These conflicts directly shaped today’s party systems through their transformation 
into political parties that continue to mobilise to defend interests and identities 
related to the conflict, subsequently structuring present-day politics (Lipset & 
Rokkan, 1967; Flora, Kuhnle & Urwin, 1999). The three traditional cleavages of 
Rokkan that Kriesi et al. examine in their conceptualisation of the POS are conflicts 
between centre and periphery, state and church, and capital and labour.  
• formal institutional structures. These are the formal, institutional aspects of the 
state that determine its capacity to implement policies, and its openness to outsiders 
to influence key decision-makers. Kriesi et al. (1995) discern several general 
formal institutional characteristics of the political system, such as the degree of 
centralism or federalism of a state, its electoral system, and the balance of power 
between the judiciary, government and legislative arms of the state. Joyce 
Outshoorn (2000) also includes here the formal rules, laws and constitution of a 
state.  
• informal procedures and prevailing strategies of elites. Kriesi et al. (1995) 
differentiate between more exclusive and more inclusive strategies that 
governments may employ towards non-governmental actors mobilising for change. 
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• shifting configurations of power between and within parties. This last dimension 
refers to fluctuating aspects of the political context, such as electoral shifts in ruling 
alignments, intra-elite divisions, and the availability of influential allies who can 
help outsiders push for their desired reforms. 
Kriesi et al.’s four dimensions of the POS are a set of independent variables that allow for 
an analysis of the particular political and institutional environment that shapes the dynamic 
political struggles between actors as well as the policy output of these political conflicts. In 
addition to institutional characteristics, governing strategies and historical cleavages, it also 
allows for an analysis of the influence of (shifting) power constellations on actors’ 
opportunities to push for certain policies. Although the POS concept has mainly been used 
to explain the mobilisation of protest ‘outside’ state institutions and the success of such 
social movements to push for policy reform, I will use it to explain the dynamic political 
conflict over the hijab between different actors ‘inside’ the state (see also Hafner-Burton & 
Pollack, 2000; Roggeband & Verloo, 2006).  
In particular, I will use it to explain the timing and contentiousness of the 
politicisation of the hijab in the national (and Germany also federal) parliaments, as well as 
the nature of the resulting policies. Even though I recognise that state actors may be 
influenced by the mobilisation of ‘outsiders’ (and therefore I will pay some attention to the 
role of non-governmental actors in policy debates on the hijab), the focus of this study lies 
in explaining the politicisation of the hijab by ‘insiders’ within French, German and Dutch 
state institutions, namely politicians.21 In France and the Netherlands, which are centrally 
organised states, I focus on the policy responses taken by the national government and the 
debates in parliaments preceding the implementation of these responses. In Germany, 
which is a decentralised polity, I focus on the action taken by governments at the Länder 
level in response to policy debates in their respective legislatures, interacting with the 
actions of courts and other state institutions. Since the Länder have autonomy over 
educational and cultural policies, they decide the rules governing the hijab in public 
institutions, subject to nationally binding constitutional rights. 
 
While I draw heavily on the framework of Kriesi et al. (1995) I have had to amend it for 
purposes of this study for two primary reasons. The first is that the four elements of their 
POS are too general to explain the specific political dynamics on the issue of the hijab. 
General institutional characteristics of the political system may explain, for example, why 
different allocations of power gave one government more capacity to implement headscarf 
policies than another. However, they do not explain why the hijab is more likely to become 
controversial in one country than another in the first instance, or why certain hijab policies 
are more widely accepted in one country than another.  
We therefore need a more refined theoretical model that includes the specific 
cleavages, rules, laws and governing strategies that matter for the mobilisation around the 
issue of the hijab. The literature discussed above suggests that the three countries’ 
                                                           
21
 My use of the words ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ has been placed between brackets, because the 
differentiation between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ of the state can be challenged if one considers the 
state as a highly diversified actor that likewise consists of insiders/elites who dominate political 
discourses and outsiders/challengers/opponents thereoff. Moreover, actors within the state may 
even be part of ‘outside’ movements, such as femocrats working within the state (single 
bureaucrats and decision-makers who promote feminist ideas, actors, and demands) who are part of 
the larger women’s movement (see also: Chappel, 2006). 
  
26 
internally heterogeneous and changing state-church regimes, migrant incorporation 
regimes and gender regimes can be considered ‘issue-specific’ political opportunity 
structures that circumscribe actors’ chances to politicise issues like the hijab and shape 
their strategies. In this light, I will conceptualise the second and third elements of Kriesi’s 
POS as the institutions and strategies that states have developed over time to govern 
religious, ethno cultural and gender differences, as well as their underlying historical 
cleavages. In other words, I will not make the analytical distinction between the ‘formal’ 
institutional characteristics and the ‘informal’ elite strategies that Kriesi et al. (1995) 
discern in their conceptualisation of the political opportunity structure. Not only is it 
prohibitively difficult to disentangle formal laws from informal governing strategies, but 
such an analytical distinction also wrongly suggests that laws and policies can be separated 
from informal logics, norms and values.22 
A second, related, reason why the theoretical model of Kriesi et al. needs amending 
is that they downplay an important aspect of policy-formation processes: the role of ideas 
and frames. Policy formation is not only a political struggle between interest-seeking 
actors mobilizing in response to their (changing) political and institutional environment. It 
is also a discursive struggle between actors who construct and compete over the problem 
for which particular policies must be designed. Before determining what their interests and 
goals are, actors must first agree upon the issue at stake. And before authorities can create 
policy responses, actors must first convert social reality into a political problem. 
‘Framing’ describes this process of constructing, adapting and negotiating frames 
(Triandafyllidou & Fotiou, 1998), a term that is familiar to both public policy analysts and 
social movement scholars (Béland, 2009). Since my research compares parliamentary 
debates on the hijab that primarily involve policy makers, I will stick to the definition of 
Rein and Schön (2003: 146). They identify a policy frame as ‘a way of selecting, 
organising, interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for 
                                                           
22
 For this reason, I also do not use the heuristic concept of ‘discursive opportunity structure’ 
(DOS). This concept was developed by Koopmans and Statham (1999), who studied and compared 
public claims made in the mass media regarding immigrant integration in six European countries, 
in an attempt to capture the cultural meanings and values underlying states’ policies regarding 
citizenship and immigrant integration. It was further developed by Ferree et al. (2002) who studied 
the framing of abortion in printed media in the United States and Germany. The concept refers to 
the meaning-making practices and institutionalised discourses that reflect dominant values, belief 
systems, images of a society (Ferree et al., 2002; Ferree, 2003; Koopmans & Olzak, 2004; 
Koopmans & Statham, 1999). Discursive opportunities are often juxtaposed with institutional 
opportunities, such as the (electoral or party) state system, laws and regulations. I will not make an 
analytical distinction between institutional and discursive opportunity structures. First, this is 
because the separation between, on the one hand, institutions or policies, and, on the other hand, 
discourses, (cultural) norms and values, is not easily drawn. The analytical distinction can therefore 
appear rather artificial and may result in a weak operationalisation of DOS. Second, I consider the 
concept problematic because it may lead to tautological explanations. The dependent variable that I 
seek to explain consists of (competing) policy frames and policy responses on the hijab, rather than 
the (discursive) strategies used by social movements to influence policy outcomes. The framing of 
the hijab as a political problem by policy elites can be seen as a (more volatile and short-lived) 
component of the discursive opportunity structure, with the result that policy frames will serve as 
both a dependent and an independent variable. For this reason, I stick to the more general concept 
of Political Opportunity Structure, operationalised here as policies and governing strategies, 
including underlying ideas and values, as well as cleavage structures and power constellations. 
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knowing, analysing persuading, and acting.’23 As cognitive structures, policy frames help 
actors to define the problem to be solved, and identify the solution. They influence what 
type of information is gathered by policy makers and how to weigh each piece of 
information. As normative structures, policy frames satisfy policy makers that their 
reforms serve the underlying values of the polity they envisage. They help actors define 
what is just and what is wrong, and they may allot authority to certain actors speaking for a 
cause (Bleich, 2003, 26-29). In addition, Deborah Stone (1989: 295) identifies four 
important political functions that frames may play for political actors: 1) to challenge or 
protect social order, 2) to identify causal agents responsible for the problem, 3) to 
legitimate and empower problem “fixers”, 4) to create new political alliances. Policy 
frames, whether used strategically and deliberately or not, thus help allocate authority to 
certain actors while discrediting others.  
Consequently, a political process is best conceived as a framing contest about the 
correct interpretation of the issue at stake. This contest takes place in the interaction 
between several actors, within and outside the state, all pushing for their version of reality 
to be translated into policy and governing practice. Policies can therefore also be 
understood as the outcomes of discursive politics, where some actors, having successfully 
allied around a particular frame, can accordingly formulate policy proposals and act upon 
social reality. In this way, consolidated policy frames give direction to policy making and 
help explain policy outcomes (Bacchi, 2005; Hajer, 1995). The political opportunity 
framework developed by Kriesi et al. (1995) will therefore be complemented with an 
ideational perspective that scrutinizes the influence of frames on policy outcomes. 
 
How are institutions of state-church relations, immigrant integration and gender equality 
related to the emergence and development of policy frames around the hijab? The regime 
literature suggests that institutions, once established, structure and constrain political action 
and policy decisions, by exerting “path-dependent effects” on policy-making procedures 
(Pierson, 2000; Mahoney, 2000; van Waarden, 1995). Policy decisions made by earlier 
generations create institutions that reinforce themselves and shape policies and ideas for 
future generations, because institutionalised policy fields have generated a practice of 
thinking about and acting upon certain social phenomena without due consideration. In the 
words of James March and Johan Olsen (1989: 160), institutions “guide human 
interactions via a ‘logic of appropriateness’, meaning that they encourage human beings 
and organisations to associate new situations to situations for which rules already exist and 
to do what is ‘appropriate’.” Institutional logics subsequently define ‘what is discussable, 
what is realistic, what is natural, without the recognition of the arbitrary foundations on 
which these judgments are based’ (Laws & Rein, 2003: 179). Although these logics are not 
invincible, they are difficult to change because institutions generate actors ‘who embody 
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 There are many competing definitions and interpretations of the concept of frame, changing 
according to the discipline. In this study, I will focus on policy frames rather than ‘media frames’ 
and ‘collective action frames’. Originally, the term frame stems from social psychology, where it 
was used to denote the ‘schemata of interpretation’ through which individuals perceived the world’. 
As Erving Goffman wrote, a frame involves a cognitive framework, ‘that governs the subjective 
meaning we assign to social events’. Goffman argued that framing is the response to the problems 
encountered in everyday life by everyday citizens seeking to order, perceive and make sense of the 
world they inhabit: Goffman, E. (1974). Frame Analysis: An essay on the organization of 
experience. Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 10, 11, 21. 
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and reflect existing norms and beliefs’ and who will resist change (Chappell, 2006: 225). 
Because institutions guide actors’ perceptions of new situations by filtering out those 
aspects that risk destabilising the institutional framework and existing power relations, they 
tend to favour the policy frames that are in line with those that are anchored in laws and 
policies (Schmidt, 2008).  
But actors do not just passively reproduce these frames. They may also decide to 
exploit institutions for their own ends, framing laws and norms in ways that fit their aims, 
but which may stretch prevailing institutional logics (Chappell, 2000). In fact, when 
mobilising for change, actors must refer to traditional representations of social reality in 
order to make their frames resonate (Beland, 2009). In doing so, however, actors can create 
new opportunities through which to pursue their aims or circumvent legal constraints. 
Social movement scholars like Benford and Snow, for instance, have found that actors 
strategically frame a problem so that the solutions they propose prevail because they 
resonate with the wider culture and values of the actors they influence. In other words, 
actors can try to make their frames ‘fit’ the institutions within which elites operate and 
others they are trying to influence (Snow & Benford, 1992: 137).24 Furthermore, in 
addition to reframing institutional patterns in ways that fit their aims, people may also 
choose for frames that do not resonate with existing institutional logics because they do not 
want to reproduce them (Ferree, 2003). In the words of Vivien Schmidt (2008: 316), “the 
deliberative nature of discourse allows them to conceive of and talk about institutions as 
objects at a distance, and to dissociate themselves from them even as they continue to use 
them”. 
In short, pre-existing laws or policies institutionalise certain ways of thinking and 
shape actors’ understandings of issues, but they can also be used strategically as normative 
and ideological resources to push for policy reforms that actually help construct these very 
same institutions. This requires a more dynamic theoretical model that also takes into 
consideration the actual uses, negotiations and contestations of ‘models’ by political actors, 
and the feedback effects of such discursive struggles on institutional patterns and 
governing strategies of state-church relations, immigrant integration, and gender equality. 
These adjustments of the political opportunity model of Kriesi et al. (taking into account 
issue-specific aspects of the POS, combining the formal and informal aspects of the POS, 
and incorporating the role of frames on policy outcomes and their feed-back effects) lead 
to the theoretical model displayed in Figure 1, which I will use as a road map for further 
analysis. 
 
                                                           
24 Snow & Benford (1992: 137) have suggested several frame alignment processes through which 
(policy) actors may try to link their understandings of the issue to greater concerns in order to 
convince others: 1) frame amplification: invigorating values or beliefs central to a society’s cultural 
repertoire (or cleavage structure). Even when a value is taken for granted, actors may revive it by 
idealising and elevating it as essential and timeless; 2) frame extension: adding certain issues or 
dimensions to a frame that hitherto were of no relevance to it; 3) frame bridging: the linking of one 
frame to another, ideologically congruent but unconnected frame; and 4) frame transformation: 
changing old meanings and understandings of a frame. Because the primary aim of this research 
was to explain cross-national differences, and only secondary to explain policy changes within 
countries, I have not analyzed and compared actors’ framing strategies in a systematic way, and 
will therefore not further elaborate upon these framing strategies here. 
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Figure 1 Theoretical Model: POS shaping policy responses to the hijab 
 
 
Based on this model, I expect the three general and issue-specific elements of the political 
opportunity structures (cleavages, public policies and political institutions, and party 
constellations) to influence the framing contest in Parliament (Arrow 1) and subsequent 
policy responses (Arrow 2), with frames forming an intervening variable (Arrow 3). 
Parliamentary debates themselves are expected to reflect the framing contests that take 
place in other forums that make up the public sphere, such as the mass media, courts, 
scientific congresses, street demonstrations, and meetings of organisations (Ferree et al., 
2002: 10). Although I expect an influence of these domains on the parliamentary debate on 
the hijab, they have not been included in the model (but see: Kleinnijenhuis, 2003; 
Roggeband & Vliegenthart, 2007 for an analysis of the mutual influence between 
parliamentary and media debates).25 The model does account for the fact that framing may 
be influenced by non-structural elements of actors’ environments, most notably political 
and historical events, which may open a window of opportunity for other actors to push for 
certain policy frames. Situational factors that are expected to influence framing processes 
on the hijab include the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, national political events, 
and broader trends and conjunctures like immigration processes or shifts in public opinion 
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 The model also leaves out the transnational influence that may be expected to come from 
international institutions, laws and jurisprudence. I will come back to the possible ways in which 
transnational opportunity structures like the EU influence national policy debates in the concluding 
chapter 
Policy response to hijab 
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- National cleavage structure, including fault lines around religion, nationality, 
gender  
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5 
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(Maussen, 2009: 38). I will now elaborate upon the ways in which the three elements of the 
political opportunity structure are expected to influence actual policy responses to the 
hijab, by shaping the framing of the parliamentary debate.  
 
1) National cleavages  
We may expect that the hijab issue will capture much public and political attention once 
framed in terms of historical cleavage structures, because political parties and others will 
mobilise for the goals that relate to their particular cleavage. Cleavages are important in 
structuring political debates when they are still salient in a country and when they are still 
closed. ‘Salient’ means that the conflict is still important relative to other divides, while 
‘closed’ means that the collective identities of parties, social movements and interest 
groups that belong to one side of the cleavage are fairly stable (Bornschier, 2010: 66). To 
the extent that traditional cleavages are still salient and fragment the population into 
mutually conscious adversial groups, there is little space for actors to frame the issue in 
terms other than these of the cleavage structure, making the issue contentious. If cleavages 
have been pacified and have opened up, it is less likely that traditional fault lines will break 
open, because political actors will find it less necessary to speak out on issues that have 
already been settled (Kriesi et al., 1995; Kriesi, 2007).  
In addition to religious cleavages, two other cleavages are particularly relevant to 
the issue of the hijab. Historical cleavages over national identity shape the debate because 
the hijab is mostly worn by (descendants) of immigrants, and thus concerns issues of 
integrating ethnic migrant minorities into the national community. The ways in which 
historical conflicts over national identity have been dealt with, and the extent to which 
such cleavages are still salient and open, are expected to shape present-day controversies 
over the hijab. Furthermore, we may expect historical cleavages about gender relations and 
sexuality - issues intrinsically related to contested constructions of the nation and to 
conflicts about the place of religion in society - to shape political contention over the hijab. 
It may be argued that it is difficult to speak about a cleavage ‘structure’ in regard to sex 
and gender, because political parties have not organised on grounds of clear-cut gender 
identities to attract votes, which would be expected under the Rokkan definition of a 
cleavage structure. Nonetheless, attitudes towards gender – and sexuality - do shape public 
policy (Lane & Ersson, 2006), and political parties and interest groups differ in this regard, 
with some defending the equal rights of women as individual citizens and others seeing 
women mainly as mothers. In this light, I will also consider historical conflicts and 
mobilisation around gender and sexuality as a cleavage structure. In short, national 
cleavage structures over religion, nationality and gender are expected to shape attention 
for, and contentiousness towards, the hijab issue in the national parliaments (arrow 1).  
 
2) General institutional structures of the state and issue-specific institutions regulating 
state-church relations, immigrant integration and gender 
Formal state characteristics discerned by Kriesi et al. are expected to structure policy-
formation processes in several ways. First, whether a country is a centralised or federal 
polity determines which level of the state has authority over regulations on the hijab, hence 
at which level polic debates and decisions take place. Second, differences in the nature and 
strength of the judicial arm of the state relative to the legislative and executive branches 
shape the capacity of the government to act upon policy frames; policy decisions may be 
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halted or overruled by the judiciary if courts have that power and find the decisions in 
conflict with existing law (Ferree et al., 2002: 15-16). Third, multiparty systems constrain 
government action more than bipolar party systems, due to the need to forge consensus 
between coalition partners. The result is that even if politicians win the battle of words 
within the parliament, intra-cabinet conflicts or court-decisions may impede the 
implementation of policy frames. General features of the political system are therefore 
expected to influence parliamentary debates (Arrow 1) but may also directly impact policy 
responses, when courts have the power to block policy reforms that resulted from the 
framing contest in parliament (Arrow 2 in Figure 1).  
In addition to general state characteristics, issue-specific laws, policies and 
governing strategies (‘regimes’) regulating state-church relations, migrant incorporation 
and gender equality can be expected to shape the framing of policy debates on the hijab. 
First, they structurally favour certain policy alternatives that ‘fit’ with prevailing 
institutional logics (Arrow 1 in Figure 1). If certain policy proposals conflict with 
institutionalised principles, they may not be seen as legitimate. Myra Marx Ferree (2003: 
305) therefore argues that ‘the use of non-resonant frames is by definition radical’. 
Conversely, frames that link with institutionalized ways of thinking will find much cultural 
resonance, expedient for the purpose of influencing policy yet simultaneously discrediting 
marginalized interests and needs that do not benefit from maintaining existing policy 
debates, laws and institutional patterns. Just which frames are radical and which are 
resonant depends on the particular institutional context and may differ between countries. 
Second, institutional repertoires of state-church relations and policy paradigms of 
migrant incorporation and women’s emancipation are expected to shape policy debates on 
the hijab by enabling or constraining certain non-governmental actors’ access to policy 
decision-making arenas. Research on ‘comparative state feminism’ has, for instance, 
drawn attention to so-called ‘women’s policy machineries’ as important institutions that 
create access for women’s movements to influence policy debates and policy decisions 
regarding gender (McBride & Mazur, 1995; Mc Bride & Mazur, 2010; MacCammon et al, 
2001; Ferree, 2008; Outshoorn & Kantola, 2007). Such machineries refer to “any structure 
established by governments with its main purpose being the betterment of women’s social 
status” (Kantola & Outshoorn, 2007: 3). Other authors prefer the term ‘gender equality 
machineries’, because most of those agencies aim to promote gender equality rather than 
only women’s rights (Bleijenburg & Roggeband, 2007: 440). Gender machineries take 
different forms across countries, including an independent Ministry responsible for the 
portfolio of gender equality; administrative units within a larger Ministry; parliamentary, 
inter-ministerial or (semi-public) advisory committees and councils; or independent 
ombudsmen or equality commissions. Comparative state feminism studies have shown that 
gender machineries and femocrats (single bureaucrats and decision-makers who promote 
feminist ideas, actors, and demands)26 function as important mechanisms by which 
women’s movements can ‘gender policy debates in a feminist way’, which means making 
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 McBride & Mazur (2010: 4-5) define femocrats as bureaucrats and decision-makers who 
promote ideas, actors and demands based on gender consciousness, women’s solidarity and the 
cause of women. Other definitions also add feminist deputies to the category.  
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sure that ‘policy content formally acknowledges the gendered nature of the social problems 
and designs solutions that attempt to redress gender-based inequalities’ (Mazur: 2003).27  
In similar vein, comparative studies on immigrant integration point to other 
agencies that create venues for non-governmental actors, like migrant associations or anti-
discrimination organisations, to shape policy debates on this particular issue, such as 
offices charged with anti-discrimination or integration, consultation councils for immigrant 
ethnic minorities, or representative bodies for religious groups (Koopmans et al., 2005: 
65). In other words, by privileging certain actors and institutionally anchored frames, 
state’s institutions and governing strategies of gender equality, immigrant integration and 
state-church relations are expected to shape policy responses regarding the hijab. 
 
3) Shifting constellations of power and the availability of influential allies.  
Finally, we may expect that (changing) configurations of power will have a significant 
impact on the ways in which the issue of the hijab is understood and debated in parliament 
(Arrow 2). Arrow 3 in Figure 1 above indicates that the framing of the hijab in parliament 
is seen here as an intervening variable explaining policy responses. Erik Bleich (2003) has 
explained that, when frames are shared by a wide range of actors, they will have the most 
impact on policy outcomes. Moreover, if frames become taken for granted, this may close 
off potential challenges, which will strongly impact policy-making decisions, particularly 
if frames are formalised in law. But as Bleich (2003: 185) points out, even marginal frames 
can influence policy outcomes when those controlling the levers of power support that 
portrayal of the issue and the course of action suggested in the frame. Moreover, the entry 
of new, powerful political parties into parliament can challenge the framing strategies of 
established actors, necessitating either competition or alliance (Koopmans et al. 2005). 
The constellation of power also determines the opportunities for non-governmental 
actors to influence the policy deliberations on the hijab. The availability of allies in a given 
party system for such outsiders is related to the cleavage structure, because political parties 
will mobilise for their side of each cleavage when they feel that their vested interests are 
challenged.28 Fetzer & Soper (2005: 128) have, for instance, noted: ‘Whether out of 
principle or self-interest, Christians are more likely to fight for state accommodation of 
Muslims’ religious practices in Germany, where church and state work together on various 
issues, than in France, where the institutions are rigidly separated’. This suggests that the 
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 Amy Mazur’s definition was used in the Research Network on Gender Politics and the State 
(RNGS), a research network consisting of 38 scholars from 16 Western post-industrial countries. It 
compared the policy success of women’s movements across five different policy issues in thirteen 
post-industrial democracies over four decades in order to find out to what extent gender 
machineries were successful in advocating for women’s goals in policy-making. The Network 
concluded that many gender machineries did help ‘gender’ the terms of policy debates by providing 
access to women’s movements, and rarely promoted non-feminist ends. Particularly if the political 
environment was otherwise unfavourable, women’s movements benefited from feminist insiders 
working within the state to gender policy debates to back-up their claims (Mc Bride & Mazur, 
2010: 241-266): http://libarts.wsu.edu/polisci/rngs/ (Retrieved December 3, 2010). Other studies 
show that gender machineries only have significant impacts if they have political-institutional and 
material resources and are backed by ideological support from the government (Teghtsoonian & 
Chappell, 2008). 
28
 Kriesi et al. (2006) include the cleavage structure in the configuration of power. However, 
because the cleavage structure may be more stable than the shifting constellation of power, I treat 
these aspects separately. 
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presence of strong religious parties, in combination with cooperative state-church patterns, 
will facilitate Muslim women finding allies to claim the right to express their religion in 
public. The representation of strong anti-migrant parties, in contrast, may decrease the 
chances of finding allies for claims of multicultural recognition (Koopmans et al., 2005). In 
a similar vein, comparative gender policy studies have pointed out that parties that have 
historically allied with and included feminists, most often left-wing parties with a larger 
number of female legislators, are most likely to defend women’s equal right and 
opportunities (Mazur & McBride, 2006), albeit not in all policy fields (Weldon, 2002; 
Zippel, 2006).  
The (shifting) constellation of power between and within political parties is thus 
expected to impact the framing of the issue in parliament, which is related to the 
institutional features of the political system (in proportional electoral systems with low 
thresholds for small parties to enter the parliament, opportunities are greater for small 
parties to exert influence on parliamentary debates and policy responses than in winner-
take-all systems). In other words, we may expect that differences in the framing of the 
hijab both between and within countries can partly be explained by differences in 
countries’ configurations of power. Conversely, cross-national similarities or convergences 
in framing can often be tied to similarities in the power relations between and within 
parties in the three countries in question (Arrow 1 in Figure 1). 
 
Finally, arrows 4 and 5 of Figure 1 indicate the feedback effects of both framing and policy 
responses on the political opportunity structure. Through framing processes, political 
actors can seize, create and disregard the political opportunities their structural 
environment offers. Political actors may subsequently expand institutional logics, 
reinvigorate existing cleavages and eventually push for policy responses that change 
existing institutional patterns, if they manage to rally enough support for their policy 
frame. Even though institutional change is not easily achieved, actors may be able to make 
more incremental changes to existing laws, policies and governing strategies, with a shift 
in government providing new windows of opportunity. In other words, although the term 
political opportunity structure suggests a model that is static and unchangeable, both 
institutions and the political context overall may change due to the dynamic interplay 
among and between actors and their environment (cf. Koopmans et al., 2005; Roggeband, 
2002; Zippel, 2006). 
 
In order to test the extent to which such issue-specific opportunity structures have shaped 
the framing and regulating of the hijab, I must first determine the differences in how the 
issue has been framed and regulated. Next, I must analyse the extent to which those 
differences can be linked to the general and to the issue-specific opportunity structures of 
state-church relations, immigrant integration and state feminism. Therefore, the following 
research questions and sub-questions will guide this dissertation:  
1. What differences and similarities existed in the framing and policy responses to the 
hijab in France, the Netherlands, and Germany from 1985-2007?  
2. To what extent can country-specific opportunity structures explain differences in 
framing and policy responses to the hijab?  
In order to answer this second research question, I will seek to answer the following 
sub-questions: 
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• What are the differences in the general characteristics of the three countries’ 
political systems, and what can we expect on the basis of these differences 
for policy-formation processes? Chapter 3 compares these differences, and 
also scrutinizes available political opportunities at the European level by 
elaborating upon European Equality Directives and the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights on the hijab issue. 
• To what extent were religious cleavage structures still salient and open in 
France, the Netherlands and Germany before the first conflicts about the 
hijab emerged? Which laws and policies regulate state-church relations? 
What are the differences in the representation of religion in the party 
systems? What can we expect on the basis of these differences for the 
framing and regulating of the hijab? These questions will be answered in 
Chapter 4.  
• How salient and open were cleavages around nationality in the three 
countries when the first hijab debates occurred? Which differences and 
similarities exist between the laws and policies regulating migrants’ 
naturalisation and integration, including their informal institutional logics? 
How have anti- and pro- immigrant parties fared in the three countries? 
How can we expect these differences to affect the framing and regulating of 
the hijab? These questions will be answered in Chapter 5. 
• How did gender cleavages develop in the three countries, and to what extent 
are such conflicts still salient and open? What differences exist in the 
gender machineries, laws and policies, and governing strategies that 
regulate gender relations and women’s emancipation in the three countries? 
Which parties have allied with feminist movements? What can we expect 
for the framing and regulating of the hijab based these differences? These 
questions will be answered in Chapter 6. 
• To what extent did my research findings correspond to the expectations that 
were raised in Chapters 3 to 6? Which differences and similarities cannot be 
explained through the issue-specific opportunity structures? In Chapters 7-9 
I will analyse the policy debates and policy responses for each country over 
time.  
In the conclusion, Chapter 10, I will compare the differences and similarities in the 
saliency of the issue, in the policy frames that structured the debate, in the actors 
involved in politicising the issue, and in the policies that were developed for 
different types of hijabs and for different (public) realms, and will thus answer the 
first research question. I will also provide more detailed conclusions to the second 
research question.  
 
2.4 Design of the study 
In order to scrutinise the impact of existing institutions and policy paradigms on policy-
formation and policy-making processes on the hijab, I have chosen a comparative method 
(Lijphart, 1971) that is case-oriented (Ragin, 1989). The cases have been selected on 
grounds of a ‘most similar’ approach, meaning that the three cases have many 
characteristics in common, but differ on some of the explananda (Przeworski & Teune, 
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1970; Skocpol, 1979). As explained in the introduction, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands are all members of the European Union, are all social-welfare states, and all 
have a substantial number of Muslims among their citizenries. In the literature on 
citizenship and integration models, however, these three countries are often represented as 
paradigmatic examples of distinctive citizenship models (ethnic, civic-assimilationist and 
multicultural); also the state-church literature emphasises France and Germany as ideal-
typical examples of different state-church regimes with French laïcité being contrasted to 
German church-state cooperation, while the Netherlands is often represented as an 
intermediary case between strict secularism and corporatism.  
Yet, the hijab is not only worn by Muslims - a religious minority to have arrived in 
Europe through migration - but also a gender-specific dress and religious prescription. 
Because comparative gender research suggests that countries’ gender machineries and 
policies have path-dependent effects on certain policy fields of gender equality, I also 
included this literature to discern gender gender cleavages, institutions, and underlying 
logics and ideas of masculinity and femininity or equality. My case selection has therefore 
been theoretically guided in order to discern and specify the ‘issue-specific’ elements of 
institutional regimes that are most relevant for studying policy-formation processes on the 
hijab, which are analysed in a context-specific, detailed and historically sensitive way in 
Chapters 3 to 6 (Bader, 2007b: 876). 
The focus of my analysis lies on the national level. Nonetheless, in the federal 
system of Germany I will also take the regional level into account, because policy 
decisions on the hijab have been decentralised to the authorities of the Länder, at least in 
the realm of education and the public service. I analyse the policy-formation process in 
four (of Germany’s sixteen) federal states, where debates resulted in different policies: 
Baden-Württemberg, where headscarves are banned for teachers but Christian and Jewish 
symbolism is tolerated; Berlin, where all religious and political symbolism are forbidden 
for both teachers and other public officers; and Schleswig-Holstein and Rhineland-
Palatinate, two states that continue to allow teachers to wear signs and dress that may 
express their personal religious affiliations. In order to understand these different policy 
responses within the same polity, I have analysed regional differences in the constellation 
of power and tried to pay attention to differences in the cleavage structure and institutional 
patterns at the Länder level.    
 
2.5 Data 
In order to analyse the issue-specific opportunity structures, I have made use of a wide 
range of secondary literature on countries’ political systems, state-church patterns, 
citizenship and immigrant integration policies, as well as gender equality policies. Because 
the comparative literature on countries’ different gender equality policies and governing 
strategies is still an incipient research field, I have also sometimes made use of primary 
sources, like governments’ policy reports, when scrutinising the specific institutions that 
countries have developed to foster (migrant) women’s equality.  
In order to trace the different stages of the policy process on the hijab, I have used 
primary parliamentary sources. Parliament is the central arena where legislators can put an 
issue on the agenda and formulate and deliberate policies. Using parliamentary sources 
will allow me to focus on the different ways in which national politicians understood and 
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debated the issue, which are directly related to non-discursive social practices like 
regulations, policies and laws. Moreover, if there is one arena where institutions and laws 
may have structured framing then it is the Parliament. Politicians are directly socialised in 
different policy legacies, and must relate to them when deliberating an issue and 
formulating policies.   
The data set consists of parliamentary debates (in the Lower House) on the issue, 
parliamentary questions, policy proposals or motions of deputies, parties or Ministers, 
subsequent minutes of meetings between parliamentary commissions and Ministers or of 
meetings with non-governmental actors, and policy declarations of Ministers. When 
legislative proposals were sent to the Senate, as in France, I also collected such 
parliamentary debates (in Germany, all Länder governments are unicameral. The issue was 
hardly addressed at the national level where a kind of Senate does exist, the ‘Bundesrat’; in 
the Netherlands, the First Chamber has so far not been involved in the legislative process). 
All documents were found in the parliamentary databases or archives of each country by 
means of selected keywords. Because the search engines of each database (or the indexes 
of hardcopy parliamentary sources) worked differently, I used a wide range of keywords to 
find all relevant policy documents.29 Due to Germany’s federal system, documents were 
also retrieved from the parliamentary databases of the four federal states of Baden-
Württemberg, Berlin, Schleswig-Holstein and Rhineland-Palatinate.30 The number of 
documents found differed per country and will be mentioned in the empirical chapters. In 
total, 192 law proposals, motions, parliamentary discussions, questions and policy reports 
were found and analysed, which were complemented by other policy documents such as 
research reports and advices of extra-parliamentary committees.  
The time period of my research runs from 1985 until 2007. In 1985, the issue of the 
hijab emerged for the first time on the political agenda in the Netherlands. In France, 
policy debates started in 1989 and have continued to be salient until today. In Germany 
debates only started in the late 1990s. My period of data collection ended in 2007, but 
since policy debates on the hijab have continued beyond 2007, I have collected and 
analysed additional data on later policy discussions in a less systematic manner, in order to 
follow current developments and policy responses.31 
                                                           
29
 The French keywords on the headscarf debate were: ‘foulard’, ‘tchador’, ‘hidjeb’, ‘voile 
islamique’, ‘voile intégral’; the Dutch keywords were ‘hoofddoek’, ‘niqab’, ‘boerka’, ‘burka’, 
‘burqa’, ‘gezichtsbedekkende kleding’, ‘chador’, ‘sluier’; the German keywords were ‘burka’, 
‘kopftuch’, ‘schleier’, ‘tschador’, and ‘niqab’. Depending on the search engine or archive used, I 
sometimes added additional keywords, such as ‘neutrality’, ‘school law’, or ‘Islam’. The search 
was continued until it yielded no new documents.  
30
 Databases that were used to find parliamentary sources were: Netherlands: 
www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl (for documents before January 1, 1995) and www.parlando.sdu.nl 
(documents after January 1, 1995); France: http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr (documents after  
1993). Documents before 1993 were gathered manually in the archives of the Parliament in Paris. 
Documents in the French Senate were found in http://www.senat.fr/recherche/index.html; 
Germany: http://dip.bundestag.de (Germany). The Länder Parliaments have their own online 
databases.  In Germany, I asked for additional documents that were not accessible online. 
31
 The parliamentary documents on the Netherlands were collected in the first period of research 
(2006). Those for France were collected during a research period at the Centre of Cultures and 
Urban societies (CSU) of the Research centre of sociology and Political Science (CNRS) of 
University Paris 8 in France from September to December 2007. Those for Germany were 
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Parliamentary sources have two important shortcomings: firstly, actual decisions 
may have been made well before the policy deliberation in Parliament, or take place 
behind closed doors after parliamentary debates (Jacobs, 1997). Hence actual policy 
decisions may be influenced by factors other than mere parliamentary deliberation. I did 
not have access to data on those debates that took place between ministers, higher 
bureaucrats and lobbyists before or after actual policy decisions were taken, meaning that 
even though parliamentary debates reveal a lot about these decision-making moments, I 
could not trace the final phase of the policy-formation process.32  
Secondly, parliamentary debates are influenced by framing contests that take place 
in other forums. In addition to parliamentary sources, I made use of several legal sources to 
trace the policy process, such as important court cases on the hijab or advices of the Equal 
Treatment Committee, particularly in the Netherlands (in France and Germany, such 
Committees only exist since 2004 and 2006 respectively). But because this research is not 
a legal but a sociological study, I have only taken into account the most important and 
exemplary case-decisions and jurisprudence that structured governments’ policy responses. 
I also used some media-reports or extracts from feminist journals and websites to gather 
more information on the frames used by non-governmental actors involved in the policy-
making process. Because a wide range of non-governmental actors have been invited to 
policy debates, particularly in France and Germany, I could subsequently find traces of 
larger public debates in parliamentary sources. Moreover, politicians referred to the claims 
of non-governmental actors (see also Jacobs, 1998). I did not, however, systematically 
analyse the influence of media debates on the ways in which politicians deliberated and 
understood the issue of the hijab in Parliament (but see Roggeband, & Vliegenthart, 2007).  
 
2.6 Method of analysis 
In order to explain the emergence and evolution of policy frames and policy responses, I 
have used a method of ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) and ‘process-tracing’ (George & 
McKeown, 1985). Process tracing is a method for ‘assembling bits of evidence into a story 
of what happened, detailing a sequence of events leading up to the event of interest’ 
(Weldon, 2002: 26). This means that I have described in a qualitative way the different 
stages of the policy process, from the time the issue of the hijab was first put on the agenda 
to the moment that governments responded. 
Moreover, I used the method of ‘interpretative policy analysis’ to study the 
construction of the hijab as a policy problem. The ontological and epistemological 
premises of this particular method are grounded in social constructivism (Yanow, 1996). 
Interpretative policy analysis focuses on how social ‘problems’ are socially constructed in 
the ways in which politicians speak about them and offer solutions addressing them 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966). This analysis of the social construction of policy problems 
through discourse is also known as the ‘argumentative turn in policy analysis’ (Fischer & 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
collected in Berlin from September 2008 to February 2009 at the department ‘Migration, 
Integration and Trans-nationalisation’ of the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) in Germany. 
32
 It must be noted that the focus of this research lies on explaining cross-national differences in the 
framing and regulation of the hijab. Even though I used concepts and insights of public policy 
analysis, this study does not aim to analyse policy formation and implementation in order to 
develop theoretical models that can help improve this process (e.g. Van de Graaf & Hoppe, 1992). 
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Forester, 1991). This interpretative method allowed me to follow the origin, content and 
consequences of certain policy frames, who was involved in defining the meaning of the 
issue at stake, and the extent to which their policy frames shaped authorities’ policy 
responses (in laws, reports or other decisions). 
In order to measure its level of contentiousness, I counted the number of documents 
in which the issue of the hijab was addressed. I only selected those documents that 
discussed the issue of the hijab itself. Debates within extra-parliamentary committees were 
analysed for their frames but not taken into account to measure the saliency of the issue in 
the Parliament. In order to scrutinise which actor or party put the issue on the agenda in 
each country and how frequently, I counted the number of parliamentary questions, law 
proposals and motions submitted by deputies or parties.33  
In order to compare the framing of the issue, I used a qualitative method of frame-
analysis that allowed me to identify similarities and differences in the ways in which the 
issue was constructed as a problem, and the solutions formulated. I largely followed the 
‘critical frame analysis’ approach, as developed by Mieke Verloo (2005).34 Her approach 
has been used in an adapted version in the cross-national research project VEIL, in which 
we compared countries’ policy frames in public debates on the hijab (2006-2009).35 (See 
Appendix).        
Verloo’s qualitative methodology of constructing the policy frames is well suited 
for the aims of this dissertation. It uses an ‘analytic matrix’ in which three important 
elements of policy frames are translated in a list of ‘sensitising’ questions to help the 
researcher focus on three major categories of a frame: voice, diagnosis, and prognosis 
(Verloo, 2005). These three elements have been inspired by various existing frame theories 
(Stone, 1989; Snow & Benford, 1992; Graaf & Hoppe, 1992; Verloo & Roggeband, 1996).  
First, the methodology takes from Ferree et al. (2002) the idea of ‘standing’, which 
captures who has a voice in meaning-making processes. The first set of questions, 
concerning voice, therefore seeks to answer who should speak, on which occasion, to 
which audience, and in what form. In contrast to the use of standing by Ferree et al. (2002), 
who only include actors granted their own voice, this set of questions also draws attention 
                                                           
33
 I used all different types of documents to scrutinise the framing of the issue and to trace the 
different stages of the policy-formation process, including the reports of extra-parliamentary 
committees. The documents had to concern the question of the hijab in the national polity (even 
though parallels could be drawn to other countries). 
34
 Verloo developed this method of frame analysis for the MAGEEQ project (2003-2007) that 
studied and aimed to explain different countries’ policy frames and policies on gender equality. I 
have also been inspired by Carolyn Bacchi’s (2006) ‘what’s the problem represented to be’ 
approach. Like Verloo’s method of frame analysis, it is rooted in the Foucauldian discourse 
tradition that pays attention to how language constructs, reifies or changes asymmetrical relations 
of power. Yet, while Verloo’s approach is more focused on the imprint of policy discourse on the 
formation and impact of (gender equality) policies, Carolyn Bacchi is more concerned with the 
unspoken, implicit assumptions that sustain and generate certain hegemonic ‘regimes of truth’, 
their social production (in policies, laws, institutions) and effects on subjects’ self-understanding, 
hence less suitable for the aims of this study.  
35
 Values, Equality & Differences in Liberal Democracies (VEIL) was a 6th framework project 
running from 2006-2009. It compared the debates and policies concerning female Islamic head and 
body covering in eight European countries to scrutinize which gendered values were renegotiated 
and collective identities were constructed: the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Austria, Greece and Turkey: www.veil-project.org.  
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to indirect, described, and criticised voices that are referred to in the text. This allowed me 
to identify who has been involved in the construction of the frame and who supported it 
and, conversely, whose frame was countered or delegitimized. Voice often tells us much 
about someone’s standing and authority on the subject matter. It also helps the researcher 
to identify discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1995). Discourse coalitions can be defined as 
networks of actors sharing similar discourses around one or more policy frames, which 
may begin to structure certain policy fields that can inform a course of action or strategies 
of regulation (Maussen, 2009: 31).  
Second, Verloo’s approach draws on Snow and Benford’s (1992) idea that policy 
frames consist of a certain understanding of a problematic condition or situation defined as 
in need of change (the diagnosis). The diagnosis comprises ‘causal stories’ that help 
identify who or what is to blame or to be held responsible for the identified problem 
(Stone, 1989). Through causal stories, actors can attribute responsibility to a certain group 
or category. Conversely, they can attribute clear responsibility for policy success to 
themselves or another particular actor through intelligible and convincing stories 
explaining such causality. Graaf and Hoppe (1992) have similarly structured policy frames 
according to explicit and implicit ‘causal chains’ about what is seen as the cause and what 
as the effect of a certain policy problem. The second set of questions thus focuses on what 
is seen as the problem of the issue. Which causal stories are used to explain that problem, 
including who is seen as the perpetrator and who as the victim of the problem?  
A third important element of policy frames, drawn from Snow and Benford (1992), 
is the prognosis - the articulation of an alternative solution to the problem, and the 
strategies for attaining that solution. This resembles Graaf and Hoppe’s (1992) ‘final’ 
chains, referring to the goals policy actors want to achieve and the means identified to 
reach these. The prognosis often goes together with a ‘motivational call for action’, a call 
upon others to act in concert to affect change (Snow & Benford, 1992). Graaf and Hoppe 
(1992) have called this ‘normative’ chains. Normative chains refer to the various (implicit) 
levels of what is seen as wrong and right, and how normative change should be achieved. 
Through such a normative call for action, frames help actors to makes the normative leap 
from what ‘is’ to what ‘ought to be’ (Scholten, 2007: 29). Thus the third list of questions 
asks: what is seen as the solution a problem? What means are identified to reach that goal? 
What call of action is being propagated to reach that change? Which values are being 
appealed to? And who is given voice in that course of action?    
I used a simplified version of Verloo’s analytical matrix in order to develop frames 
out of my material. Table 1 lists an example of how I interpreted a Dutch parliamentary 
subtract according to the three elements of voice, diagnosis and prognosis. It concerns a 
meeting with the parliamentary committee and the Minister of Education in December 
2008 on the Government’s plans to introduce a law on face covers. A deputy of the 
populist Freedom Party (Partij van de Vrijheid, PVV) calls for more restrictive measures.  
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Table 1 Analytical matrix for frame analysis 
Text 
fragment 
"Another argument against the wearing of burqas in schools is, of course, that we 
cannot let Islam conquer and allow its uniforms. A second argument is that burqas 
are obviously women-unfriendly (...) I am satisfied with the top-down measures and 
happy to hear that the Minister ignores groups like the Secondary Education Board, 
which pleads for self-regulation. We all know what this means in these leftist 
strongholds: nothing will change. I am even wondering to what extent this law will 
be implemented in practice (...) why don't we just criminalize the wearing of burqas, 
so the police can interfere in case of non-compliance? (..) Make sure that the police 
can do something against it and that harsh penalties exist. In line with the motion of 
the Group Wilders, my party will come with an Initiative Bill, which proposes a 
new article in the Penal Code to criminalise the wearing of burqas, as well as to cut 
subsidies to schools that still tolerate the burqa: “three strikes, you’re out!”." 
Title, date, 
location 
TK 31 700 VII, no. 127 (December 24, 2008: 4). Transcription of a general 
consultation on 26 November 2008 between the Parliamentary Committee of 
Education, Culture and Science and the Minister of Education (Ronald Plasterk) 
about facial covering in schools. 
Voices Martin Bosma of the Freedom Party (Partij van de Vrijheid, PVV) 
Type of 
hijab/ 
Domain 
Burqa, Islamic face covers in general. Educational domain. 
Diagnosis 
What is the 
problem and 
why? 
What is not a 
problem? 
Location/origin 
of problem 
Active roles: 
Problem 
holder/ 
Perpetrator 
What are 
the effects of 
the problem/ 
of non-
action 
Burqa is a 
‘uniform’ of 
aggressive 
Islamist 
ideology; 
burqa is a 
symbol of 
women’s 
oppression  
X Islam ‘leftists’ are 
part of the 
problem, 
because they 
don’t act 
against 
Political 
Islam 
Toleration of 
burqa in 
schools will 
lead to 
‘Islamisation’ 
of society 
and gender 
segregation/ 
oppression  
Prognosis 
What is the 
solution and 
which action 
should be 
taken? 
What is not a 
solution? How 
is non-action 
legitimized? 
Which means 
to reach the 
goal? 
Passive 
roles: 
Targets/ 
Beneficiaries  
Who should 
act 
A law that 
bans the 
burqa, at 
least in lower 
and higher 
education 
Decentralization 
of policy to 
schools will 
lead to inaction 
and further 
‘Islamisation’ 
Change penal 
code to 
criminalise the 
wearing of 
burqas and 
penalise schools 
that continue to 
tolerate face 
veils 
Schools are 
targets, 
unclear who 
benefits from 
solution, 
possibly 
Dutch society 
that should 
be protected 
from 
‘Islamisation’ 
State, police 
and school 
inspectorate 
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I coded all country’s parliamentary documents on the hijab according to the three 
elements of this matrix. Then I compared the matrixes, searching for similarities and 
differences in the problems discussed and the solutions suggested. Based on this 
comparison, I constructed several frames for each country. Through repeated re-reading of 
the material, gaining new perspectives on the material, I sometimes revised previously 
constructed frames. Verloo’s method of interpretative process allows for such ‘flexible 
coding’, as it does not use pre-determined boxes of frame-elements (which are often used 
to quantify frames). I then compared the frames between the countries, and reconstructed 
larger frames that were clustered in 3 frame categories consisting of, first, frames that 
discus the hijab in relation to state-church relations; second, frames that discus the hijab in 
relation to social cohesion and public order; and third, frames that discus the hijab in 
relation to gender and women’s emancipation (see below). I constructed these three 
categories and rather large frames, because I ended up with a plethora of sub-frames for 
each country that made any cross-national comparison impossible. The categories are 
merely a tool to enable the systematic comparison of frames across countries; in reality the 
frames that belong to each category intersect. In order to enhance the replicability of my 
method of frame analysis, I have attempted to empirically substantiate my frame concepts 
by providing detailed, thickly described, textual evidence that is taken to be representative 
for a certain frame. This will be illustrated in in the empirical chapters. 
 In order to measure the differential impact of policy frames across countries on 
actual policy responses, I compared the actors that were using the frame, the direction in 
which they used it, and the position of power they had in deciding upon the subsequent 
course of action. In my empirical chapters, I will illustrate that politicians can use the same 
diagnostic frame yet come to different conclusions on the course of action to take, even 
though diagnostic frames often entail a particular direction in the prognosis. Actors can 
also deny the diagnosis tabled by others, or come up with counter-arguments to deconstruct 
its causal logic. In order to show the resonance of the frame in that particular context, I 
nonetheless coded actors as using that particular diagnostic frame even if they did not 
support its direction (see also Ferree et al., 2002: 52). In the empirical chapters, I will show 
which frames belonging to each of the three metacategories structured the debates in each 
country, how this changed over time, and how this eventually shaped policy responses, 
relating it to power constellations and political institutions. In the conclusion, I will come 
back to the ways in which institutional patterns of state-church relations, immigrant 
integration and gender shaped, and were themselves shaped, the framing of the hijab in the 
three countries’ parliaments. 
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Category I: State-church relations frames 
The frames clustered in this category all centre on the relation between state and (minority) 
religions; the divide between public (neutral) and private (particular) spheres; and the 
balance between conflicting (religious freedom) rights and interests of public neutrality 
and religious peace 
1) Conflict with state neutrality frame: the central diagnosis of this frame is that the 
wearing of hijabs in public institutions conflicts with or threatens the separation between 
church and state or state neutrality and/or infringes upon the religious freedom rights of 
third persons.  
It is often used with a prognosis that argues in favour of a ban on all religious symbols in 
public institutions, with the aim to guarantee the rights and liberties of all citizens and/or 
societal peace. But actors may also offer different prognoses, for example that current 
legislation already contains sufficient means to prevent religious proselytism. Or, when 
used together with other frames like the Islamic fundamentalism or Christian Occidental 
frame, that only Islamic dress conflicts with neutrality and must be removed. 
2) Religious rights and pluralism frame: this frame argues that the wearing of hijabs is a 
religious freedom right protected by the state. It is often used to argue that prohibiting the 
headscarf leads to an undesirable secularisation of public space and conflicts with state-
church relations.  
It is mostly employed to argue against a ban on hijabs. Accommodating all religious 
expressions on equal footing is seen as the best way to foster religious toleration and 
protect civic liberties. 
3) Christian Occidental frame: this diagnosis of this frame is that hijabs symbolise a 
different cultural or ideological value system that conflicts with human rights, democracy 
and progress. Since public school teachers must teach children according to such values, it 
is problematic that they wear hijabs. 
It mainly goes together with a prognosis that propagates partial bans on the headscarf 
alone, arguing that kippahs and nuns’ habits do symbolise the Judeo-Christian civilization 
that the state needs to transmit. Some actors may, however, support the diagnosis yet 
object to legislation that only targets the headscarf. Others may dispute the idea that there 
is a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West or that hijab-wearing women cannot 
transmit this value system 
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Category II: Social cohesion and public order frames 
The frames in this cluster all deliberate ethnic relations and social cohesion; the integration 
of or migrant minorities in mainstream society; issues of public order and morality; or 
public security in relation to Islamic extremism. 
1) Segregation frame: The diagnosis of this frame reads that the hijab indicates a rejection 
of integration and/or segregation by Muslim migrants. It symbolises them withdrawing in 
parallel societies, adhering to values other than those of the majority (communalism). The 
causal logic is that tolerating the hijab contributes to ethno-religious conflict and/or hinders 
the integration of other immigrant children who do not want to follow communal norms. It 
may also be argued that headscarves and particularly face veils cause feelings of 
estrangement and subsequently hinder social integration.  
This diagnosis often goes together with a prognosis that calls upon Muslims to integrate 
more actively by removing the hijab, or upon the state to implement a ban on the hijab 
(and/or other religious signs). Prohibiting the hijab and stimulating shared citizenship 
would contribute to social peace and integration. But actors may also use a different 
prognosis, arguing that a ban only further segregates and marginalises Muslim migrants. 
Such actors may use the discrimination and participation frame to call upon the state to 
increase space for diversity and/or reduce class inequalities to foster integration. 
2) Political Islam frame: The diagnosis of this frame argues that the hijab is a symbol of 
Islamic extremism that conflicts with values like the separation between church and state, 
religious tolerance or gender equality. Tolerating such symbols would be a naive 
multiculturalism, giving leeway to extremism and undermining individual liberties.  
This frame often goes together with a call for legislation against the hijab and/or all 
political symbols in public institutions. Tolerance for intolerance would give leeway to 
Islamic extremists. Others may argue that such bans are only stigmatising Muslims, and 
subsequently play into the hands of Islamic extremists who can recruit more souls for their 
political projects. They argue for less symbolic measures to deal with religious extremists. 
3) Security and extremism frame: This frame situates the face veil as a threat to security, 
because women are no longer identifiable. It is sometimes argued that terrorists or other 
criminals can hide underneath it and thus go undetected. This often goes together with a 
prognosis calling for a (context-specific) ban on face veils.  
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Category III: Gender and emancipation frames 
The frames in this category all deliberate the status of women in migrant cultures and/or 
society at large; the relation between the sexes, or between majority and minority cultures’ 
levels of emancipation; and conceptions of autonomy, femininity and masculinity, gender 
equality and women’s emancipation. 
1) Oppression frame: the central diagnosis of this frame is that the hijab symbolises 
women’s submission and gender segregation in Islam and/or is a tool to oppress women 
and girls by (fundamentalist) men, family and communities following patriarchal norms. 
Accommodating such symbols would be gender-discriminatory or in conflict with values 
like gender equality.  
It is often used together with a prognosis that calls upon the state to liberate girls by 
prohibiting headscarves or all religious symbols. But actors may come with a different 
prognosis that argues that a ban is counterproductive by further isolating women and/or 
depriving them of chances to gain autonomy and/or that a ban conflicts with gender 
equality. They may stress civic education or soft measures like communal dialogue to 
change patriarchal cultural gender roles. 
2) Discrimination and participation frame: this frame argues that prohibitions on the hijab 
are discriminatory (on grounds of sex and/or other grounds) and hindering the participation 
of Muslim women, subsequently contributing to the problem of their lacking (social-
economic or cultural) emancipation as women and/or as minorities. 
It is mostly a prognostic frame that is used to call upon the state to combat discrimination 
and stigmatisation of hijab-wearing women in order to enable their participation and equal 
opportunities in society. However, some actors may use this frame to plea for the 
accommodation of hijabs in the private sector but still defend a ban in certain context like 
public institutions for other reasons, such as public neutrality or liberation of young girls.  
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Part 1. Political-institutional context. Governing religious, ethnic and 
gender differences in France, the Netherlands and Germany 
 
In the next three chapters, I elaborate upon the political context in which the hijab 
controversies must be situated. In Chapter 3, I analyse the differences and similarities in 
the three countries’ general opportunity structures, focusing on the institutional 
characteristics of their political systems and shifting power constellations during the time 
that the hijab became a political issue. In this chapter, I also elaborate upon two relevant 
European institutions that may have affected policy-formation processes on the hijab: the 
European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice. In Chapter 4, I 
analyse the differences between the ways in which the three countries have governed 
religion and the historical fault lines around religion that preceded these institutional 
frameworks. In Chapter 5, I focus on the laws, policies and strategies used by the three 
countries to govern migrant integration and ethnic relations. Finally, Chapter 6 focuses on 
historical conflicts over gender, and the institutions, laws and strategies that countries have 
developed to govern gender relations and to foster gender equality. The aim of these three 
chapters is to stipulate expected outcomes of the influence of the identified differences in 
each country’s POS on the politicisation of the hijab.  
  
  
46 
Chapter 3. The political systems in France, the Netherlands and 
Germany and a note on European institutions 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will elaborate upon the general characteristics of the political opportunity 
structure in each country. The core of these structures comprise formal political institutions 
and configurations of power. Social movement scholars have compared such institutions 
by measuring the degree of openness of political systems for outside challengers and the 
strength of the state to implement policies (Kriesi, 1995; Hafner-Burton & Pollack, 2002). 
They have done this by examining the difference between the degree of territorial 
centralisation and the degree of functional centralisation. ‘Territorial centralisation’ refers 
to whether a state is a centralised or decentralised unit. In federal states, local and regional 
authorities have much more autonomy and power to implement policies than in centralised 
states. ‘Functional centralisation’ refers to the separation of power between and within the 
legislature (parliamentary arena), executive (government and public administrative) and 
judiciary (courts and legal bodies). Increased degrees of separation entail a larger number 
of institutional venues to challenge state’s policies, thereby restricting the capacity of the 
state to implement policies. Moreover, it matters whether countries have majoritarian or 
proportional electoral systems. Increased proportionality leads to a larger number of parties 
in the political system, and subsequently the need to form coalition governments. This 
enables more access for challengers to the political status quo, but simultaneously 
decreases the capacity of the government to act (Kriesi, 2004).  
In addition to the formal institutional characteristics of the three countries’ political 
systems, this chapter analyses the least stable element of the political opportunity structure: 
the configuration of parties in power, from the moment when hijabs became politically 
contentious in that country until 2007. Because of Germany’s federal system, where states 
have autonomy over educational matters (including pupils’ and teachers’ headscarves), I 
will only discuss the power constellations at the federal level here. I will elaborate upon the 
constellation of power at the Länder level in chapter 7 on the German hijab controversy. I 
will conclude with some observations of how these general elements of the three countries’ 
political opportunity structures are expected to structure policy processes around the hijab.   
This chapter will also elaborate upon two transnational opportunity structures that 
are relevant to the hijab question: the European Convention of Human Rights, protected by 
the European Court of Human Rights, and European Equality law, protected by the 
European Court of Justice.36 In the concluding chapter 10, I will come back to the 
influence of these two transnational institutions on national hijab policies. 
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 Other human rights institutions relevant to the restriction of the wearing of religious symbols in 
public areas are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (and the Human Rights Committee); the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (all three legally binding on all European member states); the European 
Social charter (Not ratified by Germany); the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (not ratified by France); and the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All forms of 
Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (see McGoldrick, 2006 for 
international human rights instruments other than the ECHR in hijab debates). See also: Steering 
Committee For Human Rights (CDDH), Committee of Experts for the Development of Human 
Rights (DH-DEV), Working Group B (2007), Report. Human Rights in a multicultural society. The 
wearing of religious symbols in public areas. Strassbourg, February 9 2007. 
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3.2 General characteristics of political opportunity structure in France, the 
Netherlands and Germany 
3.2.1 Institutional characteristics  
Kriesi et al. (1995) identify France as a strongly centralised state, both territorially and 
functionally. The Parisian centre remains powerful in most policy domains, including 
education (Poulter, 1997). The executive, consisting of a President and a Government 
chosen directly by the people, is powerful when compared to the other two countries for 
four reasons. First, the French political system displays some tendencies of a two-party 
system in which power alternates between relatively stable coalitions, each led by a 
majority party that can form parliamentary groups with smaller parties (Duyvendak, 1995). 
Because of the majoritarian electoral system, the 577 deputies of the French Parliament are 
elected for the national assembly in single-seat constituencies rather than through a 
proportional system. Small parties therefore have few opportunities to enter Parliament and 
to challenge the hegemony of the majority parties.  
Second, in the 1958 Constitution of the Fifth Republic, the functions of the 
legislature to control the executive were limited, in order to prevent the instability 
characterised by the previous Republic. Although, the Senate has become a more important 
controlling institution over time, the Government is not responsible to the Senate.37 The 
Parliament has the last word on bills (Lazardeux, 2009). Until 2001, the power of the 
Government to enforce laws was sometimes impeded by periods of ‘cohabitation’, when a 
right-wing government was forced to cooperate with a left-wing President, or vice versa. 
Today, the legislature rarely fulfils its function of watchdog over the executive, since a 
2001 referendum synchronised Presidential elections with Parliamentary elections. This 
means that the parliamentary majority is usually of the same party of the President (Bell 
2004), increasing the capacity of the executive to pass bills.  
Third, the judiciary is the only institution that can successfully control legislation. 
The Council of State (‘Conseil d’État’) functions as legal adviser to the Government and 
the Constitutional Council (‘Conseil Constitutionel’) reviews legislation. Nonetheless, the 
French judiciary’s independence, too, is being undermined by executive control (Bell, 
2004).  
Finally, ordinary citizens do not have the right to appeal Government decisions 
before the Constitutional Council, nor can they influence policy decisions through direct 
democratic procedures. We may therefore conclude that if the Government or the majority 
party in Parliament proposes a law to regulate the hijab, it has much power to pass it. 
 
The Netherlands is a unitary state, with the cabinet’s seat in The Hague determining the 
national agenda, including education policy (Kriesi et al., 1995). Functionally, however, its 
power is much more decentralised than in the other two countries. Due to the proportional 
electoral system there are no majority governments but parliamentary coalitions. The 
subsequent need to form compromises decreases the government’s power to act. Moreover, 
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 The French Senate has 321 members, 304 of which are elected for six-year terms by an electoral 
college consisting of elected representatives from each district, five of whom are elected from other 
dependencies, and twelve by the French Assembly of French Citizens Living Abroad.  
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small parties get easily access to national politics, since the threshold for gaining a 
parliamentary seat is lower than 1%. Since governments are dependent on the approval of 
Parliament (150 members) and the Senate (75 members) to push for legal reform, smaller 
parties’ consent is important to push through policy reforms. As a result, policymaking is a 
complicated and slow process (Duyvendak & Koopmans, 1992).  
The power of the government to implement policies is, however, increased because 
of the lack of dualism in the Dutch political system. Parliamentary party-fractions tend to 
support controversial parts of the governing parties’ agenda. They will particularly support 
those sections that were agreed upon in the formation of a coalition agreement before the 
government is installed (Bonjour, 2009: 285; Outshoorn, 2000).  
Moreover, the government’s power is not strongly reduced by the judiciary, which 
is relatively weak in the Netherlands. The Council of State cannot render laws void, as it 
only has an advisory function.38 Due to the absence of a Constitutional Court, no 
possibilities exist for citizens to challenge the constitutional compatibility of government 
policies. Finally, the Netherlands does not have a system of legally binding direct 
democratic procedures. We may therefore conclude that plenty of opportunities exist to 
negotiate about policies on the hijab, resulting in incremental policymaking, but once 
policy decisions have been made there are few chances to undo them.  
 
Finally, Germany is a federal and decentralised polity, which gives the states (‘Länder’) 
much autonomy in certain policy fields, such as education and social services. This 
diminishes the power of the Federal Government (‘Bundesregierung’) in those policy 
fields, which include headscarf policies for public schools and kindergartens. Germany has 
a (rather complex) proportional electoral system, but with a 5% threshold in the political 
system to keep radicals out. Established parties subsequently have more power to set the 
agenda than Dutch government parties, because coalition governments consist of either the 
Social Democrat Party or the Christian Democrat Party, together with a minor coalition 
party. Furthermore, because party discipline is high, governments often face little 
opposition from within their parties in parliament, increasing their capacity to implement 
policies. Finally, no direct democratic procedures exist as part of the decision-making 
process that would allow civilians to challenge governments’ (headscarf) policies (Kriesi et 
al. 1995).  
However, Germany has a strong judiciary, which provides opportunities to 
challenge policies through the courts. The Federal Administrative Court (FAC) assesses 
whether lower courts have rightly interpreted federal law in accordance with the national 
constitution.39 Moreover, citizens can launch constitutional appeals to the Federal 
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 The Council of State consists of 28 sub-councils and is presided over by the Dutch monarch. Its 
members are appointed for life by the Ministers of Interior Affairs and of Justice. They are high 
profile figures from the judiciary, politics, economy, administration and science, with power to 
review law proposals, either those of the cabinet - that are per definition reviewed - or those  of a 
deputy or party - that the Second Chamber may decide to sent to the Council for advice -. 
39
 The judges of the FAC are elected for life with a majority of vote by a special Federal Committee 
of twelve delegates, existing of members of the National Parliament (‘Bundestag’) and of the 
Federal Council (‘Bundesrat’). The Bundesrat exists of 69 prime-ministers/burgomasters and 
ministers/senators of one of Germany’s 16 (city) states. The number of seats reflects the amount of 
inhabitants of the constituent state. The Bundestag consists of 598 members, half of whom are 
elected via direct vote at local constituency level (‘Erststimme’), the other half from a regional list 
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Constitutional Court (FCC) to dispute policies. This is a highly influential constitutional 
safeguard with a broad range of powers (such as examining the compatibility of a pending 
piece of legislation with the Federal Constitution).40 Nonetheless, the Court’s effectiveness 
is often undermined by a lack of compliance with or evasion of its decisions.   
Based upon the institutional characteristics of the political systems of the three 
countries in question, I expect that it is easy to push for a dominant policy frame on the 
hijab in the French Parliament, and for the Government to act upon it. Even though smaller 
parties may benefit from the divisions between the two largest parties, I expect that the 
French parties in power have much power to pass their desired legislation on the hijab. In 
Germany, in contrast, the Länder governments’ capacity to act may be constrained by the 
strength of the judiciary and to a lesser extent by coalition partners in government. In the 
Netherlands, a multiparty system with a low threshold for newcomers to enter parliament, I 
expect most frame-competition to occur, resulting in incremental policymaking. Once a 
decision has been made, however, fewer opportunities exist for opponents to challenge 
state-implemented policies than in Germany and, to a lesser extent, France where 
Constitutional Courts exist. 
 
3.2.2 Party system and power constellations 
In France, power constellations have twice shifted from Left to Right during the headscarf 
debates in France (1989-2007), with a right-wing Government having ruled since 2002. 
From 1988 until 1993, a Socialist Government ruled the country, headed by Prime Minister 
Jospin (Parti Socialist, PS) and President François Mitterand (PS). It was during this period 
that the hijab issue was politicised for the first time. After a brief period of recognising 
migrants’ ‘right to difference’, a Republican discourse re-emerged that stressed individual 
inclusion and universal equality. The abandonment of multiculturalism by the PS in favour 
of an egalitarian discourse was mostly the result of Front National (FN), which used this 
discourse to call for the expulsion of intrinsically different migrants. The FN had gained 35 
parliamentary seats in the 1986 elections when the Socialist Party changed the electoral 
system and allowed proportional representation, wrongly estimating that this would be to 
their benefit. When the Socialist Government entered office in 1988, it quickly 
reintroduced the two-ballot system. Hereafter, the FN has only managed to get one 
parliamentary seat in 1988-1993 and one seat in 1997-2002 (Ezekiel, 2006).41  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
of candidates set up by the parties (‘Zweitstimme’). Because both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat 
represent the majority parties (at respectively the state and the federal level), the independence of 
the judges of the Federal Courts is sometimes claimed to be undermined by party politics and 
regional interests. Former Constitutional Judge Ernst-Wofgang Böckenförde (1983-1996), see: 
Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang (1976), Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit (Frankfurt): 60. 
40
 Its members are likewise elected by a special Federal committee, but with a two-third majority 
and for a continuous period of twelve years (see previous footnote).  
41
 Other populist and far right-wing parties are the National Center of Independents and Farmers 
(Centre nationale des indépendents et paysans, CNI); the Forum for social Republicans (Forum des 
Républicains sociaux, FRS), and the nationalist Movement for France (Mouvement pour la France, 
MPF). 
  
50 
In 1993, a conservative right-wing coalition Government was elected into office, 
existing of the Democratic Union (Union pour la Démocratie Français, UDF)42 and Rally 
for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République, RPR) and headed by Edouard 
Balladur (RPR), and from 1995 by Alain Juppé (RPR). Both right-wing Prime Ministers 
had to govern alongside Socialist President Mitterand until 1997. The Minister of Interior 
Affairs, Charles Pasqua (RPR), combined a tough stance on immigration with an attempt 
to bring Islam under state control, by re-launching contacts with Muslim leaders to create a 
representative Council.  
In 1997, a pluralist left-wing coalition Government headed by Prime-Minister 
Lionel Jospin (PS) entered office, consisting of the Socialist Party, the Communist Party 
(Parti Communist de France, PCF), the Greens (les Verts), the Left-of-centre Radical Party 
(Parti Radical de Gauche, PRG) and Citizens’ Movement (Mouvement des Citoyens, 
MDC). A new period of cohabitation followed when Jacques Chirac of the RPR was 
elected President in 1997 for a period of seven years. This Government was preoccupied 
with European integration issues and made several significant steps to ameliorate the civic 
equality of same-sex couples and the political rights of women (see chapter 6). 
In 2002 the PS was defeated when the Union for Popular Movement (Union 
Mouvement Populaire, UMP), a splinter party of RPR, won a major victory with 394 of 
577 seats (known as the ‘blue surge’ due to the party’s colour). Ever since, the UMP has 
had an absolute majority, first under Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin (2002-2005) then 
under Dominique de Villepin (2005-2007) and today under François Fillon. Moreover, in 
the first round of the Presidential elections just preceding the parliamentary elections, the 
Socialist Jospin was defeated by the right-wing candidate Jean-Marie le Pen of the FN. Le 
Pen achieved 16.8% of the vote, just behind Chirac, after a successful campaign focusing 
on law and order and the delinquency of Maghrebian youth. Massive demonstrations 
followed to oppose the rise of the far-Right, resulting in Chirac taking 82 % of the popular 
vote in the second round. Chirac remained President until 2007, when Nicolas Sarkozy 
won the Presidential elections who takes a restrictive approach towards immigration and 
strongly promotes French national identity. Together the UMP and PS currently make up 
90% of all delegates in Parliament, making some scholars conclude that France has 
developed from a bipolarised system of Left versus Right into a bi-party system between 
PS and UMP (Sauger, 2009). 
To sum up, the established Right and Left already faced the challenge of a strong 
populist right-wing party in the 1980s that made it politically untenable to emphasize 
respect for cultural differences without ‘othering’ migrants, making them vulnerable to 
expulsion. Since 2000, due to the increasing prevalence of nationalist forces in power, 
political opportunities for multicultural claims of recognition such as the headscarf have 
further decreased.   
 
In the Netherlands, power constellations have shifted dramatically during the headscarf 
debates. When the first conflict emerged in the mid 1980s, the country was ruled by a 
coalition government of the Christian Democratic Appeal (‘Christelijk Democratisch 
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 In 2007 some UDF deputies (among them the former Minister of Education François Bayrou) 
established the democratic movement ‘MoDem’ whose candidates aimed to be more independent 
from the Right than the UDF, whereas another split off group of the UDF, the ‘Nouveau Centre’, 
accepts coalitions with predominantly the right wing party UMP to exert power. 
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Appèl, CDA) and conservative Liberal Party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, 
VVD), followed by a government of the CDA and the PvdA. In the 1994 elections, the 
CDA was defeated for the first time in nearly a century. The incoming coalition 
government of Labour (Partij van de Arbei, PvdA), conservative Liberals (VVD) and 
Liberal Democrats (Democraten ’66, D66), headed by Labour Party leader Wim Kok, 
shifted the focus from simply respecting cultural diversity to actively promoting 
immigrants’ social and economic participation. This secular coalition lasted for two terms, 
during which several prominent members of the Liberal Party and Social Democrat party 
broke the political consensus not to politicise migrant-related issues (see Chapter 4). Also 
the hijab issue re-emerged on the agenda.  
The Netherlands had long prided itself for not having any substantial far-Right 
parties. From 1982-1986, Hans Janmaat of the small Centre Party (Centrum Partij, CP) 
only held one seat in the national Parliament, and from 1994-1998 three seats (turned into 
Centrum Democrats, CD). He defended the rights of native Dutch citizens against 
immigrants and refuted multicultural society. But his party was largely neglected by the 
established elites and therefore did not destabilise the party system. After the turn of the 
century, however, the Netherlands witnessed the rise of several new populist right-wing 
parties challenging the position of established parties, for example the new List Pim 
Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF). The party was named after its late party leader, Pim 
Fortuyn, who was killed by a radical animal-rights activist in 2002.  
In the parliamentary elections of May 2002, the LPF won 26 out of 150 seats in 
Parliament, a major victory. Since then, the established parties on both the Left and the 
Right have moved in the direction of the populist Right, hence converging in their stance 
on immigrant integration issues (Kriesi et al., 2006). In 2003, the CDA re-entered the 
government, along with the LPF and the VVD, headed by Prime Minister Jan Peter 
Balkenende. Curtailing immigration and promoting a more coercive integration policy 
were high on the new Government’s agenda. The CDA abandoned its previous 
multicultural stance, copying Fortuyn’s rhetoric that the Netherlands needed to be 
‘reconstructed’ after eight years of Purple ‘destruction’. It stressed shared national values 
as a necessity for integration (van Kersbergen, 2008: 270). However, this Government was 
very unstable, because the LPF suffered from internal strife without the charismatic 
Fortuyn, and the cabinet fell within three months.  
In the new parliamentary elections in January 2003, the Fortuynists took only eight 
seats (7 % of votes) and a new coalition was formed, consisting of CDA, VVD and D66. 
Like its predecessor, this Government opted for a more populist agenda regarding 
immigration and integration. This cabinet also fell prematurely in 2006 due to an internal 
conflict.43 In the new elections of 22 November 2006, the Socialist party (Socialistische 
Partij, SP) and the Christian Union (Christen Unie, CU) each won a substantial number of 
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 The D66 decided to withdraw from the government when it turned out that the Minister of 
Integration, Rita Verdonk, had known about the fact that MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali (VVD) had not 
legally received her Dutch citizenship. Because of Verdonk’s zero-tolerance stance towards illegal 
immigrants, MP van der Laan of D66 submitted a motion that demanded her resignation as 
Minister of Integration, which was not accepted by a majority of parliament. Verdonk remained 
Minister in the subsequent cabinet. Hirsi Ali, a politician for the Conservative Liberal party VVD, 
had arrived in the Netherlands as a refugee from Somalia and lied about her father’s name to get a 
residency permit. She would become a very important actor in debates about migrant women’s 
emancipation and integration in the Netherlands (see chapter 6).  
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seats, as well as the new Freedom Party (Partij van de Vrijheid, PVV). It was established 
by Geert Wilders, who had left the VVD in 2004 in objection to the party’s support for 
Turkey to enter the European Union. Hereafter, Wilders radicalised his views against 
Muslim immigrants, equating Islam with fascism and calling the Prophet Mohammed a 
paedophile.44 A difficult round of coalition formation followed, which resulted in a Centre-
Left coalition Government between the CDA, CU and the PvdA (2007-2010). Headed by 
two Christian parties, this Government emphasised shared ‘norms and values’ in a 
multicultural society that was deemed too permissive and too fragmented. This 
Government also fell prematurely in 2010 when the PvdA insisted upon pulling back from 
Afghanistan on short notice and its coalition partners disagreed. In October 2010, a new 
minority cabinet entered office, consisting of the VVD and the CDA. Its endurance is 
dependent on the support of the PVV, which has signed a parliamentary support agreement 
with the cabinet on certain key issues before it was installed.  
In summary, while immigrant integration was already politicised in the 1990s, the 
rise of strong right-wing populist parties has contributed to a further discrediting of 
multiculturalism. Since established left-wing and right-wing parties have made significant 
movements in the direction of the populist Right, we may expect debates on the hijab in 
the Netherlands to have become heavily politicised and policies to more restrictive. 
 
Finally, the German party system is likewise characterised by a class and religious 
cleavage. On the Left, the largest party is the Social Democrat party (‘Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands’, SPD). The SPD gained a monopoly on the Left, once the Communist 
party (‘Kommunistische Partei Deutchlands’, KPD) in West Germany no longer managed 
to rally sufficient support in the parliamentary elections after 1953, and was eventually 
banned in 1956. The SPD continues to attract the blue collar vote (Bornschier, 2010: 169). 
Other new left-wing parties are the Green Party (Die Grünen) and the post-communist 
Party of Democratic Socialism (‘Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus’, PDS). The 
Green Party was established in the 1970s and managed to pass the Federal Parliament’s 5% 
hurdle for the first time in 1983. It predominantly focused on ecological issues, pacifism 
and explicitly defined itself in terms of its support for feminism and, later, gay rights. After 
the Reunification of East and West Germany, the Greens merged with the former East 
German party Alliance ’90 (Bündnis 90). The PDS also emerged as a new party after 
reunification. In 2007, it merged with a former Western German left-wing party into the 
Left Party (Die Linke), currently the fourth-largest party in Germany.45  
On the right are the Christian Union parties (‘Christlich Democratische Union 
Deutschlands’, CDU and its Bavarian sister party ‘Christlich-Soziale Union’, CSU) and the 
smaller centre-Right Liberal Democrat Party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP) that has 
taken side with the Union parties along the class cleavage in favour of economic 
liberalism. The CDU/CSU has advocated for a tough and nationalistic stance with regard to 
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 His movie ‘Fitna’ - in which pages were ripped out of the Quran - was compared to Mein Kampf 
and screened all over the world. In 2009, several people appealed to the court of Amsterdam to 
accuse Wilders of instigating hatred and discrimination against Muslims and their belief. Currently, 
a higher appeal is pending, with Wilders claiming his right to freedom of speech.  
45
 Die Linkspartei/PDS had been formed in 2005 by SPD foreman Oskar Lafontaine and Gregor 
Gysi of the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus, PDS, the 
successor of the former East German Socialist Unity Party, SED, which was a communist party 
with a Marxist-Leninist ideology). In 2007, its name changed into The Left (Die Linke).  
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immigration. So far, no new right-wing party has succeeded in establishing itself as a 
competitor to the CDU/CSU (Kriesi et al., 2006). Extreme or populist right-wing parties 
have only existed at a regional level.46  
In Germany, the power constellations at the Länder level are most important for 
understanding policy-making processes on the hijab. At the federal level, political 
opportunities for multicultural recognition have increased. Germany was ruled by a 
coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP (1982-1998) when the first local headscarf controversy 
occurred in 1997. It was headed by the Christian Democrat Chancellor Helmut Kohl. This 
Government took the first steps towards allowing citizenship for second-generation 
children born of non-ethnic Germans (see chapter 5). In 1998, this 16-year conservative 
coalition Government was ousted from office by the first Red-Green coalition at the 
national level, consisting of the Social Democrat and Green parties (Bündnis 90/Grünen) 
(1998-2005). This cabinet, headed by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of the SPD, further 
expanded German citizenship opportunities for non-ethnic Germans in 2000. After the 
parliamentary elections of September 2005, SPD and CDU were forced to form a Grand 
Coalition. In 2005, the first woman was sworn into the office of Chancellor: Angela 
Merkel of the CDU. In 2009, after the SPD scored a dramatic result in the federal 
elections, a new CDU-FDP coalition took office, which was confronted with new public 
controversies about Islam.47  
 
3.3 Transnational opportunity structures: a note on the role of the ECHR and the 
ECJ 
Two European institutions may be particularly relevant to political debates on the hijab: 
the European Court of Human Rights, whose jurisprudence is based on the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the European Commission. To start with the 
latter: European countries must reckon with several Equality Directives issued by the 
Commission when deliberating and constructing policies on the headscarf, which concerns 
an equality claim on the intersecting grounds of religion, ethnicity/race and sex. First, the 
Race Directive (2000/43/EC) prohibits any discrimination on the basis of ‘race’ or ethnic 
origin in employment and regarding access to, and supply of, goods and services (covering 
both teachers and pupils, as well as all public and private employment). Secondly, the 
Framework Directive (2000/78/EC) prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion or 
belief, age, disability and sexual orientation in the labour market (covering teachers, 
teacher-trainees and other employees in public and private employment, but not pupils). 
Third, several gender-equality Directives (2002/73/EC; 2004/113/EC; 2006/54/EC) forbid 
discrimination on the grounds of sex in labour market/vocational training (covering both 
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 Such as the Democratic People’s Union (Deutsche Volksunion, DVU), the National Democrat 
Party Germany (Nationaldemokratsiche Partei Deutschlands, NPD), and the Republican party (Die 
Republikaner, REP). 
47
 It was during this during this government that Islam was increasingly politicised, with two very 
different occasions triggering public debates about the compatibility of Islam with German values: 
first, a book by a politician from the Social Democrat party (Thilo Sarrazin, also member of the 
board of the Bundesbank) about the threat of Muslim immigrants to German society and, second, 
the statement of the newly elected German President Christian Wulff (CDA) that ‘Islam belongs to 
Germany’. See: Jürgen Habermas, ‘Leadership and Leitkultur’, The New York Times (October 28, 
2010). 
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teachers and teacher-trainees), as well as access to, and supply of, goods and services 
(which excludes education). France, Germany and the Netherlands have all echoed these 
equality directives with national legislation, which may provide new opportunities for non-
discrimination frames. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg overlooks 
whether nation-states comply with and interpret EU law uniformly. When in doubt, 
national courts can request a ‘preliminary ruling’ from the Court as to whether regulations 
that prohibit headscarves are compatible with EU law (Berghahn, 2011). So far, no country 
has requested such a ruling. 
By contrast, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg has 
adjudicated several headscarf cases. This Court oversees the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), which binds all 47 members of the Council of Europe, including 
the 27 EU member states. In contrast to the ECJ, individual women who consider their 
rights violated may appeal to this court. The Court protects the rights to both freedom of 
thought and to manifesting one’s religion, which are embedded in Article 9 of the ECHR. 
While the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is protected absolutely (an 
“internal freedom”) by the ECHR, the right to ‘manifest’ one’s religion or belief is only 
protected with certain caveats (“external freedom”) (see for a critique: Fernando, 2010; 
Vakulenko, 2007). This right may be subject to certain limitations if those limitations are 
prescribed by law, follow a legitimate aim and are proportionate to that aim. Article 9 
stipulates some of these possible aims: ‘in the interests of public safety, for the protection 
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’ 
(quoted from Loenen, 2009: 316). When balancing these aims with the right to religious 
freedom of the applicant, the Court takes into account the specific national context, 
including the relationship between state and religion, and the moment when the 
prohibitions are introduced.48  
So far, no headscarf-wearing woman who claimed that her rights were violated 
under Article 9, or any other article of the ECHR, has won her case. And rather 
remarkably, the Court has not taken into consideration women’s rights to freedom of 
expression in its judgements.49 The Court tends to grant member-states a wide ‘margin of 
appreciation’ to proscribe the scope of religious freedom. Several times, it has legitimised 
restrictions imposed on school children and university students in the state education 
systems. In November and December 2008, the Court ruled on two cases, Kevanci vs 
France and Dogru vs France, which concerned the 1999 expulsion of pupils for wearing 
headscarves during physical education classes. The Court concluded that their right to 
religious freedom had not been violated because they had made an ‘ostentatious’ display 
conflicting with French secularism. Although the students’ parents had volunteered to 
replace the headscarves with hats, the court still considered the expulsion not 
disproportionate since the students could continue their education by taking distance 
courses. In Șahin vs Turkey, the Court found the prohibition on the wearing of headscarves 
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 Also the right not to be discriminated against (as guaranteed by Article 14 and/or Protocol No. 
12) or the right to education (enshrined in Article 2, of Protocol no. 1) may be applicable, but so far 
it has played no significant role in the Court’s jurisprudence (Loenen, 2009). 
49
 I thank Sejal Parmar for pointing at this out. See her analysis of the Courts’ verdicts on Muslim 
women’s dress: Parmar, S. (2010), Legal Comment. Bans on the Full Face Veil and Human Rights. 
A Freedom of Expression Perspective. Unpublished Report of Article 19 at: 
http://www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/bans-on-the-full-face veil-and-human-rights.pdf 
(Retrieved: May 13, 2011). 
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at Turkish universities to be compatible with Article 9, arguing that imposing limitations 
on the headscarf could be regarded as meeting ‘a pressing social need’ in the particular 
context of Turkey, where the headscarf had taken on political meaning and the majority of 
people adhered to the Islamic faith (Vakulenko, 2007).  
Restrictions on civil servants’ rights to religious expression have also been deemed 
legitimate. In Dahlab vs. Switzerland, the Court ruled that the Canton of Geneva had 
legitimately required a teacher in a public elementary school to remove her headscarf while 
teaching in order to guarantee pupils’ right to neutrality. The Court linked the question of 
required neutrality to the question of gender equality. It argued that allowing the headscarf 
– as a ‘powerful external symbol’ - risked proselytising, communicating a message that 
was ‘hard to square with the principle of gender equality.’ The Court therefore found that it 
was difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the ‘message of 
tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all 
teachers and professors in a democratic society must convey to their pupils’ (quoted from 
Loenen, 2009: 318). Attributing the meaning of gender inequality to the headscarf, it was 
considered legitimate that teachers had to compromise their religious beliefs in class. 
Because the duty of neutrality would also have applied to men wearing religious symbols, 
it was argued that there was no question of sex discrimination (see Skeje, 2007 for a 
critical reading).  
In short, the European Court of Human Rights tends to leave countries a wide 
margin to interpret and balance human rights to religious freedom and equality, and has 
hitherto upheld most headscarf bans. In the empirical chapters on the headscarf debates in 
each country, we will see how actors referred to these institutions to advocate or contest 
prohibitions on the hijab. In the concluding chapter, I will come back to the influence of 
these two transnational institutions on national hijab policies. 
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Chapter 4. Governing religious differences in France, the Netherlands 
and Germany  
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will elaborate upon existing theories of how national church-state traditions 
shape state accommodation of Muslim religious practices such as the headscarf. Various 
scholars have argued that particular national state-church traditions and ‘logics of the 
domestication of religious diversities’ (Sengers & Sunier, 2010) influence state responses 
to the religious claims of Muslims, which are the result of historical processes of nation 
building and conflicts between the national and the religious (Bader, 2007a; 2007b; 
Koenig, 2005; Monsma & Soper, 2009; Modood & Kastoryano, 2006). Fetzer & Soper 
(2005: 13) argue that “the constitutional and legal status of religion in each nation, along 
with the historical context through which the institutions of church and state have been 
related, are very significant in shaping how Britain, France, and Germany have 
accommodated the religious needs of Muslim groups. That history and these institutional 
structures have been key components in explaining the disparate ways in which states have 
accommodated the religious needs of Muslims.” In this chapter, I will elaborate upon my 
three countries’ state-church patterns and their respective framing and regulation of the 
hijab.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, I will compare the saliency of the 
traditional cleavage between religious and non-religious groups and explain how this 
would be expected to affect the saliency debate over the hijab in each country. Secondly, I 
will compare the countries’ institutions, laws and strategies of governing state-church 
relations, as well as the neutrality of the state and the strategies it uses to incorporate, 
negotiate and co-opt religious groups. Because the hijab conflict has focused so strongly on 
students’ and teachers’ headscarves, I will focus particularly on the institutionalisation of 
religion in education. I will discuss how we might expect the hijab to be framed and 
regulated based on these institutions and how they regulate religion. Finally, I will 
elaborate on the role of organised religion in the party system by comparing various 
religious and secular parties and how they view existing state-church regulations. I will 
also formulate theses on the expected availability of allies to defend the right to wear 
headscarves on the grounds of religious freedom.  
 
4.2 National state-church patterns 
4.2.1 Religious cleavages   
In France, the religious cleavage stems from a historic struggle between the secular 
Republic and the Catholic Church over the nation and its citizens – often called the 
struggle between ‘two Frances’ (Bowen, 2007a). After the French Revolution, the 
Republicans tried to break the political power of the Catholic clergy, who had legitimised 
the old regime’s sovereignty by portraying the monarch as God’s chosen ruler on earth. In 
their attack on the Catholic Church, the Republicans brought collective religious 
expression under the control of the state. Religion was de-politicised and narrowed down 
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to a privatised notion of individual freedom of conscience (‘croyance’) in order to 
secularise the public sphere. This continuing conflict between the two Frances gave 
secularism a clear anti-clerical emphasis. This cleavage had its heyday when the Third 
Republic (1871-1940) attempted to curb the Church’s remaining power in the realm of 
education (Labourde, 2008: 44). By making secular education compulsory for six- to 
thirteen year olds, the Republicans attempted to take primary education out of the hands of 
the Catholic Church, which had used its monopoly over primary education to preach anti-
republican, royalist doctrines. State-appointed teachers replaced local priests, with the 
intended effect of assimilating citizens of different backgrounds into rational, secular and 
loyal subjects (Scott, 2007: 99; 107). Existing childcare facilities run by Catholic orders 
were incorporated by the state and branded ‘maternal schools’ (‘écoles maternelles’; 
Morgan, 2003).  
Because religious groups continued to struggle for the right to establish private 
schools and receive state subsidies, the religious cleavage continued to exist well into the 
20th century (Bowen, 2007a; Labourde, 2008). The increasing secularisation and 
individualisation of French society weakened the Catholic clergy, even as the Republicans 
began to lose their anti-clericalism, gradually acknowledging the social role of religion and 
accepting the notion of a religious role in education. The Assembly of Cardinals and 
Archbishops of France publicly accepted laïcité in 1945, and one year later the Roman 
Catholic Church finally renounced its ambition to establish a confessional state.  
Today, religious conflicts still occasionally flare up between combative (‘laïcité de 
combat’) and pluralist (‘laïcité ouverte’) secularism (Baubérot, 2005). Combative 
secularists seek national unity through secularisation, wanting the state to break all ties 
with religion and allow citizens only private expressions of faith. Historically this group 
included atheists and freemasons, Jews, Protestants and few Catholic anti-clerics (Joppke, 
2009: 33-37; Fetzer & Soper, 2005: 73-76). By contrast, Pluralist secularists emphasised 
religious liberty and civic inclusion. This group historically included practicing Christians, 
and today also includes post-modernists who object to the homogenisation of the public 
realm (Labourde, 2008). A more recent example of the conflict between combative and 
pluralist secularists occurred in 1984, when the Socialist Government tried to eliminate 
state subsidies for private Catholic schools. Enormous demonstrations resulted, with more 
than a million people marching in French streets for the preservation of the ‘école libre’ 
(Duyvendak, 1995: 121). Because religious expression in schools has continually been a 
hot-button political question in France, we may expect that the issue of the headscarf will 
continue this trend when being related to religion.  
In the Netherlands, the secular state developed to protect the autonomy and 
religious freedom of minorities. The seven Low Countries struggled for independence from 
Catholic Spain’s repression of the Calvinist Reformation, emerging as a relatively liberal 
state in terms of freedom of religion and thought. In the Republic of the United Provinces 
(1588-1795) Jewish and Protestant minorities and dissenters – even those who arrived as 
immigrants fleeing religious wars elsewhere in Europe - were tolerated. Although religious 
minorities did not enjoy the same rights as members of the Reformed Church – in 
particularly rights to public religious activity and to enter public office - their presence was 
tolerated, albeit within clearly stipulated boundaries. The result was that religious strife 
was contained (Maussen, 2009: 43-55).  
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At the end of the 19th Century, however, religious conflicts flared up when Dutch 
Liberalism took on an increasingly anti-clerical character (Maussen, 2009). Dutch Liberals 
passed a new law that cut funding for religious schools (Boekholt & de Booij, 1987; 
Monsma & Soper, 2009: 56).50 Religious minorities, including Catholics and orthodox 
Reformed Protestants, started mobilising jointly, organising religious subcultures to oppose 
the Liberals’ hegemonic secular nation-building project. Based upon the Protestant idea of 
‘sphere sovereignty’ and the Catholic principle of ‘subsidiarity’, Calvinist and Catholic 
minorities successfully obtained equal rights to educate their members in their own 
institutions (Maussen, 2009).  
These institutions became self-contained worlds of opposition, which were 
particularly helpful to religious and socialist minorities in emancipating themselves from 
their subordinate position (Kersbergen & Manow, 2008). The confessional parties (the 
Anti-Revolutionary Party of the Reformed Protestants and the Catholic People’s Party) 
quickly won a majority in parliament. When they were joined by the Social-Democrats in 
the 20th century - who had started organising separately in opposition to the liberal market 
state - the Liberals were forced to cooperate with this newly powerful opposition. In 1917, 
religious conflicts were temporarily settled when Article 23 of the Constitution guaranteed 
the right to equal financial treatment for private religious schools and public-authority 
schools (Hupe, 1993; Fetzer & Soper, 2005).  
After the school struggle, Dutch society segmented along confessional and 
ideological lines, also known as ‘pillarisation’ (‘verzuiling’, 1900-1960) (Kriesi et al., 
1995; Duyvendak & Koopmans, 1992). Members of the four politico-religious groups 
(Catholics, Reformed Protestants, Socialists and Liberals) went to different schools, sports 
clubs, social welfare organisations or hospitals, and had their own political parties, trade-
unions and media networks. The elites of the respective pillars came together to govern the 
country and manage compromises, forming in a typical ‘consensus democracy’ that helped 
pacify old political cleavages over religion (Lijphart, 1968; Blom, 2000). In the 1960s, 
however, the pillarised consensus began to crumble as a result of democratisation, 
individualisation and secularisation. Various religious groups lost their traditional 
identities, and political parties ceased playing the role of mediator of these conflicts 
(Kennedy, 1995). Increasingly, religious freedom was also seen as the right of individuals 
to be free from religious tutelage (Maussen, 2009). By the time Muslim immigrants began 
to arrive in significant numbers, religious controversies no longer structured policy 
alternatives and no longer formed the basis of interparty policy competition (Eisinga, 
Frances & Ooms, 1997). Due to this pacification of religious cleavages, particularly in 
regard to education, we may expect that headscarves will not trigger much political 
controversy when framed in terms of religion. 
In Germany, the religious cleavage has been depoliticised for more than a century. 
The Holy German Empire (10th Century to 1806) witnessed bloody conflicts between 
Catholics and Protestants when Luther challenged the position of the Catholic Church. 
                                                           
50
 The school law of 1806 regulated public and private religious primary education. Both enjoyed 
the right to state subsidies, and public schools had to teach on Christian morals. The liberal 
constitution of 1848 officially guaranteed private religious associations the right to establish private 
schools. The school law of 1857 changed this, declaring that only public schools could receive state 
funding, and that they had to be confessionally neutral and accessible for all pupils regardless of 
background. In 1878, religious schools regained their right to state subsidies (see for the history of 
the public school: Bockholt & de Booy, 1987). 
  
59 
Since the Peace of Augsburg in 1550, the German princedoms that formed the Holy 
German Empire were ruled by the ‘cuius region, eius religio’ principle, meaning that 
subjects followed the religion of the prince. When the 1648 Peace of Westphalia ended the 
bloody Thirty Years War, the Catholic, evangelic-Lutheran and the Reformed (Calvinist 
and ‘Zwinglianer) Churches were officially recognised as state churches 
(‘Landeskirchen’). Ever since, states and various denominations have cooperated 
consensually in various domains, such as healthcare, social welfare and education.  
The most recent religious conflict occurred in the late 19th century, when Prussian 
Protestant nationalists - organised between Conservative and Liberal parties - tried to 
marginalise Roman Catholics during the so-called ‘Kulturkampf’ (1870-1891). Prussian 
nationalists saw the Catholics as a national threat who were opposed to both Luther’s 
Reformation and the Enlightenment (Amir-Moazami, 2007: 146). In their efforts to create 
a Protestant nation, all Catholic schools were brought under state control, and Catholics 
lost their seat in the (Prussian) Ministry of Education and their educational subsidies 
(Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Koenig, 2003). This triggered the mobilisation and emancipation of 
the Catholics, whose Catholic Centre Party became one of Germany’s main political 
players, forcing the Protestant conservatives into cooperative efforts. Thereafter, the 
Roman Catholic and Protestant churches have each maintained a strong position in civil 
society and politics, cooperating with the state over public life. Only under National 
Socialism did the Government temporarily cut ties with the churches in managing social 
welfare and education.  
After the Second World War, German churches regained the social centre. In the 
Federal Republic, the CDU became a multi-confessional party that integrated practicing 
Catholics and Protestants under one roof (Koopmans, 1995). In the German Democratic 
Republic, however, religion was marginalised. In 1968, GDR churches were deprived of 
public status because they were seen as opposed to the socialist state. But after the 
reunification in 1989, churches regained their public status and relations normalised. Due 
to this recent division, however, the religious cleavage is still more salient in Eastern 
Germany. In 2009, a conflict occurred in Berlin when the state government wished to 
replace religion courses with general ethics courses. This triggered the mobilisation of 
conservative parties and churches that launched, in vain, a public campaign to retain their 
right. Based on the relaxation of religious cleavages in Germany, we may expect that the 
visibility of the headscarf will not trigger much controversy when framed in terms of 
religion, yet that religious and secular forces in Eastern German states may seize it as an 
opportunity to mobilize for their cause.  
In sum, traditional religious cleavages have declined in all three countries. In 
France, however, religious conflicts endured longer and have remained salient to this day. 
In Eastern Germany, relations between state and religion have also been tense during the 
era of Socialism. I therefore expect that the headscarf will trigger the most debate in 
France, as well as some in the former Eastern German states, when framed in terms of 
state-church relations.   
 
 
 
  
60 
4.2.2 Laws, policies and governing strategies regulating state-church relations 
 
France 
In France, few formal opportunities exist for religious groups to claim state support. 
Historically, the Republic has attempted to depoliticise religion and break the power of the 
Catholic Church by insisting upon a secular public realm (‘laïcité). The Educational Laws 
of the 1880s championed by Jules Ferry, along with the Separation Law of 1905, form the 
institutional framework of this Republican secularism, aiming to narrow religion to a 
personal, private matter (Labourde, 2005; 2008). The Educational Laws subjected all 
schools to a nationwide uniform curriculum, aiming to bring religion in line with science. 
Only lay-teachers and secular teaching were allowed in public schools and state-run 
kindergartens. In order to further reduce the power of the Catholic Church, the Separation 
Law took away the public status of all religions and severed their financial support. The 
first two articles of the 1905 law read (quoted from Labourde, 2008): 
Article 1. The Republic ensures freedom of conscience. It guarantees the 
free exercise of religions. 
Article 2. It neither recognises nor subsidises any religion. 
This doctrine of separation is implicitly referred to in Article 1 of the 1946 Constitution 
(also included in the 1959 version), which reads: ‘France is an indivisible, laïque, 
democratic and social Republic. She ensures the equality of all citizens before the law 
without regard for (their) origin, race, or religion. She respects all beliefs’ (quoted from 
Fetzer & Soper, 2005: 76). The separation doctrine means that state depends on abstention 
from religious affairs. In this light, the state does not officially subsidise salaries or 
expenses for any form of worship. Nor does the state offer any religious education in 
public schools.  
The public school is considered a principal instrument of the secular nation-state 
because of its importance in shaping citizens. It is not considered a regular part of civil 
society, which is physically and symbolically demonstrated in that most school buildings 
are closed to the general public (Sunier, 2000: 317). Religion is not part of the state 
curriculum, although there are increasing calls for general history and social studies 
courses to examine religion (in fact, this was one of the recommendations of the Stasi 
Commission in its 2003 report, see Chapter 7)). Students are permitted to be absent on 
recognised religious holidays and take extra-curricular religious classes during school 
hours if this does not impede the normal functioning of the school. (The Stasi Commission 
also advised the recognition of Aïd al-Kebir and Yom Kippur as national holidays, but his 
idea was not followed up by President Chirac, see Chapter 7) (Delmas, 2006).51 
The neutrality of the state also lies in its equal treatment of all citizens regardless of 
faith, identity and affiliations, a principle embodied in Article 2 of the 1958 Constitution. 
The state officially guarantees religious freedom for all, as well as permitting the public 
exercise of religion for organised groups (‘cultes’) and freedom of conscience of 
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 The 1905 law does not apply in Alsace-Moselle, because the region was part of Germany when 
the law was passed. There, the state finances religious education, theological seminars and prayer 
spaces, and religious instruction (in Christianity and Judaism) is still a mandatory part of public 
instruction. Muslims living in Alsace-Moselle can request exemption from those courses but do not 
(yet) have the opportunity to select alternative courses in Islam  (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006: 142). 
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individuals (Baubérot, 2000). The Republican state, however, officially does not 
(financially) support exercises of faith, which is seen as conflicting with the second 
paragraph of the 1905 law. Religious groups must respect the law, renounce all claims to 
political power and refrain from intervening in public debates. In turn, state institutions 
must refrain from privileging any religious group over another or identifying with any 
religion in particular. Public officials have therefore a ‘devoir de réserve’ (obligation of 
restraint) and have only a few opportunities to be exempted from uniform rules on grounds 
of the freedom of conscience (Labourde, 2008). 
Under the 1901 law permitting citizens to form voluntary organisations, religious 
groups are allowed to organise religious schools. They can apply for state funding through 
the Debré law of 1959.52 Private schools are allowed to retain their ‘particular 
characteristics’, but they may only receive state funding on the conditions that they teach 
the national curriculum (as in the Netherlands and Germany); provide only limited 
religious instruction; accept students regardless of ‘origin, opinion, or belief’; and allow all 
students to opt out from religious courses (Heylay, 1975). Currently, 20 % of all pupils in 
France visit state-funded religious schools, 90% of which are Catholic schools (Bader, 
2007a: 161). Only one of the four existing Islamic schools in France (in Lille) receives 
state funding (other non state-funded Islamic schools are in Lyon, Aubervilliers and on the 
island of La Réunion in the Indian Ocean).53 
Although formally the French state does not recognise or subsidise religion, it has 
integrated and co-opted religious communities. From 1801-1905, France had a 
Concordatarian state-church model that was based on the official recognition and funding 
of Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist religions as ‘cultes’ (organised religions, not 
communities). In order to negotiate with such organised religions, the state recognised 
several interlocutors that still exist today and are officially contacted by the French Central 
Office of Religions in the Interior Ministry (‘Bureau Central des Cultes’). In addition to the 
Catholic Bishop’s Conference (‘Conférance des Evêques de France’, CEF), also the Jewish 
Consistory (‘Consistoire Central de France’, CCF54) and the Protestant Council 
(‘Fédération Protestante de France’, FPF) were recognised as independent religious 
councils. This has resulted in several compromises, some of which conflict with the 
principles of secularism and equality. For example, the state continues to own and fund the 
maintenance and renovation of houses of worship built before 1905, which in practice 
benefits Catholic churches. This strategy of cooperating with and co-opting religious 
                                                           
52 A wide range of religious schools already existed prior to 1959 as so-called ‘free schools’. A 
1919 law had allowed non-religious associations to apply for state funding (Bowen, 2007a). After 
WWII, public schools did not have sufficient space for the growing number of children. Moreover, 
private schools suffered from financial shortages. This contributed to the passing of the Debré 
Laws which recognised the current practice of state funding for religious schools. The right-wing 
party RPR in particular defended the public funding of religious schools (Delmas, 2006). 
53 In fact, one of the recommendations of the Stasi Commission to President Jacques Chirac was to 
offer courses on Islam in Alsace-Moselle, as well as on the sociology of religion in French history 
and language lessons in public schools. It also tentatively conceded that no legal obstacles existed 
to the creation of private Islamic schools. These policy recommendations have not been 
institutionalized. 
54 The Consistory consists of rabbis who are called on to resolve religious questions. An additional 
council, the Conseil Representatif des Institutions juives de France (CRIF) has existed since 1943. 
It is composed of intellectuals and activists who speak out on issues of importance to French Jews 
(Bowen, 2007a: 58).  
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groups in order to control religion is related to the ‘Gallican’ tradition of French state-
church relations, in reference to early monarchical efforts to nationalise the French 
Catholic Church (Bowen, 2007a; Labourde, 2008; Maussen, 2009). 
Since the 1990s, the Government has also attempted to establish a representative 
body for Islam in line with its existing institutional structure.55 In 2002, the French Muslim 
Council (‘Conseil Français du Culte Musulman’, CFCM) was established, representing 
only ‘religious’, mosque-going Muslims. The CFCM represents an estimated 10% of the 5 
million citizens French citizens with an Islamic background (Laurence and Vaise, 2006). 
Those Muslim groups willing to organise and cooperate with the state therefore have some 
opportunities to influence policy debates on religious, non-political issues (Modood, 2007: 
75). Muslim political associations, on the other hand, have no opportunities to lobby or 
influence stakeholders.  
In short, French state-church relations are characterised by contrasting institutional 
logics. Firstly, the hands-off approach to religion (laïcité) is seen as a guarantee of 
religious freedom and non-discrimination. Further, a Republican principle argues that the 
state stands for a homogeneous, secular public realm. Citizens and religious communities 
are expected to compromise their religious identities and group claims in the public sphere 
and to conform to civic law. Nonetheless, this secular culture has been shaped by Christian 
compromises forged with the secular state. Lastly, state recognition and control of 
centralised religious authorities follows the Gallican principle: the neutral state is not 
indifferent to religion, but rather tries to bring religious groups under state control.  
 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands has no constitutionally embedded principle of separation between church 
and state. In fact, the Netherlands has a long history of close cooperation between the state 
and various religious groups in politics, media, education, health care and more. Unlike 
Germany, however, organised religions have no public status and receive no public 
funding. Dutch state-church relations are strongly shaped not only by the highly valued 
principle of religious freedom, but also by the principle of equal treatment of different 
religions (Maussen, 2006). Monsma & Soper (2009) have described the Dutch state-church 
system as one of ‘principled pluralism’. State neutrality does not depend on strict 
separation or abstention, but rather is embodied in the ‘even-handed’ recognition of 
various religions by the state.  
The institutional framework of Dutch secularism is reflected in both the 1983 
Constitution and the Equal Treatment Act of 1994. Like in Germany, the Dutch right to 
freedom of religion, established in Article 6 of the Constitution, not only guarantees a 
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 In the French colonies, the state already attempted to create and support an official, moderate 
Islam in order to negotiate with moderate clerics and prevent the politicisation of Islam. During the 
Third Republic (1871-1940), France conquered various territories in West Indies, North and West 
Africa that were inhabited by Muslim populations. Islam was one of France’s officially recognised 
religions (‘cultes reconnus’) and brought under the control of the colonial government. But 
Muslims did not gain as much autonomy over their affairs as the majority, because the French state 
issued a special decree allowing it to fund mosques and Islamic schools, and to train and appoint 
religious personnel, even after the 1905 law cut financial ties between state and church (Maussen, 
2009: 57-67). Until the independence of Algeria in 1962, the French government continued to 
finance, protect and foster a co-opted loyalist Islam, dubbed ‘the Islamic exception’ (Labourde, 
1008). 
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citizen’s negative freedom of conscience, but also the ‘positive’ freedom to express and 
‘live out’ one’s particular faith or ‘philosophy of life’ in public, either individually or in 
community with others. Moreover, it comprises a right to associational autonomy (Bader 
2007a; Mausen, 2009). This means that the Dutch state does not follow a strategy of 
abstention, but rather recognises the valuable role that religion can play in civil society. 
Unlike France, it does not attempt to secularise the public realm; unlike Germany, it cuts 
the financial ties between state and church. The state no longer pays the salaries and 
pensions of clergymen, and religious groups no longer have the right to free postage or tax 
exemptions (van Bijsterveld, 2005). The Dutch government continues to support non-
religious activities of religious foundations that organise as private associations, including 
mosque associations. The new Law of 2006 on Societal Development (Wet 
Maatschappelijke Vorming, WMV) covers the right of municipalities to subsidise religious 
organisations that play an important role in initiating social or cultural activities (Van 
Bijsterveld, 2005).  
The right to equal treatment and non-discrimination is embedded in Article 1 of the 
Dutch constitution, as well as in the Dutch Equal Treatment Act. In contrast to France, the 
rights of individuals may be overridden by rights to religious freedom granted to a group. 
According to paragraph 5 of the Equality Act, for instance, a political party founded on 
religious principles may discriminate against members on grounds of religion, if these 
requirements are necessary to maintain the party’s religious views. The small Christian 
Orthodox party Staatskundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP) has used this right to exclude 
female members from executive and representative functions within the party. It argued 
that its religion considers men and women to be created differently by God and hence to 
have received different roles and duties. The state not only allowed this treatment but 
endorsed it by funding the party like any other. Nonetheless, this extensive religious 
freedom right is recently being challenged, with European equality norms functioning as 
an opportunity for opponents to dispute subsequent discrimination. In 2007, for instance, a 
women’s rights group won a court order forcing the Dutch state to cease subsidizing the 
SGP, arguing that it facilitated the discrimination of women, which contravened 
constitutionally embedded principles of equality and internationally ratified human rights 
treaties.56 Also the fact that public officers were long allowed to refuse to marry same-sex 
couples on grounds of conscientious objection has recently been successfully challenged.57 
Finally, Article 23 of the 1983 Constitution institutionalises freedom of education, 
establishing that private primary schools are subsidised on an equal footing with public 
                                                           
56 In 2007, a court in The Hague declared that the state had to discontinue subsidies because it 
facilitated gender discrimination by allowing the SGP to deprive passive voting rights for women. 
It argued that allowing women to be elected did not disproportionately restrict the Party’s right to 
freedom of association and religion, because it was still up to female party members to decide to 
actually participate in elections for public office. Even though the Dutch Council of State declared 
that state financing of this party was constitutional, the Highest Court endorsed the judgement of 
this The Hague Court in April 2009. The SGP will launch an appeal to the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
57
 In 2002 (ETC 2002-25; ETC 2002-26) the Equal Treatment Commission still reasoned that 
public officers had the right to religious freedom not to marry same-sex couples. The Commission 
considered it unreasonable to demand compliance with the law if there were other public officers 
available that could marry the couple. Six years later, it changed its opinion, arguing that the state 
could not enable public officers to discriminate against minority groups (ETC 2008-40).  
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schools state if the (religious) community meets certain financial conditions and 
educational standards.58 It forbids public schools from discriminating on religious grounds, 
insisting on ‘respect for everyone’s freedom of religion or belief’. This means that, upon 
parental request, they must provide the opportunity for pupils to take extracurricular or 
ancillary religious or Humanist courses, which are organised by private associations. The 
Law on Primary Education of 2010 stipulates that public education should reflect a 
pluralist society and familiarize students with the backgrounds and cultures of their peers. 
It also states that public education aims to encourage social integration and ‘active 
citizenship’. Hence, Dutch schools are seen as much more a part of civil society, with more 
parental involvement and multicultural education (Sunier, 2000). 
Religious schools are attended by roughly 70 % of Dutch pupils (Bader, 2007a: 
161). Most are Christian schools (Roman-Catholic, Orthodox Protestant, some Dutch-
Reformed), many of which have lost their specific denominational colour and have become 
inter-confessional. There are also several fully state-funded Jewish, Hindu and Islamic 
schools, as well as others based on certain pedagogic or philosophical traditions. 46 
Islamic primary schools have been established since 1988, along with two secondary 
schools and six higher educational institutions (Mijer, 2008). There is also an Islamic 
school board organisation, a pedagogic centre, two private higher educational institutions, 
and a national, state-sponsored centre for imams.59 
Religious schools have gained group rights that may override the individual rights 
of their members. In order to protect their particular denominational character, they may 
require that staff share their denominational or secular views (Zoontjes, 2003). This means 
that, unlike French private schools, Dutch private schools may directly discriminate on 
grounds of religion in their selection of pupils and staff and set certain requirements that, in 
view of the establishment's purpose, are necessary under its founding principles. The 
demands of conformity may be stricter for teachers, due to their special function in 
communicating a school’s values to pupils. But while discrimination on grounds of 
religion is allowed, this may not lead to discrimination on the ‘sole grounds’ of political 
opinion, race, sex, nationality, sexual orientation or civil status. There should always be 
additional circumstances, for instance the behaviour of the person in question, that make it 
impossible for an institution to appoint someone for the post of a teacher (Cremers-
Hartman, 2004). In 2008, the Dutch Council of State advised the Government to 
reformulate the law by removing the ‘sole grounds’ criterion because it could lead to 
                                                           
58 The state does not define which religions are officially able to receive state funding: if a 
denomination has been recognised as ‘distinct’ from others and as ‘perceptible’, then it may lay 
claims to state funding for founding a school, provided that no other schools are in the direct 
neighbourhood and the target group is large enough. 
59
 In 2000, the then-Minister of Integration and City Policies, Roger van Boxtel, feared that Islamic 
schools were hampering the integration of Muslims in society by segregating them from native 
youth. He also declared that they were centres of conservatism or even radicalism, because teachers 
were having links with extremist countries and organisations. A committee of investigation of the 
Dutch National Security Service concluded in a report that only two out of fifty-two Islamic 
schools, board members had ties to any conservative Islamic organisations abroad. None of these 
schools were found guilty of teaching hatred and violence (see also: Kennedy & Valenta, 2008). 
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discriminatory practices against sexual minorities who tend to be fired when they are open 
about their same-sex relationship.60  
To sum up, Dutch state-church patterns provide favourable opportunities for 
Muslim minorities to claim equal rights and public recognition of their religious practices, 
which we might expect to lead to more accommodation of hijabs in public institutions than 
in France. One similarity with France is, however, that the Government has sought 
cooperation with Muslim groups, hoping to domesticate their religion by stimulating the 
erection of two Muslim Councils that were officially recognised in 2005 and structurally 
meet the Minister of Integration: the ‘Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid’ (CMO) and 
‘Contactgroep Islam’ (CGI). The CMO represents the largest Sunnite mosque 
organisations (approximately 560.000 Muslims). The CGI represents minority Muslim 
communities of the Alevi and Ahmadiyya (approximately 115.000 Muslims) (Van 
Heelsum et al., 2004). A similar interlocutor has existed since 1940, for Christian and 
Jewish groups (‘Interkerkelijk Contact in Overheidszaken’, CIO). Their members meet 
different Ministers to manage issues like spiritual care in prisons and the army, elderly care 
and the maintenance of houses of worship.61  
 
Germany 
In Germany, citizens are also able to express their religion in (semi) public domains. 
Germany has no constitutionally embedded doctrine of demanding a separation of religion 
from the public sphere. In fact, religions are supposed to have a public dimension and can 
rely on state support. The neutral state does not discriminate against or favour any religion. 
But Germany’s church-state relations still institutionally favour historically dominant 
Christian churches in sectors such as education and social welfare. State-church relations 
have therefore been dubbed as ‘multiple establishment’, comparable to countries with 
state-churches (Monsma & Soper, 2009; Fetzer & Soper, 2005). 
German state-church relations are characterised by, in the words of Federal 
Constitutional Court, a ‘limping’ (in German: ‘hinkende’) separation, meaning Germany is 
no laicist state (Mahlmann, 2003; 2005). Historically, the state closely cooperated with the 
Christian churches that ran most social welfare services and health agencies, which were 
operating as state churches at the Länder level. Over time, these intermediate organisations 
gained certain legitimacy in the management of public life (Morgan, 2002). After the 
Second World War, several institutionalised ties between church and state endured when 
the new Federal Republic tried to break with the fascist state of the National-Socialists. 
Religious intermediary organisations were seen as a way to avoid a dangerous, over-
centralised government and a defence against moral and social fragmentation (Ferree et al., 
2002: 77). In order to illustrate the boundaries of the new Federal Republic’s authority, the 
new constitution of 1949 opened with the reference “conscious of their responsibility 
before God and humankind” (Amir Moazami, 2007: 147).  
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 This occurred after the European Commission had reprimanded the Dutch state for failing to 
implement the Equality Directive that obliges member states to protect people from discrimination 
in the field of labour. But in the advice of the State Council, private schools still got much leeway 
to require of teachers to hide their sexual orientation. 
61 Representing twenty-six Catholic and Protestant churches and three Jewish organisations. In 
1997 another Jewish Contact Council was established that lobbies the government on nonreligious 
matters, the ‘Centraal Overleg Joden’ (COJ). 
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Germany formally abolished its system of state churches. The constitutional 
secularism and neutrality of the German state was guaranteed by several legal norms. The 
right to freedom of religion is constitutionally embedded in Article 4 § 1-2 of the Basic 
Law and extends to people of all religious and non-religious faiths, including new 
religions, irrespective of size and social importance (Monsma & Soper, 2009). The norm 
has been interpreted expansively by the German Federal Constitutional Court, which has 
given it much weight in the German constitutional order of fundamental rights by linking it 
to the supreme norm of human dignity (Mahlman, 2003). Like in the Netherlands, religious 
freedom not only includes the freedom of belief but also the freedom to act upon one’s 
belief. It can only be restricted with reference to other constitutional rights. Religious 
groups have a positive freedom right to religion in that they can lay claim to state support. 
The Government funds faith-based social services on an equal footing with secular 
organisations and, in contrast to the Netherlands and France, also their religious activities. 
The Constitution even protects citizens’ right not to work on Sunday or publicly 
recognised religious holidays (Article 140) and the right to decline military service based 
on conscientious objection (Monsma & Soper, 2009: 109). 
The neutrality of the state manifests itself in treating each religious and non-
religious group equally in the public sphere, discriminating against none, as mandated in 
Article 3 § 3. Civil servants may not be refused on grounds of their religious or non-belief 
in public service: Article 33 §2-3 establishes that: “every German is equally eligible for 
any public office according to his aptitude, qualifications and professional achievements”, 
and that the “enjoyment of civil and political rights, eligibility for public office and rights 
acquired in the public service are independent of religious denomination. No one may 
suffer any disadvantage by reasons of his adherence or non-adherence to a denomination or 
to a conviction” (quoted from HRW: 17-18, footnote 49).  
The 1949 Constitution incorporated several articles of the older Weimar 
Constitution of 1919, which secured cooperation between state and majority religions in 
several policy domains. Article 140 of the Constitution automatically granted the three 
main historical religious communities –Catholic, Jewish and Evangelical - legal status as 
public corporations (‘Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts’), giving them an elevated 
degree of autonomy from state intervention. There were also privileges, notably the 
collection of taxes through the financial authorities of the state (Fetzer & Soper, 2005).62 
Article 140 also stipulates the conditions that other religious communities must fulfil in 
order to gain official recognition as public law corporations: they must have an official 
constitution, a substantial number of permanent members, and sufficient financial means. 
They must also show that they have existed for some time (generally thirty years), and that 
they respect the German democracy and state order (Jasch, 2007). The Länder 
Governments decide whether new religious and non-religious organisations fulfil these 
criteria.  
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 These privileges included full independence in matters of employment, recognition of the 
community’s religious oath in a court of law, fiscal protection and exemption from real estate taxes 
on property designated as belonging to the public domain, automatic membership of the followers 
in the community and the right to receive a percentage of national revenue based on tax payers’ 
declarations of membership, and access to public radio and television councils: Jasch (2007): fn 
106. 
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German state-church relations thus provide several opportunities for religious 
minorities to claim public space for religious expression on equal footing with Christian 
majority religions. The Jewish community, for instance, has been recognised as a public 
law corporation since the Second World War. Furthermore, because of Germany’s moral 
culpability in the Holocaust, Jewish organisations can lay claim to extensive state funding 
for their activities and houses of prayer: in 2003, the Federal Government officially 
established a long-term contract with the Central Council of Jews, with a yearly subsidy of 
€5 million (Berger, 2010). However, Länder Governments have thus far denied requests by 
Islamic and other religious minorities to obtain the status of officially recognised religions 
and public bodies, mostly because their democratic credentials were distrusted, or they 
failed to fulfil criteria such as a centralised organisational structure.63 Representatives of 
Islam do not have equal access to public policymaking either. Within the Federal Ministry 
of Education and Culture, a special Commissioner is responsible for representing the 
interests of the representatives of Evangelical, Protestant and Jewish communities 
(‘Beauftragte für Kirchen, Religions- und Weltanschauungsgemeinschaften’), and similar 
representatives exist at the Länder level. Muslims, however have no representative 
councils that can be approached by the state. Only recently, the German Federal 
Government has started negotiations with religious and non-religious Muslims about the 
integration of Islam. In 2007, it launched the first round of the so-called Islam 
conferences.64 Hereafter, the four largest Muslim associations established the first national 
umbrella organisation in order to offer the state a central contact point, the 
Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland (KMD).65 The KMD has not yet been 
recognised, however, and its representation is disputed within the Muslim community.  
Moreover, while Muslims have formal rights to offer Islamic courses in public 
schools, Länder governments have been reluctant to grant it. Article 7, §3 writes that 
religious courses are a compulsory part of the standard school curriculum of public 
schools.66 Religious instruction is considered a religious freedom right, both of pupils and 
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 Jehovah’s Witnesses, for instance, have been trying to get the status of public body since the 
1990s. But state authorities argued that because the religion is not a democratically structured 
organisation (it forbids its members to vote or stand for public office), it could not be trusted 
because of its lack of democratic credentials and loyalty to the state (Barker, 2000). Finally, in 
2006, the Jehovah’s Witnesses won a higher court case against the city state of Berlin and gained 
this status here. 
64
 In 2006, Minister of Interior and Integration Wolfgang Schäuble of the CDU-SPD cabinet (2005-
2009) launched the first series of the Islam conference, entitled ‘Muslims in Germany- German 
Muslims’. There will be two plenary meetings a year under the presidency of the Interior Ministry, 
which sets the agenda for the meetings, whereas working groups meet at least six times a year. 
Issues that were discussed in the first round included the provision of Islamic courses in state 
schools, the training of German-speaking imams in German Universities, and the headscarf in 
public schools. Islamic extremism was also featured prominently the agenda (Jasch, 2000). 
65 The four largest organisations are: the Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (IRD) 
(dominated by the Milli Görüs movement); the Zentralrat für die Muslime in Deutschland (ZMD); 
the Diyanet (which is affiliated to the Turkish government and the Türkisch-Islamische Union 
DITIB); and the Verband islamischer Kulturzentren (VIKZ).  
66 This Article does not apply in Berlin or Bremen. The so-called Bremen clause, Article 141 of the 
constitution, exempts Berlin and Bremen, because different provisions were in place on January 1, 
1949 when the new constitution went into force. In Berlin, religion classes are voluntary  and 
administered directly by the various churches or philosophical organisations. Since 2010 pupils 
have been obliged to follow a compulsory course on ethics, administrated by the federal state. In 
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of parents, who have, according to Article 6 §2 of the German Constitution, the right to 
care for and raise their children according to their conception of the good life. The content 
of religious courses is a common responsibility of the regional state authority, which works 
together with the religious community in question (Monsma & Soper, 2009). By law, any 
religious community with sufficient students may offer religious education if it respects the 
principles of the German constitution. They must have systematised their membership in 
order to assess how many pupils are obliged to follow the course and must offer a central 
contact point for the Government (Jasch, 2007). But only in few states, Islamic courses 
exist. Some states - in cooperation with Evangelical and Catholic churches – offer different 
courses only for Christian denominations, allowing Muslim pupils either exemptions or 
other interdenominational studies in religion or ethics. Other states still offer Turkish 
language and society courses that also include religious elements, which were established 
during the guest-worker regime to enable children to retain ties to the homeland.67 Berlin 
and North Rhine-Westphalia now offer voluntary and compulsory Islamic religious 
instruction respectively, but only when in 2003 a Muslim religious organisation won its 
case at the Federal Administrative Court.68 
Moreover, Christianity still plays a fundamental role in several state schools in the 
South. In Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, for instance, public schools (in German: 
‘öffentliche Volksschulen’) used to be organised either as Christian interdenominational 
public schools (in German: ‘Christliche Gemeinschaftsschulen’ or ‘Simultanschulen mit 
christlichem Charakter’) or as confessional schools (‘Bekentnisschulen’). In the 1960s, 
most confessional schools became public schools, which officially became 
interdenominational in character. Nonetheless, most Southern public schools have retained 
their Christian character, incorporating Christian prayers and songs and crucifixes on 
school walls. Moreover, the constitutions of these states still stipulate that teaching 
Christian morals and values is part of the state’s educational mandate. When it came to 
court cases, the Federal Constitutional Court concluded that prohibiting prayers in public 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Bremen, the state administers so called ‘courses on Christian religions’ as part of the fixed 
curriculum.  
67
 Muslims were long seen as immigrant communities who would eventually return to their home 
countries (see chapter 5). German state authorities therefore considered the religious needs of 
Muslim immigrants to be an affair of migrants’ homelands. In 1984, the Turkish Government’s 
Office for Religious Affairs established a German branch, the Diyanet (DITIB), which fosters a 
Turkish state Islam and only targets Muslim children with Turkish backgrounds. It paid the salaries 
of imams who were trained according to secularist interpretations of Turkish Islam and set up 
religious courses in German school during so-called Turkish language and culture classes. These 
were organised during Germany’s guest-workers regime to foster children’s ties with their 
homelands in order to facilitate their return home. Some public schools in states like Bremen still 
offer such courses, which are only open for Turkish speaking pupils (Fetzer & Soper, 2005:113). 
68
 After a long legal battle that ultimately led to a positive ruling of the Federal Administrative 
Court, the organisation ‘Berlin Islamic Federation’ (‘Islamische Föderation’) was finally allowed to 
administer voluntary Islamic courses in public schools in 2000, and a ruling which later included 
Alevi Muslims (Fetzer & Soper, 2005: 115). The Islamic Federation in Berlin was initially not 
allowed to offer religious education because of the Federation’s alleged ties to Milli Görüs, an 
organisation that was expelled from Turkey in the 1980s for their ties to the Islamist Refah party of 
Necmettin Erbakan and that is under the supervision of the intelligence services because of possible 
relationships with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Ministry of Integration has forbidden two other 
Muslim organisations because of their alleged extreme activities: the Khilafet Devleti and the Hizb 
al Tahrir.  
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schools would disproportionately harm (Christian) pupils’ positive right to religion and 
their parents’ right to educate their children in light of their religious beliefs. The 
transmission of Christian-occidental cultural values during singing lessons, moreover, did 
not infringe upon the neutrality of the state.69 But the Court did rule in favour of Bavarian 
parents requesting the removal of crucifixes from classrooms. Because the children had no 
choice in being confronted with religion’s presence and message, the court argued that they 
must be removed for reasons of state neutrality upon parental request (Monsma & Soper, 
2009: 195).70 This extensive denominational influence on public schools may explain why 
only 4% of German schoolchildren attend private confessional schools. Any person or 
legal entity may establish private schools and lay claim to 70 to 90 % state funding, so long 
as they comply with the law, do not discriminate on grounds of class and wealth, and offer 
education that is equivalent to that of public schools. So far, only two private Muslim 
schools exist, in Berlin and Munich (Lemmen, 2001). 
In short, German state-church relations offer favourable institutional opportunities 
for Muslims to claim the right to wear headscarves in public as part of their religious 
belonging. The principle of equal treatment and the extensive nature of religious freedom 
provide a framework that should provide the same opportunities for Islamic religious 
expressions as it does for Christians. Nonetheless, since they lack public status, Muslim 
communities have fewer financial and cultural resources than Christian and Jewish 
religious groups. Monsma & Soper (2009: 187) conclude that “Evangelic, Catholic and 
Jewish faiths have certain advantages that other religious bodies and competing secular 
ideologies do not fully share”. 
 
In all three countries, the rights to freedom of religion and equal treatment of religion are 
clearly embedded in laws. Nonetheless, in contrast to France, where the separation 
between church and state is a constitutionally embedded principle, German and Dutch 
state-church relations are interpreted in a non-secularist way, and strong reasons are 
required to justify state curtailment of religious freedoms. We may therefore expect more 
opportunities in these two countries to claim a religious freedom right to wear headscarves. 
A significant difference between Germany and the Netherlands is that the latter affords no 
public status to religion and has a longer history of institutionalised equal treatment of all 
religions. In Germany, Christian majority and Jewish minority religions are public bodies, 
receiving advantages over unrecognised “foreign” religions like Islam. In France and the 
Netherlands, organised Muslims do have some institutional access to state authorities, 
whose voices may be reflected in policy debates on the hijab.  
 
4.2.3 Political allies for religious claims of recognition 
In France, we may expect the Right to favour religious claims of recognition more than 
the Left. Even though the PS includes several moderate Catholics (Delmas, 2006: 28), it 
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 BVerfGE 41, 29 – Simultanschule (December 17, 1975). See also: http://www.historisches-
lexikon-bayerns.de/artikel/artikel_44500#12 (Retrieved March 21, 2011). In 1979, the Federal 
Constitutional Court again found the use of general prayers in the public schools constitutional: 
BVerfGE 52, 223. See: Monsma & Soper (2009): 179, fn 27. 
70
 BVerfGE 93, 1 (May 16, 1995). The verdict triggered a storm of public criticism which only 
subsided when the court made clear that it had not argued that all public schools in Bavaria had to 
remove crucifixes from the wall, but only those in which students or parents register a complaint. 
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staunchly defended the secular state and the enforced private expression of religious 
collective identities in public. The Communist Party has been anti-religious for longer 
(Raymond, 2009). The RPR and UDF, in contrast, have historically attracted the majority 
of the Catholic vote (a Christian-Democrat party has never taken root in France).71 
Although with the pacification of the religious cleavage since the 1990s, such voting 
behaviour has become more diffuse, we can still discern a difference between the Right 
and Left regarding issues of religion.72 When President Mitterand (PS) presented a draft 
law in the early 1980s to cut state subsidies to private religious schools, members of the 
RPR participated in massive demonstrations against the law, including the then-mayor of 
Paris, President Jacques Chirac (RPR). The conservative right-wing coalition Government 
of UDF and RPR (1993-1997) also attempted to reform the 1905 law by abolishing the 10 
% limit of state subsidies to private schools. This led in turn to a furious reaction from 
Socialist President Mitterand.73  
Both Socialist and right-wing Governments have, however, initiated official 
contacts with Muslim leaders since the 1980s in order to domesticate Islam and create a 
representative Muslim Council. It was the then-Minister of Interior Affairs, Nicolas 
Sarkozy (UMP), who established the first Muslim Council CFCM in 2003. President 
Sarkozy has also been in favour of positive discrimination on grounds of religion, 
trumpeting the appointment of the first ‘Muslim Préfet’ (the Algerian-born Aïssa 
Dermouche) in the Jura in January 2004, and baffling secularists with his welcome of Pope 
Benedict XVI to France in 2008, while emphasizing the nation’s close ties to Catholicism 
(Raymond, 2009). These actions triggered criticism from the Left (and within his own 
party) as conflicting with French secularism and as contributing to the collective 
ethnicisation of Muslims in France. Overall, political opportunities for religious 
recognition have thus improved since the turn of the century under the more moderate 
secular rule of the UMP.  
In the Netherlands, the Christian Democrat Party and the secular Left will most 
likely defend the equal rights of Muslims to be recognised along with other religious and 
non-religious groups. The PvdA has integrated many progressive Christians in the 1970s, 
as has the Green Party. In contrast to the conservative Liberal party VVD and the liberal 
Democrat party D66, we may expect these parties to adhere to a more moderated secularist 
stance.74 The PvdA, however, also came out in favour of ending state subsidies to religion 
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 Only during the Fourth Republic (1946-1958), one Christian Democratic Party existed 
(Mouvement Républicain Populaire, MRP). The MRP faced difficulty to winn the votes of a 
conservative Catholic majority that remained fairly anti Republican. Leftists were too anticlerical 
to support the party. It disappeared after a change of the electoral system in 1958, which made it 
more difficult for smaller parties to enter parliament (Morgan, 2003). 
72
 Bornschier, S. & Laschat, R., ‘The Evolution of the French Political Space’. Unpublished paper 
at: http://emiliano-grossman.webou.net/hopfichiers/08%20-%20Bornschier-Lachat.pdf (Retrieved 
January 14, 2011). 
73
 Nundy, J. ‘Row over funding closes French schools’, The Independent (December 18, 1993). 
74
 Van Kersbergen (2008) argues that the religious cleavage in the Netherlands has transformed 
into a new cultural cleavage that can be differentiated into, first, a new communitarian cleavage 
that divides post-modernists (D66, VVD) from communitarianists (CDA). While the former stress 
the liberal rights of individuals, the latter stress the collectivity and conservative norms and values, 
rejecting the hedonism and individualist consumerism of their adversaries. Second, he observes an 
ethical cleavage that divides religious parties from liberal secular parties in regard to issues like 
euthanasia, same-sex marriages, and the right to abortion. 
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in the 1980s, with its members increasingly defending stricter separation between church 
and state (Maussen, 2006). We may expect the Dutch CDA to defend equal rights to 
religious accommodation of Muslims, considering Dutch state-church relations of even-
handedness. It has historically been the champion of Dutch pillarisation, pleading for an 
emancipation of Muslims in line with that of the Catholic minority in the past (Maussen, 
2006). Even though the CDA has recently also changed its position on Dutch pillarised 
multiculturalism, we may still expect several opportunities for hijab-wearing women to 
find political allies for their religious claims of recognition.  
In Germany, both the secular Left and the Christian Democrat parties may defend 
Muslim women’s rights to express their religion in public. The class cleavage intersected 
with and moderated the religious cleavage and vice versa. The SPD lost its anti-religious 
standing in the 1960s, winning a substantial part of the Catholic CDU vote (Morgan, 2002) 
and endorsing the power base of churches in the provision of childcare and education 
(Monsma & Soper, 2009). Today, religious cleavages have lessened, and religious 
affiliations and practice no longer structure voting behaviour (Dogan, 2004: 13). Whether 
the Christian Union parties will defend Muslim women’s rights to freedom of expression 
depends on the extent to which they, along with Christian church interest-organisations, are 
willing to integrate Islam on equal footing as Christian religions, hence giving up some of 
their historical privileges. According to Fetzer & Soper (2005: 128), they will most likely 
defend the equal rights to religious freedom and recognition of religious Muslims: 
“Whether out of principle or self-interest, Christians are more likely to fight for state 
accommodation of Muslim’s religious practices in Germany, where church and state work 
together on various issues, than in France, where the institutions are rigidly separated”. The 
Liberal party FDP has been most critical of Germany’s corporatist state-church relations, 
for instance objecting to the right to levy church taxes (Monsma & Soper, 2009). But 
because this is only a small party, it will not likely have a large impact on the generally 
favourable political climate for religious claims of recognition. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has compared the state-church relations in the Netherlands, France and 
Germany. I expect the headscarf, when framed as a religious symbol, to be most politically 
contentious in France, where traditional cleavages over religion have been fierce. Religion 
and state also turn out to be most institutionally and ideologically separated in France, even 
though authorities have negotiated and co-opted religious groups in line with its Gallican 
state-church tradition. In Germany, state and church are most intertwined, granting 
Christian majority groups more power to influence policy debates than Islamic minorities, 
particularly in the realm of education. The Netherlands constitutes an intermediary case, 
where state and religion are two separate domains but where religious groups have 
significant access to public space and obtain state funding for their activities. Because of 
its institutionalised logic of even-handedness, we may expect most favourable 
opportunities for Muslim women to claim rights to religious freedom and expression to 
wear the hijab in public space. Table 2 summarises the findings and expectations for all 
three countries.   
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Table 2 Expectations regarding the POS for hijab-wearing women as religious actors 
State-church France Netherlands Germany Expectations  
Religious 
cleavages 
Religion has been 
a salient cleavage 
that was only 
recently pacified 
Religious 
cleavages pacified 
for nearly a century 
Religious 
cleavages 
pacified for 
nearly a century 
Headscarf most 
salient issue in 
France if framed in 
terms of state-
church relations 
Laws/policies/ 
governing 
strategies 
regulating 
state-church 
relations 
Separation 
church/state 
constitutionally 
embedded; 
neutrality as state 
abstention and 
equal treatment; 
secularised 
public (school) 
realm, in 
combination with 
Gallican, top-
down control of 
and cooperation 
with religious 
groups 
No institutionalised 
separation; neutrality 
as even-handed 
treatment of 
different groups; 
religious freedom 
both negative and 
positive right; 
religion plays role 
in public (school) 
realm. Cooperation 
with religious 
groups. 
No 
institutionalised 
separation; 
‘open’ 
interpretation of 
neutrality; 
religious 
freedom both 
positive and 
negative right; 
cooperation 
between state 
and only 
recognised 
religious groups; 
Christianity 
plays role in 
public (school) 
realm 
Opportunities to 
claim rights to 
freedom of religion 
to wear 
headscarves in 
public institutions 
more limited in 
France compared 
to NL/ Germany. 
More institutional 
venues for 
organised Muslims 
in NL/ France to 
influence policy 
debates 
 
Political allies 
for religious 
claims of 
recognition 
Most support 
among RPR/ 
UMP, less among 
left-wing parties. 
Opportunities 
most favourable 
> 2000 for 
religious claims 
of recognition 
Most support 
among CDA, less 
among liberal D66 
and VVD. 
Opportunities most 
favourable under 
CDA ruled 
coalitiongovernments 
with PvdA, least 
under Purple 
governments (1994-
2002) 
Most support 
among 
CDU/CSU if it is 
willing to share 
privileges with 
Muslim 
minorities. Least 
among FPD. 
Opportunities most 
favourable under 
CDU/CSU or SPD 
ruled Länder 
Due to existence of 
confessional parties 
in NL and 
Germany, more 
opportunities to 
claim religious 
freedom rights to 
cover in public. 
Some support 
among the Right in 
France 
Expectations 
for each 
country on 
grounds of 
state-church 
patterns 
Few opportunities 
to claim religious 
freedom rights to 
wear headscarves 
in public 
institutions. 
Much 
controversy 
expected if 
headscarf is 
framed in terms 
of religious 
cleavage 
Favourable 
opportunities to 
claim religious 
freedom rights to 
wear headscarves 
in public 
institutions. Not 
much controversy 
expected if framed 
in terms of 
religious cleavage 
Favourable 
opportunities to 
claim religious 
freedom rights to 
wear headscarves 
in public 
institutions but 
less in Southern 
states, where 
Christianity is 
privileged. Low 
saliency when 
framed in 
religious 
cleavage 
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Chapter 5. Governing immigrant integration and ethnic differences in 
France, the Netherlands and Germany  
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter further builds upon the empirical research that has compared different 
countries’ institutions and practices of citizenship, in order to explain the different ways in 
which states have responded to cultural claims to recognition by immigrants. This 
literature on citizenship practices and institutions (Brubraker 1992; Castles 1995; Favell, 
1998; Entzinger 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005; Kastoryano, 2002) assumes that countries 
combining a multicultural approach with ius soli citizenship will be most favourable 
towards accommodating Muslim cultural and religious practices like the hijab. This 
chapter compares the citizenship and integration policies of France, Germany and the 
Netherlands since the mid 1980s, paying attention to the shifts in institutional logics over 
time, with the aim of stipulating expected opportunities and constraints that such 
institutional frameworks pose for the framing and regulating of the hijab as an expression 
of the religious culture of immigrants and their descendants.  
However, I will not follow the classic distinction made by the majority of 
sociological studies on countries’ citizenship and incorporation policies, which often view 
religion as an aspect of immigrants’ ethno-cultural particularity and label countries as 
multicultural if they have accommodated immigrants’ religious needs. Even though Islam 
is ethnicised as a religion of aliens because of immigration, issues related to religion may 
evoke different normative, cognitive and institutional logics than those specifically related 
to ethno-cultural diversity (Koenig, 2003b: 160). In order to avoid repetition from the 
previous chapter, and to discern the specific institutional and ideological opportunities and 
constraints offered by countries’ citizenship and immigrant integration logics, this chapter 
only compares the ways in which states have granted civic, political and social citizenship 
rights to immigrants, recognising and accommodating ethnic minorities’ cultural and 
linguistic differences. I will rely upon some of the indicators developed by Koopmans et al. 
(2005), who compared five European countries’ citizenship and immigrant incorporation 
policies, but omit those indicators measuring ‘cultural’ rights specific to religion. As such, 
my comparison focuses on nationality acquisition (from liberal to restrictive rules, and 
civic and ethnic conceptions of citizenship); on anti-discrimination machineries (ranging 
from strong to weak legislation protecting citizens on grounds of race/ethnicity or national 
origin); on affirmative action policies to redistribute resources and power; and finally on 
the existence of representative councils for immigrant/ethnic minority interests. 
This chapter starts with an analysis of historical cleavages arising from state 
formation and nation building, and how these have been dealt with. This cleavage is 
understood as a conflict between opponents and proponents of a homogeneous 
understanding of the nation based on a common ethnic origin. This common ancestry and 
shared origin can be constructed in multiple ways, through physical, linguistic, cultural or 
religious characteristics, or via shared historical events or myths (Verkuyten, 1999). If 
historical cleavages around national identity and belonging still divided political and 
societal actors when Muslim immigrants settled, we may expect that the hijab will become 
contentious once linked to nationality and ethnic diversity. After having analyzed each 
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country’s cleavage structure, I will examine their citizenship laws and immigrant 
incorporation policies over time. Finally, I will compare the availability of political allies 
for hijab-wearing women as migrant minorities claiming equal rights and opportunities 
while simultaneously claiming space for their multiple identities. I will elaborate upon the 
political embedding of the new cultural cleavage around immigration, ethnic differences 
and nationality as discerned by Kriesi et al. (2006). They argue that immigration and ethnic 
diversity are part of a new structural cleavage emergent in European national politics as the 
result of globalisation and the weakening of national borders. On one side of the political 
cleavage, we find parties defending open borders and multicultural policies; on the other 
we find parties perceiving immigration and cultural diversity as a threat to their national or 
cultural identity, and therefore defending tougher stances on immigration, law and order. If 
in a particular country there are many parties taking the latter stance, we may expect fewer 
opportunities for Muslim women to claim recognition for the hijab.  
 
5.2 Citizenship and migrant incorporation patterns 
5.2.1 Cleavages around national identity 
French national identity is strongly shaped by the conflict between anti-religious 
revolutionary Republicans, with their commitment to the rights of man, and Catholic pro-
monarchists, with their lingering dedication to the institutions and values of the ancient 
regime - known as a conflict between “the two Frances” (Bowen, 2007a: 23). This fault-
line was particularly salient during the 18th and 19th century, when republican and 
monarchical forces found themselves struggling for a liberal, secular Republic and a 
Catholic Monarchy respectively, until the former finally managed to establish the Third 
Republic (1871-1940) (see also chapter 4). During the Dreyfus Affair (1898 -1899) the 
nativism and anti-Semitism of the traditional, Catholic France came to the surface again, 
which also manifested itself in the rhetoric and policies of the Vichy government (1940-
1944) that presented itself as a Catholic state that aimed to restore Christian values (Kuru, 
2008). It replaced the Republican’s Universalistic credo of ‘freedom, equality, and 
solidarity’ by the credo of ‘work, family, homeland’ (Delmas, 2006). After the second 
World War, this cleavage between ethno-nationalistic Catholics and Republicans 
evaporated when the nation’s self-imaginary was firmly constructed around an ostensibly 
ethnicity-blind Republican Universalism. Up until today, France officially continues to 
deny the existence of ‘minorities’ on French soil, continually refusing to designate the 
Corsican people as an indigenous population. In 1999, it refused to sign the EU charter on 
Regional Minority Languages because of its opposition to the concept of ‘minority’ and 
‘minority rights’.75  
French Republican nationalism developed when Republicans dismantled the 
ancient regime in 1789 and, in opposition to the monarchy, which had privileged citizens 
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 Regional minorities, such as those in Alsace, Brittany, the Basque country, Corsica, and 
Occitania, have continued to mobilise for the recognition of their particularistic cultures and 
identities, with the result that regional cleavages continue to exist up until today. Regional 
movements lost strength during the 1970s, and particularly after 1982 when France recognised 
linguistic differences in public schools by allowing optional courses. Federal and municipal entities 
also gained institutional autonomy and financial resources to sustain their regional culture (Delmas, 
2006). Only a few radical movements are left (Duyvendak, 1995: 120).  
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on grounds of religious and regional differences, tried to win over the population by 
(re)defining the nation as a political, egalitarian entity with shared Enlightenment values of 
equality, freedom, and tolerance (Brubaker, 1992; Kastoryano, 2002; Schnapper, 1994). 
Universalism functioned as the glue to forge this new national unity in the midst of 
disparate regional, class and religious differences, and it helped safeguard the loyalty of the 
citizenry to the new Republic rather than the old Catholic monarchy. In theory at least, 
everyone belonged to the nation simply by virtue of being born on French territory, but 
was expected to give up particularistic loyalty claims.76 Particularly during the Third 
Republic (1871-1940), the French nation-building project based upon the ideals of French 
Universalism gained in strength. The state ‘turned peasants into Frenchmen’ through 
compulsory secular schooling and military service, aiming to flatten linguistic, regional 
and religious differences (Weber, 1976). Even though regional identities were occasionally 
recognised as folkloristic expressions of national identity, or as inherent parts of French 
mosaic (Thiesse, 2001), all regional aspirations for autonomy were repressed and regional 
languages were banned from public institutions.  
Although French Republicanism is usually categorised as ‘civic’ or ‘territorial’ 
nationalism, another ethno-nationalistic reality existed: the Third Republic was also the era 
when France embarked upon its imperialist colonial endeavour as it attempted to 
‘Frenchify’ colonial subjects (Asad, 2006).77 Nonetheless, Muslim subjects in French 
colonies (‘sujets Français’) could not gain full citizenship status and were excluded from 
the nation unless they gave up their religion-based customs, if not their faith itself. Because 
of their perceived intrinsic cultural difference, Algerian Muslims were considered 
“indigènes” - members of an Islamic community - and they therefore were subject to the 
legislative ‘Code de l’Indigénat’ (1874) rather than the French Civil Code. By contrast, 
Algerian Jews were naturalised as full citizens with the Cremieux Decree of 1870, gaining 
automatic citizenship in 1889 together with all Europeans born in Algeria. Only in 1947 
was this legal inequality between full and secondary citizens abolished, when Algerians 
became citizens of the French Union through the ‘citoyens de statut local’ (Maussen, 
2009). They retained their unrestricted right to migrate to France until the Evian Accords 
ended the bloody Algerian Independence War and Algeria became an independent state 
(1954-1962).  
After the Second World War, and with the horrors of the Vichy era in mind, France 
officially returned to the idea of a nation consisting of abstract individual subjects, all 
interchangeable and thus equal. It refused any discrimination along racial and ethnic lines 
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 The granting of birthright citizenship to Jewish minorities in 1789 is often taken as an example of 
this demand to renounce particularistic collective identities in exchange for being allowed to join 
the nation. As Count Stanislas Cerlmont-Tonnerre declared in 1789: “Everything must be refused 
to the Jews as a nation in the sense of a corporate body and everything must be granted to the Jews 
as individuals[...] They must make up neither a political body nor an order within the State; they 
must individually be citizens” (quoted from Scott, 2007: 75). In reality, certain categories were still 
excluded from full membership in the polity on grounds of gender, age, place of birth and ethno 
racial ancestry.   
77
 During the Third Republic (1871-1940), France conquered various territories in the West Indies, 
North and West Africa that were inhabited by Muslim populations, including Algeria in 1830 
(organised as three departments of France in 1848 and becoming part of metropolitan France in 
1881), Tunisia in 1881 and Morocco in 1907. The latter two remained semi-autonomous 
protectorates. See: Maussen (2009).   
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by denying the existence of such categories. Immigrants could become citizens, regardless 
of ethnic origin. Due to the pacification of historic fault lines around the nation, with 
ethno-cultural differences negated in a homogeneous Republican national culture, we may 
expect it is difficult to mobilize the headscarf as a symbol of (in)compatible cultural 
differences between ethnic French and migrant minorities. 
Dutch nationality was not widely discussed until the 1990s (Lechner, 2007). Rather 
than integrating citizens into a Universalist ideology of conflated differences, or into a 
Völkish nation, the Dutch nation had historically comprised various religious and political 
groups, its collective identity shaped by a corporatist history of pillarisation (‘verzuiling’, 
1917-1960). Pillarisation refers to the division of Dutch society into religious and 
ideological groups during the first half of the 20th century (see chapter 4). In contrast to 
France, individual citizens were incorporated into groups whose different ideologies could 
be equally manifested in public space. The Dutch primarily identified themselves as 
members of different religious and ideological groups represented by the elites of these 
groups – the Catholic, Protestant, Socialist and Liberal communities – who together 
regulated social life. Such pillarising resulted in a consociational democracy functioning to 
sustain societal peace (Blom, 2000; Lijphart, 1968).  
Dutch nationality thus never split society along oppositional fault lines, because the 
nation had consisted of several minority groups whose differences were institutionalised 
but who shared a ‘thick’ understanding of Dutchness based on implicitly shared cultural 
codes (Ghorashi, 2003). This shared culture implicitly bridged the various pillars and 
regional minorities, but it separated the native Dutch from their colonial subjects in the 
overseas territories. With the establishment of the Independent Kingdom of the 
Netherlands in 1814, former Dutch sea-trading posts in present day Indonesia, Surinam, 
and the Dutch Antilles were turned into colonies. When the Dutch East Indies became part 
of the Dutch monarchy, it turned into the ‘largest Muslim country on earth’ (Van der Veer, 
2002). Here, Susan Legène (2009: 234) writes, “the religious and political divisions of the 
pillarised society were not relevant. The colonialists were all members of a white elite, a 
minority in the colony.” While formally classified as Dutch nationals, colonial subjects 
were secondary citizens never fully belonging to the nation; in 1838, colonial subjects 
gained Dutch citizenship based upon their birth on Dutch soil, but they were deprived of 
political rights in 1850 (Heijs, 1995). Under a new citizenship law of 1892, the indigenous 
population of the Dutch East Indies were formally excluded from Dutch nationality, and in 
1910, they received a ‘second rank’ Dutch nationality (‘Nederlands onderdaan niet-
Nederlander’) (Heijs, 1995).78  
After the de-colonisation of the Dutch East Indies (1949-1962), approximately 
312,500 Dutch citizens moved from the Indonesian Archipelago to the Netherlands, 
including 200,000 Eurasians (Dutch of mixed descent), 100,000 ‘totoks’ (white Dutch 
settlers), and 12,500 Moluccans (Jones, 2009: 6). They were followed in the 1960s by 
recruited labour-migrants from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey and Morocco and after 1975 
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 Colonial subjects who were excluded from Dutch nationality included so-called ‘Oriental 
Foreigners’ (Chinese and other Asian inhabitants) and ‘Natives’ (or ‘Inlanders’, the native 
population) (van Oers, 2006: 393). The indigenous inhabitants of the colonies of Surinam and 
Curacao (Dutch Antilleans), by contrast, were Dutch nationals since 1832. They kept this status on 
grounds of ius sanguinis after the introduction of the new citizenship law of 1892, in contrast to 
children of labour migrants from the Dutch East Indies who continued to be excluded from full 
citizenship (Heijs, 1997: 71-72, 144-146).  
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by post-colonial immigrants from Surinam. Since the 1980s, the immigration of Dutch 
citizens from the Dutch Antilles and Aruba, which retained an autonomous status within 
the Dutch Kingdom, has also increased (Ersanilli, 2007). Gradually, the different shades of 
whiteness between Dutch citizens became visible, and the nation was forced to reinvent 
itself. Initially, this pluralisation of the nation was accompanied by little national soul-
searching (Lechner, 2007). Labour-migrants turned citizens and were tolerated as separate 
ethnic groups in a depillarised society79 priding itself on not being nationalistic but instead 
being part of a global community.  
Due to the absence of historical cleavages around national identity in the 
Netherlands, with minorities’ ethno-cultural differences being recognized and 
institutionalised as separate parts of the nation, we may expect a low saliency of the 
headscarf issue.   
In contrast to France and the Netherlands, ethnically articulated conflicts over 
German national identity were not settled in the late 20th century. German nationalism is 
often portrayed as a classic example of an ethno-cultural understanding of the nation, 
attaching citizenship to shared ethnic descent. It is located in the late nation-building 
process of Germany - a ‘nation searching for a state’ (Brubaker, 1992; Kastoryano, 2002). 
Prussian nationalists, who also embarked upon a colonial enterprise80, tried to forge 
national cohesion by cultivating some of the vaguely national spirit which had existed 
among the elites of the forty autonomous kingdoms of the North German Confederation 
before the 1871 establishment of the German Empire. In opposition to French 
Universalism, they based their nationalistic project on Romantic ideals of a ‘Volksgeist’ 
uniting people through an imagined common German spirit, culture and Christian heritage. 
While emigrants living outside the national territory could lay claim to citizenship as 
members of the German people, Polish and Jewish immigrants faced harsh anti-
immigration policies and were perceived as ‘alien to the people’ (‘Volksfremde’) 
(Schönwälder, 2008), including Catholic Poles living within the boundaries of the empire 
and enjoying formal citizenship status (‘Reichspolen’) (Ulrich, 2003). Ethnically and 
religiously articulated conflicts over nationality temporarily quieted with the emergence of 
an independent Polish state (1918-1939). Also Frisian and Danish minorities in the North 
gradually attained a status as national minority groups whose culture and language are still 
constitutionally protected, a status which has also been granted to those national minorities 
who suffered under Nazi persecution, such as the Roma and Sinti (Kriesi et al., 1995).  
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 The pillarized society fell apart in the 1960s due to increasing levels of de-confessionalisation 
and individualisation of Dutch society, as well as the development of a welfare state that decreased 
the need for citizens to rely on their own communities’ institutions (van Kersbergen, 2008; Rath et 
al., 1996). 
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 Between 1884 and 1900, the German Reich gained an empire in Africa and the Pacific of 
approximately 12 million inhabitants. In Africa, it had Deutsch Ostafrika (partly present day 
Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi); Deutsch Südwest Afrika (parts of present day Namibia and Nigeria); 
Deutsch West Afrika (parts of present day Cameroon) and Deutsch Togo (Republic of Togo and 
part of Ghana); and Südrand des Caprivi-Zipfels (Botswana). In the Pacific, it had German New 
Guinea (Papua New Guinea and the Republic of the Marshall Islands) and various other islands 
like present day Western Samoa. The leased Chinese region of what Germans called Deutsche 
Kiautschiou (Kiao Chiow,) is today called Jiaozhou and Tsingtua is today Qingdao City 
(Wildenthal, 2001). 
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Nonetheless, ethnically articulated conflicts around nationality reappeared after the 
Second World War, when millions of ethnic Germans lived outside the country’s new 
territorial borders, where they suffered discrimination and persecution (Özcan, 2007). In 
order to protect these German emigrants (‘Aussiedler’) or ‘late emigrants’ 
(‘Spätaussiedler)81, the post-war constitution of the FRG recognised them as members of 
the German Nation (‘Auslanddeutsche’ or ‘Volksdeutsche’), able to claim citizenship on 
the grounds of their common ancestry (see below). Furthermore, the Cold War resulted in a 
national division into two separate states - the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR). Both historical events contributed to sustaining an 
ethnic concept of the nation that largely excluded ethnic migrant minorities as citizens.  
Ethnically articulated cleavages around nationality have continued to shape 
political debates in the FRG until well into the 1990s. All attempts to further open up 
citizenship rules for ethnic minorities who arrived as labour and family migrants failed82, 
while ethnic Germans and their descendants continued to have privileged access to German 
nationality as victims of post-war measures. Their immigration continued to increase 
between 1950 and 1987, peaking after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 when Germans 
from the former BRD moved to the West and German emigrants and Jews from Eastern 
Europe immigrated to the unified state (Hirschler-Horakova, 2003). Only after the fall of 
the Iron Curtain did the cherished ideal of an undivided ethnically homogeneous nation 
evaporate, and national cleavages relaxed as well.  
Due to the ethnicisation of post-war German politics, we may therefore expect 
debates about the hijab in Germany to be most intense when linked to ethnic differences 
and the nation. There exist strong ethno-nationalist voices that reject the accommodation of 
cultural differences of migrant minorities as part of the nation. In France and the 
Netherlands, ethnic cleavages were not salient in contests of national identity; ethnic 
differences were officially played down, if not ignored, by the homogeneous French 
nation, whilst being institutionalised in the Netherlands as distinct parts of the nation. 
 
5.2.2 Laws, policies and governing strategies regulating migrant incorporation  
Citizenship policies 
France has historically practiced open citizenship, which is seen as an instrument of 
integration into society and to becoming culturally ‘French’ (Brubaker, 1992; Weil, Spire 
& Bertossi, 2010). French nationality is a combination of the ‘ius sanguinis’ and ‘ius soli’ 
principles: It is attributed at birth (irrespective of place) if one of the child’s parents is 
French, or if the child is born in France and also has a parent born in France. While 
citizenship was initially passed through the father, since 1973 all gender discrimination has 
been removed from nationality legislation.  
                                                           
81 Spätaussiedler were ‘Germans’ who had migrated already before the emergence of the German 
nation-state to the Russian empire for work. Because they suffered from repression and 
discrimination during and after WWII, Germany facilitated their ‘return home’ by granting them 
automatic citizenship on grounds of the pre-war 1913 citizenship law, which was transposed in 
Article 116 of the Federal Republic’s Constitution of 1949 (Michalowski, 2007: 36 fn. 27). 
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 While the Western Federal Republic of Germany signed bilateral contracts with Italy, Greece, 
Spain, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia, the German Democratic Republic 
recruited labour force from allying socialist countries, such as Poland, Hungary, Mozambique and 
Vietnam (Özcan, 2007). 
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Since 1889, when France introduced the ius soli principle, third-generation 
immigrant children become French at birth. A child born in France whose parents are 
neither French nor born in France (hence second generation) automatically becomes 
French when they reach majority, as long as they have resided in France for a period of 
five years after the age of eleven and still reside there at the time of application.  
In 1993, the right-wing Gaullist and Liberal Government restricted this ius soli 
component by demanding the ‘voluntary consent’ of children born in France to foreign 
parents when accepting French citizenship. This was because the cultural difference of 
Maghrebians was seen as an obstacle for their integration into French society (Weil, Spire 
& Bertossi, 2010). Moreover, children born in France to parents born in former French 
colonies other than Algeria lost their specific rights to automatic citizenship at birth. They 
thus had the same status as anyone born in France to foreign parents. Only four years later, 
however, the new left-wing Government reinstated automatic citizenship for children born 
of foreign parents in France. But rather than removing the principle of consent, the 
Government reversed the logic by automatically granting citizenship to French-born 
children of migrants unless they opted out when turning 18. This was primarily motivated 
by children of Algerian parents who rejected the automatic acquisition of French 
nationality as treacherous to their parents.83 The core idea that one could become French 
regardless of ethnic background has remained the same.  
France has also relatively relaxed thresholds for naturalisation. People born abroad 
but living in France can acquire citizenship if they have lived there for at least five years, 
though they may not depend on social welfare. A certain degree of assimilation is 
expected. Already since 1945, Article 21-24 of the French Civil Code states that 
‘assimilation into the French community, primarily by sufficient knowledge of the French 
language is a requirement for naturalisation’. Civil servants determine in a personal 
interview with the applicant whether the candidate possesses sufficient knowledge of 
French language and values to be eligible for naturalisation (Ersanilli, 2010: 29). Yet, 
immigrants do not need to renounce dual citizenship. In contrast to the other two countries, 
this is hardly disputed (Weil & Spire, 2006).  
Recently, naturalisation requirements have become more demanding. With the 
passage of a new Migration Act in 2006, foreigners who wish to take up permanent 
residence must sign a special ‘integration contract’ (‘contrat d’accueil et d’intégration’, 
CAI). In exchange for migrants’ promising to abide by the law and to integrate, the state 
offers free language courses and tutoring on civic rights and obligations. Migrants must 
have participated in those courses in order to obtain a ten-year residence permit, otherwise 
they only get a one-year renewable permit (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006: 189). Moreover, in 
2007, a law was adopted restricting family reunification. Migrant families’ access to 
France is conditional on their knowledge of “the language and values of the Republic”. 
The law also states that polygamy or female genital mutilation of children constitute a 
‘fault of assimilation’ (Weil, Spire & Bertossi, 2010). Should an applicant’s evaluation 
reveal insufficient knowledge, the applicant will be obliged to participate in a course, 
organised and financed by the Government. In contrast to Germany and the Netherlands, 
admission to France is conditional upon participation in the evaluation and course, not 
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 Because their parents had been French before the decolonisation of Algeria in 1962, they were 
automatically French at birth. With the 1997 law, they continued to have the opportunity to 
renounce French nationality. 
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upon achieving a certain level of knowledge, and the law does not differentiate between 
Western and non-Western family migrants.84 Upon arrival, their level is again evaluated to 
decide upon the level and length of the course belonging to the ‘integration contract’.   
In the Netherlands citizenship has likewise been based on a combination of ius soli 
and ius sanguinis. Third-generation immigrants gained automatic citizenship in 1953. This 
right was briefly questioned in 1981, but has not been changed (Heijs, 1995). Citizenship 
was further opened up in the 1980s when the Government recognised the Netherlands had 
become an immigrant country.85 In 1985, children of foreigners born in the Netherlands 
gained the right to opt in for Dutch nationality between the ages of 18 and 25 (in contrast 
to France, where the onus is on opting out). The maximum age of 25 was withdrawn in the 
year 2000. Only since 1985 has there been total gender equality in the transmission of 
citizenship to children at birth and in the acquisition of Dutch nationality for foreign men 
and women marrying Dutch nationals (Oers et al., 2006; see also Bonjour, 2009; de Hart, 
2003 and van Walsum, 2008 on Dutch family migration policies).   
Until 2003, there were no obstacles to the naturalisation procedure of second-
generation immigrants born in the Netherlands. The new Dutch Nationality Act of 2003, 
however, requires that second-generation immigrants opting for citizenship must undergo a 
public order investigation. As in Germany, applicants are denied if they have been 
convicted for certain crimes (van Oers et al., 2006). In contrast to the children of native 
Dutch, the loyalties of Dutch children with foreign backgrounds are thus questioned.  
The Netherlands has historically required immigrants to assimilate to a certain 
degree in order to become naturalised. Until the mid-1980s, when citizenship was further 
opened up, applicants’ degrees of civic integration had been screened by local authorities. 
Immigrants had to prove knowledge of the Dutch language and people, and that they had 
resided in the Netherlands for five years, before being granted a passport. Moreover, their 
family situation and ‘moral and social’ behaviour was evaluated (Heijs, 1995). Immigrants 
seeking naturalisation must also renounce dual citizenship. Between 1992 and 1997, this 
formal renunciation requirement was temporally withdrawn (van Oers et al., 2006). But the 
prohibition of dual citizenship was quickly reinstated and has remained a contentious issue 
ever since.86 Officially, only immigrants who have acquired citizenship by option (that is: 
second generation) can retain their previous citizenship but in reality many exemptions are 
also made with regard to the double citizenship of naturalised migrants (Ersanilli, 2010).  
In 1998, the Netherlands was the first country that passed a law on Civic 
Integration (‘Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers’, WIN). It obliges migrants from outside the 
European Union who have both lawfully resided in the Netherlands for five years 
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 Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (CESEDA) L211-2-1. The law 
writes: “Those exempted from this requirement include: people aged under 16 or over 65 years old, 
foreigners who have studied for at least 3 years at a French secondary school or at a francophone 
school abroad, foreigners who have studied for at least one year at a higher education establishment 
in France.” Pascouau (2011), fn 12. 
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 In 1979 the Dutch Scientific Council for Immigrant Policies (‘Wetenschappelijke Raad voor 
Regeringsadvies’, WRR) warned the government that it had to develop more active integration 
policies to prevent the socioeconomic deprivation and cultural isolation of migrants. An academic 
commission of experts also argued that the government could no longer deny that the Netherlands 
had become an immigration country. Hereafter, the government  started developing active 
integration policies. 
86
 ‘Ook VVD-lid heeft dubbele nationaliteit’, Volkskrant (October 25, 2010). 
  
81 
consecutively and maintained economic self-sufficiency to attend a naturalisation course in 
order to become Dutch.87 This consists of an oral and written language exam with 
questions on Dutch politics and culture, with the stated aim to foster migrants’ integration 
into Dutch society (Entzinger, 2005; Joppke, 2007).  
In December 2006, Parliament adopted a new Civic Integration Act (‘Wet 
Inburgering’, WI) replacing the previous Act of 1998. It obliges newly arrived migrants, as 
well as refugees with the right to asylum, to pass a civic integration exam in order to gain 
permanent residency (rather than for naturalisation). Unlike in France, migrants must pay 
for the costs of the classes (which are not compulsory) and the test themselves. Moreover, 
resident migrants between the ages of 16 and 65 who have not received Dutch education 
for at least eight years and who lived in the Netherlands prior to 1 January 2007, are also 
obliged to pass the test, as are refugees and clergymen from outside the EU. This last 
requirement indicates that foreign imams are seen as hindering the integration of Muslims 
in Dutch society. Several specific groups of naturalised citizens must also take the exam, 
such as new Dutch nationals who receive welfare benefits. Rather than voluntary 
participation in courses (as in France), passing the exam is mandatory in order to be 
eligible for a permanent residence permit and to continue receiving welfare benefits 
(Spijkerboer, 2007; Vink, 2007).88  
In March 2006, the Netherlands was the first country where a new Civic Integration 
Abroad Act (‘Wet Inburgering Buitenland’, WIB) went into force. It obliges would-be 
family migrants applying for a temporary residence permit to pass a language and 
integration test in their homeland (both spouses and children of 16 and 17 who are no 
longer required to attend school), but only from certain countries. Citizens of the European 
Union and European Economic Area states, of Switzerland, New Zealand, Australia, 
Canada, Japan, South Korea and the United States are not required to take the exam. They 
must pay the €350 costs of the course material and exam themselves. If they fail, they do 
not receive a visa until they pass another test (Pascouau, 2011). From the information 
video accompanying the preparatory material, which contains scenes of homosexual 
couples and nudist beaches, it also becomes clear that knowledge of Dutch liberal sexual 
norms is mandatory to enter the Netherlands (Michalowski, 2010). Moreover, family 
members in the Netherlands must demonstrate they have a long-term labour-contract and 
earn sufficiently to support themselves and new immigrant. Becoming familiar with Dutch 
liberal culture is thus a condition for both citizenship and denizenship, with particularly 
immigrants from ‘non-western’ countries wishing to join family members or spouses in the 
Netherlands being seen as a problematic social-economic and culturally deficient 
category.89 This may explain why several authors have pointed out the paradigm shift that 
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 In 2010, a Dutch court ruled that also two Turkish nationals - who objected to taking and paying 
for the (rather expensive) integration courses - could not be obliged to follow the courses due to the 
existence of special agreements between Turkey and the EU regarding the access of Turkish 
nationals to the labour market: ‘Rechter: Turken hoeven niet verplicht in te burgeren’, Algemeen 
Handelsblad (August 15, 2010). 
88
 The initial proposal to also include Dutch nationals from the Antilles and Aruba (and naturalized 
clergymen) was dropped after the Council of State argued that differentiation between native and 
new Dutch nationals contravened international and constitutionally embedded human rights to 
equality (Spijkerboer, 2007: 43).  
89
 In May 2008, Human Rights Watch declared the Wib to be discriminatory on the basis of 
international human rights law, which forbids countries from making distinctions based on 
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the Netherlands has observed from multiculturalism to assimilationism after the turn of the 
century (Entzinger, 2003; Joppke, 2004; Scholten, 2008; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). 
In Germany, citizenship acquisition was solely based on the ius sanguinis principle 
until 2000. German-born immigrants who could not prove German descent had difficulty 
applying for German citizenship. The naturalisation guidelines stated that citizenship was 
only granted if applicants proved a ‘voluntary and permanent commitment to Germany 
[…] judged from (the applicant’s) fundamental attitude with regard to the German cultural 
realm. A permanent commitment is principally not to be assumed when the applicant is 
active in a political emigrant organisation’ (quoted from Ersanilli, 2010: 33). Moreover, 
non-ethnic German immigrants had to relinquish their primary nationality in order to 
become German.  
This closed citizenship for non-ethnic Germans, in contrast to the open citizenship 
policy for migrants of German descent. In order to enable German (post-) war refugees’ 
return to their homeland, Article 116 of the FRG post-war constitution incorporated a 1913 
citizenship law recognising people with German nationality as German citizens, as well as 
migrants belonging to the German ‘People’ (‘Volkszugehörigkeit’). In order to be 
considered a German emigrant, one had to prove descent from an ethnic German, and 
adherence to the German nation, which could be shown by the use of German language 
within the family. Also, spouses and descendants of German emigrants considered victims 
of persecution under post-war measures in Eastern and Central Europe were entitled to 
naturalisation. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, when Germany witnessed large streams of 
immigrants from the East, conditions became more stringent for German emigrants. In 
1993, the Government introduced a quota system and a language test, in order to prove 
ethnic Germanness. Since 2000, non-German relatives and descendants of German 
repatriates have required certificates of German language skills before being granted 
citizenship and entrance into German territory (Hailbronner, 2006). 
In 2000, a new citizenship law came into effect introducing the ius soli principle, 
automatically naturalising foreign children born on German soil. While this seems more 
open than Dutch and French citizenship policies, where foreigners’ children must still opt 
out and opt in for nationality once they turn eighteen, the criteria automatic citizenship 
upon birth are higher: at least one parent must have lived in Germany for at least eight 
consecutive years and must hold a permanent residency permit. Moreover, children must 
relinquish their parents’ citizenship before the age of 23 or lose their German nationality 
(Ersanilli, 2010). Because of those conditions, only 40 % of children born to foreign 
parents in Germany automatically receive German nationality (Özcan, 2007).  
Naturalisation requirements for migrants in Germany are also more demanding than 
in France and the Netherlands. In 1991, the CDU-FDP Government decided that non-
ethnic migrants could claim citizenship after 15 years of lawful and permanent residency in 
Germany, or 8 years for minors aged between 16 and 23 (who had completed at least 6 
years of school in Germany). They had to renounce their former nationality and identify 
with German culture, could not have been prosecuted for a criminal offence and had to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
ethnicity or nationality in their immigration policies. It would indirectly violate the rights of 
citizens from Turkish and Moroccan backgrounds to family reunion, since the law explicitly targets 
migrants from certain (‘non-Western’) nationalities and also indirectly discriminates these two 
groups –and particular women - whose social-economic status makes it harder to fulfil the income 
requirements: Human Rights Watch (2008), Discrimination in the Name of Integration. 
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demonstrate an ability to earn a living (Ersanilli, 2010; Hailbronner, 2006; 2010). 
Naturalisation could thus be seen as a favour, dependent on the wish and will of (local) 
state authorities. In 1993, naturalisation became a right for migrants, and under the 2000 
law, migrants no longer need to prove a commitment to the German culture. Instead, they 
must declare loyalty to the German Constitution and fulfil certain language requirements. 
Moreover they can now apply for citizenship after 8 years of permanent residence. This 
illustrates a change of perception, with naturalisation and citizenship for immigrants now 
being considered in the German public interest. However, applicants must not have a 
criminal record, and they may not receive welfare benefits or maintain their previous 
nationality. Exceptions are made for citizens from EU member-states that allow for dual 
nationality. Since 2007, they no longer need to renounce their previous nationality 
(Hailbronner, 2006; 2010).  
With the Immigration Act of 2004, implemented on 1st January 2005, requirements 
were tightened again. Migrants have to participate and – as in the Netherlands - 
successfully complete a civic integration course in order to be eligible for naturalisation. 
The course consists of a language component and a class on of the basics of German 
history and politics (Hailbronner, 2010). Applicants must not be engaged in 
unconstitutional political activities and, unlike France, are subject to expulsion for terrorist 
affiliation (Michalowski, 2007). Security considerations resulting from post-9.11 anti-
terrorism legislation have thus shaped immigration laws. 
Finally, Germany has also restricted family migration, including for (non-ethnic 
German) relatives of German emigrants. Foreign spouses can acquire German citizenship 
through marriage, after two years of marriage and a residence permit of three years, and 
must renounce their original nationality (Hailbronner, 2006). Since an amendment of the 
nationality law was put into effect on July 15, 2007, spouses of Germans living abroad 
must be able to make themselves understood in German at a basic level before they are 
eligible for a residence permit. They can submit a certificate from the famous Goethe 
Language Institute, or they may demonstrate their knowledge in a personal interview with 
staff at German embassies and consulates (Pascouau, 2011). This requirement does not 
apply for nationals of the EU and countries like the USA, Canada, Japan, and South Korea, 
or for the spouses of highly educated professionals, such as academics. The law thus seems 
to be designed to select predominantly skilled immigrants by targeting poorer families of 
Turkish immigrants in Germany (Michalowski, 2010). This is reinforced by the fact that 
Germany, unlike France, does not offer free language classes in the country of origin. 
To summarise, due to different nationality legislation, most Muslim immigrants to 
France or the Netherlands are already nationals of those countries, in contrast to German 
Muslims who were long excluded from political citizenship rights. Yet in all three 
countries a convergence has occurred, with France and particularly the Netherlands putting 
up higher cultural and linguistic boundaries to the acquisition of nationality for foreigners 
– boundaries that already existed in Germany, which grants nationality based on place of 
birth. 
      
Integration policies  
In 1981, the Socialist Government of France first developed integration policies to 
improve the position of immigrants in France. Even though some left-wing politicians 
temporarily recognised immigrants’ ‘right to be different’ (‘droit à la différence’), the 
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Government never officially adopted a policy of recognition. In exchange for migrants’ 
willingness to integrate into a common Republican democratic culture, the state promised 
them equal rights and the benefits of social inclusion. Immigrants gained the right to 
establish their own associations and to apply for subsidies in 1981. Since then, the 
established religious and class-based associations that had regulated immigrant 
incorporation had to compete with immigrants’ own associations for government subsidies 
(Ireland, 2000). The Government also strengthened immigrants’ protection against 
administrative abuse and deportation without due process, streamlining the residence 
permit system (Ireland, 2000: 238). Nonetheless, President Mitterrand never made good on 
his 1981 promise to give immigrants the right to vote in local elections, and political rights 
continued to be attached to French nationality. 
The national government has no organised way of consulting immigrants about 
policy decisions, neither integrating them into advisory bodies nor involving them in the 
implementation of Government policies (MIPEX, 2010). Even though ad hoc meetings do 
occur, the government has a hand in the selection of participants and only cooperates with 
associations loyal to its agenda. In 1989, a consultative body on immigrant integration was 
installed - the High Council on Integration (Haut Conseil d’intégration, HCI). This body, 
however, does not include representatives of ethnic minorities per se, but rather “experts” 
on immigration and integration issues. It makes proposals and launches yearly research 
reports on integration issues, but it has no regulatory or legal powers.  
Since its inception, the HCI has continued to legitimise the colour-blind approach 
to French integration policies. According to Bertossi (2007: 7), ‘It is the guardian of the 
Republican tradition in its most conservative form’. Illustrative of the stress on the 
uniformity of the citizenry is the HCI’s first report, issued in 1991, which states that ‘the 
French conception of integration should obey a logic of equality and not a logic of 
minorities’ (cited in Poulter (1997): 51). In its 1995 report, the HCI wrote that immigrant 
cultures do not need to become extinct, and may even ‘be a factor of integration’ (quoted 
from Labourde, 2008:190). Yet, it was not the responsibility of the state to cultivate such 
cultures or to grant minorities rights of special political representation. By contrast, 
immigrants would automatically be socialised into mainstream culture through their 
exposure to national institutions like education, the army, the universal welfare state, and 
trade-unions.  
In line with the difference-blind logic of Republican citizenship, French authorities 
have continued to refuse to take into account racial and ethnic differences when assessing 
immigrants’ social mobility or incorporating their interests in state structures. After 
naturalisation, all distinctions between French citizens are made irrelevant (Bleich, 2000). 
There is even a 1978 law forbidding the gathering of statistical data on the basis of 
ethnicity, except under restricted circumstances of individual consent and formal approval 
of a national commission (‘Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés’, 
CNIL) (Bleich, 2000; Geddes & Guireaudon, 2004). In order to target inequality and 
redistribute resources without having to recognise ethnicity, French authorities have 
instead resorted to a policy of ‘replacement’ (de Zwart & Poppelaars, 2007). This means 
that no group-specific policies are developed, but that educational and labour-market 
policies implicitly focus on marginalised migrant groups.  
Urban integration policies (‘Politique de la Ville’) target areas with low social-
economic standards (‘cités’) rather than ethnic minorities per se. The state subsidises 
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housing projects that are selected for their enduring poverty and unemployment 
(‘Habitations á Loyer Modéré’, HLM) and creates priority zones of education in some poor 
areas (since 1981 the ‘Zones d’éducation prioritaires’, ZEP, and since the 1990s, an 
additional category of schools exist in areas called ‘Zones urbaines sensibles’, ZUP) 
(Laurence & Vaisse, 2006: 186). Educational establishments also receive extra funding if 
they give priority to students from disadvantaged neighbourhoods, and in 2004 a vast 
system of vocational training for the unemployed was established. The social disparities 
remaining between migrant ethnic minorities and native French are thus primarily 
attributed to class, rather than to cultural differences or racial prejudices (Labourde, 2008: 
184).  
That anti-discrimination legislation in the criminal law and the Labour Code have 
largely focused on acts of expressive racism, rather than on equality of outcome, is 
illustrative of the ethnicity-blind approach to citizenship. Anti-discrimination laws that 
focus on equality of outcome rather equal opportunity would, after all, require some 
recognition of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ as real sociological categories (Geddes & Guireaudon, 
2004). By only focusing on openly racist speech, French policies fail to tackle routine 
discriminatory practices that are not always intentional and may be embedded in 
institutional practices. Local authorities therefore covertly engage in the management of 
ethnic diversity. Informal quota systems exist to encourage native white French to buy or 
rent property in such migrant populated areas (Bleich, 2000: 52-53). Moreover, authorities 
have increasingly called for a change of strategy to tackle structural inequalities. In 2003, 
the National Commission on Civil Liberties (CNIL) advised the Government to start 
collecting ethnic data for statistical studies in order to better combat inequality. Then-
President Jacques Chirac was one of the many who rejected the idea, and the 
Constitutional Council ruled that the collection of such data conflicted with Article 1 of the 
French Constitution, protecting equality between citizens and the ‘indivisible’ French 
nation (Mc Goldrick, 2006: 41).90 After the riots of 2005 in French suburbs, the then-
Minister of Interior Nicolas Sarkozy launched the initiative to introduce positive 
discrimination measures. The idea was fiercely criticised, and was later withdrawn by 
Sarkozy, who nonetheless appointed a significant number of women from immigrant 
backgrounds to his cabinet in 2007 (Raymond, 2007; see chapter 6).  
The anti-discrimination framework has changed under European pressure to 
implement EU Equality Directives. In 2001, an antidiscrimination law was passed, and on 
January 17th 2002 the prohibition of discrimination in housing was included in the social 
modernisation law (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006: 61). In 2004, a ‘High Council against 
Discrimination and For Equality’ (Haut Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et 
pour Egalité, HALDE) was set up, including an Equal Treatment Commission one year 
                                                           
90
 In 2003, a public debate emerged when the national statistical agency (CNIL) suggested 
including ‘ethnic origin’ in a census to measure experiences of discrimination. In contrast to the 
Netherlands, ethnicity would be determined based on people’s self-identification rather than place 
of birth or ancestry. The National Statistics Institute (‘Institut National de la Statistique et des 
Études Economique’, INSEE) and National Demographics Institute (‘Institut National d’Etudes 
Demographiques’, INDD) opposed the collection of such data (Guiraudon, 1998). Also, the then-
President Chirac emphasized that: “The Republic does not recognise people on the basis of their 
origin. You are French, and there are French people of all ethnic origins. The idea of checking a 
box for ethnic identity is scandalous and contrary to the principle of the Republic. It’s illegal and 
immoral” (quoted in Laurence & Vaise, 2006: 176).  
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later. The HALDE must be consulted on all legal bills pertaining to discrimination. It gives 
legal advice, mediates in conflicts if individuals feel discriminated against, and can initiate 
investigations and lawsuits on behalf of victims of ethnic, religious or other discrimination 
in housing, work or entertainment establishments before the criminal court (Geddes & 
Guireaudon, 2004). Together with the smaller and older National Advisory Commission on 
Human Rights (the Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme, CNCDH), 
it may also embark upon research and launch public campaigns to fight discrimination. 
After the riots of 2005, the HALDE was given additional enforcement powers and the 
legislature adopted an Equal Opportunities Law. This law focuses particularly on 
improving the educational and labour-market participation of socio-economically 
marginalised youth.  
Moreover, non-state human rights associations are involved in the deliberation over 
and implementation of anti-racism legislation, such as the International League against 
Racism and Anti-Semitism (‘Ligue Internationale contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme’, 
LICRA), the League of Human Rights (‘Ligue du Droits des Hommes’, LDH), SOS 
Racism, and the Movement against Racism and for Solidarity between Peoples (‘le 
Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour l’Amitié entre les Peuples’, MRAP) (Bleich, 2002). 
Since 1985, these four associations, which have strong universalist outlooks, have also 
been allowed to join lawsuits as plaintiffs (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006). Institutional 
opportunities to report discrimination have thus improved over time. According to 
Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse (2006: 191), it is even clear that “the parameters of 
French policies towards the country’s minorities have changed dramatically in the past 
decades, from a classically republican and “colour-blind” approach to something more 
nuanced.” 
In the Netherlands, immigrant integration policies have shifted over time 
(Duyvendak & Scholten, 2009). From 1980 to 1994, the government’s ‘ethnic minority 
policy’ focused on improving immigrants’ legal and socio-economic conditions and 
promoting cultural group emancipation. In its first policy report of 1983, the Government 
aimed ‘to achieve a society in which the members of minority groups that reside in the 
Netherlands can, each individually as well as group-wise, enjoy an equal position and full 
opportunities for development’ (Minderhedennota, 1983, TK 1982-1983, 16102, no. 21: 
107, quoted from Scholten, 2007: 81, his italics). Nationality was dissociated from 
citizenship in 1985 when foreigners were granted the right to vote in local elections after 5 
years of legal residency. Non-citizens were also allowed to work in the civil service, 
excluding the police force and the army (Ersanilli, 2010). In contrast to France, the 
Netherlands embarked upon a policy of recognition, believing that integration was most 
likely to be accomplished through strong ethnic minority migrant cultures. But instead of a 
normative multiculturalism that regards the preservation of immigrant cultures itself as 
valuable, Dutch integration policies focused on cultural retention as a means of smoothly 
integrating immigrants into Dutch society, believing that strong cultural identities could 
help immigrants find their way in the new society (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2009; 
Vermeulen & Pennix, 2000: Rath et al., 2001).  
The Government focused only on specific minority groups that were seen as 
lagging behind, such as Moluccan, Surinamese and Antillean postcolonial migrants, 
Turkish and Moroccan labour-migrants, as well as refugees and indigenous minorities like 
‘gypsies’ and ‘caravan dwellers’ (de Zwart en Poppelaars, 2007; Entzinger, 2003; 
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Scholten, 2008). In 1985, an advisory and consultation structure was developed to enhance 
minorities’ political voice, and to contain social peace in a de facto multicultural society. It 
was formalised in 1997 when the Law on the Consultation of Minorities (‘Wet 
Overlegorgaan Minderheden’) was adopted. Article 2 of the 1997 Law explicitly allows 
self-organisations on grounds of ethnicity. Article 6 also provides funding for minority 
associations (Kortmann, 2010). 
Even though the Netherlands formally abandoned its group-based approach in its 
‘integration policy plan’ of 1994, the Minister of Integration continues to meet regularly 
with officially recognised minority representative bodies.  Also, at the municipality level, 
other special representative bodies exist. The government today funds only self-
organisations that will contribute to the social-economic participation and emancipation of 
individual immigrants or enhance inter-cultural dialogue. Previously it structurally funded 
immigrant groups that were categorised as socioeconomically lagging. In other words, 
authorities have been quite hesitant to fund religious activities directly, regarding this as an 
infringement on the separation between church and state (Rijkschroef & Duyvendak, 
2004). In fact, by 1979, the Scientific Council for Government Policy had already rejected 
the idea of creating a new Islamic pillar (Vink, 2007), fearing it would isolate itself from a 
secularized, individualistic society (Rath et al., 2001, see chapter 4).  
The Dutch government temporarily experimented with affirmative action in the 
1980s and early 1990s in order to enhance the number of minority members in government 
services (‘Etnische Minderheden bij de Overheden’, EMO), successfully doubling the 
number of young Moroccan and Turkish people in the civil service during both 1987-89 
and 1993-1995 (Doomernik, 1988: 64). Furthermore, employers were encouraged to 
increase the number of ethnic minority employees. In 1990, the so-called STAR agreement 
was reached, but employers were reluctant to implement it. Thereafter, the Government 
proposed a law requiring private employers to register the ethnic composition of their 
personnel to enhance diversity in business. In 1998, the Act for Stimulation of Labour 
Market Participation (‘Wet Stimulering Arbeidsdeelname Minderheden’, Wet SAMEN) 
went into force. However, ethnicity registration was fiercely opposed by employers and the 
Act was discontinued in 2004.91 
Also of note is the 1994 creation of the National Bureau against Racism (LBR) and 
Europe’s first Equal Treatment Commission (ETC), which has its origins in combating sex 
discrimination (see Chapter 6). In 1994, the general Equal Treatment Act (ETA) went into 
force, prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sex, faith, political orientation, race 
(including ethnic background), nationality, sexual orientation and marital status. Article 2 
explicitly allows for discrimination on the basis of ethnicity for the purpose of equality of 
outcome. Also, the Dutch Law on Data Collection (‘Wet bescherming Persoonsgegevens’) 
explicitly allows for ethnic differentiation in redistributing resources as an exception to the 
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 In addition to the Wet SAMEN, agreements made between governments and businesses have 
been abolished, such as the ‘Convent Minorities’ (‘Minderhedenconvenant’). Several programmes 
to subsidize employers that hire ethnic minorities with little opportunity on the labour market have 
also ended. Nevertheless, up until very recently the government still encouraged diversity in 
employment through soft policy measures, including the creation of jobs/internships for certain 
groups of people, the creation of co-ed learn and work trajectories, improvement of information for 
employers on skilled persons with non-Dutch backgrounds and job mediation. 
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non-discrimination principle embedded in Article 1 of the Dutch constitution.92 The 
Netherlands is unique among the three countries in that the European Racial Equality 
Directive (2000/43/EC) and Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC) have been 
implemented in national legislation without any difficulty (Ruygrok, 2003). 
Since the mid-1990s, authorities have abandoned the idea of emancipating 
immigrants by fostering their ethno-cultural group identities. They now put more emphasis 
on the legal rights and duties of individual immigrants, and on ensuring equal opportunity 
in education and the labour-market, particularly for youngsters (Scholten, 2008; 
Duyvendak & Scholten, 2009). After the turn of the century, cultural adaptation became 
more important for integration, as demonstrated by the introduction of citizenship and 
language tests for nationality acquisition. Rather than foster a society composed of 
different ethnic minority groups coexisting alongside a culturally dominant majority, the 
Government now placed emphasis on shared national values and the rule of law. The 
Government (VVD, D66, CDA) clearly stated in its 2004 policy report that ‘this cabinet 
[…] distances itself from multiculturalism as a normative ideal, from the open-endedness 
of the past and from a government that takes ethnic minorities by the hand as if they were 
subjects in need of care’ (quoted from Vink, 2007: 346). Moreover, immigrants were made 
increasingly responsible for their own integration, which was seen as a ‘citizenship duty’. 
Policies also target immigrant women, who are primarily targeted in their role as working 
mothers and educators, aiming at the cultural integration of their children in Dutch society 
(Roggeband & Verloo, 2007).93 This is not a novelty. Similarly, in the 1950s the Dutch 
Government designed special integration programmes to foster the assimilation of 
postcolonial immigrants from the former Dutch Indies. These were likewise directed at 
women as bearers of their culture. Indonesian-Dutch mothers in particular were educated 
by social workers to raise their children according to Dutch culture and traditions 
(Schuster, 1999).  
Nonetheless, the ‘National Consultation of Minorities’ still exists, allowing the 
Government to meet with officially recognised ‘minorities’ (‘Landelijk Overleg 
Minderheden’, LOM, before LAOM).94 The Netherlands also offers various programmes 
on public television and radio targeting minorities (Koopmans et al. 2006). Moreover, 
while policy paradigms have shifted from multiculturalism to civic assimilation via social-
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 Article 1 establishes that ‘all persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in all 
circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on 
any other ground whatsoever shall not be permitted’. 
93
 Nationalised Dutch migrant women have been policy targets since the introduction of citizenship 
integration courses in 2007 (and immigrant resident mothers since 1998). Because they cannot be 
obliged to participate in the course, the state allows them to voluntarily participate in the language 
courses offered by municipalities free of charge. Research found that most migrant women are 
assigned to courses testing language skills in the domains of ‘citizenship’ that focus on ‘raising 
children’ rather than in the domains of ‘work’ or ‘entrepreneurship’ that are primarily followed by 
male migrants: Kirk, K. (2010),‘A Gendered Story of Citizenship: A Narrative Policy analysis of 
Dutch Civic Integration Policy’, PhD thesis defended at department of Political Science of Queens 
University Belfast. 
94
 The LOM is intended both to advise the government and to represent minorities’ interests. It 
consists of eight minority organisations, and meets with the government at least three times a year 
to discuss matters of integration. These officially subsidized minority groups are supposed to 
represent Turks, Moloccans, Southern European communities, Caribbean Dutch, Surinamese, 
Moroccans and refugees.  
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economic integration, the underlying categories of immigrants as ethnic minorities needing 
to be ‘integrated’ have remained fairly stable. Individual immigrants continue to be seen as 
members of different ethnic communities rather than of one Dutch nation. The Dutch label 
‘allochthone’, for instance, was invented as a governmental statistical term to refer to 
people with non-Dutch ethnic backgrounds, in order to register their socio-economic 
situation for policy purposes.95 However, the word gained meaning beyond its initial 
usage. It functionally sets apart immigrants with real or attributed ethnic identities from 
native white Dutch, suggesting that integration will never be possible (Essed & Trienekes, 
2008). As Frank de Zwart (2009: 15) aptly summarises: “People have learned to think of 
Dutch society as composed of an ethnic Dutch majority, surrounded by various sharply 
distinguished ethnic or cultural minorities. In the process differences are emphasised, 
numbers exaggerated, and stereotypes reinforced”. 
In Germany, no national integration framework existed until 2000, when 
authorities officially abandoned the myth that it was not an immigration country. This does 
not mean that there were previously no integration measures. In 1975, a coalition 
government of the Socialist and Liberal parties presented a programme for immigrant 
employment, systematically outlining the idea of ‘temporary integration’ for former 
migrant workers and their families. A special commission was charged with drafting 
comprehensive proposals for future policy. Even though its proposals stated that the 
Federal Republic of Germany was not a country of immigration, and that foreign workers 
should ultimately return to their homelands, it also urged the Government to intensify its 
programmes for integration. The Government responded in 1978, installing a Federal 
Commissioner for Foreigners (‘Beauftragter der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen', 
hereinafter ‘Ausländerbeauftragte’) in the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs to 
provide information and advice about the labour market and living situation of foreign 
migrants. Similar officers were created at the Länder level (Broeders, 2001). In 1980, the 
Government endorsed the advice of the then-Commissioner for Foreigners to further the 
integration of immigrant workers by fostering the ‘social’ integration of second and third 
generations. Yet, it also emphasised the need to maintain ties with the countries of origin to 
encourage an eventual return ‘home,’ both through so-called ‘mother-tongue courses’ and 
monetary incentives, and it remained difficult for immigrants and their children to 
naturalise.  
Local authorities initiated programmes to foster the social and economic 
incorporation of immigrants: they funded welfare organisations offering social workers and 
leisure centres to immigrants of different nationalities and religions: Catholic welfare 
organisations catered to the interests of Catholic migrants from Italy and Croatia; 
Evangelical organisations supported Orthodox Greek migrants, and Social Democrats 
supported Turkish guest-workers (Michalowski, 2007). Migrant workers also joined trade-
unions, which enabled them to influence working conditions, and their numbers on 
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 Officially, the term refers to residents born in a foreign country who have at least one foreign-
born parent. It also includes Netherlands-born children with at least one foreign-born parent. 
Allochtones are juxtaposed to ‘autochtones,’ people of Dutch birth and ancestry. Further 
distinctions are made between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ allochtones. See for a geneology of the 
term, as well as its racist connotations: Yanow D. & Ter Haar, M., (forthcoming), ‘People out of 
Place: Allochtony and autochtony in the Netherlands identity discourse – metaphors and categories 
in action’, Journal of International Relations and Development. Special Issue on Politics and 
Language, edited by Alan Cienki & Dvora Yanow.  
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Germany’s industrial advisory boards significantly increased after they gained voting 
rights in 1972 in factory and company councils (Thränhardt, 2008). Well-organised 
language courses and labour-market integration projects existed at the local level, even 
though they primarily focused on Aussiedler (Schönwälder, 2006; Thränhardt, 2008). 
Some liberal Länder wanted to introduce local voting rights for foreigners in 1989. But 
when a case was brought before the Constitutional Court, its judges concluded that only 
German nationals had voting rights on grounds of the Basic Law (Broeders, 2001).  
In June 2001, the ‘Independent Commission Immigration’ – also known as the 
Süssmuth Commission’, headed by Rita Süssmuth (CDU) and Hans-Jochen Vogel (SPD) 
and installed by the SPD-Green coalition - advised the Government to replace these 
‘pragmatic’ integration projects with a federal and structural framework that no longer 
focused exclusively on German emigrants, but rather on integrating ‘people of different 
cultures and background’. The Commission, consisting of several city representatives, 
social, religious, political and scientific representatives and members of (ethnic) interest 
groups, also advised the Government to open up public service jobs for non-German 
nationals.96 This policy advice served as a guideline for Germany’s present-day integration 
policies. In 2002, a new Federal Department for Migration and Refugees was installed 
(‘Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge’, BAMF) to finance and coordinate (together 
with local authorities) the civic integration courses that migrants must follow to be eligible 
for a permanent residence permit. The policy shift is also indicated by the change of the 
name in 2005 of the Federal Commissioner for Foreigners to the Commissioner for 
Migration, Refugees and Integration (‘Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, 
Flüchtlinge und Integration’).  
Furthermore, the Federal Government has started to reach out to migrant minorities. 
In 2006, the CDU/CSU-SDP Government of Chancellor Angela Merkel initiated the first 
of the so-called ‘Integration Summit’ (‘Integrationsgipfel’). Several federal and local 
authorities and a wide range of selected immigrant self-organisations and individuals were 
invited to discuss integration issues. This was primarily a top-down initiative to get 
immigrant organisations involved in the development and implementation of a National 
Integration Plan, the agenda of which was nonetheless set by the Government (Musch, 
2010). So-called Foreigner Councils have long existed at the municipality level 
(‘Ausländerbeirate’), collectively representing immigrant interests. These councils must be 
consulted by municipal governments in policy debates. Both naturalised immigrants and 
immigrants that have lived in the respective municipality for three consecutive months can 
be elected to these multi-ethnic and multi-religious councils. Hence, even though they are 
German nationals, immigrants are still approached as ‘foreigners’ (‘Ausländer’).97 
Employment restrictions also continue to exist for third-country nationals in certain 
public sectors, including the police, army and education (‘Beamte’), even though regular 
civil service jobs (‘Angestellte’) were opened up for third-country nationals in 1993. 
Today, only few Länder allow foreigners as Beamte, particularly in the police, if there is an 
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 Leise E., Germany strives to integrate Immigrants with New Policies. Migration Policy Institute: 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=610 (Retrieved August 13, 2010). 
97
 Policy documents initially labelled labour-migrants as ‘foreign workers’ (‘Fremdarbeiter’). This 
term was replaced in the 1960s by ‘guestworkers’ (‘Gastarbeiter’), because of the former’s 
connotation to the Third Reich’s label for forced labour-force (Pratt Ewing, 2008: 217). Hereafter, 
labels have shifted from ‘foreigners’ (‘Ausländer), ‘foreign co-citizens’ (‘ausländische Mitbürger’), 
‘migrants’ (‘Migranten’) to ‘immigrants’ (‘Zuwander’) (Michalowski, 2007: 35). 
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urgent public interest (Koopmans, Michalowski & Waibel, 2010). No affirmative action 
programmes exist to enhance the number of minorities in public institutions. Moreover, 
only a weak anti-discrimination framework exists. In 2006 the general Equal Treatment 
Act (ETA) came into force, based upon the equality Directives of the EU (EC 2000/78; 
2000/43) that obliges member-states to protect people from ethnic and racial 
discrimination. In order to pass the Equal Treatment Act in the Federal Parliament and the 
Federal Council, the Act had to be amended several times (see Rottman & Ferree, 2008).98  
The result is that the current Act provides only moderate protection from 
discrimination for citizens. Its scope does not extend to public institutions and does not 
include discrimination between individuals or on grounds of national citizenship; it only 
protects people in large firms from discrimination on grounds of religion. Moreover, the 
Equal Treatment Commission is located in the Federal Ministry of Family and Women’s 
affairs and does therefore not have the same autonomy or judicial scope as its Dutch and 
French counterparts: its employees are appointed by the Government, and it cannot 
sanction or advise employers or (federal) authorities to compensate people who have been 
discriminated against, or file complaints to courts. While immigrants thus benefit from 
Germany’s corporatist welfare state in regard to social-economic rights, the German state 
has only recently paid attention to their civic and political rights.  
 
To summarise this section, striking differences exist between the approaches the three 
countries have taken towards immigrants. Germany long denied being an immigration 
country and primarily focused on improving social-economic conditions for migrants as 
workers. Due to their lack of citizenship, few opportunities existed for immigrants to 
access public service jobs, to vote, or to claim equal opportunities. Even when naturalised, 
immigrants are only moderately protected against discrimination. By contrast, France and 
the Netherlands have practiced open citizenship and developed active integration 
programmes since the 1980s. French integration strategies exemplify a vision of a country 
composed of individual Frenchmen all sharing a similar Republican culture. Immigrants 
are invited to acquire this status and expected to become culturally French, which implies 
becoming convinced of the value of Republican national identity. French Universalism and 
its emphasis on common humanity is a powerful weapon against unequal treatment, but the 
denial of difference makes it difficult to tackle structural and unintentional ethnic 
discrimination, or to involve disadvantaged groups in policy debates. By contrast, Dutch 
integration strategies illustrate a perception of a nation composed of different ethnic 
minorities coexisting alongside a culturally dominant majority, one in which cultural 
difference was initially tolerated but increasingly seen as obstructive. Halleh Ghorashi 
(2006: 8-17) has situated this continuing group-based thinking about cultural differences in 
the legacy of pillarisation, which divided Dutch society in strictly divided groups and 
would have left the Dutch with a “categorical thinking” mindset that entails an essentialist 
conception of culture. This makes it “seem almost impossible to detach the individual 
immigrant from his/her cultural and/or ethnic category” (see also Rath (1991) on the 
‘minoritisation’ habitus in Dutch discourses about citizenship). While the existence of 
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 A first draft from 2001 (initiated by the then SPD Minister of Justice Herta Däubler-Gmelin) 
failed to pass the Federal Parliament. A new version was rejected by the Federal Council, which 
was at that time dominated by the conservative parties CDU/CSU. The new draft was a 
compromise between the coalition partners CDU/CSU and SPD (Rottman & Ferree, 2008). 
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ethnic minority councils and of antidiscrimination machinery thus makes it easier for 
Muslim women to draw attention to particular kinds of disadvantages, the emphasis on 
(real or perceived) cultural differences may simultaneously function to exclude immigrants 
from the nation.  
All three countries’ citizenship and integration programmes have gradually 
converged, with Germany opening up citizenship rights to German-born immigrant 
children and France and the Netherlands restricting naturalisation and requiring shared 
values. We may therefore expect a convergence over time in the policy debates on the 
hijab.   
 
5.2.3 Political allies for claims of equality and cultural recognition 
In France, we may expect the Left to function as an ally for migrant women to claim 
recognition of their headscarves. When in the 1980s migrants started mobilising to claim 
substantive equality and nationality, migrant-related issues became the subject of political 
discussion in the 1980s, the Socialist Party took up the claims of immigrants to improve 
their political and social economic rights, and initially adopted a pluralist discourse (Favell, 
1998; Feldblum, 1999; Wayland, 1995). But in the mid 1980s, the PS abandoned its 
multicultural approach in favour of colour-blind Republicanism, due to the ethno-
nationalistic, differentialist discourse of the far-Right (Bertossi, 2007; Duyvendak, 2001). 
The PCF has moderated its initial reactionary working-class populism and, together with 
the Greens, gradually accepted the importance of immigrants’ self-identities for their 
emancipation. In 2000, Jospin’s left-wing Government of the Socialist party, Greens, 
Radicals and Communists endorsed the claims of ethnic and racial minorities, by passing a 
law acknowledging slavery as a crime against humanity.99 Moreover, when in 2005 the 
UMP parliamentary majority passed a law that obliged high-school teachers to teach the 
‘positive sides’ of colonialism, post-colonial citizens, scholars and school-unions forged 
successful alliances with Left wing parties to have the law repealed.  
The established Right, by contrast, adopted some elements of the FN’s discourse by 
politicising nationality and immigration control, culminating in a 1993 reform and 
nationality law that curtailed the rights to automatic citizenship of postcolonial immigrant 
children.100 A new politicisation of Republican citizenship occurred after 2002, when Jean-
Marie Le Pen of FN came second in the first round of the Presidential elections, following 
a campaign in which the issues of the legal status of nationality and dual citizenship had 
figured prominently. The established Right shifted attention to immigration control, law 
and order and a defence of nationalistic values, with then-Minister of the Interior Nicolas 
Sarkozy declaring youth from the poor migrant-populated suburbs to be ‘scum’ when faced 
with civil unrest there in October 2005. President Sarkozy launched a Ministry of 
Immigration, Integration and National Identity in 2007, and in November 2009 the 
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 This had much to do with the active lobbying of the single black member of the French 
Parliament, Christiana Taubira (of the parliamentary group Socialiste, Radical et Citoyen) and her 
relationship with the black movement in France, whose ‘Representative Council for Black 
Associations’ (‘Conseil Representatif des Associations Noires’, CRAN), which brings together 
sixty NGOs of black people, successfully lobbied for the law. 
100
 Bornschier, S. & Laschat, R., ‘The Evolution of the French Political Space’. Unpublished paper 
at: http://emiliano-grossman.webou.net/hopfichiers/08%20-%20Bornschier-Lachat.pdf (Retrieved 
January 14, 2011). 
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Government introduced a ‘grand debate on national identity’ (Weil, Spire & Bertossi, 
2010). In 2007, the UMP passed a controversial law requiring family migrants to undergo 
DNA tests in order to prove blood affiliations (the ‘loi Hortefeux’ of 2007).101 President 
Sarkozy has, however, also introduced ethnicity into the migration debate from a different 
angle, by openly admitting to be in favour of affirmative action measures to enhance ethnic 
and religious diversity, an admission that breaks the taboo on different-blindness.  
In the Netherlands, we may expect that until the turn of the century the traditional 
pro-migrant party PvdA, the Green party (both of which have a relatively high number of 
parliamentarians with a Turkish or Moroccan background102), as well as the pro-
pillarisation/multiculturalism party CDA will function as allies for hijab-wearing women’s 
claims of recognition. However, we may observe a shift in position of all parties after the 
turn of the century to the more restrictive positions of the Right, emphasising the 
assimilation of immigrants to a Dutch culture.  
During the 1990s already, an incipient cultural cleavage emerged when the nation 
came to the fore again in debates about immigration and integration. Some members of the 
Liberal party were critical of cultural accommodation, with faction leader Frits Bolkestein 
of the VVD arguing at the Liberal International Conference of 1991 that Muslim 
immigrants had to adopt the principles of secularism and equality between men and 
women.103 This triggered a ‘national minorities’ debate about the conditions of integration, 
in particular the role of immigrants’ ethno-religious culture in that process (see particularly 
Prins, 2000). Also within the PvdA, the heritage of Dutch multiculturalism was criticised. 
In a 2000 article called ‘the Multicultural Drama,’104 the historian and former Social-
Democrat Paul Scheffer voiced his concerns about the emergence of an ethnic underclass 
of Muslims, whose cultural differences conflicted with Dutch democratic achievements. 
The director of the Dutch Social and Cultural Research institute (SCP), Paul Schnabel, also 
published a critical article called ‘The Multicultural Illusion,’ which likewise criticised 
cultural relativism.105 This accompanied debates about what the nation is or should be, 
with the emergence of historical canons to be taught in schools (Kesic & Duyvendak, 
2010).  
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 This was fiercely criticized and parallels were drawn to National Socialism, which selected Jews 
for exclusion based on origin. The Senate amended the law significantly, while the new Minister of 
Integration of 2009, Érik Besson (PS), has not taken up the issue of DNA tests. 
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 The representation of people with an ethnic minority background in politics is relatively high in 
the Netherlands. In 2006, 10 percent of national politicians had a minority background, which 
equals their proportion of the Dutch population, but municipal politicians had only 3 percent 
(Keuzenkamp & Merens, 2006). I could not find comparable data for the other two countries, since 
France does not register ethnicity while German data is based on place of birth rather than ethnic 
origin. In Germany, 8.2 % of the candidates in the Bundestag was first or second generation 
migrant in 1998. This decreased to 5.4 % in 2005, mostly because of a reducing number of ethnic 
German legislatures migrating from Eastern Europe: Fonseca, S. (2006), Immigrant Constituencies 
as Political Challenge. The German Federal Elections 1998-2005  Revisited. Paper prepared for 
presentation to the panel on ‘Parties and Immigration in Europe’ at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, August 31- September 2, 2006, Philadelphia, USA.  
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 Bolkestein, F. (1991) ‘Integratie van minderheden moet met lef worden aangepakt’, NRC 
Handelsblad (September 12, 1991).  
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 Scheffer, P. (2000), ‘Het multiculturele drama’, NRC Handelsblad (January 29, 2000). 
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 Schnabel, P. (2000), ‘De multiculturele samenleving is an illusion’, NRC Handelsblad (February 
17, 2000).  
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In the last decade, this cultural cleavage has been increasingly politicised by 
nativist parties, which have won major victories by calling for the assimilation of 
immigrants into Dutch culture. After September 11th, Pim Fortuyn entered the political 
arena, successfully blaming the ‘the left-wing church’ for neglecting the integration 
problems that native Dutch faced in their neighbourhoods, and presenting Islam as a 
backward religion that needed to be brought in line with Western modernity. ‘Mass’ 
immigration had to be halted. This discourse radicalised when the Liberal deputy Geert 
Wilders and his Freedom Party gained political credibility after gaining a substantial 
number of seats in the 2006 and 2009 parliamentary elections. As a result, Dutch 
established right-wing and left-wing parties have both moved in the direction of the LPF 
(Kriesi et al., 2006).  
In Germany, I also expect the Left to function as an ally for hijab-wearing 
women’s claims of recognition and equality. Historically, the SPD defended the rights and 
interests of Ausländer as labour migrants, who enjoyed a strong position in Leftist trade-
unions (Thränhardt, 2000). It also favoured de-ethnicising nationality by granting 
citizenship to German-born children of Turkish immigrants. The Green party had already 
initiated debates in the 1980s to liberalise naturalisation procedures for migrants of non-
German ethnic background, to tolerate dual citizenship, and to introduce the ius soli 
principle in the citizenship law. The Green party even flirted briefly with multicultural 
rhetoric that celebrated immigrants’ cultural differences (Pratt Ewing, 2008). When an 
SPD-Greens Government entered office under Chancellor Schröder (1998-2005), 
citizenship was opened up for German-born children of foreigners. Also the PDS takes a 
liberal position on immigration (Kriesi et al., 2006: 940). The FDP takes a central position 
in regard to immigration and integration that is more similar to the SPD. It supported 
opening up citizenship for migrant minorities on the condition that immigrants give up 
their dual nationality.  
The Conservative Union parties have, by contrast, long adhered to an ethnically 
based concept of citizenship, opposing the introduction of ius soli (Broeders, 2001). 
Christian Protestant and Catholic welfare organisations catered German emigrants’ needs. 
Even though the CDU has come to terms with the de facto multicultural character of 
present-day society, it continues to demand immigrants’ assimilation to German values and 
adherence to the law. In 2000, after Germany opened up citizenship to foreigners born in 
Germany, politicians of the CDU launched a national debate about the assimilation of 
immigrants to a German ‘Leitkultur’. This re-awakened the public unease that had 
surrounded German national identity ever since its Nazi past (Pratt Ewing, 2008). Several 
times, conservative-ruled Länder in the Federal Council also blocked the law proposals of 
the Schröder Government to implement the 2004 EU antidiscrimination directives.  
The dominance of German mainstream conservative union parties espousing 
reactive nationalism and ethnocentrism contrasts with France and the Netherlands, where 
such rhetoric has been more confined to populist right-wing parties. I therefore expect that 
left-wing parties and federal states with left-wing Governments will most likely support 
immigrant women’s claim equal rights and recognition, while the Christian-Democrat-
ruled states will continue to differentiate between ethnic and non-ethnic Germans. In the 
Netherlands and France, the increasing popularity of right-wing parties playing into the 
cultural cleavage may lead to a more restrictive stance towards multicultural claims of 
recognition over time by mainstream parties. 
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5.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have compared the three countries’ ethnic cleavages around nationality, 
citizenship and integration policy frameworks, identifying the opportunities for and 
constraints on political actors pushing for the recognition of the hijab as an expression of 
migrant minorities’ religious culture. I expect the headscarf, when framed in terms of 
nationality and ethnic diversity, to be most contentious in Germany, due to a salient 
structural cleavage around national identity. Because Germany has practiced an ethnic 
citizenship that made it difficult for migrants to obtain legal and political citizenship rights, 
we should also expect few opportunities to claim equal rights and recognition, though a 
change may become visible since the turn of the century when new powerful allies emerge, 
especially on the Left. Because French authorities are not inclined to recognise expressions 
of linguistic, ethnic or religious difference in the public sphere, we may expect few 
opportunities to claim recognition for cultural differences, but more opportunities to claim 
equal rights than in Germany. The Netherlands has developed strong anti-discrimination 
machinery focusing on equality of outcome, increasing opportunities to claim both rights 
and cultural recognition. Yet we may expect decreasing opportunities since the late 1990s, 
linked to changes in citizenship and integration policies, coupled with the rise of nativist 
parties. Due to a convergence in the three countries’ citizenship and integration policies, 
with Germany opening up citizenship and France and the Netherlands making cultural 
integration a condition for citizenship, I expect a similar convergence to occur in the 
framing of the hijab. Table 3 summarises the differences and similarities in this issue-
specific POS and my expectations for the politicisation of the hijab. 
 
  
96 
Table 3 Expectations regarding the POS for hijab-wearing women as migrant 
minority actors 
 France Netherlands Germany Expectations 
Cleavages 
around 
national 
identity 
Rather pacified 
cleavage, except 
for regional 
cleavage 
Rather pacified 
cleavage 
Nationality only 
pacified cleavage 
in 1990s after the 
unification of 
German states 
Headscarf most salient 
in Germany if framed 
in terms of national 
identity/ nationality 
Citizenship 
and 
immigrant 
integration 
policies 
Open citizenship 
policy; double 
nationality 
allowed; degree 
of assimilation 
expected; no 
immigrant 
representation 
councils; denial 
of ethnic 
differences in 
integration 
policies and 
emphasis on 
individual’s equal 
rights and social-
economic 
equality 
Open citizenship 
policy; double 
nationality not 
allowed; shifting 
integration policies 
from multicultural 
approach to civic 
assimilation > 
2000, via soc-ec. 
Integration; ethnic 
minority councils 
and strong 
antidiscrimination 
framework 
Closed citizenship 
for non German 
immigrants until 
2000; double 
nationality not 
allowed; 
assimilation 
condition for cz. 
local integration 
policies focused on 
soc-ec. rights, 
weak 
antidiscrimination 
framework; 
‘Foreigners’ 
Councils 
Opportunities to 
claims equal rights 
more limited in 
Germany compared to 
France and NL, and to 
cultural recognition in 
NL than in 
Germany/France. But 
convergence between 
citizenship and 
integration policies 
towards higher cultural 
requirements = 
convergence in 
headscarf 
debates/policies 
becoming more 
restrictive 
Political allies 
for claims of 
equality and 
cultural 
recognition 
Most support 
among PCF, 
Greens, and PS; 
least among 
RPR/UMP. 
Favorable 
opportunities in 
1980s decrease 
with rise of far-
Right 
Most support 
among PvdA, 
Greens, D66 and, 
until 2002, CDA, 
least among VVD. 
With rise of 
populist Right > 
2002, the CDA,  
VVD and PvdA 
become 
ambivalent allies, 
and opportunities 
decrease 
Most support 
among SPD, 
Greens and PDS, 
least among 
CDU/CSU. Weak 
opportunities in 
CDU/CSU ruled 
states, particularly 
when challenged 
by far-Right 
parties at local 
level 
   
Fewest political 
opportunities in 
Germany when when 
federal and Länder 
governments are ruled 
by conservative Union 
parties. In France and 
later in NL decreasing 
opportunities to claim 
equal rights and 
recognition 
Expectations 
for each 
country on 
grounds of 
migrant 
incorporation 
policy 
paradigms 
Due to open 
citizenship, hijab- 
wearing women -
will be 
approached as 
citizens with 
equal rights. 
Little 
opportunities to 
claim cultural 
recognition or to 
target indirect 
discrimination of 
ethnic minorities 
Due to open and 
group based 
citizenship, hijab- 
wearing women 
will be approached 
as members of 
ethnic minorities, 
protected against 
(indirect) 
discrimination. 
Opportunities 
decrease over time 
due to changing 
POS 
Due to closed 
citizenship, hijab-
wearing women 
long excluded or 
ignored as 
foreigners. After 
turn of century 
inst. opportunities 
increase to claim 
equal rights, but 
opposition 
expected from 
strong nationalist 
parties  
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Chapter 6. Governing gender differences in France, Germany and the 
Netherlands 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide an institutional explanation for the differences and similarities 
in the ways in which debates and policies on the hijab have been gendered in the three 
countries in question. The donning of the hijab is not only a claim for recognition of a 
minority group whose religion arrived in Europe through migration, but also an act by 
women who believe that veiling is a prescription in their faith. In this light, we may expect 
it to be subject to national ideas and institutions regulating gender relations. This chapter 
compares the countries’ institutions and policy legacies regarding emancipation and gender 
equality, with the aim of stipulating expected outcomes how this influences the ways in 
which debates on the hijab are gendered. By ‘gendering’ in this context I mean that gender 
equality is referenced as a concern in the debate over the hijab.106 These references can be 
explicit or implicit regarding social relations between men and women, or regarding 
implicitly gendered categories and concepts of masculinity and femininity. Beyond the 
question of whether policy debates are gendered at all, I am interested in whether 
differences exist in the ways in which gender equality is understood in the three countries. 
Three different conceptual approaches to gender equality have been proposed: an 
equality approach, a difference approach and a diversity approach (Squires, 2005; 2007). 
The equality approach emphasises equal rights and opportunities for men and women as 
human beings, as well as the attainability of universal laws and rights. It demands that the 
concept of citizenship live up to its claims to universality and impartiality by making 
gender politically irrelevant and removing gender bias. The difference approach believes 
in the complementarity of male and female roles and characteristics, arguing that equality 
can be reached if historically devalued roles of femininity and maternity are re-valued as 
equal-but-different contributions to society. The diversity approach aims to go beyond this 
dichotomy between ‘difference’ and ‘equality’ by reckoning with the social implications of 
multiple constellations of gender, which intersect and collide with race/ethnicity, age, 
sexuality, religion and class, and addressing issues that arise with appropriate policies. 
Countries may have embarked upon all three approaches to advance the status of women, 
or have focussed on different strategies in different policy domains. This chapter starts 
from the assumption that specific approaches to gender equality will continue to exert 
path-dependent effects on the gendering of policy frames and responses to the hijab, and 
yet that such approaches and governing strategies also differ from one field to another, 
change over time and even differ between groups of women. 
This chapter largely follows the same outline as the previous two institutional 
chapters. First, I will compare the three countries’ gender cleavages and examine the extent 
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 Here I rely upon a manual generated by the project Quality in Gender + Equality Policies 
(Quing), funded by the European Commission’s 6th framework Programme (2006-2010). It 
compares the nature and quality of gender equality policy across Europe, particularly regarding the 
issues of gender-based violence, intimate citizenship and non-employment. Walby, S. (2007), ‘A 
manual for the methodology of discursive institutionalism: D. 20. Draft’ (unpublished policy 
report).  
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to which such cleavages have been pacified. When I speak of gender cleavages, I refer to 
the saliency of conflicts around gender and sexuality, and the visibility of feminist 
activities and lobby for a new politics of sex that is opposed by others (see theoretical 
chapter). In countries where gender cleavages were still salient, we may expect the hijab to 
attract much political attention once related to women’s status and rights.  
Second, I will compare each country’s laws, policies and strategies to regulate 
gender equality, including underlying logics, which are expected to differ from one policy 
sector to another. For this reason, I will compare state’s approaches and strategies to 
gender equality in three different policy sectors: women’s political rights (quotas or parity 
laws that strive for greater representation of women’s concerns and experiences in political 
institutions); social-economic rights (policies to foster the reconciliation of labour and care 
in order to improve women’s economic and social position); and finally civic rights (non-
discrimination, equal pay, equal treatment) (von Wahl, 2006). Because states’ policies may 
also differ between groups of women (Brush, 2000), I will pay particular attention to the 
extent to which states’ policies have taken into account migrant minority women’s 
particular needs and interests. The second section also compares the history of the 
establishment of each country’s ‘gender machinery,’ its institutional capacity and its 
relation to different women’s movements (Bleijenburg & Roggeband: 2007: 447; Kantola 
& Outshoorn, 2007: 3). I expect that strong gender equality machineries will enable 
feminist voices inside and outside of state institutions to draw attention to gendered policy 
problems and outcomes of legislation. If countries’ gender equality machineries have many 
institutional-political and material resources, feminists should be expected to have more 
chances to halt laws that directly or indirectly discriminate against women on grounds of 
sex (Sauer, 2009).     
Finally, I will analyse the existence of political allies for gender equality concerns 
in the party system, scrutinising the gender cleavages in each country’s party system. I will 
then propose a hypothesis as to what the differences and similarities between those issue-
specific political opportunity structures may entail for the gendering and regulation of the 
hijab in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
One note about the terminology used in this chapter. My use of the term ‘women’s 
movement’ is intended to include all women, interacting and organising collectively or 
individually, who identify with women as a group (however that group may be defined), 
who use explicitly gendered language and whose ideas are expressed in terms of 
representing women as women in public and social life (Mazur & Zwingel, 2003: 366). 
(Migrant) minority women’s movements refer to women’s organisations and individuals 
with an ethnic minority background. In the context of this research, most of these groups 
are composed of women of Maghrebian107 or Turkish descent (see also Roggeband, 2010). 
Feminist movements are women’s movements that share a political project to advance the 
status and condition of women as a group, explicitly challenging gender hierarchies and 
women’s subordination.108 I will use the term ‘Muslim feminists’ to identify all women 
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 The word ‘Maghreb’ is derived from Arab, where it means ‘West’ or ‘time or place of sunset’. It 
designates the North-West regions of Africa, including Muaritania, Western Sahara, Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, and Libyia: Gordner, M.J (2008), ‘Challenging the French Exception; ‘Islam’ and 
laïcité’, In-Spire Journal of Law, Politics and Societies 3 (2): 72-87. 
108
 I derive this operational definition of feminism from the RNGS project (‘Research Network on 
Gender, Politics, and the State’), which compares different traditions of state feminism in European 
countries (see footnote 28). This should not obscure the different goals that women’s groups may 
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with social or cultural Islamic roots who express feminist ideals, regardless of their very 
different visions, backgrounds and strategies, and irrespective of whether they appropriate 
the term themselves.109 I use the denominator ‘secular’ for Muslim feminists whose 
discourse illustrates a preference for a private rather than public role for religion.    
 
6.2 Gender and women’s emancipation patterns 
6.2.1 Gender cleavages: political polarisation and mobilisation of gender  
In France, the women’s movement is still vibrant and alive, but highly split (Jenson, 1990; 
Mazur, 2007). Ever since the ‘first wave’ of feminism110 heralded their battle for equality 
and justice, French women have found themselves situated in the struggle between, on the 
one hand, the familialist doctrine of conservative right-wing parties and the Catholic 
Church and, on the other hand, the ostensibly gender-blind ethos of the Republicans. 
Initially, the Left also saw women’s struggle for equality as a bourgeois intervention that 
undermined a collective class struggle (Delmas, 2006; Ford, 2005). Women were only 
granted the right to vote and to run for office in 1944, almost a century after all adult men 
had been granted this right, and twenty-eight years after German and Dutch women’s 
suffrage movements achieved success (Siim, 2000).  
As part of the 1968 student movement, a new women’s effort emerged that sought 
to radically change the conservative, Catholic society of post-war France. The fragmented 
Movement for the Liberation of Women (‘Mouvement de Libération des femmes’, MLF) 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
have and the different ways in which they define the problems facing women in society and the 
solutions they suggest. In fact, the analysis of the hijab debates will illustrate how women compete 
over the meanings, goals and strategies of feminism, sometimes challenging the feminist 
credentials of other women’s groups in the process.   
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 Not all Muslim women who struggle for an improved women’s position label themselves 
feminist. Some Muslim women deliberately refuse to use the term as they associate feminism with 
a political project of Western European white women (see also Mohanty, 2003). Since they 
consider Islam to be an egalitarian religion, being a devout practicing Muslim for them already 
implies being in favour of gender equality. To account for the socially constructed power 
imbalances in Muslim cultures, they offer alternative and female-friendly readings of the Quran 
(Barlas, 2002). Other Muslim women do appropriate the term Islamic feminism, both to reclaim an 
Islam that is egalitarian and emancipatory and to reclaim a feminist project that is compatible with 
the doctrines of their faith (Al-Hibri, 1999; Badran, 2008; Hassan, 2001; Wadud, 1999; 2005). Still 
other Muslim women who advocate gender justice do not choose the label ‘Islamic’ feminism, 
because they don’t ground their feminist project on the sources of the Quran (Afshar, 1999; 
Ahmed, 1992; Mernissi, 1991a; 199b; Moghadam, 2002). Some are even very critical towards the 
feminist nature of Islam, finding the term ‘Islamic feminism’ an oxymoron in itself (Hirsi Ali, 
2004; Majid, 2002). See also: International Congress of Islamic feminism in Barcelona 
http://feminismeislamic.org/home/ (Retrieved January 5, 2010). 
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 The term ‘first-wave feminism’ refers to the socio-political conflicts that evolved around the 
unequal power relations between men and women in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A second 
wave occurred in the late 1960s/ early 1970s. Some scholars have argued that a third wave of 
feminism occurred in the late 1980s/1990s, as ethnic and racial minority women claimed 
recognition for their particular needs and interests as both gendered and racial groups. They not 
only drew attention to the unequal relations between men and women but also to inequality among 
women. I utilize these terms in this piece, although I recognise that the term ‘wave’ falsely suggests 
a clean break between several feminist struggles (although it is more accurate for Germany, where 
later feminists consciously broke with their past). 
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argued for recognition of a new collective identity of ‘women’, defined in terms of sexual 
difference — a characteristic that crossed other social differences like class. It insisted 
upon the autonomous organisation of women and rejected cooperation with established 
authorities (Jenson, 1990). This movement fundamentally challenged the gender-neutral 
character of French Universalism by pointing out how sexual difference and its social 
effects continued to set women back (Mazur, 1995). Some egalitarian and labour-union 
feminists did negotiate with the state during this time. Then, in the 1970s, some feminists 
entered political parties and trade-unions and successfully pushed for legislative changes in 
certain domains like abortion (legalised in 1975) and reproductive rights (contraception 
legalised in 1976) (both framed in terms of individual rights and women’s dignity), equal 
pay, and non-discrimination (framed in terms of equality) (Sauer, 2010). While these 
feminists primarily allied with the Left, several liberal Rightists also supported their 
claims, demonstrating how the gender cleavage could transcend the Right-Left cleavage 
(Duyvendak, 2001).  
Partly because of the rapid recognition of women’s issues, gender-related issues 
were quickly depoliticised in the party system. Yet, a rather anti-statist women’s 
movement continues to exist outside the political arena, which has crystallised into a dense 
organisational field that continues to mobilise. The largest umbrella association is the 
‘National Collective for the Rights of Women’ (‘Collectif National des Droits des 
Femmes’, CNDF), which aggregates various women’s movements and branches of trade-
unions and political parties on the Left.111 In opposition to the feminist movement, a much 
stronger familialist movement exists. Its interests in preserving the traditional nuclear 
family and gender roles are represented by the National Union of Family Associations 
(‘Union nationale des associations familiales’, UNAF) (Revillard, 2007). In the 1990s, 
women’s groups continued to organise en masse to protest against proposed restrictions on 
the right to abortion (succeeding in making access to contraception and abortion more 
accessible in 2000 and 2001), and in support of a rule that 50% of deputies ought to be 
female that was finally implemented in 2000 (Bereni, 2007; Jenson & Valiente, 2003; 
Lépinard, 2006; 2007; Scott, 2004; 2005). Some women’s movements also participated in 
the struggle of gay movements, which lobbied for a civil union pact passed in 1999 that 
allows same-sex couples to register (‘Pact Civile de Solidarité’, PACS). It does not allow 
for same-sex marriage or filiation (Fassin, 1999). 
Migrant minority women have also organised, but until the turn of the century they 
were less successful in drawing attention to their specific claims for gender justice. 
Particularly during the ‘Beur’ movement of the 1980s, feminist and lesbian groups brought 
together black and postcolonial migrant women to draw attention to their position as 
women of ethnic and racial minorities in France (Lloyd, 1998). Minority women’s groups 
allied with the anti-racist movement to address discrimination, and with the larger 
women’s movement to campaign against polygamy and genital mutilation (Bloul, 1996) or 
to advocate for migrant women’s independent status during the Algerian civil war (1991-
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 It brings together the MLF and its pillar-organisations like  the French Movement for Family 
Planning (‘Mouvement Francais pour le Planning Familial’, MFPF), the League for International 
Right of Women (‘La Ligue du Droit International des Femmes’, LDIF), as well as Choose – 
Women’s Cause (‘Choisir – La Cause des Femmes’) that struggles for reproductive rights and the 
Movement for the Liberation of Abortion and Contraception (‘Mouvement pour la Liberalisation 
de l’Avortement et la Contraception’, MLAC). 
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2002) (Lloyd, 1998). However, each of the other movements neglected an aspect of the 
struggle: anti-discrimination associations largely ignored the gender discrimination 
suffered by minority women, and the white women’s movement tended to focus on sex 
(and class) as the dominant dividing structures in society, disregarding power inequalities 
between women (Jenson, 1990; Lépinard, 2006; 2009; Lloyd, 1998). Lacking similar 
institutional and financial resources as the established women’s organisations, several 
migrant women’s movements disappeared in the 1990s, or turned their attention to 
grassroots activism in local neighbourhoods (Withol de Wenden & Leveau, 2007).  
In the Netherlands, the once strong and successful independent women’s 
movement has been in decline since the mid-1990s. Plenty of movement events exist, but 
Dutch women’s organisations are fragmented, shaky and lacking continuity (Outshoorn & 
Kantola, 2007). Dutch society changed drastically in the late 1960s, though still more 
peacefully than in Germany and France, when feminist groups like ‘Dolle Mina’ and 
‘Man-Vrouw Maatschappij’ started mobilising to claim equality, individual liberties and 
gender justice. Comparatively speaking, the Dutch women’s movement was strongly 
characterised by an emphasis on gender differences, using frames in debates about abortion 
(legalised in 1981) and political representation that focus on women’s choice and 
responsibility, rather than on women’s rights and equality (Sauer, 2010).  
Due to the ‘institutionalisation of the women’s question’, as Joyce Outshoorn 
(2000) frames it, the movement overall has been quite successful in putting most of its 
concerns on the political agenda, including legalised sex work, reproductive rights, equal 
opportunity legislation and combating sexual violence (Outshoorn, 1999). Within two 
decades, Dutch society changed from a pillarised, conservative, middle-class-oriented 
society into a progressive liberal society where traditional family values are prioritised less 
and homosexuality tolerated more than in any other country in Europe (Duyvendak, Pels & 
Rijkschroeff, 2008).112 Yet, partly because of the pacification of gender cleavages, the 
movement lost much of its explicitly queer, radical and autonomous character (Roggeband, 
2002; Duyvendak, 2001). When the state cut short subsidies during the mid-1990s, most 
autonomous associations disappeared, either because they were absorbed into semi-public 
professional organisations, or because they were unable to develop alternative sources of 
financing. Some achievements were nonetheless made, such as the possibility to legalise 
prostitution as sex work when the ban on brothels was lifted in 1999 and the 
institutionalisation of gay marriage in 2001, including the right of same-sex couples to 
adopt children (Chambon, 2002; Fassin & Feher, 1999). 
Migrant minority women and women of colour started organising in the 1980s. 
Partly because of discontent with the white women’s movement’s failure to recognize its 
white and middle-class bias, they established their own associations, organised on grounds 
of ethnicity or religion. In order to highlight the diversity among ‘allochtonous’ or ‘ethnic 
minority’ women, they developed the label, ‘black, migrant and refugee women’ (Botman, 
Jouwe & Wekker, 2001; Captein & Ghorashi, 2001). Migrant women subsequently broke 
away from male-dominated ethnic associations and women’s associations dominated by 
native Dutch women. Their relations with those organizations have remained tense, while 
                                                           
112
 According to a poll conducted by TNS opinion & Social/ Eurobarometer in 2006, of the 25 
European member states, the Netherlands ranks highest in supporting same-sex marriages (82 
percent). Germany ranks 5th on the list (52%) and France 10th (48%). Same-sex couples in the 
Netherlands gained the right to civil partnership in 1998 and to marriage in 2001. 
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at the same time many have not survived the subsidy cuts of the 1990s. Today, only two 
national independent feminist umbrella organisation exist that lobby political authorities: 
the Dutch Women’s Council (‘Nederlandse Vrouwen Raad’, NVR), which comprises 47 
mainly white feminist and women’s organisations, and Tiye International, an NGO that 
brings together 21 national black, migrant, and refugee women’s organisations. Also 
within state institutions, the ‘femocrat’ culture has largely disappeared (Outshoorn & 
Kantola, 2007b).   
In Germany, gender cleavages have largely depoliticised once women entered 
government (Gerhard, 2008: 263). Femocrats and female deputies working inside state 
institutions continue to promote gender equality. Outside the government, there are 
professional organisations, grassroots initiatives, and feminists within women’s studies 
departments in academia. But similarly to the Netherlands, this fragmented women’s 
movement no longer mobilises together or develops joint policy goals. Women’s groups 
lack visibility and, moreover, fail to reach out to migrant minority women (Lang, 2007).  
The German second-wave women’s movement emerged in the late 1960s. It 
mobilised against the symbolic and material oppression of women and opted for drastic 
social, political, ecological and cultural reforms in order to change a society that was 
marked by the heritage of Nazi Germany and a conservative, Christian culture regarding 
morality and sexuality (Ehmsen, 2008; Gerhard, 2008). As in France, the German 
‘feminist’ movement was strongly affiliated with the student movement of the New Left, 
but unlike its French counterparts, it rejected the term ‘feminism’ as being elitist and 
bourgeois (Gerhard, 2008: 190; Ferree 1995: 96). Up until the 1980s, the women’s 
movement rejected any cooperation with the state, organising in autonomous women-only 
groups to dismantle the male-dominated society (Ferree, 2003a). It chose a radical ‘women 
centred’ approach, emphasising women’s control over reproduction and autonomy, 
focusing on issues like abortion and contraception rather than anti-discrimination 
employment policies (von Wahl, 2006). Their feminism was a ‘difference feminism’ which 
focused on re-evaluating women’s different qualities (Sauer, 2010). In contrast to France 
and the Netherlands, the BRD was not responsive to their claims for reproductive rights. 
The Federal Constitutional Court affirmed in 1993 that abortion was a criminal act, even 
though it was not to be punished in the first trimester and exceptions were recognised 
(Ferree et al., 2002).  
During the 1980s, women started entering political parties, national women’s 
councils and political institutions (Ehmsen, 2008). The highly institutionalised nature of 
gender at various state levels served to depoliticise the autonomous movement. Only the 
German Women’s Council (‘Deutscher Frauenrat’) still functions as an effective advocacy 
channel for professional and cultural women’s organisations. It enabled women to book 
some successes in the late 1990s in the realm of sex-workers’ social rights, sexual 
violence, who also allied with the gay movement that successfully lobbied for a Life 
Partnership Act (2001) that enabled same-sex couples to register (although legal 
inequalities remain in regard to welfare and tax schemes and reproductive rights) 
(Urbanek, 2007).  
Only in the late 1990s, the first Muslim migrant women’s associations appeared, 
particularly in the federal states of North Rhine-Westphalia and Berlin where the largest 
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proportion of Turkish immigrants lives (Lenz & Schwenken, 2003, Lenz, 2008).113 
Minority and majority women cooperated few times on common initiatives such as the 
‘National Initiative for the Change of § 19 of the Foreigners’ Law’ (1993-1997), a loose 
coalition of feminists who successfully fought for an independent legal status for foreign 
spouses (Lenz, 2003). Nonetheless, migrant women have mainly focused on local, 
grassroots projects (Lenz & Schwenken, 2003), which are not represented by the German 
Women’s Council that mostly exists of native German women’s member organisations. 
Only since 2005 has it also includes a Federal Union for migrant women and a union for 
bi-national women. And whereas several Jewish and Christian women’s associations are 
members, no Muslim women’s association has so far joined.  
Comparing conflicts around gender and sexuality in the three countries before the 
first hijab debates started, it appears that in France gender cleavages are still most salient. 
In the Netherlands and Germany, where the women’s movement made a ‘march through 
the institutions’, gender became an inconspicuous cleavage (Ehmsen, 2008). By contrast, 
an independent French women’s movement has continued to exist and extra-parliamentary 
mobilisation still occurs. Because gender in France continues to function as a fault line 
along which conflicts are articulated, we may expect the issue of the hijab to be most 
contentious in that country when framed in terms of gender and gender relations.  
 
6.2.2 Laws, policies and institutions of gender 
Gender equality machinery 
France has developed an extensive women’s equality machinery at both national and 
regional levels. Its capacity to influence policy used to be limited because of its highly 
politicised and ever-changing nature, its lack of resources and its marginal position within 
the overall government structure (Mazur, 1995). However, over time, the gender equality 
machinery has become less dependent on political incumbency. It has consolidated at 
several national and regional levels and has gained a well-institutionalised position within 
the overall administration (Mazur, 2007).  
In 1965, an advisory committee on women’s labour came into existence after 
pressure from the women’s movement. Ten years later, in 1976, President Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing appointed the first Secretary of State for ‘Women’s Conditions’ within the 
department of the Prime Minister (Revillard, 2007). The first office focusing on these 
issues with a significant budget and administrative staff was established in 1981 under a 
Leftist parliamentary majority and the Socialist President François Mitterand. The Feminist 
activist Yvette Roudy became the first Delegate Minister of Women’s Rights. Between 
1985 and 1986, the office was upgraded to a full Ministry for Women’s Rights (‘Ministère 
des Droits de la Femme’, MDF). Thereafter, authority over gender equality shifted back 
and forth from delegations, secretaries of state, and delegate ministers to full ministers.  
Since 1999, two parliamentary delegations on women’s rights and equal 
opportunities have been set up in both chambers of the French parliament. Their tasks 
include informing the chambers about the gendered implications of government policies, 
monitoring the implementation of legislation and giving annual recommendations. 
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 German migrant and black women came together for the first time in 1984 at the congress of 
‘foreign and German women’ in Frankfurt. Black women have formed an organisation called 
‘Initiative Black People in Germany’ (‘Initative Schwarze Menschen in Deutschland’, ISD). 
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Moreover, in 1995, an ‘Observatory of Parity’ was created to study, promote and advise 
the government on gender equality in different public, economic and social spheres. The 
observatory consists of members of the parliament, scholars and women’s associations. 
And in 2001, the Government established a national commission composed of several state 
representatives and women’s associations to oversee the fight against violence against 
women (Jarty, 2007).  
In 1993, a Women’s Rights and Equality Service was developed (‘Service des 
Droits des Femmes et Egalité’, SDFE), which is still responsible for the development and 
implementation of women’s emancipation policies. The budget of the SDFE remains small 
and many of its employees work part time, yet its overall position has consolidated within 
the state infrastructure (Mazur, 2007). The SDFE, which has been under the authority of 
different Ministries, has authority over the local network of equality offices that have 
developed in all 12 French regions and most of the 92 departments. Moreover, it has the 
authority over two permanent advisory bodies, the High Council for Equal Employment 
(‘Conseil Supérieur de l’Égalité Professionelle’, CSEP) and the High Council on Sexual 
Information (‘Conseil Supérieur de l’Information Sexuelle’, CSIS), as well as over state-
funded non-governmental Women’s Rights Information Centres that exist at various state 
levels. Since the late 1990s, these two consultative bodies and the Women’s Rights 
Information Centres have convened on a regular basis to elaborate feminist policy (Mazur, 
2007).  
The relationship between the SDFE and women’s movements remains complex. Up 
until 2002, state funding was a closed and secret process, which made state support largely 
dependent on political power constellations. Women’s associations sometimes lost funding 
when power shifted to the Right. Moreover, only those associations formally registered 
with the state and sharing the Socialist ideals of PS femocrats working within the state 
machinery were funded and included in policy debates while PS was in power (Mazur, 
1995; 2007). Migrant minority women’s groups were largely neglected in policy-making 
processes around gender equality concerns. Only since the turn of the century have some 
migrant women’s associations found access to state machinery (see below). With a gender 
equality machinery that has expanded and consolidated over time in combination with a 
visible women’s movement, we may expect several femininist voices to gender policy 
debates on the hijab, albeit only for well-organised and resourced associations whose 
claims largely correspond with the dominant aims of the ruling parties.  
In the Netherlands, an extensive gender equality machinery developed rapidly in 
the 1970s, but the institutional framework has diminished over time and taken on a more 
symbolic character (Kantola & Outshoorn, 2007; Outshoorn & Kantola, 2007). It no longer 
functions as a significant institutional venue for women’s voices, and its ability to gender 
policy debates and outcomes has been reduced.  
In 1974, an Emancipation Commission was established to advise the Government 
on women’s issues (replaced by the permanent Emancipation Council in 1981). It 
comprised reform-minded feminists of the autonomous women’s movement and 
representatives of political parties. The Commission had to be consulted on women’s 
issues, but it could also initiate its own critical reports. It played a key role in defining the 
content and structure of emancipation policies until it was abolished in 1997. In 1978, 
Hedy d’Ancona of the feminist association ‘Man-woman-society’ was appointed State 
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Secretary on Emancipation, heading the Department of Coordination of Emancipation 
(‘Directie Coordinatie Emancipatiezaken’, DCE) (Verloo & Lamoen, 2003).  
This administrative branch, which has been under the authority of different 
Ministries, is still responsible for the coordination and integration of emancipation policies 
within different Ministries, and it has its own budget to fund women’s movements. It was 
first located in the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Welfare, but moved to the Ministry 
of Social Affairs when the focus shifted to women’s labour market participation in 1986, 
only moving back to the Minister of Education, Culture and Science in 2007. In other 
Ministries, civil servants were made responsible for women’s affairs, which were 
coordinated by the Interdepartmental Commission Emancipation (‘Interdepartementale 
Coordinatiecommissie Emancipatiebeleid’, ICE). In 1986, a Cabinet Committee for 
Emancipation was set up to coordinate gender mainstreaming in the various ministries. At 
the parliamentary level, deputies established the Permanent Standing Committee on 
Emancipation Policy in 1981, as well as an inter-party meeting group consisting of female 
deputies from the first and second chambers (‘Kamerbreed Vrouwenoverleg’) (Roggeband, 
2002). Moreover, even without party quotas, the number of female deputies in the Dutch 
National Parliament increased more quickly than in Germany and France (see below) 
(Koning, 2009).  
While rapid institutionalisation of gender in the Dutch policy machinery differs 
from the more incremental process in France and Germany, the institutional framework 
decreased significantly in the 1990s. Political elites began to downsize government 
agencies and cut the budget for equality programs (Outshoorn & Kantola, 2007). When the 
Cabinet Committee was abolished in 1991, no central coordination existed to supervise 
gender-mainstreaming within other Ministries, resulting in decreased attention being paid 
to gender. Additionally, the parliamentary Standing Committee on Emancipation Policy 
and the meeting group of feminist deputies were dissolved in 1994, while the 
Emancipation Council was abolished in 1997 (Roggeband, 2002).  
Moreover, the DCE never became a powerful actor after losing the guidance of an 
independent Secretary of State on Emancipation in 1998. Nor has the ICE ever been a 
strong institution. It is therefore not surprising that the Dutch Review Committee, 
established in 2004 to evaluate gender mainstreaming, published a devastating report in 
2007 that described how gender was not adequately taken into account in the policy of 
Ministries (Lauwers, 2007). Finally, many provincial and municipal women’s units 
(‘Emancipatiebureaus’) were dissolved due to subsidy cuts.  
Furthermore, it proved difficult to develop a ‘velvet triangle’ with women’s 
activists and feminist scholars due to those groups’ troubled relationship with the DCE. 
Women’s movements have been involved in policy debates since the mid 1970s (Verloo & 
Lamoen, 2003). However, the state today increasingly relies upon feminist ‘experts’ rather 
than independent women’s associations, especially as the relationship of those associations 
to the state has become increasingly strained (Lauwers, 2007; Outshoorn & Kantola, 
2007). While migrant minority women’s organisations have been encouraged to create 
umbrella organisations to be consulted, they have increasingly kept a critical distance from 
the state. Particularly when it became clear that they were expected to develop and execute 
projects in line with the policies defined by the state rather than to set their own agendas 
(Roggeband, 2010). In their comparative analysis of several European countries’ gender 
machineries, Outshoorn and Kantola (2007a) therefore conclude that the Dutch gender 
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equality machinery is one of the few that has weakened considerably over the years. 
Together with the weak character of the autonomous women’s movement, we may 
therefore expect a low visibility of feminist voices in Dutch policy debates on the hijab. 
In Germany, an extensive equality machinery has developed over time at both the 
Federal and Länder levels, composed of Women’s Ministries or Departments and Equality 
offices (‘Gleichstellungsstelle’, previously called Women’s Commissioners, 
‘Frauenbeauftragte’) (Ferree, 1995). However, substantial differences in the scope, power 
allocation and resources of gender equality institutions remain between the federal states. 
Political and financial support for the women’s equality offices depend largely on the party 
in power. Women’s policy offices are powerless in states, councils or towns ruled by 
Conservative governments, which tend to delegate gender issues to youth and family 
ministries (Ferree, 1995). Moreover, while the machinery has consolidated at the federal 
level, several Länder have witnessed substantial downsizing of their machineries since the 
mid-1990s (Lang, 2009). 
The German gender machinery emerged in 1972, when the Social Democrat 
Government established a three-person staff in the family division of the Ministry on 
Health, Family and Youth. In 1986, the new Minister Rita Süssmuth of the CDU added 
‘and women’ to the title, but her resources remained too limited to affect change (Ferree, 
1995). At the local level, equality offices emerged in the 1980s in Western Germany. After 
reunification in 1990, different Eastern states were linked to different Western states and 
tried to copy the blueprints of their machineries, with the result that an established and 
well-integrated gender-equality infrastructure developed in the East as well. By 1993, all 
federal states of Western Germany had some sort of equality offices and a few states 
(Berlin, Hesse, and North Rhine-Westphalia) had passed antidiscrimination laws (Ferree, 
1995).  By 2004, 10 of Germany’s 16 states had established Women’s Ministries, 4 states 
had a commissioner for gender equality, and 2 states a department within the Ministry for 
Social Affairs handling women’s issues. At the Federal level, the Ministry for Family, 
Youth, Women and Seniors has a significant budget and staff to promote gender equality, 
fight discrimination, and instill positive measures on behalf of women. It regularly invites 
the German Women’s Council (‘Deutscher Frauenrat’) to negotiate on emancipation 
policies. As of 2009, Germany’s equality machinery consisted of more than 1900 local 
equality offices in cities and counties. Equality officers also exist in private firms, courts, 
hospitals, research institutes and universities. Sabine Lang (2009: 56) thus concludes that 
“formally, the German political system in the traditional institutionalist perspective 
provides a sound basis for agency on behalf of gender”.  
In several Länder, however, the gender machinery has been downsized and emptied 
of resources, resulting in a reduced ability to produce substantive policy change. The joint 
Conference of Women’s and Equality State Ministers, which brought together all local 
equality officers on a yearly basis, was abolished in 2005 by a majority vote of the 
conservative Länder. Women’s issues had to be discussed during joint meetings of the 
state’s youth and family ministers, which not only conceptualized women only as mothers 
and wives, but also severely limited the bargaining power of the women’s departments 
(Lang, 2007).  
Moreover, substantial differences exist between liberal, progressive city-states and 
conservative-ruled states in the annual budget provided for gender-related issues and in the 
feminist leadership of gender equality agencies. Eastern states that cooperated with SPD-
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governed states have developed more efficient gender equality machineries than states that 
copied the blueprints of CDU ruled states. In some Conservative ruled states, gender 
machineries have degenerated to merely symbolic entities within the larger bureaucratic 
structure (Lang, 2009). At the local level, there are several migrant women’s grassroots 
organisations reliant on state funding, resulting in a professionalised and state-dependent 
project culture (Ehmsen, 2008). But while Berlin allocates a substantial budget for such 
women’s projects, conservative states like Baden-Württemberg offer only limited funds. 
Women’s movements remain largely invisible in national politics, having been reduced to 
a bargaining partner of the state (Lang, 2007: 139).  
 In sum, while the French gender machinery has consolidated and provides some 
amount of access to (mainly white) women’s voices to gender policy debates, the Dutch 
and German gender machineries (apart from the federal level) have suffered from neo-
liberal downsizing and subsidy cuts and no longer provide many points of access for 
women’s associations. We may therefore expect French women’s movements, both within 
and outside the state, to be increasingly successful in gendering policy debates and 
outcomes, albeit only from the perspective of a selected group of white, native French 
women.     
       
Gender equality laws and policies 
France has a weak record in safeguarding women’s political rights. Between 1945 and 
1997, women never constituted more than 6 % of the deputies in the National Assembly or 
3% of the Senate. Although in 1974 the Socialist Party introduced a sex-based quota of 10 
% for the party leadership and candidacies, which it raised to 30 % in 1990, this never led 
to actual equality in party leadership. Feminist activists within the RPR never managed to 
rally support for such a quota. In 1999, the Parliament adopted a constitutional amendment 
to include a parity clause to augment women’s political representation, which was the 
result of active lobbying by women inside and outside of government. The parity law was 
passed on 6 June 2000 and requires that female candidates comprise half of electoral lists 
in municipal and regional parliamentary elections. The lists of the Senate and European 
Parliament must alternate candidates by sex; those for municipalities, regional assemblies, 
and the Corsican Assembly must have three women and three men in each group of six.  
The Parity Law is remarkable in light of French difference-blind Republicanism. In 
1982, for instance, the Constitutional Court nullified a Socialist Party amendment ruling 
that candidate lists in local elections should include no more than 75 % of persons of the 
same sex. The Court argued that such a quota conflicted with Republican equality 
principles (Bereni, 2007). Only by strategically framing their cause in terms of parity 
(equity) and citizenship, rather than in terms of quotas or affirmative action, feminists 
working inside and outside state institutions succeeded in rallying enough support for the 
law. Nonetheless, most parties have still not complied with the 50-50 norm even after 
passage of the law. In 2002, only eight more women became deputies in the National 
Parliament, which accounts for an increase from 10.9 to 12.3%. Moreover, migrant 
women’s movements have criticised the law for not addressing the lack of representation 
of their interests and needs (Bird, 2001; Lépinard, 2007). In 2007, President Nicholas 
Sarkozy (UMP) embarrassed the Left by appointing three women of minority background 
into his cabinet: Fadela Amera as State Secretary for City Affairs, Rachida Dati as Minister 
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of Justice and Human Rights, and Rama Yade as Secretary of State charged with human 
rights and foreign affairs.  
France has a better record of safeguarding women’s civil citizenship rights. French 
emancipation policies have particularly been devoted to equality in the legal and 
professional spheres, framing women’s issues in terms of equal rights and opportunities 
(Revillard, 2007). France was one of the first European countries to ban unequal pay after 
WWII, after the 1957 Treaty of Rome asserted this need. It introduced an Equal Pay Law 
in 1972, which was followed by several laws pertaining to equal employment policy.114 
The previously mentioned High Council for Equal Employment is responsible for 
overseeing gender equality in employment. In 1983, France ratified the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (Jarty, 2007). 
Since the passage of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the EU has become an 
important source for the expansion of women’s civil rights. The left-wing pluralist 
Government of 1997-2002 introduced new legislation to combat discrimination in the 
private sector and to increase women’s access to management positions in the French civil 
service. Also in the educational realm, various sensitising projects were developed to 
promote gender equality (Jarty, 2007).115 In 2001, it adopted a law to comply with the EU 
Equality Directives, which prohibit discrimination on various grounds in all stages of 
professional life, not limited to wage.116 Also significant is the 2004 creation of the High 
Authority to Fight Against Discrimination and Promote Equality (HALDE) (see chapter 
5).117 The UMP Government that took office in 2002 has taken further steps to combat 
discrimination, but it has chosen rather soft policy measures instead of quotas or 
legislation. It created an ‘equality label’ for companies that actively fight against gender 
equality, signing a charter with major French trade unions in 2004 to tackle gender 
discrimination.  
In regard to women’s social citizenship, France has long been characterised as 
having a moderate male-breadwinner model (Lewis, 1992; Hobson, 1994; Knijn, 1998). 
Familialism has historically been strong in French Republicanism, which values the 
institution of the family as the basis for social organisation (rather than individuals) and 
emphasises women’s caregiving role in the family sphere (Revillard, 2007). French family 
law and policies, which are the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice rather than of 
Parity (equality), have long been based upon a traditional nuclear family ideal and a gender 
norm of working mothers. In the 1970s, tax laws were adjusted so that they no longer 
penalised dual-income families, who received generous welfare benefits and maternity 
leave, in order to increase both birth rates and women’s labour-market participation (Misra 
& Jude, 2008). Working women benefited from the extensive state-funded child care 
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 Another law to promote professional equality was introduced in 1983, also named after Minister 
Yvette Roudy: Law No. 83-635 (July 13, 1983). It was followed by the Guénisson Act of 2001 to 
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network, but this primarily sprang from the Third Republic’s struggle against the Catholic 
Church over the socialisation of young children rather than from gender equality concerns. 
The all-day nursery schools (which many children begin attending aged 2) set up to 
maintain the Church’s influence over children are still called mother schools (‘ecole 
maternelle’), indicating that children are the primary responsibility of French women. In 
addition, a fully state-funded crèche system exists for babies and toddlers (Morgan, 2003; 
2009).  
Since the 1980s, family policies have shifted against women’s employment. Rising 
employment rates led to family policies which subsidise mothers who stay home through 
paid parental leave (‘Allocation Parentale d’Éducation’, created in 1985 and further 
expanded in 1994).118 These policies particularly benefit larger families with lower 
incomes, making it disadvantageous for lower-income women to work. Part-time work is 
not well institutionalised, forcing women to either work full-time or leave the labour 
market altogether (Bleijenburg & Roggeband, 2007). Since the mid 1990s, the right-wing 
Government has weakened the crèche system and simultaneously developed new benefits 
and tax relief to support private childcare costs, which has been particularly advantageous 
for middle-class parents (Mahon, 2002). The Socialist Government that entered office in 
1997 expanded the number of public childcare places. Moreover, it promoted parental 
leave for fathers, which indicates a change in the familialist gender ideology by identifying 
men as carers. Yet despite these efforts, 97 % of people taking time off or reducing their 
hours to take care of children are still mothers, not fathers.119  
France has only recently started to pay attention to the position of migrant women 
in its gender policies. In 2003, the High Council on Integration (‘Haut Conseil à 
l’intégration’) published a non-binding advisory document for the new UMP Prime 
Minister, in which it encouraged the Government to take action to address these women’s 
marginalised position. It encouraged the government to pay more attention to the specific 
‘integration’ problems that migrant women face, situating issues like polygamy, forced 
marriages, parental authority, and female circumcision as problems imported by migrants’ 
culture.120 The Ministry of Employment, Social Relations and Solidarity responded by 
conducting several studies on the position of minority women.121 The then-Ministry of 
Parity (currently integrated in the Ministry of Employment) and the Ministry of Justice set 
up a working group of six government agencies that formally agreed in December 2007 to 
promote migrant women’s equality, to fight multiple forms of discrimination, and to foster 
their participation in social, educational and professional life.122 In 2003, the department 
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responsible for gender equality signed a convention with two other government agencies to 
increase migrant women’s equality and integration. The state created a National 
Commission to Combat Domestic Violence in 2005, which paid particular attention to 
violence against migrant women. Two laws were introduced in 2006 that criminalise 
forced marriages and female genital mutilation (FGM), which went hand-in-hand with 
sensitising projects to educate migrant women about their rights and ‘French’ values.123  
In the Netherlands, women’s political citizenship has a relatively good record. 
While in 1971 only 10% of Dutch legislators were female, this increased to 30 % by 1994 
and 40% by 2005 (10 % more than the European average of that time) (Koning, 2009). In 
2005, 30% of the Dutch ministers in 2006 were female, including several with an ethnic 
minority background (Keuzenkamp & Merens, 2006). Women’s political representation 
has increased due to active feminist lobbying within and outside of parties (Oldersma, 
2002). Only the Labour Party has a 50% quota, and since 1998 has alternated between 
women and men on their party lists for parliamentary elections (Koning, 2009: 179). 
Dutch women’s civil rights have also improved over time. Until 1971, employers 
received dispensation for paying lower wages to women and, until 1973, employers could 
legally fire a woman because of pregnancy, childbirth or marriage (Misra & Jude, 2008). 
In order to comply with EC directives, the Government passed the Equal Pay Act in 1975 
and, five years later, the Equal Treatment in the Workplace Act (amended in 1989) 
(Outshoorn, 1999; 2001). In 1991, the Netherlands ratified CEDAW, a transnational 
instrument that has proven to be an important tool for feminists pressuring governments to 
foster gender equality.  
In 1994, the coalition Government of VVD, D66, PvdA introduced the Equal 
Treatment Act (ETA), which covers discrimination on several grounds including of sex 
and sexuality and also allows for sex-based affirmative action. The existing Equal 
Treatment Commission of Men and Women (‘Commissie Gelijke Behandeling m/v’), 
which had hitherto overlooked gender equality legislation, was transformed into a general 
Equal Treatment Commission that plays a central role in overseeing the implementation of 
the ETA, as well as other equal treatment and non-discrimination laws. However, Women 
continue to earn 22 % less than men in the business sector and 14 % in the public sector, 
and even after adjustment (of working hours, experience, position) an unexplained 7 % pay 
discrepancy remains in the private sector and 3 % in the public sector. 124 The state 
continues to prioritise soft measures to tackle the gender gap in the labour-market, such as 
setting targets over quotas. For instance, the Purple Government passed the ‘Act on 
Representation in Advisory Bodies’ (1997) and the Act on ‘Proportional Representation of 
Women in Managerial Posts in Education’ (1997) (Verloo & Lamoen, 2003).125 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
‘Migrants’ include all foreign born women, regardless of nationality. ‘Foreigners’ refers to women 
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In regard to women’s social rights, the Dutch state appears to lag behind. A 
familialist ideology remained firmly institutionalised in Dutch social welfare and tax 
policies until the mid-1990s, when the first cracks in this ideology occurred. Until a 1987 
tax reform, which reduced but did not eliminate tax allowances for (male) breadwinners, 
the social security system left part of the breadwinner regime intact, with taxation systems 
still burdening second earners (Outshoorn, 1999). Not until 1990 did the Government pass 
a Stimulation Measure on Childcare that emphasised childcare provision as a way of 
encouraging women’s labour market participation (Bussemaker, 1998). In 1991, the 
Government introduced paternal leave, allowing either parent to work part time for six-
month periods until the child turns eight. However, it is mostly women who make use of 
this prolonged leave and who continue working part-time after giving birth. Particularly 
during the two Purple coalition Governments (1994-2002), the idea gained ground that 
once women began working more and gained representative functions, their individual 
freedom would increase and a better balance would emerge between men and women in 
private life (Prins & Saharso, 2008). Several women’s movements’ goals were finally 
endorsed, such as providing public childcare facilities and unpaid parental leave in order to 
ease the combination of paid and unpaid labour (Bussemaker, 1998). The Government also 
introduced several acts to equalise part-time and full-time workers and enable more 
flexible and shorter working hours (Bleijenberg & Roggeband, 2007).126 And it started to 
intervene more directly in the private family sphere, by obliging women on welfare with 
children over five years old to apply for paid work.  
Although significant improvements have occurred, policies continue to endorse a 
1.5 male breadwinner to female care-taker model, by taking the family as a point of 
departure in tax benefits and stimulating part-time employment. Also illustrative of a 
persistent familialism is that in 2002, the new cabinet of the CDA, VVD and LPF coalition 
government reassigned a Secretary of State in the Ministry of Social Affairs with the name 
‘Emancipation and Family’, again situating women in their primary role as mothers while 
simultaneously encouraging their labour-market participation (Verloo & Lamoen, 2003). 
Even though the Netherlands has one of the highest numbers of women employed (in 
2008, 71 % of Dutch women worked in paid jobs, compared to the average of 59 % in 
Europe), it also still has one of the highest numbers of women in Europe working part time 
(Misra & Jude, 2008).127 From 2008 to 2010, the Dutch Government launched a ‘Taskforce 
Part-Time Plus’ to encourage women to take on more (yet part-time) working hours. In 
addition to women’s individual and cultural preferences, and the gender bias in tax law, the 
persistent lack of adequate and affordable childcare facilities, in combination with 
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mismatched school and business hours, may explain why so many women leave the labour 
market or reduce working hours when having children. 
Finally, in contrast to France and Germany, Dutch gender policies have paid some 
attention to minority women’s emancipation since the 1980s. In 1982, the Emancipation 
Council already called upon the Dutch Government to initiate special policies to stimulate 
their emancipation. Through so-called ‘Women and Minorities’ projects (‘Vrouwen en 
Minderheden’, VEM-project, a collabourative initiative of the Ministries of Emancipation 
and Integration that ran from 1982-1994), the Government aimed to increase minority 
women’s education levels and labour market participation128 (Roggeband & Verloo, 2007).  
Similar to France, migrant women moved from the ‘margins into the spotlight’ after 
the turn of the century (Prins & Saharso, 2008). This went along with a shift in attention 
from structural obstacles to emancipation - like education and labourmarket discrepancies - 
to problematic aspects of migrants’ culture (Roggeband & Verloo, 2007). From 2003 to 
2005, the Ministries of Emancipation and Integration of the Balkenende II cabinet (CDA, 
VVD, D66) installed a temporal advisory commission, Commission Pavem/Rosemöller, 
tasked with improving migrant women’s position and stimulating their social and labour-
market participation through language courses, networks and rolemodels.129 However, in 
the Emancipation Policy Plan of 2006-2010, the Government already abandoned the 
general goal of economic independence for certain categories of (older) migrant minority 
women. Instead, it focused on increasing their ‘social participation’ and strengthening their 
position through unpaid voluntary work. Moreover, under a new heading of ‘security’ the 
Policy Plan focused on preventing and combating violence against women, with a special 
focus on ‘culturally’ legitimised violence such as FGM, honour killings and forced 
marriages. The Government even initiated a ‘Priority’ project (‘groot project’) to tackle 
honour-related violence, which is quite remarkable because that label is normally only 
attributed to large infrastructural projects and requires extensive ministerial reporting 
regarding its financial or social implications (Brenninkmeijer et al., 2009). While the 
government thus focuses on increasing improving the labour-market and managerial 
position of native Dutch women, it approaches migrant minority women primarily as 
victims of their problematic culture and secondary as agents of cultural change 
(Roggeband & Verloo, 2007) 
Germany, like the Netherlands, has a relatively high record in women’s political 
rights. This has partly been the result of quotas. In 1986 the Green Party set the standard 
for the other parties with the introduction of a women’s quota of 50 %. The Social 
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Democrats introduced a quota in 1987, which aimed at establishing 25% women. In 1998, 
it increased the quota to 40%. The Christian Democrats decided in favour of a 33% quota 
for women in 1996, and PDS/die Linke introduced a 50% quota in 1994. The Christian 
Social Union CSU and the FPD have not introduced any quotas, resulting in a significantly 
lower female representation (von Wahl, 2006; McKay 2004).130 In 1998, women made up 
32.8% of members in the Federal Parliament. The then SPD-Green coalition Government 
included a record five out of fourteen ministries headed by women (Lang, 2007: 129). In 
2008, the number of women in the Federal Parliament decreased slightly to 31.2 %, while 
women held 6 out of 16 cabinet posts (Meyer, 2003). At the Länder level, however, the 
average rate of male to female legislators is much lower, at 14 to 1 (McKay, 2004).  
Regarding civil rights, Germany has a poor record in contrast to France and the 
Netherlands. Until the late 1990s, the German state largely approached women as a social 
group defined by their primary role in reproduction in a heterosexual marriage. A clear line 
between ‘public’ (male) matters of production and ‘private’ (female) matters of 
reproduction was underlaying the state’s governing strategies (Ferree 2007). Even though 
Article 3 of the 1949 Basic Law guaranteed equal political rights for women, it was not 
seen as guaranteeing women’s civil rights in the family and the labour market (Berghahn, 
2003). The Federal Constitutional Court allowed unequal pay between men and women 
well until the 1970s. Until 1977, the German civil code explicitly depicted married women 
(but not married men) as homemakers with the legal duty to fulfil their home duties before 
they could justify working outside (a codification that had been abolished in the 
Netherlands in 1956 and in France in 1965). Only after the threat of a lawsuit that would 
have brought Germany before the European Court of Justice was a modest Equal Pay Act 
passed in 1980. No Equal Treatment Committee was established to oversee its 
implementation and no meaningful penalties were introduced for violators. Only in 1988 
was the indirect form of unequal pay for so-called ‘light work’ in firms in which only 
women worked (‘Leichtlohngruppen’) abolished (von Wahl, 2006). The 1994 Federal 
Employee Protection Law, moreover, only weakly protects women from sexual harassment 
(Zippel, 2006).  
In 1998, a more gender-sensitive Red-Green coalition took office, consisting of the 
Green party and the SPD. In 2001, it implemented a Gender Equality Enforcement Act to 
promote women’s employment in government administration, utilizing a flexible quota 
system, the prohibition of indirect discrimination, more transparency in the hiring of staff 
and improving the status of gender equality offices (that replaced the Women’s Promotion 
Act of 1994). However, equal opportunity regulations are still missing in private sector, 
which may explain why Germany still has a 24% income differential between male and 
female full-time employees – the highest in Europe (von Wahl, 2006: 447) (Berghahn, 
2003; von Wahl, 2006). A proposal to introduce an affirmative action law for the private 
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sector failed: only a non-binding agreement exists in which businesses promise to take 
steps to foster gender equality in hiring and promotion.131  
Opportunities to push for equality legislation were found at the international level. 
In 1980, the GDR ratified CEDAW and the FGR followed suit in 1985.132 Preceding the 
46th UN World Conference on Women in 1995, the Government amended the Basic Law 
to include a requirement that ‘the state should enhance the factual implementation of 
gender equality and eliminate all existing discrimination’ (Urbanek, 2007: 5). The Equal 
Treatment Act (‘Allgemeine Gleichbehandlungsgesetz’, AGG) only entered into force in 
August 2006.133 This was again mostly the result of pressure from the EU, which had 
started an enforcement process against the German state for non-implementation of its 
Equality Directives (von Wahl, 2006; Rottmann & Ferree, 2008). The Act is only a greatly 
weakened version of the initial draft made by the SPD-Green Government, because 
conservative states in the Bundesrat had succeeded in rejecting prior versions. On 31st 
January 2008, the EU Commission reprimanded Germany again for non-compliance with 
EU law. 
In regard to women’s social rights, West Germany has long exemplified the typical 
male-breadwinner model. Up until the late 1990s, German emancipation policies were seen 
as ‘women and family’ policies, rather than gender equality policies. The Christian 
Democrat-led Kohl Government (1982-1998) introduced various policies that strengthened 
both the traditional nuclear family and the male breadwinner model, encouraging women 
to stay at home to take care of the children. Tax benefits continued to place high penalties 
on working wives by reducing the family benefit if women work more or have no children 
(Hantrais, 2004, von Wahl, 2006).134 The GDR, by contrast, encouraged women’s 
participation in the labour market. East Germany also fostered equality between men and 
women through quotas in the legislature and laws mandating support for working women 
and single mothers. After the reunification in 1989, when Eastern German states copied 
gender policies of the West, women’s opportunities to attain economic independence 
significantly decreased: while 86 % of Eastern German women aged 18 to 59 were 
employed in the 1990s, this number had dropped to 50 % by 2004 (Lang, 2007). 
Differences continue to exist today between the two regions, with women in the ex-GDR 
more strongly favouring a working mother role and more frequently having children while 
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unmarried, and with men also taking up more household and childcare responsibilities than 
in the West (Ferree, 2010: 201).   
Some changes have occurred in the male breadwinner logic in Germany’s family 
policies during the late 1990s, when the Red-Green coalition cabinet took office and 
women’s policies changed into gender policies. In 1998, the cabinet legally endorsed the 
goal of gender mainstreaming (but the central steering and implementation committee at 
the federal level has been abolished in 2007 by the current Conservative government). The 
Schröder Government also focused on men’s caregiver responsibilities by renewing 
parental leave in 2001, developing childcare policies to expand public facilities for three-
to-five-year-old children, and institutionalising part-time work more firmly. Nonetheless, 
Chancellor Schröder himself only half-heartedly supported the feminist agenda, publicly 
declaring in 1998 that women’s equality concerns were a ‘fuss’ (Ferree, 2010: 198). No 
significant changes occurred in the tax system, which continues to be based on family 
income and indirectly punishes second earners, in addition to allowing only very limited 
tax deductions for child care or domestic services.135 Moreover, his Government’s neo-
market liberalisation policies in the labour-market and welfare state, including the so-
called ‘Hartz reforms’, had several indirect gender discriminatory effects, making women 
more dependent on their husband’s incomes (Lang, 2007).136 Policies thus complement 
rather than change the breadwinner logic (von Wahl, 2006; Berghahn, 2003). Women’s 
labour market participation continues to be low. 137 
Much in line with its conservative gender regime, the state has long approached 
migrant minority women as family spouses of male labour migrants. An arriving spouse 
was barred from employment for four years (two years since 2000). Even though 
Schröder’s Government improved migrant women’s access to an independent residence 
permit after two (instead of four) years of marriage, women continue to be discriminated 
against indirectly through the requirement of five years of social insurance contribution 
(Sainsbury, 2006: 235). Only in 2005 did the Federal Ministry of Family, Seniors, Women 
and Youth start focusing on the emancipation of girls and women with a migrant 
background, initiating several studies.138 It started special mentoring projects for migrant 
girls to encourage their labour-market participation and ‘to discuss gender roles of their 
own and their new culture’.139 Also in a particular section of the Federal Integration Plan of 
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2007, attention was paid to the position of migrant girls and women. Its primary goals were 
improving migrant women’s citizenship rights, augmenting their participation in the labour 
market, and combating gender violence. Similar to the Netherlands and France, forced 
marriages, trafficking women and FGM played an important role in policy debates on 
restricting family migration, which focused on migrants’ cultures as an obstacle to 
integration.140 The Federal Ministry established a working group to tackle such problems, 
which brought together various local and national experts, women’s associations, Islamic 
umbrella organisations, and ministries.141 
 
To sum up, some differences exist between the three countries’ equality policies. France 
and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands have established several policies and laws to foster 
formal equality, non-discrimination and equal opportunities, as well as equality bodies to 
overlook the implementation thereoff. I therefore expect a greater emphasis on gender 
equality and sex discrimination in hijab debates in France and the Netherlands than in 
Germany, with the difference being that in France the emphasis will lie on sex only and in 
Netherlands also on intersecting grounds of ethnicity. In Germany and the Netherlands, I 
expect a greater tolerance for female-specific practices like veiling than in France, where 
the French state officially approaches women as individual citizens (but simultaneously 
disregards the gendered division of labour in ‘the’ private sphereand identifies women as 
mothers as primarily responsible for the care of children142). Because of the increasing 
focus on migrant minority women in all three countries’ emancipation policies, I expect an 
converging focus on the status and rights of hijab-wearing women, with a particular 
problematisation of their culture. 
 
6.2.3 Political allies for claims of gender equality and recognition 
In France, gender cleavages cross-cut right-left cleavages. Women’s movements allied 
with the Socialist Party in their advocacy for an equal opportunity law in employment in 
the 1980s (Mazur, 1995) and again in the late 1990s. They also found support on the Left 
for their drive for a Parity Law (Chambon, 2002). Familialist ideologies have, in contrast, 
long permeated the ideology of the Gaulist RPR, which has objected to changes in tax 
legislation, or family policies that challenged traditional, heterosexual gender norms (with 
the UMP continuing to oppose the access to marriage in 2006). Nonetheless, feminist 
coalitions around reproductive rights and protection from domestic violence did benefit 
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 Forced marriages received particular attention when a new Immigration Act came into effect in 
January 2005 that restricted the right to family migration through age limits and civil integration 
tests abroad. The Federal parliament also passed a bill in October 2004 that designated forced 
marriages as severe offences of coercion, which was followed by another bill introduced by the 
conservative-ruled Federal Council to criminalize forced marriages sui generis, with a term of 
imprisonment between six months and ten years (Rostock & Berghahn, 2008). See also: 
Kreinbrink, Axel & Rühl, Stefan (2007), ‘Family Reunification in Germany. Small scale study IV 
in the Framework of European Migration Network. Working paper 10 der Forschungsgruppe des 
Bundesamts’ (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees). 
141
 Bundesregierung Deutschlands, ‘Der Neue Integrationsplan. Neue Wege – Neue Chancen’ 
(July, 2007). 
142
 Since 1983, approximately half of French women aged 25-54 have worked full time and 12 to 
16 % women part time. Although women’s part-time work has increased, those working part time 
still work on average 34 hours a week (Misra & Jude, 2008). 
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from feminist support within (centre-) Right parties. Moreover, gender-related issues 
regarding women’s employment have increasingly started to transcend traditional Left-
Right cleavages, with both sides increasingly favouring work-family reconciliation policies 
(Revillard, 2007).  
Furthermore, the right-wing UMP Government of 2002 made gender equality one 
of the priorities on their agenda and upgraded the agency responsible for it to a full 
Ministry with a significant budget (Mazur, 2007). Some migrant women’s movements 
have found allies among the UMP when politicising sexual oppression and violence in 
migrant neighbourhoods, such as the association called Neither Whores Nor Submissive 
(‘Ni Putes Ni Soumises’, NPNS). Some of its chairwomen had previously been working in 
a local association that cooperated with the PS satellite organisation SOS Racism. When a 
young girl of Moroccan background was brutally murdered in a Paris suburb by her 
boyfriend in October 2002, a local gang leader, the women’s movement organised a march 
through France from February to March 2003, drawing attention to sexual violence.143 
Partly because its cause fit the UMP’s agenda of augmenting public security in the 
banlieus, it managed to draw the attention of important stakeholders on the Right for 
migrant women’s status (Ezekiel, 2006; Tickcin, 2008). We may therefore expect that until 
the turn of the century the Left will draw attention to gender equality concerns in hijab 
debates, followed by the UMP after the turn of the century that will use a protective 
discourse.  
In the Netherlands the women’s movement has also allied with the Green, Social 
Democrat and Liberal Democrat parties. The Social Democratic Party’s women’s 
commission, ‘Women’s Contact’ (‘Vrouwencontact’), played a key role in successfully 
introducing feminist demands into the party platform in the 1980s. The Greens have also 
included many feminists, being led by a female party leader since 2002, while the Liberal 
Democrat party has a high record of defending women’s and gays’ civil rights (Oldersma, 
2002). The Purple coalition Government of VVD, D66, PvdA (1994-2002) also responded 
to several demands of the women’s and gay movement regarding part-time work and equal 
rights. The Christian Democrat party and particularly the smaller Christian Union parties, 
by contrast, have mainly defended women’s roles as mothers in the family (Outshoorn & 
Kantola, 2007).  
After the turn of the century, some alliances occurred between the Left, the 
conservative Liberal party and the Christian Democrat party in regard to migrant women’s 
rights, such as when Ayaan Hirsi Ali was elected a member of parliament in 2003 for the 
VVD. For instance, in 2003 Hirsi Ali launched a proposal with representatives of the 
Greens and the Christian-Democrats to grant rights to immigrant wives who had been left 
by their husbands.144 Nonetheless, her fierce criticisms of Islamic culture and practice also 
quickly estranged potential allies on the Left, and particularly the Muslim migrant women 
she claimed to represent (Ghorashi, 2010). Populist right-wing parties like Fortuyn’s LPF 
and Geert Wilders’ PVV have currently adopted her discourse of blaming Dutch 
                                                           
143
 One of the chairwomen of NPNS also released a book on collective rapes among migrant youth 
that triggered a public debate and helped draw attention to violence against women of ethnic 
minority backgrounds living in the French suburbs: Bellil, Samira (2003), Dans l’enfer des 
tournantes (‘In gang-rape hell’), Paris: Gallimard.  
144
 No. 95, ‘Interpellatie Hirsi Ali over het achterlaten van vrouwen en kinderen in Marokko, 
Handelingen 2003-2004, 2e kamer’  (September 14, 2004) 
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multiculturalism for undermining women’s rights in a ‘clash of civilisation’ discourse 
(Akkerman & Hagelund, 2007). While we may particularly expect a gendered discourse 
among left-wing parties, a convergence may thus occur over time between the Left and the 
Right in politicising women’s concerns and gender power relations.  
In Germany, gender cleavages have largely divided the progressive secular left-
wing parties from conservative Christian and Liberal parties. Feminists joined the Green 
party, which explicitly labelled itself in feminist terms when it was established in 1982. 
The Left Party, Die Linke, has also become a strong advocate of gender-equality concerns. 
Gender equality machineries have also been the most extensive and powerful in federal 
states that are ruled by left-wing governments, whereas conservative-ruled governments 
have blocked claims for gender equality and non-discrimination and have primarily 
advocated for women’s role in the family (Ferree, 1995; Lang, 2007). Nonetheless, both 
CDU- and SPD-ruled governments have supported the male-breadwinner model. 
Supporting labour and business interests, the Social Democrats have not always supported 
the feminist agenda regarding work and family (von Wahl, 2006). The FDP has also 
traditionally been protective of the private sphere of the family and wary of the state 
interfering in the market to promote women’s employment and opportunities. We may 
therefore expect that the Green party in particular will draw attention to the rights and 
status of women in the hijab debates. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter compared gender cleavages, gender machineries and gender policies in the 
Netherlands, France and Germany. I expect some differences in the gendering of policy 
debates about the hijab, with French debates being most contentious when framed in terms 
of gender equality, due to the extra-parliamentary mobilisation of independent women’s 
movements. French women have over time gained more favorabele opportunities for 
involvement in policy debates, albeit only those with close ties to the gender machinery. In 
Germany and the Netherlands, feminist gendering is to be expected from femocrats 
working within state institutions and political parties. I expect policy frames that focus on 
women’s formal equality regardless of sexual difference to be most resonant in France, 
followed by the Netherlands, which both have a higher record of civil rights, equal 
treatment and non-discrimination than Germany. Because Dutch emancipation policies 
have a longer record of fostering migrant women’s labour market participation, frames 
may pay more attention to discrimination in the labour-market on grounds of inequalities 
related to intersecting gender and ethnic differences. In all three countries, I expect the 
hijab debate to be increasingly gendered due the recent increasing focus in emancipation 
policies on migrant women’s status and rights, with the both the Right and Left in France 
and the Netherlands politicising gender. Table 4 summarizes my expectations for all three 
countries on grounds of gender cleavages, legal frameworks and policies regulating gender 
relations and the representation of gender in the party system. 
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Table 4 Expectations regarding the POS for hijab-wearing women as gendered actors 
 France Netherlands Germany Expectations  
Gender 
cleavages 
Rather pacified but 
still autonomous 
women’s 
movement visible; 
stronger equality 
feminism 
Rather pacified 
cleavage; stronger 
difference 
feminism 
Rather pacified 
cleavage; stronger 
difference 
feminism 
When framed in terms 
of gender (equality), 
most salient issue in 
France where 
women’s movement 
may mobilize 
Gender 
machinery 
and gender 
equality laws 
and policies 
Strong emphasis 
on gender equality/ 
non-
discrimination; 
social rights based 
on norms of (full-
time) working 
mother; only after 
turn of century 
attention for 
migrant women.  
Consolidated 
gender machinery, 
but low 
representation of 
women in politics: 
access for (mainly 
native French) 
women’s 
movement 
improves over 
time 
 
 
Moderate 
emphasis on 
gender equality/ 
non-
discrimination; 
social rights based 
on male 
breadwinner and 
(part-time) female 
care taker; already 
scant attention for 
migrant women 
before turn of 
century.  
Weakened gender 
machinery, but 
high representation 
of women in 
politics: access for 
(also migrant) 
women’s 
movement 
decreases over 
time 
 
Low emphasis on 
gender equality/ 
non-
discrimination; 
social rights based 
on male 
breadwinner and 
female care taker; 
only after turn of 
century attention 
for migrant 
women.  At federal 
level gender 
machinery 
consolidated and 
high representation 
of women in 
politics, but 
weakened at  
regional level: 
little access for 
(particularly 
migrant) women’s 
movement 
Most favourable and 
increasing 
opportunities in France 
to gender policy 
debates in terms of 
equal rights/ 
opportunities for 
girls/women, and then 
in the Netherlands 
where opportunities 
decrease. In all three 
countries convergence 
in emancipation 
policies focusing on 
migrant women = 
convergence in 
gendering of headscarf 
debate  
Political 
allies  for 
claims of 
gender 
equality and 
recognition 
Particularly among 
left-wing parties 
(PS/Greens/PCF), 
but later also 
among UMP: 
increasing 
opportunities to 
gender policy 
debate 
Particularly among 
left-wing and 
Liberal Democrat 
parties (Greens, 
PvdA, D66), least 
among Christian 
parties: decreasing 
opportunities after 
turn of century 
Particularly among 
Greens, Die Linke 
and to lesser extent 
SPD, least among 
Christian parties: 
favourable 
opportunities in 
SPD ruled Länder 
to gender debate 
In all three countries, 
most attention for 
gender equality and 
women’s rights when 
Left rules the country 
or federal state. In 
France also some 
opportunities among 
the Right after turn of 
century   
Expectations 
for each 
country on 
grounds of 
women’s 
emanci-
pation policy 
paradigms 
 
Debate contentious 
when framed in 
terms of gender 
equality: focus on 
equal rights. 
Women’s 
movements 
increasingly 
involved in policy 
deliberations  
Debate less 
contentious when 
framed in terms of 
gender equality: 
more focus on 
gender difference. 
Little involvement 
of women’s 
movement in 
policy 
deliberations 
Debate less 
contentious when 
gendered: focus on 
gender difference 
not on gender 
discrimination. 
Little involvement 
of women’s 
movement in 
policy 
deliberations 
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Part 2. The political process on the hijab in France, the Netherlands and 
Germany 
 
The next three chapters analyse the politicisation of the hijab in France, the Netherlands 
and Germany. The aim is to ascertain the extent to which the general and issue-specific 
opportunity structures elaborated upon in the previous chapters have shaped the 
contentiousness, framing and regulation of the hijab. In order to answer this question, the 
chapters in this Part will analyse the time span of the debates, the actors involved, the 
problems they tabled and the solutions they suggested, as well as the outcomes of these 
framing contests. Because the issue first became contentious in France, Chapter 7 starts 
with an analysis of the policy process there. This is followed by an analysis of the Dutch 
debates and regulations in Chapter 8, and the German case in Chapter 9.  
The structure of these chapters will be the same. First, I will describe the saliency 
of the issue in the political realm in each country, elaborating upon the types of hijab 
which became contentious, as well as when and in what setting (schools, public service 
functions, private sector etcetera) this took place. Second, I will analyse which actors were 
involved in politicising the issue. Third, I will elaborate upon the policy-formation process 
and the different policy responses formulated by authorities over time. Fourth, I will 
discuss the different problems tabled in the hijab debates, the solutions suggested for 
managing these, and how different actors negotiated these diagnostic and prognostic 
frames. Each chapter will be concluded with an analysis to what extent my findings 
matched the expectations that were raised in the previous chapters on each country’s 
general and issue-specific opportunity structure. In Chapter 10, I will summarise my 
findings in a cross-national analysis.   
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Chapter 7. France: debates and policies on the hijab (1989-2007) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will analyse the policy-formulation and policy-making processes 
concerning the hijab in France, including the discursive politics within the state preceding 
policy outcomes. Various scholars have argued that French traditions of strict secularism, 
laïcité, and its national identity of a singular, non-differentiated Republican citizenship 
explain French bans on headscarves in public schools (Freedman, 2004; Galleotti, 1993; 
Joppke, 2009). In this chapter I will show that institutionalised practices of laïcité and 
Republican citizenship were indeed very important in making the wearing of headscarves 
in state schools so contentious in France, but I will also nuance this assumption.  
First, laïcité and Republican citizenship were in themselves contested concepts that 
gained different meanings during the hijab debates and, moreover, shifted over time. The 
ban on conspicuous religious symbols in public schools passed by the French Government 
in 2003 did not naturally or logically follow from preceding policies and institutions. There 
had been no previous institutional obstacles to accommodating religious symbols in 
schools; in fact, traditions of laïcité had never demanded pupils to privatise their faith in 
Republican schools. Only when the headscarf was linked to concerns about social 
fragmentation and a politicised Islam encroaching upon individual liberties of Jewish 
minorities and girls, a consensus emerged that laïcité required the privatization of religious 
identities in public schools. 
Second, institutional patterns cannot explain why only in 2003 such restrictive 
legislation was passed and not in 1989, when the pupil’s hijab for the first time figured on 
the political agenda. In order to explain such changes over time, it is necessary to take into 
account the changing social and political context, including shifts in party constellations. 
The emergence of a right-wing Government in 2002 created new political opportunities for 
advocates of a law that relegated religion out of the public school. Also the Socialist Party 
became less tolerant. Several feminist and anti-discrimination movements successfully 
linked their concerns about sexual violence and anti-Semitism to the dominant political 
discourse on hijabs, contributing to a discourse coalition favouring restrictive legislation.  
Third, international developments like the Algerian civil war in the mid-1990s and 
September 11th indirectly influenced the policy debate on the hijab by enabling frames that 
focused on the danger of a radical Islam for national values. 
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Figure 2 Political contentiousness of hijab in France (1989-2007)
7.2 Debates and policy responses  
7.2.1 Time line and saliency 
In France, the headscarf has been a recurring political issue since 1989, with three clear 
periods of heightened contestation in 1989, 1994 and 2003-2004 (see figure 2). From 1989 
until 2007, 51 questions were raised concerning the hijab, with all but six focusing on 
pupils’ right to cover (three others focused on the hijab on passports or on students’ 
identity cards, and one on hijabs for nurses). Most of these were written questions (33), 
answered within two months by the designated Minister in a letter published in the 
parliamentary daily ‘Journal Officiel’ (JO). Three questions were raised during the weekly 
question hour, and fifteen during one of the two weekly meetings with the Council of 
Ministers.145 Finally, 15 law proposals were submitted between 1989 and 2004, all aimed 
at banning religious symbolism in public schools.  
Up until 2003, no legislative proposals on the hijab were proposed for plenary 
debate.146 In January 2004, however, the Government submitted a law project that was 
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 During the weekly question hour, the (deputy) Minister has the right to select questions for a 
personal response. Parliamentary questioning is no effective means to criticise the Government’s 
public (non) policies (Lazardeux, 2009). More effective are the so-called Questions to the 
Government during the meetings with the Council of Ministers, when each parliamentary group 
gets five minutes to raise and discuss questions with the Government, whose responses are 
broadcast live on the Government’s public channel. Due to a constitutional reform in 1995, the 
number of sessions devoted to parliamentary questioning doubled. This led to increased amounts of 
questions and the capacity of the legislature to control the government (Lazardeux, 2009). But there 
has been no significant increase of questions about the hijab issue since 1995.  
146
 The Chairmen’s Conference decides whether and which law proposals and projects are proposed 
for plenary debate. It consists of the President of the Assembly, six Vice-Presidents, the chairmen 
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adopted by a majority in Parliament in February and implemented the subsequent school 
year. It prohibits the display of all ‘ostensible’ religious symbolism in public primary and 
secondary schools, meaning the hijab, large crucifixes and kippahs. The law does not apply 
to university students.  
The debate’s timeline does not reflect a steady increase of conflicts over 
headscarves in public schools.147 Conflicts were scarce before the law was implemented. 
The Minister of Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, claimed in 2003 that out of 250,000 Muslim 
schoolgirls 1,256 insisted on wearing the hijab, and that only 20 caused problems, of 
whom four were expelled. Also after the implementation of the law, there were only 48 
cases of expulsion for hijab-wearing Muslim girls and three for turban-wearing Sikh boys 
between September 2004 and April 2005. According to the Minister of Education, Francois 
Fillon, only 110 out of 639 girls refused to remove their headscarves, and most accepted 
the regulations of the school after dialogue (Laurence & Vaisse: 170-171; Winter, 2006: 
285). While the low amount of conflict after the introduction of the law was taken as 
indicative of the large support for the law, used to relativise the costs of legislation, the 
question remains whether the disciplinary (and rather repressive) strategy of the state 
actually resolved the tension between Republicans’ insistence on a secularist and 
ostensibly colour-blind citizenship ideal and citizens’ claims of recognition for their 
multiple identities (Scott, 2007). 
The French debate focused on pupils’ (and not teachers’) rights to cover, and did 
not carry over to other realms such as the civil service or judiciary. Few conflicts have 
emerged regarding headscarves worn by employees in private sectors of the labour market, 
but these have not been addressed in the Parliament.148 This is not indicative of a general 
tolerance of religious dress in other public domains. Rather, as we will see, deputies 
disagreed whether pupils could express their religion in public schools, but never even 
discussed the option of headscarves for civil servants. Deputies have also never challenged 
the State Council’s opinion of May 3, 2000, which argued that civil servants, including 
school teachers and school inspectors, may not manifest their religious beliefs during work 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
of each parliamentary group, and the Secretary of the Finance Committee (and, since 1995, also the 
chairman of the Delegation for the European Union). Law proposals which are proposed for 
plenary debate are first sent to one of the six (currently eight) permanent Parliamentary Committees 
for consideration (or to a temporary ad-hoc Committee).Standing committees consist of one of the 
577 deputies who are appointed by the Assembly by proportional representation of the 
parliamentary groups; each committee thus reflects the Assembly’s political composition. The hijab 
issue generally falls under the remit of the Committee of Cultural, Family and Social affairs (140 
members) or Committee of Laws (about 70 members). Other committees are the Committee of 
Economic Affairs, Environment and Territory (currently split in two separate Committees of 
Economic affairs and of Environment and Territory), the Committee of Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee of National Defence and Armed Forces and the Committee of Finance, General 
Economy and Planning. Currently, the Committee of Social, Cultural and Family affairs has been 
split in two separate Committees (of respectively Cultural affairs and Education, and of Social 
affairs), making a total of eight Committees.  
147
 This was the conclusion of the Human Rights Commission (‘Commission Nationale 
Consultative des Droits de l’Homme, CNCDH) in its report called ‘La laïcité aujourd’hui’ 
(December 2003). Its finding was confirmed by the research of the Debré commission. 
148
 On December 17th 2002, for instance, the Paris Labour Court concluded that a trans-national 
telemarketing company had illegally sacked an employee for wearing a headscarf. Although French 
workplace legislation (‘Code du Travail’) allows employers to restrict individual freedoms, they 
must prove that this is necessary for the function in question, or for security (Cadot et al., 2007). 
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for reasons of impartiality and neutrality.149 This duty has also applied to health workers in 
public services150, as well as to court personnel. When in 2004 a conflict arose in which a 
lay judge was asked to remove her headscarf, the Government decided without further 
controversy that lay judges and clerks who assist the audience in court may be required to 
wear cloths that convey ‘an attitude of dignity and respect for the justice system’. It is up to 
the judge in question to decide whether someone has jeopardised the impartiality and 
independence of the jury with her dress.151 Recently, even the right of elected deputies to 
express their personal religious affiliation in local parliaments has been questioned.152 
Since 2009 (not visible in figure 2), the debate has shifted to other types of religious 
dress, namely the Islamic face veil. One year later, in September 2010, the Parliament 
adopted a law that bans all kinds of face covers in public spaces, which took effect in April 
2011. Veiled women will be consulted by organisations with the aim to convince them to 
reconsider their choice within six months after their first arrest, and can be fined if they 
repeatedly ignore warnings of the police to unveil in public. People found guilty of forcing 
others to cover are penalised with fines up to 30.000 and a year in prison. My analysis of 
framing of French debates aabout the face veil will be brief compared to the analysis of 
policy debates and policies on the pupil’s headscarf, because this issue only became 
politically contentious in 2009, two years after the end of my research period (1985-2007). 
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 See: Conseil d’Etat, No. 217.017, Melle Marteaux (May 3, 2000). This jurisprudence was 
confirmed in 2003 in the annual report of the State Council: Conseil d’Etat, ‘Un Siècle de laïcité- 
jurisprudence et avis du 2003’, Rapport Public (2003) 
150
 On September 27, 2002 the Paris Administrative Tribunal rejected an appeal from a hijab-
wearing health worker who had been fired by a public clinic for the homeless. The judges argued 
that employees of public services were, bound by the principle of secularism and strict neutrality, 
to refrain from expressing their adherence to a religious faith during work. 
151
 Minister of Justice in: AN No. 32189, JO (May 4, 2004): 3344.  
152
 This occurred when in the regional elections of 2010 a far left-wing party put a headscarf-
wearing woman on the list. The candidate was the 21 year old Ilham Mousaid, running for the New 
Anti Capitalist Party (‘Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste’, NPA) in the district of Vaucluse. All 
political parties, except for the small Christian Democrat party, rejected it. The feminist 
Association pour Solidarité, and its Arab women’s unit, unsuccessfully tried to appeal to court to 
render her candidacy illegitimate. The administrative court of Marseille nullified the appeal, 
finding no prove that fundamental liberties were at stake. 
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Figure 3 French actors politicising hijab (1989-2007)
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7.2.2 Actors 
Figure 3 makes clear that the right-wing party RPR and later UMP most frequently 
politicised the headscarf issue, together with the centre-Right party UDF, particularly 
during the 12th legislature when a right-wing UMP Government took office. Of the 15 law 
proposals found in the French debate, nine were initiated by the right-wing Gaullist party 
Republican Rally (RPR) or its successor UMP, and three by the Liberal Democrat party 
(UDF) or the centrist Radical Party (Valoisien) (PR). However, the Republican Left also 
raised the issue various times. Several deputies of mixed parliamentary groups Republic 
and Liberty (République et Liberté, RL) (1993-1997) and Radicals, Citizens and Greens 
(Radical, Citoyen et Verts, RCV) which supported Jospin’s Government (1997-2002) 
asked for restrictive legislation.153  
After the turn of the century, some members of the Socialist party (PS) also 
politicised the hijab from a restrictive position, among them former education minister 
Jack Lang and former Prime Minister Laurent Fabius, who launched a law proposal to ban 
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 The parliamentary group RL regrouped 23 (independent) members of smaller left-wing, Centrist 
and right-wing parties, such as the former Socialists Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement and 
Georges Sarre who established in 1993 the Citizen’s Movement (‘Mouvement des Citoyens’, 
MDC, from 2002: ‘Mouvement Républicain et Citoyen’, MRC). They would politicise the 
headscarf several times. The parliamentary group RCV, regrouped deputies of five leftist and 
ecological parties, including the left-wing Radical party (‘Parti radical-socialiste’, later ‘Parti 
Radical de Gauche’, PRG), the Greens (Verts), the Citizen’s movement (MDC), reunited 
Communists and the Ecologists. The RCV formed an alliance with the Socialist government of 
Lionel Jospin from 1997-2002, called the Pluralist Left (‘Gauche Plurielle’) or the Pluralist 
Majority (‘Majorité Plurielle’).  
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religious symbolism in public schools.154 This move of the Left from accommodation to 
legislation went hand-in-hand with a frame convergence (see below). 
Remarkably, the Front National has never politicised the headscarf. The fact that 
the FN only managed to get one parliamentary seat in 1988-1993 and one seat in 1997-
2002 partly explains its lack of intervention in the debate. Instead of discussing the 
incorporation of Muslim girls with or without headscarves in schools, le Pen insisted upon 
the expulsion of all immigrants from France. Jean-Marie Le Pen therefore opposed the 
Government’s law of 2004 allowing ‘discrete’ religious symbols, such as the bandana.  
7.2.3 Policy responses and jurisprudence 
 
Table 5 French policy responses to the hijab 
Time Government Policy response 
1989 
Socialist/Liberal (PS-UDF). Prime-
Minister Michel Rocard (PS). Minister of 
Education Lionel Jospin (PS). President 
Francois Mitterand (PS) 
 
Directive that alludes to case to case 
approach (accommodation): pupil can only 
be expelled if conduct contains prove of 
proselytism or of disturb of educational 
peace 
 
1994 
Gaullist/Liberal (RPR-UDF-PR). Prime-
Minister Edouard Balladur (RPR). Minister 
of Education Francois Bayrou(UDF). 
Cohabitation: President Francois 
Mitterand (PS) 
 
Directive that allows schools to ban 
'ostentatious' symbols of religious 
affiliation. 
 
2004 
Right-wing (UMP). Prime-Minister Jean-
Pierre Raffarin (UMP); Minister of 
Education Luc Ferry (independent); 
President Jacques Chirac (RPR/UMP) 
 
Law that bans all 'ostensible' signs of 
religious affiliation in primary and 
secondary state schools. 
 
2010 
Right-wing (UMP). Prime-Minister 
Francois Fillon (UMP); Minister of Justice 
Michèle Alliot-Marie; President Nicolas 
Sarkozy (UMP) 
Law that prohibits the wearing of all types 
of face covers in public space. 
 
Table 5 summarises the policy responses of the French government over time. As widely 
reported elsewhere, the debate started in 1989 when three pupils in the Northern town of 
Creil were expelled from school because of their headscarves (Bowen, 2007a; Kastoryano, 
2006; Moruzzi, 1994; Rocheford, 2002; Scott, 2007).155 The principal of the school was 
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 AN No. 1227, Proposition de Loi (November 18, 2003). 
155
 The three girls were two sisters of Moroccan background and one daughter of Tunisian parents, 
who were expelled for the reason that their headscarves infringed upon the neutrality of the school. 
The school in Creil, an industrial city North of Paris, was a public middle school for pupils aged 
from 11 to 15 in one of poor housing projects of France (‘cité’). At the time of the affair, the school 
consisted of 55 % ethnic minority pupils with 26 different backgrounds (Rochefort, 2001). Initially, 
a compromise was found in that the girls could wear their headscarves in the school yard, while 
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Ernest Chénière, who later entered national Parliament in 1993 as a deputy for the RPR. 
On 25th October, three weeks after the girls had been expelled and the local affair had 
become a national debate, the Socialist Minister of Education, Lionel Jospin, responded to 
the issue in Parliament.156 On 27th November 1989, the State Council advised the 
Government that the wearing of headscarves conveys a right to freedom of religion of 
pupils, as it comprises the expression and demonstration of religious beliefs. It argued that 
religious signs by themselves could not be presumed to perturb schoolchildren. Any 
discrimination on the basis of religious belief was considered unconstitutional. In line with 
the state’s duty of neutrality, the State Council was not prepared to interpret questions of 
religious doctrine, for example assessing whether the hijab represented the oppression and 
subordination of women in Islam.  
Hence, pupils had a right to express and manifest their religious beliefs within state 
schools. Only if their actions or attitudes could be deemed as proselytism or propaganda 
could the wearing of headscarves be interpreted as ostentatious and impermissible. In its 
verdict, the Court made reference to both national laws and several international treaties 
that France ratified, such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 
the Convention against Discrimination in Education157 (McGoldrick, 2006: 68-70). Several 
members of the RPR, UDF and the Communist Party challenged the opinion of the 
Council and asked for legislation, but to no avail: the Socialist Government chose for 
accommodation and decentralisation. It issued a Directive to schools encouraging them to 
take a case to case approach to decide whether pupils transgressed their freedom rights, 
and to discuss the issue before expelling pupils.158 
The debate flared up again in 1993, when the right-wing coalition Government of 
the Gaullist and Liberal parties RPR and UDF took office. Chénière, who had now become 
a deputy for the RPR, drew attention to some local conflicts where several girls had 
demonstrated or gone on hunger strike after they were expelled for refusing to 
uncover.159,160 He submitted several law proposals to ban ‘ostentatious’ symbols of religion 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
removing them in the class room. But ten days later, on 19th October, they broke the agreement and 
again started wearing headscarves in schools. At that time, the local affair had become a national 
debate. On 22nd October two Islamic organisations demonstrated in Paris to oppose their exclusion. 
One month later, the King of Morocco Hassan II eventually convinced the two Moroccan-French 
girls to accept the school’s compromise, returning to school in December. The third girl refused 
and was never re-admitted (Bowen, 2007a: 84). 
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in schools.161 In addition to the RPR, members of the Republican Left and the UDF also 
asked for legislation.162  
On September 20th 1994, the new Minister of Education, Francois Bayrou (UDF) 
did not favour a law, considering dialogue a better means to ‘convince pupils to adopt an 
attitude and dress that corresponds to the French tradition’.163 Nonetheless, he issued a new 
clothing directive, stating: “the nation is not only a community of citizens with individual 
rights. She is a community with a destiny. This ideal is first of all constructed at school. 
Here all children meet and learn to live together and respect each other. […] That is why it 
is not possible to accept the presence and multiplication of ostentatious signs in a school 
whose signification involves the separation of certain students from the common life of the 
school. These signs are in themselves part of proselytisation…” (quoted from McGoldrick 
(2006): 72).164 Bayrou explained in an interview in the magazine Le Point that the 
headscarf was an ‘ostentatious’ sign, but that kippas or yarmulkes were ‘discrete’ insignia 
that only signify a private religious attachment (Rigoni, 2004). The effect of this Directive 
was that it was no longer necessary for schools to prove that pupils’ behaviour was 
discriminatory and the reason for their expulsion, because headscarves in themselves 
contained political meanings. This triggered an increase in expulsions.  
Hereafter, Minister of Social Affairs (former feminist activist and teacher, and 
current member of HALDE) Simone Veil (UDF) appointed a new office of ministerial 
mediator for headscarf cases, headed by the Algeria born Hanifa Chérifi. In case of 
conflict, she had to convince pupils to respect the rules of the school or to replace 
‘ostentatious’ scarves with ‘discrete’ bandanas, a hair-ribbon tightly covered around the 
hair leaving the neck and ears visible. She was apparently successful, because the number 
of disputes dropped significantly after 1995 (Bowen, 2007a). Girls with whom no 
compromises could be found left public school and took private courses, either from school 
teachers volunteering or (when they attained funding from Muslim associations) from the 
French Centre for Distance Courses (‘Centre national d’Éducation à Distance’).  
In 1997 the State Council ruled, however, that exclusion on the sole grounds of 
carrying a headscarf is illegal, hence nullifying Bayrou’s Directive. It continued to support 
a more inclusive interpretation of laïcité, only upholding the expulsion of headscarf-
wearing pupils if they had actually proselytised their faith or disturbed public order. This 
was considered the case when headscarf-wearing pupils publicly protested against their 
exclusion from school or had refused to partake in (gymnastic) courses bare-headed 
(Poulter, 1997: 60). Of the 49 cases of suspension or expulsion considered by the State 
Council between 1994 and 2003, 41 school decisions were reversed (Mc Goldrick, 2006: 
70-71). This jurisprudence was upheld by the new left-wing Government that took office in 
1997. The Minister of Education Claude Allègre (PS) argued that the Republican school is 
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there to welcome rather than to exclude.165 His successor Jack Lang, however, would later 
come out in favour of a law. 
In 2003, things started to change when Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP), Minister of 
Domestic Affairs, announced in a speech at a meeting with the Islamic organisation UOIF 
on April 19th that all French residents must show their hair on identity card photos, 
emphasising that the laws of the Republic precede those of religion (Bowen, 2007a: 100; 
Lorcerie, 2005). This had already been the jurisprudence of the State Council and the 
policy response of the previous Minister of Interior of the left-wing Cabinet, Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement in 2000.166 Deputies of his party UMP seized the opportunity to launch 
several law proposals to call for a ban on headscarves in public schools, which were sent to 
the standing Committee of Social, Cultural and Family affairs for further consideration. On 
5th May 2003, it launched a round-table (called ‘Education and Laïcité today’), inviting 
teachers and pupils of high schools in deprived areas, as well as scholars, ministry 
representatives, public intellectuals and journalists. One of the issues discussed was 
religious dress in school. A few highly mediatised conflicts in 1998,167 2002,168 and 
September 2003169, where both teachers and pupils had gone on strike to either oppose or 
advocate the inclusion of headscarf-wearing girls, illustrated that the conflict had hardened 
on both sides. Existing methods of negotiation and toleration appeared outdated when girls 
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increasingly insisted upon their own individual choice and religious freedom to cover 
(Lorcerie, 2008; Bowen, 2007a).  
On 4th June 2003, the Parliament installed an inquiry committee to study the issue, 
the Mission of Information about the Questions of Religious Symbols at School (‘Mission 
d’Information sur la Question des Signes Religieux à l’École’), also called Debré 
Commission after its chair, the President of the Assembly  Jean-Louis Debré. Inquiry 
Commissions may be established by Parliamentary Committees (in this case: for Culture, 
Family and Social Affairs) to gather more information. The members of such commissions, 
no more than 30 and proportionally representing the parliamentary groups, gather for a 
period of six months in which they question (non-) governmental witnesses or experts on 
the issue, before they launch a report to advise the Government. 
Also the Government took action. Within the Ministry of Education, a working 
group was established to study the issue of religious symbolism in schools, headed by 
university professor and school inspector Jean-Pierre Obin. In its report published in June 
2004 it stated that a revival of laïcité in state schools was needed.170 On 3rd July 2003, 
President Jacques Chirac installed the (initially: Independent) Commission of Reflection 
on the Application of the Principle of Laïcité in the Republic’ (‘Commission de réflexion 
sur l’application du principe de laïcité dans la République’) to study the status of 
secularism in present-day France. It was headed by Bernard Stasi, a former centre-Right 
Minister and the State Ombudsman from 2002 until 2007. It consisted of 19 non-
governmental members, ranging from academics, intellectuals, administrators, to a few 
working for integration organisations or in business life. They held four months of public 
and private hearings with a wide range of teachers and school principals, politicians, 
academics, grass-root activists, religious representatives, and students. On 11th December 
2003, the Stasi Commission published its report in which it recommended a law banning 
all signs that ‘ostensibly’ manifest (‘clearly display’, or ‘draw attention to’) one’s religious 
affiliation in public schools (Bowen, 2007a: 140). Even though most members had initially 
not favoured legislation, eventually only one member abstained from voting, the 
sociologist of religion Jean Bauberot (Bauberot, 2006). One week previously, the Debré 
commission’s report had been launched, advising a full ban on all ‘visible’ religious 
symbols in public schools.171 On 17th December 2003, Chirac gave a public speech in the 
Senate announcing his plan to implement a ban.172  
The Government’s law project173 was prepared by the Committee of Laws and 
deliberated with the fraction leaders of each parliamentary group and a member of the 
State Council, before being plenary discussed from 3rd to 7th February 2004. A majority of 
494 to 36 voted in favour of the law, with 31 abstentions. Two amendments were added: 
mediation between the school and pupil was obligatory before the latter could be expelled 
and every year there must be a review of the legislation and its implementation in practice 
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(McGoldrick, 2006; Idriss, 2005). In addition to the 330 of 364 UMP members, also 140 of 
149 members of the Socialist party voted in favour of the law. The 30 members of the 
Liberal Democrat party UDF were more divided about the law: 13 members insisted that a 
law must uphold the principle of secularism to avoid religious conflicts and communal 
tensions, 12 members abstained from voting, and 4 members voted against the law because 
it wrongly interpreted the principle of laïcité as a ‘weapon’ rather than as a marker of 
tolerance and respect of others. The strongest objection came from the parliamentary group 
Communists and Republicans, with two thirds of its 21 members voting against the law. 
They argued that instead of tackling the root causes of identity politics by combating 
poverty, the law would only stigmatise Muslim youngsters and contribute to racism, 
identity politics and fundamentalism.174  
On March 3, a vote was passed in the Senate with 276 in favour and 20 against.175 
Two weeks later, the Ministry of Education issued a new Directive explaining that all 
conspicuous religious symbols were forbidden in public schools, which were those that 
stand out and immediately denote religious affiliation: yarmulkes, headscarves, turbans, 
large Christian crosses; necklaces with small crosses, a David Star or the hands of Fatima 
(a pre-Islamic, cultural symbol) were explicitly allowed. Hence, the state made a 
distinction between non-acceptable religious and acceptable cultural practices. This led to 
some confusion about the rights of Sikh minorities to wear turbans. It became clear in a 
court case of March 2005 that turbans were also forbidden, although in some French 
schools the keski is allowed (the hairnet Sikhs wear underneath their turban) (McGoldrick, 
2006; Rigioni, 2004).  
 
7.3 Diagnoses and prognoses in the parliamentary debates on pupils’ headscarves 
In this section I will discuss which problems were defined in the debates on the pupils’ 
headscarf, and which solutions were suggested. Three dominant problems discussed were: 
first, the wearing of headscarves conflicted with the separation between church and states, 
and endangered third persons’ freedom of belief. Deputies particularly disagreed over the 
prognosis whether a ban on religious dress was in line with constitutional liberties of 
religious freedom. This problem continued to dominate the agenda from 1989 until 2003. 
Second, headscarves indicated segregationism and a manifestation of group differences 
that conflicted with Republican citizenship values of individual equality, liberty and 
solidarity, undermining national unity. This problem was already prominent on the agenda 
from the onset. But the causal logic changed over time; while the inclusion of girls in the 
Republican schools was initially considered a means of assimilating immigrants into 
individual French citizens, over time they had to be assimilated before entering school. 
Third was the problem that the headscarf symbolised women’s oppression in Islam, and 
conflicted with principles of gender equality. While it was already on the agenda in 1989, 
it only resonated after the turn of the century, when a majority of deputies considered a ban 
necessary to lift girls from communal pressure to cover. A fourth frame that intertwined 
with all three diagnoses argued that the headscarf was a symbol or tool of a politicised 
Islam. 
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1. State-church frames 
Various members of the RPR challenged the Socialist government’s initial tolerant stance 
towards headscarves, using a conflict with neutrality and an Islamic fundamentalism 
frame. In 1989, Alain Juppé of the RPR argued that the headscarf symbolized a religious 
fundamentalism of Muslims rejecting the secular foundations of the Republic.176 Using the 
word ‘intégrism’, Juppé drew a parallel between headscarf-wearing pupils and Catholic 
believers of the early 20th century, who had rejected secular modernity by living according 
to the fundaments of their religion in their public life (Bowen, 2007a: 156). Like Catholics, 
who had defended an ‘integral’ Christianity, Muslims would now intrude upon public 
schools to propagate anti-modernist and anti-Republican ideas. According to the RPR, the 
refusal to remove headscarves in public schools could in itself be interpreted as an 
unwillingness to accept the secular laws of the Republic, and as an attempt of religious 
fundamentalist groups to impose their religious truth-claims on others.177 RPR members 
together with some deputies of the PC viewed the Directive that allowed for some 
negotiation with headscarf-wearing pupils as dangerously compromising laïcité.178 
Headscarf-wearing girls, still identified as ‘immigrant’ girls, needed to be protected from 
the claims of religious fundamentalists and, instead, be exposed to laïcité, that is: a strict 
secularism that relegates religious expressions out of the public sphere.179 
The Socialist Government shared the diagnosis that the headscarf conflicted with 
laïcité. The Socialist Minister of Education, Jospin, argued that, “religion, is in our society 
a private affair,” and that therefore, “I ask pupils and parents to respect these (laic) 
principles of the public school, and not to come to school with any symbol that affirms a 
difference or religious distinction.” Yet, he also argued that “there does not exist a laïcité a 
la carte,” and that France was a constitutional state that safeguarded pupils’ religious 
freedom rights.180 Also the Minister of social housing and social welfare, Claude Evin 
(PS), framed the inclusion of hijab-wearing girls in school as a matter of extending 
universal rights of education to migrants.181  
Here we see that in the debate about headscarves the conflict between moderate 
secularists and hardliners is being played out. Even though the Socialist Government 
recognized the dilemma of religious proselytism and normatively favoured the 
privatization of religion in public schools, it was in favour of a moderate secularism to 
foster the emancipation and integration of migrants’ children. The PS Government 
reaonsed Muslim pupils would secularize gradually according to French modernity if only 
the state would integrate them socially and culturally. According to then-Prime Minister 
Michel Rocard in 1989, the headscarf should be regarded more as a ‘symbol of alienation’ 
rather than of religion.182 If only the Republic would further include migrants and tackle 
social-economic marginalisation, he seemed to suggest, the need to wear headscarves and 
retain religious and cultural identities would naturally reduce. He explained why he 
opposed a law: “I don’t believe a pure authoritarian procedure to be very effective, and 
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despite the militant lay-man I am, I don’t accept repression to be the dominant face of 
laïcité. Laïcité wants to convince, to persuade and to be shining. That is the laïcité that 
should be maintained in our schools […] The aim of our public and lay school is to 
welcome, to persuade, to integrate, that means, to realise the goals of education in another 
way than through a politics of a priori exclusion”.183  
Both the established Right and some members of the Left continued to challenge 
this tolerant stance. During the mid 1990s, Ernest Chénière of the RPR launched several 
law projects calling for a ban.184 He framed such pupil behaviour in public schools as 
‘processes of jihad’, and argued that the ‘inconsiderate, perverse and irresponsible’ 
Directive of Jospin should be replaced with a law to bolster the Islamist threat.185 Also 
members of the Republican Left argued that schools were in need of state support to deal 
with ‘intégrists’ in public school, who abused religious freedom rights to push their 
religion into the public sphere.186 Headscarves were referred to as ‘chadors’ and parallels 
were drawn with Islamist theocracies abroad.187 This framing of the headscarf in terms of 
an Islamic fundamentalism encroaching upon the Republic occurred during a period when 
the new Minister of Interior Charles Pasqua (RPR) of the RPR-UDF government (1993-
1997) had arrested several Muslim militants who transposed the Algerian War to French 
soil by killing several French tourists in Algeria, and French civilians in bomb attacks in 
Paris (Deltombe, 2005).188 The idea that France was at ‘war’ and facing Islamic 
‘aggression’ was also communicated in a debate tabled by the Government, in which 
Pasqua directly linked the hijab to the problem of Islamic fundamentalism.189 Deputies 
seized this opportunity by calling for the institutionalization of a combative secularism, but 
were only successful after the turn of the century when a law was passed that prohibited 
the wearing of conspicuous religious signs.  
Part of the reason is that in 2003, the Socialist Party had also changed position in 
favour of a strict secularism. In order to support both teachers and secular parents who 
wanted their children to be free from religious manipulation in the public school, several 
Socialist deputies called upon the Government to issue a ‘Charter of Laïcité’ and a guide of 
citizenship (‘de la citoyenetté’), as well as a law on all visible religious symbols.190 The PS 
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had initially struggled with the precise wording of the Government’s law proposal that 
differentiated between good (‘discrete’) and bad (‘ostensible’) religious expressions. The 
Socialists considered it undesirable that the state defined the signs that minorities were 
allowed to wear in public, and should instead ban all visible religious expressions, in line 
with the advice of the Debré commission. Jean-Marc Ayrault, the fraction leader of the 
Socialist Party, argued why he initially opposed the Government’s proposal: “willingly or 
unwillingly, you have contributed to the feeling that the ban particularly targets Muslims. 
A serious error! There where you should have eschewed any differentiation, you have 
created a hierarchy between good and bad signs. There where you should have stand up for 
equality and justice, you have accentuated exclusion. There where you should have 
provided clarity, you have spread trouble.”191  
But the chair of the Commission of Laws, Pascal Clément (UMP), explained that 
the proposal of the PS to ban all religious signs in public schools would not pass the 
approval of the European Court of Human rights. The Court only allows for restrictions on 
the right to religious freedom ‘in the interest of public safety, for the protection of public 
order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (Loenen, 
2009). Eventually, an overwhelming majority of Socialist deputies voted in favour of the 
law project of the government that had been advised by the members of the Stasi 
Commission, who had initially also disagreed whether a ban was in line with French 
secularism. The famous scholar of secularism Henry Pena-Ruiz had defended a combative 
interpretation of secularism, whereas another well-known scholar of secularism Jean 
Bauberot prioritized a more moderate reading of French secularism, allowing for the 
wearing of headscarves (Bauberot, 2005). The final report illustrates a middle ground by, 
on the one hand, advocating a strict secularism in schools that required the removal of 
conspicuous religious symbols and, on the other hand, recommending the introduction of a 
Muslim and Jewish holiday in the French - predominantly Catholic – calendar, or the 
creation of Muslim chaplaincies in hospitals and prisons, or the offering of Halal food in 
public schools.192 Only the former recommendation of a ban was followed up by the 
Government. 
By banning only conspicuous religious symbols, the French Government found a way 
to balance international protected religious freedom rights with general interest of public 
order. Moreover, the French used the ‘margin of appreciation’ that the European Court of 
Human Rights grants to nation-states to interpret religious freedom rights, by emphasising 
laïcité as a particular national tradition of safeguarding national unity according to a 
Republican pact (Thomas 2006: 255). Contrasting with post-national theories, the EU did 
thus not provide institutional opportunities for migrant citizens to claim expansive human 
rights. It rather functioned as an opportunity for established nation-state actors to pass 
restrictive legislation that reifies, or better, expands national state-church traditions 
(Koenig, 2007). 
 
2. Social cohesion & public order frames 
In 1993, a segregation frame also appeared in the debate about the headscarf, discussing it 
as a symbol of communalism (‘communautarisme’ or ‘repli communautaire’) and 
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indicating the formation of cultural or religious groups that isolate themselves from, and 
turn against, mainstream society (Delmas, 2006: 60). It was argued that wearing the 
headscarf indicates an unwillingness to integrate by prioritising one’s groups’ norms over 
the shared norms and values of the Republic. The causal logic is that the accommodation 
of such symbols of segregation and identity politics introduces differences that, on the one 
hand, contribute to the fragmentation of French society in separate communities fighting 
and discriminating each other and, on the other hand, jeopardise the individual rights of 
‘minorities within minorities’, such as Muslim women (Eisenberg & Spinner-Halev, 2005).  
When a Liberal Gaullist Government took office in 1993, deputies seized the 
opportunity to call for legislation on the hijab. When the State Council nullified this 
Government’s new directive that had allowed schools to expel pupils who wore 
‘ostentatious’ religious symbols, proponents of a legislation argued that if the state did not 
implement a law, it abandoned Muslims (as hijab-wearing pupils were now framed) who 
did not want to conform to group norms, but rather become ‘French’. “Recognising the 
headscarf in the heart of the secular school,” argued Maurice Leroy of the UDF in 1998, 
“is proof of a disrespect for the majority of Muslims who do want to integrate in French 
society. What kind of legislative measures or regulative orders are you planning to 
undertake so that the state fulfils its duty of protection of those who would like to leave or 
take distance from his own community, who would like to become a citizen only, in short: 
simply change?”.193 
Around the turn of the century, the diagnosis that the headscarf expressed 
communalism was linked to other problems, such as anti-Semitic acts, pupils refusing to 
partake in courses on the Enlightenment or the Shoa, or in physical or biology courses.194 
Jean-Claude Guibal (UMP), for instance, raised questions about a conflict at a university 
where Islamic students had objected to a non-Muslim teacher reciting the Quran during 
theology courses.195 In January 2003, the new Minister of Education Luc Ferry (UMP) 
responded to such incidents by launching an action-plan, including the distribution of a 
‘Republican booklet’ to educate pupils about Republican values and principles, notably 
laïcité, and a guide to support public school teachers facing concrete cases of ‘communal 
drifts and racism or anti-Semitism’ in school.196  
Also the recommendation of the Stasi committee to implement a ban on 
conspicuous religious dress had been motivated by the idea that the headscarf was not 
merely an expression of personal religious belonging but (also) of a politicised Islamic 
group identity that endangered the social pact. After six months of hearings, the majority of 
the commission members had reached the conclusion that the headscarf was no longer 
exclusively a question of religious freedom, but also of public order.197 The members were 
particularly moved by testimonies of school directors reporting about pupils being 
‘lynched’ for wearing the kippah. Different from the ‘old’ extreme right-wing anti-
Semitism, this kind of anti-Semitism was seen as the result of the politicisation of Muslim 
identities among marginalised Magrebian youth living in ethnically and socially 
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homogeneous suburb. Their disenfranchisement would explain why they increasingly 
identified with a global community of believers rather than French national identity, and 
translate their sympathy with Palestinian Muslims abroad in anti-Semitism at home (rather 
than that the external conflict fuelled internal identity politics, see Thomas, 2006).198 A 
visit to the Netherlands, where commission members spoke to the Dutch philosopher 
Herman Philipse who is known for his admiration of French Republicanism, convinced 
several commission members that policies of multiculturalism caused a situation of 
segregation (‘tribalism’), which had fed communal conflicts, religious extremism and anti-
Semitism.199 Even Stasi Commission member Alain Touraine, who had initially been in 
favour of tolerating headscarves, now also supported a ban, arguing that “since the intifada, 
France has become a communitarian country. […] It is not fair to say that I have changed 
my mind. It is France that has profoundly changed: in the high schools, one is Jewish or 
one is Arab. One no longer identifies with social class […] but by religion” (quoted from 
Thomas, 2006: 253).  
According to the Commission, recognising differences was not wrong per se. It 
differentiated between, on the one hand, community formation (‘le fait communautaire’) 
and belonging (‘apparténance’) and, on the other hand, communalism (‘le 
communautarisme’).200 It thus advised the President to recognise the diversity of 
contemporary French society by serving Halal food in public canteens, considering 
teaching Arab in public schools, and addressing colonialism and religious pluralism in the 
school curricula. But it simultaneously advised a ban on ‘conspicuous’ religious symbols 
in public schools. According to the Commission members, the 1989 State Council ruling, 
which had only discussed the issue in terms of religious freedom rights and state neutrality, 
was outdated.201 Non-specific ‘political religious’ groups were testing the Republic202 and 
used the headscarf as an instrument to spread their communitarian project in public 
schools.203 Teachers were seen as in need of clear rules and tools to bolster the ‘guerrilla 
against laïcité’.204 A restriction of a pupil’s individual freedom of religion was considered 
legitimate for these aims of protecting public order.205 The headscarf was thus not seen as a 
legitimate expression of religious belonging, but an illegitimate expression of dangerous 
communalism at odds with French individual Republicanism, and threatening the unity of 
the nation (Janssen, 2006a: 277).  
When President Jacques Chirac (RPR) announced the law project in December 
2003, he emphasised the need to fight “against xenophobia, racism, and, in particular, anti-
Semitism”, arguing that “communalism should not be the choice for France.”206 And 
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according to Prime-Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin (UMP), who introduced the law project 
to Parliament in February 2004, the law marked “a fundamental stage in the political 
project of ‘living together’ that serves national cohesion” […] Its ambition is to respond to 
those who would like to put their communitarian membership above the laws of the 
Republic.”.207 Individual citizens were thus expected to set limits on the affirmation of 
particular identities when acting as French citizens in the public sphere. If girls refused to 
do so by insisting upon their religious rights to cover, they were blamed for not 
‘integrating’ sufficiently, endangering the social pact. At the same time, they were seen as 
victims of this communalism, with the headscarf being perceived as imposed upon them. 
For instance, in a law proposal of 2003, some Socialist deputies framed the donning of 
headscarves as a ‘contestation of French values and culture’, and ‘a rejection, often 
imposed on young girls, of the Republican and laic model of integration’.208  
The only substantial opposition to this prognosis of a ban for social cohesion and 
public order came from members of the Communist Party and independent deputies of the 
far Left. Two thirds of all Communist MPs rejected the Government’s law project, because 
it would create a ‘boomerang’ effect by feeding racism, identity politics and 
fundamentalism among marginalised migrants in the suburbs. Also the High Council of 
Integration (HCI) had opposed a law in an annual report of 2000, not because it considered 
the law in itself to be discriminatory but because it would deprive young girls of their 
chances to integrate by relegating them to their poor suburbs and to private Islamic 
schools.209 Instead of challenging the diagnosis that the headscarf symbolised Islamic 
identity politics, the PCF and HCI reframed the problem in terms of class inequalities. MP 
Martine Billard of the Green Party, who would abstain from voting as she perceived the 
headscarf to be a discrimination against women, also argued that the segregation and 
social-economic marginalisation of immigrants in poor suburbs was the real obstacle for 
integration. She criticised the so-called ethnicity different-blindness of the Republic by 
pointing at the Government’s categorisation of immigrant children as Muslims, arguing 
that this denied the differences among them and only perpetuated the mobilisation of 
collective religious identities.210 In other words, she criticised the culturalisation of anti-
Semitism and segregation as a Muslim problem and pled, in vain, in favour of tackling 
intersection ethnic and class inequalities to foster social integration.  
 
3. Gender and women’s emancipation frames 
The final diagnosis was that the headscarf symbolised women’s inequality to men and their 
oppression in Islam or in Muslim communities. In this frame, headscarf-wearing girls are 
represented as victims of sexist familial and community pressure to cover. Initially, this 
was only a minor frame. The State Council had, for instance, not made any reference to 
sexual equality in its 1989 advice to the Government. Moreover, initially this diagnosis did 
not yet result in the prognosis of a ban, even though several deputies had in 1989 already 
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tabled the headscarf as a symbol of women’s oppression in Islam.211 The then State 
Secretary charged with women’s emancipation, Michèle André (PS), had also favoured a 
ban on gender unequal symbols in public schools. But she could not convince her 
colleagues to implement a ban on headscarves. Educational Minister Lionel Jospin argued: 
“Me as well, I don’t agree with the (submissive) image of the woman either, I am pro-
mixité, I am pro-emancipation of the woman.” But he considered a ban counter-productive 
by excluding those Muslim girls that would benefit most from public school education.212 
Prime Minister Michel Rocard likewise argued that Muslim girls’ emancipation would 
come naturally once Islam would modernise and secularise, drawing a parallel with 
Christian and Jewish communities that had historically ‘also’ practiced polygamy and full-
body covering but had now become gender-equal. State Secretary André eventually agreed 
with her colleagues that exclusion from school was worse for the emancipation of Muslim 
girls: “I repeat that the public school permits numerous girls to become free and 
autonomous women. It should continue this mission for all that live on our soil and that, 
regardless their origins, must integrate in our French society.”213 In other words, 
integration into an ostensibly egalitarian French culture, with the Republican school as the 
core institution of emancipation, was the solution suggested to unequal gender relations in 
migrant communities. 
After the turn of the century, the gender oppression frame gained ground and the 
prognosis changed. In its report, the Stasi commission came to the conclusion that a ‘great 
silent majority’ of young girls of immigrant origin needed protection against Islamists 
groups forcing them to cover.214 Referring to practices like genital mutilation, polygamy 
and forced marriages, the report wrote that: “the basic rights of women in our country are 
scorned nowadays on a daily basis. Such situation is unacceptable”.215 The influence of the 
new feminist movement ‘Neither Whores, Nor Submissive’ (see below) on the debate is 
evident, as the report literally copies Fadela Amara’s testimony that many young girls in 
the banlieus are called ‘whores’ if they don’t cover.216 Some commission members 
recognised that a law would not necessarily tackle all problems of gender inequality and 
actually infringed upon the individual freedom of other girls to express their self-chosen 
religion.217 Nonetheless, the commission members felt the pressure to rally behind a ban if 
they wanted to support women’s rights. In the words of Jean Baubérot, the only one who 
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abstained from voting: “if one wants to be in favour of the equality between men and 
women, one must come out in favour of a law against the headscarf” (Baubérot, 2006: 10)  
In Parliament, both the established Left and Right backed the law in order to 
support young girls facing pressure to wear headscarves. The headscarf was linked to other 
claims of sex-specific treatment, such as girls who wanted to be examined by female 
tutors, who asked permission to bring their partner or father to the examination, or whose 
parents wanted them to be exempt from gender-mixed gymnastic or swimming courses.218 
Any recognition of such sexual and cultural difference was framed as conflicting with 
Republic values of equality, as well as with the social mixing of different sexes in public 
(‘mixité’).219 Also the State Secretary for Women’s Equality, Nicole Ameline (UMP), 
insisted during a hearing for the Stasi Commission that the headscarf symbolised 
discrimination on grounds of sex, and functioned as an obstacle to emancipation. Drawing 
a parallel with women who removed their burqas once liberated in Afghanistan, the state 
needed to liberate young girls from religious pressure by spreading secular, Republican 
values in public schools where pupils became citizens.220  
The struggle for gender equality subsequently became a struggle for national 
values, as also illustrated by the speech of French President Jacques Chirac, who stated 
that, “our combat for Republican values must go hand in hand with struggle of women’s 
rights and their equality to men. This struggle will determine the France of tomorrow. The 
degree of civilisation of a society is measured in the first place by the status of women in 
that society.”221 Also the Socialist Party took up the discourse that French secularism was a 
bolster for women’s rights. Ségolène Royal, the future Socialist presidential candidate, 
now came out in favour of legislation to support teachers in their mission to transmit 
Republican values, while in 1989 she had still defended the inclusion of girls into schools. 
Linking the headscarf to sexual violence, Royal summarised her party’s stance in 2007 in 
an interview in the Daily Libération: “I wage my battle for secularism in the name of all 
women who are veiled, cut, mutilated, violated” (quoted from Raymond, 2009: 492). 
Again, the only substantial opposition against a ban came from some members of 
the far left-wing group ‘Communists and Republicans’. They did not challenge the 
dichotomous framing that juxtaposed the headscarf as a symbol of oppression within Islam 
and the Republican as liberating. Instead, they focused on the old prognosis when they 
argued that a ban would only drive vulnerable girls into the hands of fundamentalists, 
because parents would send them to private Islamic schools.222 Thus they likewise viewed 
secular public education as a means to emancipate girls, yet emphasized combating 
poverty and racism as solutions for communalism and group pressure on girls. No deputy 
drew attention to gender unequal power relations in public schools, or focused on boys as 
policy targets.  
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7.4 Policy frames and policy responses to the Islamic face cover 
In 2009, Parliament began debating the face cover - in French the ‘full veil’ (‘voile 
intégral’). Policy responses have likewise been restrictive, but boundaries between public 
and private realms drawn in regard to the pupils’ headscarf were redrawn in regard to 
Islamic face covers. Moreover, the burqa was not recognised as a religious symbol and 
hence not discussed in terms of laïcité. Instead of being seen as part of a religious ‘cult’, it 
was seen as a cultural practice or an expression of a fundamentalist Islam that most 
moderate French Muslims also rejected. Face covering was primarily framed as a problem 
of women’s subordination and refusal of (shared) citizenship, and secondarily as a security 
problem.  
The origins of the debate on face veils lay in a decision of the State Council, which 
declared in June 2008 that a Moroccan-born woman had legitimately been refused French 
citizenship due to her wearing a burqa. In reality, she was wearing a niqab. The woman 
was married to a French citizen with whom she had three children, and she spoke French 
fluently. She had been refused citizenship by state officials (who test in personal interviews 
whether applicants can prove their alliance to French values and mastery of a certain level 
of French). When she went to a local court in 2004 to dispute this refusal, the judges 
confirmed that she did not fulfil the criteria of assimilation stipulated in the French civil 
code. In 2008 the State Council confirmed these judges decision, arguing that she adhered 
to ‘a radical religious practice that conflicted with the values of the Republic’, notably the 
equality of the sexes.223  
Deputies took up the case, and on September 23rd 2008 MP Jacques Myard (UMP) 
launched the first law proposal, which called ‘to fight against attacks on women’s dignity 
from certain religious practices’. It proposed a €15,000 fine and a two months’ 
imprisonment for anyone concealing his or her face or pressuring others to do so.224 It was 
not put on the agenda for plenary discussion. One year later, on June 9th 2009, MP André 
Gerin of the Communist Party along with 58 members of other political parties requested 
the installation of a parliamentary inquiry commission to study the possibilities of a law 
banning public burqa-wearing – seen as a symbol conflicting with French values. The 
politicians framed face veils as prisons denigrating women who were forced to submit to 
their husbands and other male family members. Moreover, they still presented the burqa as 
a threat to laïcité , which figured as a guarantee for national unity.225  
Until then, the wearing of face covers had already been prohibited on identity cards 
for reasons of identification and could be forbidden in universities for reasons of public 
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safety.226 Moreover, civil servants were forbidden from covering their faces, and the 
Secularism Law of 2004 also forbade this for pupils of public primary and secondary 
schools.227 On September 15th 2008, the High Authority against Discrimination and 
Equality (HALDE) had confirmed that migrant women could be required to remove face 
veils during the language course offered by the state during the ‘Welcome and Integration 
contract’ that immigrants must sign when applying for citizenship.228 Now the question 
became whether face veiling should be banned from French territory altogether through 
legislation.  
On 22nd June 2009, President Nicolas Sarkozy concurred with this view, arguing in 
a speech to the Senate and the Assembly at the Congress of Versailles: “The burqa is not a 
sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience. It will not be welcome on the territory of the 
French republic”.229 One day later, the requested commission of inquiry was established to 
study the practice of wearing the ‘full veil’ (‘voile intégrale’, including both the burqa and 
the niqab) and ‘to fight against this affront to individual liberties’.230 The burqa 
commission held six months of hearings with more than two hundred people in France’s 
major cities, ranging from women’s rights associations, mayors, specialists of Islam, 
sociologists, to NGO’s. Muslim representatives like the controversial Muslim scholar Tariq 
Ramadan or the members of the French Muslim Council CFCM unanimously agreed that 
the burqa was undesirable, an affront to women’s rights, and had little to do with the 
quran.231 The burqa commission also invited several Republican and leftist feminist 
umbrella organisations to a round table. All feminist associations objected to the face veil 
as a sexist symbol that denigrated women and conflicted with French values, situating the 
problem in the unequal relation between men and women which was related to all 
religions. They supported a ban and called for gender education in public schools and 
mosques.232  
Six months later, on 26th January 2010, the burqa Commission published its report. 
Rather than opting for a full burqa ban, it suggested a contextual ban on all face covers in 
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certain public institutions and in public transportation.233 Discontent with this outcome, 
fraction leader of the UMP, Francois Copé, immediately launched a law proposal to ban all 
kinds of face covering in France, framing fully-covered persons as a threat to security and 
public order, and as sexual discrimination.234 The issue was also politicised in the French 
Senate.235 Laïcité had clearly moved into the background, partly because of the aim to 
prohibit the veil in all public spaces, and partly because of the non-religious political and 
cultural meaning attributed to it. In contrast to the Secularism Law of 2004 that had 
prohibited the display of religion in the realm of education, hence a public service provided 
by the state, legislators now wanted to ban burqas in all public places. Since the principle 
of laïcité regulates the relationship between public authorities and citizens in state 
institutions, rather than the relationship between individual citizens in public life, it was 
difficult to frame a ban in terms of secularism (even though no-one had questioned the 
2004 law, which extends the principle from providers (teachers) to users (pupils) of public 
services). But also the fact that the burqa was framed as an extreme practice of a politicised 
Muslim sect rather than a religious practice, made it difficult to allude to the principle of 
laïcité that, after all, is a principle to regulate religion (see also Joppke, 2011). 
Hereafter, Prime-Minister François Fillon asked the legal advice of the State 
Council on ‘the largest and most effective possible restriction of the veil’, submitted on 
30th March 2010.236 The State Council came to the same conclusion as the burqa 
commission and also opposed a general ban. In its report it argued that fundamental 
freedom rights (individual freedom, right to privacy, personal freedom, freedom of 
expression and freedom to manifest one’s beliefs, prohibition of discrimination) made it 
legally untenable to justify a full ban on the Islamic veil, and even on concealing the face 
in general. Only in certain domains could concealing one’s face be prohibited for reasons 
of identification (courts, municipalities, examination rooms) or for reasons of public 
security, law and order (in certain circumstances). In line with the burqa commission, the 
State Council rejected laïcité as a legitimate legal principle to pass a full ban on face veils. 
Encouraged by President Sarkozy who had publicly stated three days before the regional 
elections of March 2010 that he wanted a burqa ban237, several UMP deputies submitted on 
27th April 2010 a non-binding resolution (a new political tool after a constitutional reform 
in 2008) stating that wearing the burqa is an unacceptable and dangerous practice of radical 
Muslims, which conflicts with French values and ought be prohibited on the territory of the 
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Republic.238 It was supported by an overwhelming majority in Parliament, which agreed 
that face veils symbolised a radical Islamic practice that discriminated against women, and 
required appropriate means to protect women from violence and pressure (434 against 1).  
Eight days later, on 19th May 2010, the UMP Government adhered to the call and 
initiated a law project denying the legal advice of the State Council by forbidding all types 
of face covering in all public spaces (including the street).239 Women who don’t adhere to 
the prohibition will be fined €150 and must follow a citizens’ course; people who force 
women to cover can be imprisoned and must pay a fine of €30,000 (when an adult forces 
another adult to cover) to €60,000 (when an adult forces a child to cover). The bill was 
framed in terms of social cohesion and public order, with the face veil being considered an 
affront to the French Republican social pact of living together. By seeing without being 
seen and withdrawing from public life, face veiled women were undermining the social 
contract that required of citizens to express solidarity or, in more archaic terms, fraternity. 
In other words, public order was understood here much more broadly then public security 
(see also Joppke, 2011). Public security in the narrow sense of the word had been rejected 
by the State Council as a legitimate ground to pass a full burqa ban in public space, since it 
was not proven that concealment of the face constituted a threat. Also other legal scholars 
had testified for the burqa Commission that there is no legal ground to oblige citizens to 
dissimulate their faces always and everywhere. 
The bill also argued that it was a practice that, even when chosen voluntarily, 
conflicted with human dignity, including sex equality and liberty/autonomy.240 By 
punishing men found guilty of pressuring women to cover, the cause of the problem was 
clearly linked to unequal power relations between sexes. Yet, it was recognized that, in 
contrast to the 2004 debates that had concerned young school children, adult women may 
have voluntarily chosen to wear face veils. Minister of Immigration, Eric Besson, did not, 
however, consider it problematic to liberate women from an oppression they had chosen to 
submit to themselves when he argued that: “public authority is founded on protecting the 
dignity of the person, if necessary against the person herself”241 (quoted from Joppke, 
2011: 16). The State Council, in contrast, had opined that the principle of human dignity 
comprised the freedom to choose life styles and convictions even if they were hard to 
square with the principle of sex-equality, provided that they do not harm anybody else and 
that such choices are no violation of physical integrity. 
Despite these legal objections, the legislature once again overruled the judiciary. 
On 13th June 2010, a majority of 335 in the National Assembly voted in favour of the 
government’s law project (UMP, Nouveau Centre, and twenty left-wing deputies) against 
241 abstentions (majority of Socialist and Communist Party and the Greens) and just 1 
rejection from an independent candidate. The Socialists had launched, in vain, their own 
law proposal, which was formulated in line with the State Council’s advice. It prohibited 
all forms of concealing one’s face (veils, helmets, masks, hoods) but in public institutions 
only, allowing for some negotiation in case of access to social services, and in specific 
                                                           
238
 AN No. 2455, Proposition de Résolution sur l'attachement au respect des valeurs républicaines 
face au développement de pratiques radicales qui y portent atteinte (April 27, 2010). 
239
 AN No. 2520,Projet de loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public (May 19, 
2010). 
240
 AN No. 524 (May 13, 2004). 
241
 Information Mission. hearing No. 18, with Eric Besson: 13 
  
144 
cases of public security or public health.242 The Minister of Justice, Michèle Alliot-Marie 
(UMP), congratulated the Assembly, saying that the law confirmed and safeguarded the 
values of the Republic: liberty of individuals, equality between men and women, and 
particularly solidarity of a nation of destiny (public order in a broad, immaterial sense of 
the word).243 On 22nd June, the parliamentary Women’s Rights Commission concurred 
with a gender-impact evaluation of the law project, arguing that the ban was indispensable 
to foster women’s rights, while calling for additional measures to teach gender equality in 
public schools.244 In its own report on the issue, it framed Islamic face covers as a denial of 
women’s citizenship, a return to patriarchy and an affront to social cohesion.245 In other 
words, even if women intend to wear burqas, the state still had the dut to emancipate them 
against their wish, attributing a false consciousness to the veiled women in question. 
On 14th September 2010, a majority of 246 to 1 in the Senate voted in favour of the 
Government’s law project. On October 8th the same year, the Constitutional Council 
concluded that the law banning all kinds of face covers in public spaces, including public 
streets, was in line with the national constitution and international jurisprudence, and 
considered a full ban to be proportional to the aim of public order. Concealing one’s face 
constituted a problem to public security and undermined the ‘minimal’ conditions of 
forging a socially cohesive society. Moreover, the Constitutional judges concluded that 
“women who conceal their faces, voluntarily or not, find themselves in a situation of 
exclusion and inferiority that is incompatible with the constitutional principles of liberty 
and equality.” Even if women voluntarily cover, the face veil still conflicted with ‘human 
dignity’.246 It only had to be amended in one regard in order to be in line with the principle 
of religious freedom, by allowing the wearing of face veils in houses of worship.247 In 
other words, the Constitutional Council brought the issue back to a question of religion. 
7.5 Analysis and conclusion 
Now, to what extent can general and issue-specific opportunity structures explain the 
framing and regulation of the hijab in France? Were the expectations raised in chapters 3-6 
on grounds of the French political opportunity structure met? 
  
Cleavages 
Wearing headscarves in French public schools has been a contentious issue from the onset. 
It was predominantly discussed in terms of potential conflict between religion and French 
secularism in the Republican school. Deputies disagreed about the legitimate space for 
public religious expressions in French secularism. This fits the expectations that the 
religious cleavage is still salient in France and structures policy debates.  
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Over time, the headscarf became increasingly associated with worries about a 
militant Islam testing the Republic, as well as with ethno-religious separation and identity 
politics. Even though not discussed as an ethnic minority but as a religious problem, only 
headscarves – not the dress of Sikh minorities or Christian majorities - were perceived as 
symbols of politicised communal identities and of failing integration. What it means to be 
French today and to what extent the state should recognize the ethno-religious diversity of 
its society was renegotiated in debates on the hijab. In contrast to my expectations, 
cleavages around nationality and ethnic differences thus also re-appeared in the debate.  
The need to preserve public order and societal peace (in schools) was coupled with 
the idea that girls should be protected against the pressures of their fundamentalist 
communities. There was little negotiation about this diagnosis: over the whole period and 
throughout political spectrum, Muslim girls were framed as in need of state-protection to 
become free and autonomous. Politicians, as well as non-governmental women’s and 
human rights movements, were divided, however, about the prognosis. When the 
government announced its plans for a ban to liberate girls from unwanted pressure, gender 
cleavages flared up that, however, intersected with the religious and nationality/ethnic 
cleavage and divided the women’s movement (see below). Also in the burqa debate, 
gender relations were at the heart of a conflict between the French Republic and a 
(orthodox) Islam. The face veil was presented as the anti-symbol of French values and 
traditions of gender-equality, hence a symbol of failing integration.  
In other words, conflicts over gender flared up again when ‘French’ and ‘Islamic’ 
gender roles were juxtaposed in a hierarchical way, with Muslim girls and women being 
able to become ‘French’ if they emancipated from their religious culture into individual, 
secular subjects. This particular intersection of cleavages around religion, nationality and 
gender thus turned the issue of female Muslim dress into a particularly contentious issue in 
France. 
 
State-church patterns  
Historical institutional patterns of state-church relations clearly structured the policy 
process around the hijab. Whether the Government tolerated the pupils’ headscarf or opted 
for Directives or legislation to expel pupils who wore their headscarves ostentatiously, the 
aim has always been to convince pupils to remove visible expressions of religious 
difference in the public school. This policy preference for a strictly secular school can be 
explained as a path-dependent effect of the institutionalised principle of laïcité as a strict 
separation between state and church in order to depoliticise religion, particularly in the 
Republican school.  
Furthermore, in line with the Gallican approach of the French state to religion, 
authorities worked together with Muslim organisations to bring Islam in line with the laws 
of the Republic. Throughout the 1990s, local authorities had, for instance, involved Islamic 
organisations in negotiating in local conflicts between pupils refusing to unveil and schools 
insisting upon neutral classrooms (e.g. in Creil in 1989 and Lyon in 2003) (Bowen, 2007a: 
84-87; Giugni & Passy, 2000). Also after the law was implemented, the Government 
approached members of the moderate CFCM and of the Great Mosque of Paris to attend a 
mission to Baghdad to free two French hostages who had been hijacked in August 2004 by 
Muslim extremists who had threatened to kill them if the law was not retracted (Laurence 
& Vaisse, 2006). Both the President of the CFCM and rector of the Great Mosque of Paris, 
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Dalil Boubakeur, took a stance in favour of a law. In other words, the state was not 
indifferent or abstentionist to religion, but actively co-opted loyal French Muslims that 
accepted the domestication of Islam to the existing secular framework of laïcité. 
Nonetheless, institutional trajectories of secularism cannot explain why the pupils’ 
headscarf was initially tolerated, and only prohibited in 2004. In fact, laïcité formed no 
legal obstacle for pupils to wear hijabs. The State Council had argued that the right to 
express one’s religion was constitutionally protected. The duty to religious constraint so far 
only applied to providers and not users of public facilities. This made it difficult to push 
for a ban on pupils’ headscarves from the perspective of laïcité, pupils who are, after all, 
not public authorities. Only when the headscarf was framed as a symbol of a politicised 
Islam that endangered the individual rights of Muslim girls and Jewish pupils and national 
unity were curtailments of pupils’ rights to religious freedom seen as legitimate. Therefore 
the Secularism Law of 2003 illustrates an extension of institutional logics of secularism, by 
broadening the scope of ‘public’ and limiting the scope of ‘private’. The fact that the burqa 
debate quickly moved away from the laïcité frame also illustrates that the current 
legislation is not necessarily a result of a lock-in effect of institutionalized practices of 
secularism. Actors framed this issue, whether strategically or not, in terms of public 
security and human dignity rather than in terms of state-church relations, because these 
would actually make a full ban on religious dress in public space legally untenable. 
 
Citizenship and migrant integration policies 
French citizenship and integration policies can explain why any affirmation of ethno-
religious group difference was considered dangerous for national unity. Like Jewish 
minorities in the past, Muslims could become French only if they assimilated to secular 
Republicanism. They had to subdue their particular ethno-cultural and religious affiliations 
in favour of their primary identity as French citizens for the sake of national unity. 
Although the PS had initially considered tolerance of the headscarf better than exclusion, it 
never questioned the majority-based culture of the society in which migrants needed to be 
‘included’. It had also considered the headscarf as a failure of integration but, in line with 
then dominant policy paradigms of immigrant integration, it linked the problem of ethnic 
retention to class inequalities and the solution to traditional Republican institutions of 
integration, notably the public school. After the turn of the century, however, also the PS 
returned to a Republicanism model of assimilation that emphasised a homogeneous French 
national identity that demanded of citizens to take a distance from their personal religious 
affiliations already before they entered the social factory. In the words of Joan Scott (2007: 
102-3): “the school now became a miniature version of the nation, conceived as a 
collection of abstract individuals who were shorn of any identity other than their French 
citizenship. […] Those who did not conform in advance, who were not already ‘French’, 
fell outside the purview of the universal because in the body of the nation, commonality 
was a prerequisite for membership in the educational community.”  
This change from a belief that integration would naturally follow from citizenship 
and social participation (by accommodating the pupil’s headscarf) to a demand of 
assimilation to become citizen (by banning them beforehand) reflects changes that were 
observed in French citizenship legislation in Chapter 5. Also in the burqa debate, French 
authorities made cultural assimilation a prerequisite for citizenship by requiring the 
removal of face veils in order to be eligible for French nationality. The burqa debate was 
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largely framed in terms of face veiled women undermining the social pact by visibly 
demonstrating their difference and separation from society. Even though we have seen how 
the French antidiscrimination framework has augmented over time due to EU pressure, a 
ban was hardly framed in terms of racial and ethnic discrimination.  
Institutionalised actors in the field of integration and racism were divided about the 
new Secularism Law but some likewise moved towards a preference for a ban when the 
headscarf was linked to politicised Islamic group identities, anti-Semitism and the 
fracturing of the nation in oppositional groups. The anti-discrimination association ‘France 
Plus’ and ‘Ligue internationale contre le racisme et l'antisémitisme’ (LICRA) had in the 
1990s already pleaded in favour of a ban on religious symbols. According to LICRA, the 
headscarf invited communalism in the public school and hindered children’s recognition of 
one another as equal peers of the same nation. The satellite organisation of PS, SOS 
Racism, in contrast, had still opposed the exclusion of the girls in Creil as the ‘Vichy of the 
integration of immigrants’ (Bowen, 2007a: 85). But during the mid-1990s, SOS Racism 
also started advocating the prohibition of religious symbols in schools to forge social 
cohesion across difference. Trade-unions of educational staff, to whom politicians often 
referred as if they would be in need of legislation to halt identity-politics in school, were 
divided on the desirability of a law.248 
The Communist affilated MRAP (‘Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour Aminité 
entre les Peuples’) and the LDH (‘Ligue des Droits de l’Homme’) continued to oppose the 
exclusion of pupils as negative for integration. In December 2003, the vice-president of the 
LDH initiated a petition against the law together with six other public figures and a 
member of the Green party.249 They blamed the Republic, not immigrant children 
themselves, for failing integration. They argued that the law did not tackle but rather 
covered the real problems of discrimination and marginalisation that hindered post-colonial 
migrants’ full membership in the French nation. Together with other antidiscrimination 
organisations, Muslim (youth) organisations and new feminist initiatives, the LDH and 
MRAP mobilised against a ban in an association called ‘A school for and of everyone - 
Against the laws of exclusion’ (‘Collectif Une École pour toutes et tous- Contre les lois 
d’exclusions’, CEPT) (Lorcerie, 2005; Rigoni, 2004). It launched two petitions to renounce 
the Secularism Law250 and held large demonstrations in December, January and February 
in several French cities to oppose the law project, using a secular and universalistic 
                                                           
248
 On 17 December 2003 three of the four major confederations of educational personnel asked 
Chirac in a letter published in Liberation and Le Monde not to propose a new law, including the 
largest one FSU (44% of all public school teachers). Also other secularists unions of parents and 
educational staff had rejected legislation, arguing that the headscarf was not on the top priority list 
of their concerns. School principles were more in favour of legislative tools that would help them 
prohibit the wearing of headscarves in schools. The general secretary of the SNPDEN (‘Syndicat 
national des personnels de directioin de l’education nationale’), Philippe Guittet, was often in the 
media to support the law, similar to SNALC, a smaller trade union of teachers on the right side of 
the political spectrum. 
249
 ‘Un voile sur les discriminations’ (‘a veil to cover discrimination’), Le Monde (December 9, 
2003). It was signed by Christine Delphy, Alima Boudemienne-Thierry, (a Green deputy of the 
EP), the sociologists Dounia Bouzar Gaspard and Eric Fassin, the historian Madeleine Réberioux, 
and the vice-president of LDH Nicole Savy. 
250
 ‘Oui à la laïcité, non aux lois d’exeption’ (‘Yes to secularism, no to laws that differentiate’, 
published at the website ‘les mots sont importants’, published at: http://lmsi.net/spip.php?article101 
(October, 28, 2003).  
  
148 
message of inclusion and emancipation. Muslim girls and women embraced their 
simultaneous identity as Muslims and French citizens, by releasing blue, white and red 
balloons, and wearing headscarves emblazoned with the French tricolour (Silverstein, 
2004).  
Several of these NGO’s had access to policy debates and managed to draw some 
attention to persistent social-economic marginalisation as obstacles to substantive equality. 
But they were too divided about the headscarf in public schools to function as influential 
allies for hijab-wearing pupils. Moreover, new self-associations of second and third 
generation immigrants that used a more radical discourse had no institutional venues to 
shape policy debates. One example is the ‘Movement of Indigenous of the Republic’ 
(‘Mouvement des Indigenes de la Republique’ MIR). By adopting this name, which refers 
to the secondary status of the indigenous population of French colonies, it argued that the 
2003 law was as a new form of post-colonialism, racism and sexism of a Republic which 
again subjugated migrants to secondary subjects. Like Muslim subjects in the colonial past, 
post-colonial immigrants could only become French if they gave up certain elements of 
their religion and civilize (Bouteldja, 2007; Benelli et al., 2006: 4; Delphy, 2006). Even 
though the MIR found some allies among members of the Communist party PCF, the 
Revolutionary Communist League LCR, and the Green Party, its anti-statist and radical 
discourse in terms of ethno-religious differences appeared unsuccessful to effect change. 
This is in line with the expectations that French integration strategies favour claims framed 
in terms of individual human rights. The paradox is that while the headscarf was 
considered to conflict with the indivisible Republican nation existing of individuals only, 
hence as a refusal of integration, politicians simultaneously constructed this Islamic 
community by attributing values to the headscarf that marked the intrinsic differences 
between Islam and the Republic. 
 
Gender machinery and women’s emancipation policies 
In line with institutional logics of women’s emancipation and gender equality, which have 
focused on women’s formal equality, the hijab debate was over the whole period strongly 
framed in terms of the headscarf conflicting with the equality between men and women. A 
Republic that does not differentiate between citizens on any grounds, including sex, could 
not accommodate such symbols. Yet, only after the turn of the century, a consensus 
emerged that a ban on the headscarf was the right solution to foster gender equality. The 
focus had shifted from veiled girls in need of emancipation to unveiled girls in need of 
protection from sexual violence. The perpetrators of the problem had changed from 
migrant families raising their daughters according to traditional cultures of their homelands 
to neo-Islamist fundamentalist groups in the French suburbs, which attempted to impose 
patriarchal Sharia law in the heart of the Republic: the school. This increased the 
legitimacy of the state to pass a law. 
 This change in framing can be explained by the influence of new feminist alliances 
on policy debates. In line with the consolidation of the gender machinery, feminists were 
increasingly participating in policy debates, albeit only a selected few with close ties to 
political elites. In 1989, women’s movements had not yet become involved in policy 
debates, which from the onset of the debate had divided over the issue. Traditional leftist 
feminist organisations and trade-unions affiliated with the National Council for Women’s 
Rights (‘Collectif National des Droits des Femmes’, CNDF) had considered the headscarf 
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to be sexist, and worried about the autonomy and equality of young Muslim girls within 
patriarchal family and cultural structures. However, most had still defended the inclusion 
of girls in public schools, in order to enable them to increase their autonomy and 
emancipation.251 Only some had already pleaded in favour of a ban on sexist symbols in 
schools, such as the abortion-rights organisation Choisir, the League of Women’s Rights 
(LDF), the French Mouvement for Family Planning (MFPF) and the Association for 
Female Journalists (AFJ) (Rochefort, 2002: 153). 
After the turn of the century, the new organisation Neither Whores, Nor Submissive 
(NPNS) played a significant role in gendering the debates about the headscarf. Its close ties 
with political elites, as well as its framing of the headscarf problem in terms of the 
government’s discourse that stressed public security in French suburbs, enabled access to 
decision-making arenas. The Stasi Commission relied upon their and other secular Muslim 
women’s insights that non-veiled girls in French suburbs were in need of protection from 
Islamic fundamentalists through a Secularism law (Basel, 2007).252 Although she had 
initially opposed to it, the chair of NPNS Fadela Amara – who later became a Socialist 
Junior Minister with the UMP Government – eventually came out in favour of legislation 
banning headscarves in schools. NPNS signed a petition in Elle magazine in 2003 to 
encourage Chirac to impose a ban, together with other prominent Republican feminists, 
among others Elisabeth Badinter (who had already objected to the headscarf in 1989)253, 
Anne Zelensky (the chair of Women’s League)254, and former Minister of Emancipation 
Yvette Roudy (who had changed her initial tolerant stance as the conflict evolved). They 
agitated against Islamic and other forms of religious fundamentalism, discrimination and 
social degradation of suburbs.255 In contrast to most traditional feminist organisations 
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affiliated to the CNDF, which continued to object to both the headscarf and the law,256 
these Republican feminists defended the secular Republican as a bolster for women’s 
rights, which can be considered a historic anachronism.257  
Both the mainstream Left and Right adopted the frame that the headscarf 
symbolized sexism. Other feminists’ claims that a law would not tackle the structural 
causes of gender inequalities and violence, such as policies of neo-liberalism or the social-
economic marginalisation and stigmatisation of immigrants, were not addressed by the 
Government. Instead, it resorted to a symbolic law presenting the Republic as a guarantee 
for emancipation. This indicates that it co-opted rather than acted upon their feminist 
frames which drew attention to structural gender inequalities in French society (see also 
Stratigaki, 2004).258 My analysis thus corroborates the findings of feminist comparative 
research that even if women’s movements do manage to gender political debates, they are 
not always successful in steering the direction of the debate (Mc Bride & Mazur, 2010). 
In line with my expectation, the French gender machinery thus provided selective 
access to feminist movements to gender policy debates, whose project was in line with that 
of femocrats working within state institutions. The Stasi Commission, which interviewed 
over 150 people, invited only 4 traditional feminist organisations. The Debré Commission, 
which invited more than 120 guests, invited only 7 (Lépinard, 2009). Most lacking from 
policy debates were the targets of the law. The Stasi Commission invited only two women 
wearing headscarves to policy debates, including Saïda Kada, the co-founder of the Union 
of Lyon Muslim Sisters (‘Soeurs musulmanes de Lyon’) that was established in 1995 to 
organize courses outside school for students who were expelled after the Bayrou Directive. 
The lack of hijab-wearing girls’ own voices in French public and policy debates may 
explain the persistent perception that most were in need of liberation. This triggered the 
mobilisation of new feminist coalitions seeking to break the hegemonic veiling that 
headscarf-wearing girls were oppressed, for example Feminists For Equality (‘Collectif des 
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Féministes pour l’Egalité’, CFE) that published a book in 2008 called ‘Veiled girls 
speak’.259 Others directly formed in reaction to NPNS, such as the Parisian Neither Pimps 
nor Machos (‘Ni Proxos Ni Machos, NPNM, by a local branch of the MRAP), which 
challenged the dominant view that Muslim men were violent and disintegrated. Lacking 
relations with influential femocrats working within French state institutions, they have, so 
far, had not been able to change the policy discourse.  
 
General political opportunity structures  
In line with my expectations, the state’s capacity to act upon policy frames appeared 
significant due to the particular characteristics of the party system and the balance of 
power between the different arms of the state. Over time, a trade-off occurred between the 
constitutional and legislative arms - not unusual for the French institutional setting (Bell, 
2004; Favell, 1998: 183). While deputies called for laws to restore order, courts found a 
ban a too disproportionate curtailment of individuals’ religious freedom rights. The State 
Council even continued to propagate a moderate approach to secularism in its 2004 annual 
report, referring to the Dutch approach towards religious symbols as an example to 
consider accommodating headscarves in the educational realm.260 But with a majority in 
Parliament, the UMP Government appeared strong enough to push through restrictive 
legislation in name of French secularism. Also in the burqa discussion, the UMP-ruled 
Parliament favoured a law and the Government neglected the legal advice of the State 
Council. According to Christian Joppke (2011: 27), “what occurred was a political 
backlash against a perceived dictate of the legal system.” The electoral system and 
existence of majority governments enabled such a populist backlash against constitutional 
law.  
In contrast to my expectation, the Constitutional Court did not function as a serious 
institutional constraint to pass restrictive legislation, partly because this court is made up of 
conservative political notables, many of whom being closely affiliated to the Right 
(Jacques Chirac, Valerie Giscard d’Estaing, and Jean-louis Debré). It is rather the new 
Equal Treatment Committee HALDE, operating since 2005, that has functioned as a new 
important institutional venue for hijab-wearing women who have faced restrictions on 
religious dress in domains where the 2004 law does not apply, including students of 
universities261 or employees working in private kindergarten associations.262 When a public 
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school forbade hijab-wearing mothers from participating in voluntary public school 
activities and trips for reasons of secularism, the HALDE argued in 2007 that the principle 
of secularism and duty of neutrality does not apply to users and visitors of public 
institutions who are protected from discrimination on grounds of religion.263 In several 
other cases it ruled that hijab-wearing women were illegally discriminated against on 
grounds of religion in the access to public goods and services.264 It only considered 
restrictions on religious dress for employees working in private sectors legitimate in case 
hijabs endangered public safety.265 In other words, a divergence between the 
constitutional/judicial and legislative branches of the state appeared over how to manage 
religious and cultural diversity, with the former being in favour of a liberal approach 
towards religious dress and the latter of restrictions.  
 
Power constellations 
Policy responses can be explained by shifts in power constellations. Each time the 
mainstream right-wing parties RPR or UMP ruled, restrictions on the right to wear 
headscarves in schools were passed, first as a Directive and later as law. This may be 
explained by the established Right adopting some elements of the discourse of the 
increasingly popular Front National regarding immigration and nationalism. Even though 
the FN never politicised the hijab itself, the timing of the episodes when the hijab was 
fiercely debated in Parliament exactly coincides with an increasing popularity of le Pen 
challenging the mainstream parties’ stable position. One year before the first headscarf 
affair in 1989, Le Pen had acquired 14 % of the first round of the Presidential elections and 
10 seats in the European Parliament (11.8%). In 1994, just before the second peak of the 
discussions, the FN gained 11 seats in the European Parliament (10.5%). And in the 
Presidential elections of 2002, before the third peak, Le Pen came second with almost 5 
million votes (16.9%) more than socialist Prime Minister Jospin and only 3 percentage 
points behind right-wing Jacques Chirac. The politicisation of the headscarf by the 
established Right (RPR and UMP) thus correlates with the popularity of the extreme Right.  
Although it did not call for the expulsion of immigrants, the RPR and UMP - challenged 
by the dominance of the FN over issues related to immigration and integration – adopted 
some elements of its discourse by insisting upon the assimilation of Muslims to a secular 
French nationality and upon a strong state that protects public order. We have also seen 
how the Socialist party changed position when challenged by the FN challenged, which led 
to a parliamentary consensus that enabled the passing of the law in 2004.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
refus d’accès à un cours de langue opposé par un professeur d’université ayant pour motif le port 
du voile, No. 2008-194 (September 29, 2008). 
262
 HALDE, Délibération relative à un licenciement pour faute grave fondé sur le refus de la 
salariée d'ôter son voile, No. 2010-82 (March 1, 2010). 
263
 HALDE, Délibération relative à l’exclusion de mères d’èlèves de la participation à des activités 
éducatives et/ou de l’encadrement de sorties scolaires en raison du port du foulard no. 2007-117 
(May 14, 2007). 
264
 HALDE, Délibération relative au refus d'un hôtelier de louer une chambre à une cliente au motif 
que celle-ci porte un voile, No. 2006-113 (June 5, 2006); HALDE, Délibération relative au refus 
d'un instructeur d'auto-école de donner des leçons de conduite à une candidate qui refuse d'ôter son 
voile, No. 2005-25 (May 19, 2005) ;    
265
 HALDE, Délibération relative à la rupture du contrat d'une animatrice au sein d'une association 
pour enfants autistes ayant refusé de se baigner avec les enfants et de retirer son voile, No. 2006-
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Historical alliances changed due to the dynamic framing of the issue. When the 
UMP appropriated gender in a nationalistic discourse of Republican values, this created 
new and unexpected opportunities among the Right for feminist coalitions warning against 
the rise of Islamic fundamentalism for women’s rights. Feminist opponents of a ban who 
have long critiqued the public power of the Catholic Church subsequently found 
themselves protesting side by side with devout believers claiming public space for Islam. 
Conversely, feminist proponents of a ban now found allies among the Republican Right 
whose neo-liberal and nationalistic agenda they had never shared. Also other typical ‘left-
wing’ issues, like anti-discrimination and anti-Semitism, were politicised by the Right, 
namely as a problem of Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims. This created unexpected 
political opportunities for combative secularist Republicans among the RPR/UMP, which 
has historically defended a moderate secularism and the religious freedom rights of 
Catholics. The Right’s attempts to negotiate with orthodox Muslim organisations were, 
nonetheless, rejected by secularists, who continued to defend a strict separation between 
church and state. While the PS is traditionally softer on immigrant related issues, its 
secularist stance prevented them from being allies for hijab-wearing women. In other 
words, party positions and alliance structures changed as a result of the dynamic and 
intersectional process of framing between actors. A fruitful alliance emerged between 
several proponents of legislation who did not necessarily share the same normative frame, 
which enabled the passing of two laws on religious dress in public space.  
 
To conclude, the French Republican and secular ‘model’ was revitalised during the 
hijab debate. The principle of gender equality was nationalised as a value that had to be 
protected from a radical Islam and ‘extended’ to migrant girls by codifying a stricter 
interpretation of French secularism then had hitherto been practiced. While cleavages and 
institutional patterns shaped the contentiousness as well as the framing of the hijab issue by 
constraining and enabling certain policy frames, politicians – influenced by actors inside 
and outside the political arena - also seized political opportunities by reinterpreting and 
renegotiating institutional repertoires during the policy process. Linking the hijab to 
problems like public order, proponents of bans on hijabs managed to circumvent legal 
constraints of religious freedom rights, reconfigured existing alliance structures, and were 
able to push for restrictions on the hijab. This clarifies that, through their framing attempts 
that are linked to their institutional environment, actors still have leeway to reinterpret and 
extend institutional logics of, for instance, secularism. Framing thus functions as the glue 
between institutions and actors. The analysis also makes clear that international 
developments outside France influenced the framing of hijabs, with the threat of a radical 
Islam becoming a resonant frame after several radical attacks occurred in the mid-1990s 
and particularly after September 11th. Finally, we have seen how actors referred to 
European jurisprudence on the hijab to push for new legislation. EU institutions thus 
paradoxically enabled the restriction of human rights by leaving countries a margin of 
appreciation which nation-state actors seized to push for bans in the name of national - yet 
distorted - ‘models’ of state-church relations and citizenship. 
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Chapter 8. The Netherlands: debates and policies on the hijab (1985-
2007) 
 
8.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents an analysis of the regulations and political debates regarding the 
hijab veil in the Netherlands between 1985 and 2007, thereby exploring the idea that the 
framing and regulation of veiling reflect institutional patterns and policy legacies of state-
church relations, citizenship and immigrant integration, and women’s emancipation. 
Previous research has illustrated that the legacy of pillarisation makes religious identity 
claims such as the headscarf highly legitimate in the Netherlands, with Dutch policy 
makers largely approaching migrant minority groups as religious groups (van Kuijeren, 
2000, 2001; Reysoo, 1992; Saharso & Verhaar, 2006; Verhaar, 1999; Verhaar & Saharso, 
2004). The following analysis corroborates the finding that Dutch policy responses to the 
headscarf have largely been accommodating when framed in terms of religion.  
When the claim for recognition concerned headscarves in the police force and 
judiciary, however, Dutch politicians reacted more divisively. Principles like the separation 
between church and state shaped the debate, rather than pillarised notions of religious 
freedom and an even-handed accommodation of pluralist worldviews. The Dutch ‘model’ 
of managing religious differences was contrasted with the French ‘model’, but also with 
the British ‘model’ of multiculturalism with the UK having accommodated sikh turbans 
and headscarves in police uniforms. Because immigrant integration policies also structured 
the debates, restrictions on religious dress could be passed that are at odds with the Dutch 
state-church ‘model’ of pillarisation (see also Maussen, 2009).  
Furthermore, when the debate shifted to the Islamic face veil, the logic of religious 
freedom and pluralism no longer structured the framing of policy debates. Face veiled 
Muslim women were associated with an extreme and segregating section of the Muslim 
community whose practices were at odds with ‘Dutch’ citizenship values of gender 
equality and gendered norms of social interaction. This resulted in calls for full bans on 
burqas in public space that have, however, not yet been implemented. 
This change in framing must be related to a shift in power relations between 
political parties, changes in immigrant integration policies, and to political events on a 
national and international level that enabled a discourse that shifted Islam to being a threat 
to public security and order. The Dutch parliamentary debates on face veils clearly 
illustrate a departure of Dutch multicultural policies, but the analysis also shows that hijab 
policies have so far largely remained lenient. Institutionalised principles of equality, non-
discrimination, and religious freedom eventually prevented the implementation of 
restrictive frames in actual policies. This finding points at the path-dependent effect of 
institutional repertoires of state-church relations on present-day political processes. But 
also general institutional features of the political system constrained the capacity of the 
government to act upon policy frames, such as the necessity to find consensus in coalition 
governments. 
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8.2 Debates and policy responses  
8.2.1 Time line and saliency 
Figure 4 shows that the hijab was not a contentious political ere found in the period 1985-
2007. Deputies wrote 25 questions to the Goveissue until the new century. In total, 59 
parliamentary documents mentioning the hijab wrnment to ask for a written response, 
submitted five motions to encourage the Government to act, and launched two law 
proposals to ban respectively burqas or all types of face covers in public space. The 
remaining documents concerned questions raised during the weekly question hour (the 
designated Minister is obliged to attend, and must answer all questions), or minutes of 
plenary debates and meetings between one of thirteen permanent parliamentary 
commissions and the Minister, in which the hijab issue was addressed, either in itself or as 
part of a wider debate.266 
The first parliamentary question found was in 1985, when a deputy of the Social 
Democrats asked the Government for a response about the decision of a municipality of the 
town Alphen aan de Rijn to forbid headscarves in schools (van Kuijeren, 2001; Rath et al., 
1996). The Minister of Education, Wim Deetman (CDA), answered that pupils may cover 
their hair in public schools in the Netherlands for reasons of religious freedom.267 
Hereafter pupils’ headscarves were no longer a political issue. Only in 1998, the debate 
                                                           
266
 Each Ministry, except that of the Prime Minister, has a fixed parliamentary commission that 
elaborates upon its policy during weekly sittings. The number of Ministries, hence of parliamentary 
commissions, differs from one cabinet to another. In addition to Ministries, the government can 
create inter-cabinet departments that have their own parliamentary commissions, such as the 
Commission of Living, Neighborhoods and Integration that was established in 2003.  
267
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flared up again, when questions were raised about a trainee teacher who refused to cover 
her hair in a public primary school (Kuijeren, 2000; Saharso & Lettinga, 2009; Saharso & 
Verhaar, 2006; Verhaar & Saharso, 2004). The issue was solved in favour of the teacher, 
and did not trigger political controversy. The headscarf became more controversial after 
2003, when it focused on the right of court personnel and police officers to express their 
religious affiliations, and the hijab developed into a politically contentious issue after 2005, 
when the debate shifted to the burqa and the niqab (Moors, 2009). That the debate focused 
so much on the Islamic face cover illustrates, however, that wearing headscarves in public 
institutions has not (yet) been controversial in the Netherlands.  
 
8.2.2 Actors  
Figure 5 shows that until 2002, it was the Left that predominantly politicised the hijab, 
more in particular the Green Party. Figure five illustrates that the populist Right took the 
initiative after the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) victory in the 2002 elections. Of 22 
parliamentary questions or motions after 2002, fourteen stemmed from new right-wing 
populist parties, like the LPF or the Freedom Party (PVV) of Geert Wilders. This 
accompanied a frame shift (see below). As figure 5 also illustrates, the CDA has remained 
a constant player, addressing the issue five times.  
 
8.2.3 Policy responses and jurisprudence 
In this section, I will briefly discuss the Government’s policy responses to the hijab, 
together with the jurisprudence of the Equal Treatment Commission (ETC) that 
significantly shaped the parameters of the political debate. Anyone who believes that he or 
she has been discriminated against on one of the grounds of the equal treatment law (sex, 
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religion and belief, political orientation, race - including ethnic background- and 
nationality, hetero and homosexual orientation, and marital status) may file a petition free 
of charge. The commission can also be consulted by persons or institutions (including the 
Government) over antidiscrimination legislation. Although the opinion of this commission 
is not legally binding, it writes on its website that in 85% of the conflict cases in which it 
mediates in, and in 70% of court-cases, its jurisprudence is followed-up (the ETC can 
apply to courts for a binding decision).  
From 1995 until 2009, the ETC has ruled on more than 105 hijab conflicts.268 In 
most cases, the ETC has ruled in favour of the woman in question. The ETC considers the 
headscarf and face veil as expressive of Muslim women’s religious conviction, and as such 
protected by the right to freedom of religion. That Muslims internally dispute whether the 
headscarf constitutes a religious duty is not relevant for the Commission, which considers 
each religious practice to be protected by law that is recognised by a substantial part of the 
religious community in question as stemming from religious doctrines.269 The ETC argues 
that freedom of religion is a fundamental right (there is no hierarchy between fundamental 
rights in the Netherlands) that can only be restricted if it is demonstrated that the purpose 
of a headscarf ban pursues a legitimate aim, that it can be reasonably expected to achieve 
that aim and that such response is proportional (judgement 2003-40 Section 5.9 cited in 
Saharso (2007: 519). In most cases brought forward, the commission did not uphold 
prohibitions on headscarves or religious symbols, applying the proportionality test in a 
strict way. Only in regard to pupils’ face veils did the commission uphold restrictions of 
the right to wear religious dress, particularly in public schools.  
Over the years, politicians have increasingly contested its jurisprudence. The 
populist politician Wilders requested the abolishment of the Commission in 2008.270 Also 
former Minister of Integration Rita Verdonk (then a member of the liberal party VVD) said 
in 2006 that she wanted to abolish the Commission.271 We will see how the Government 
has increasingly departed from the jurisprudence of the ETC, with the result that a similar 
divergence over multiculturalism develops between the legislative and judicial branches of 
                                                           
268
 In 1995, the first case was brought forward by a woman who worked as a cleaning lady but was 
not allowed to wear a headscarf. She won her case: ETC 1995-31 (July 4, 1995). 
269
 When parents wanted to exempt their daughter from gender-mixed gymnastic courses for 
religious reasons, the Commission argued that it did not directly stem from Muslim faith that girls 
cannot participate with boys in school courses, hence was not protected by religious freedom 
rights: ETC 1999-106 (October 4, 1999). The desire not to shake hands with the opposite sex, 
however, has been recognised as a practice protected by the right to freedom of religion. 
Depending on the particular context of the case, the Commission sometimes ruled in favour of 
applicants refusing to shake hands with the opposite sex for religious reasons: ETC 2006-202 (June 
13, 2006). In one controversial case, it argued that refusing someone for vocational training to 
become a teaching assistant is an illegitimate form of indirect discrimination on grounds of religion 
that disproportionally requires minorities to conform to a majority’s way of greeting: ETC 2006-51 
(September 30, 2005). But in different cases, it ruled in favour of employees or public schools that 
required personnel to shake hands, mainly for reasons of sex equality: ETC 2007- 180 (January 19, 
2007), ETC: 2002- 22 (March 5, 2002). In the latter case the commission considered the aim of a 
school legitimate to transmit norms and values about general codes of conduct in a multicultural 
school and argued that it did not disproportionally hinder Muslims in their right to freedom of 
conscience when they were requested to shake hands. 
270
 No. 941, ‘Vragen over het advies van de commissie gelijke behandeling over het dragen van 
hoofddoekjes voor politieagenten’ (November 29, 2007). 
271
 ‘Verdonk wil af van Commissie Gelijke Behandeling’, Trouw (November 9, 2006). 
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the state as we have seen in France. Table 6 shows the policy responses of the Dutch 
Government to the hijab over time. 
 
Table 6 Dutch policy responses to the hijab 
Time Government Policy response 
1985 
Lubbers I: CDA-
VVD. 
Minister of Education 
Wim Deetman 
(CDA) 
Case to case approach: policy statement that religious expressions 
should be accommodated in public schools for pupils. 
2003 
Balkenende II (2003-
2006): VVD,CDA, D' 
66. 
Minister of Education 
Maria van der 
Hoeven (CDA). 
Minister of Interior 
Johan Remkes 
(VVD). 
Minister of Justice 
Piet-Hein Donner 
(CDA) 
 
Case to case approach: clothing directive to schools stipulates that 
religious expressions in public schools can only be prohibited for 
reasons of safety or communication. Religious schools may 
discriminate on grounds of religion under certain circumstances. 
2004 
Policy document stipulates that religious expressions by civil 
servants can only be prohibited for reasons of safety or 
communication. In 'authoritative' functions like police and judiciary 
can headscarves be forbidden for reasons of public neutrality. 
2008 
Balkenende IV 
(2007-2010):CDA-
CU-PvdA. 
Minister of Interior 
Guusje Ter Horst 
(PvdA). 
Minister of Education 
Ronald Plasterk 
(PvdA) 
 
Plans to create national regulations that forbid all religious, 
philosophical and political expressions for police personnel working 
with citizens. 
2009 
Pending law proposal that will prohibit all types of face covering in 
public and private schools. 
New clothing directive that forbids face veils in civil service. 
 
Policy responses regarding the hijab in the educational realm  
In 2003, the Minister of Education of the coalition Government of CDA, VVD and D66 
(Balkenende II, 2003-2006) sent a Clothing Directive to schools that was largely based 
upon the jurisprudence of the Equal Treatment Commission (ETC).272 The occasion for the 
Directive, which has only an advisory character, was a range of cases brought forward to 
the ETC that year by hijab-wearing pupils and trainees who had been refused by Christian 
schools because of their headscarf. Another highly mediatised conflict that had triggered 
the policy response was a conflict in 2003 between a secondary school in Amsterdam and 
two students who had insisted upon their right to wear face veils (see below on face veils).  
                                                           
272 
‘Leidraad Kleding op Scholen’ (June 11, 2003)’;WJL/2003/23379 (June 2, 2003); 
WJL/2003/25011 (June 10, 2003). 
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In the Government’s Directive of 2003, it was written that public schools cannot 
forbid pupils to wear headscarves or other religious symbols, because that would 
discriminate against them on grounds of religion. In contrast to France, the directive 
argued that the mere fact that some parents consider veiling to be ostentatious was not 
recognised as sufficient grounds to ban religious expressions in public schools.273 Only in 
case of safety concerns or for pedagogic reasons of communication, it could be reasonable 
to request pupils to remove hijabs, but only if no other means existed to reach that aim.274  
The Government’s directive also argued that public schools cannot forbid teachers 
to wear headscarves, following the jurisprudence of the ETC that the mere fact that a 
teacher wears a headscarf does not preclude her from teaching in accordance to the public 
character of the school. The first time the ETC ruled on a teacher’s right to wear 
headscarves was in 1999, when a trainee teacher brought her case to the ETC after she was 
rejected for a public school internship because of her headscarf.275 The school in question 
had received various complaints from parents of Turkish background who had threatened 
to remove their children from school because they did not want to expose their children to 
the headscarf - something they considered to be a symbol of religious fundamentalism. The 
school thus proposed to the Equal Treatment Commission that teachers had to be neutral in 
order to safeguard pupils’ different beliefs and the order within the school. The 
Commission argued that the aim of state neutrality in public education was legitimate, but 
judged that the fact that the trainee “believes in a religion and expresses this by wearing a 
headscarf does not preclude her having an open attitude and being capable of teaching in 
accordance with the character of the school as a public educational institution” (cited from 
Saharso, 2003: 15).  
In other words, the ETC did not address the claim of negative religious freedom of 
parents who wanted to shield their children from orthodox religious peer pressure. It 
concluded that the woman in question was not only directly discriminated against on 
grounds of presumptions about her faith. She was also indirectly discriminated against, 
because a ban would disproportionately hinder her practicing a career as public school 
teacher. Practicing Muslim women would only be able to work in private Islamic schools, 
whereas teachers who do not cover can work in both public and private schools. In other 
cases the ETC has argued that the principle of non-discrimination also obliges schools to 
actively seek to enhance the visible plurality of their educational staff by creating 
internships for hijab-wearing students.276 However, when the question arose whether 
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 In similar vein, it argued that children have the right to freedom of speech/conscience to wear 
clothes associated with right-wing extremism. Only if it was proven that by their dress pupils 
disturbed public disorder, schools could prohibit such cloths. Baseball hats or belly-showing T-
shirts, in contrast, could be prohibited. 
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 In 1997, it came to a case to the Equal Treatment Commission where a school had asked a pupil 
to remove her headscarf during gymnastic courses. The ETC argued that this was a form of 
illegitimate discrimination on grounds of religion. Even though the goal of safety that the school 
brought forward was considered legitimate, it was not proven that headscarves really caused 
problems if they were adequately pinned in the hair. It recommended the school to consider special 
sports scarves during gymnastic school courses: ETC 1997-149 (December 16, 1997). 
275
 ETC 1999-18 (February 19, 1999). 
276
 The Commission has followed this line of argument in several other cases of conflict between 
schools and interns. It has stated that the principle of non-discrimination also obliges public 
educational institutions to take measures to protect interns from discrimination, e.g. by creating 
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public secondary schools were obliged to offer prayer rooms for Muslim pupils, the ETC 
concluded that the state only had the duty to safeguard equal opportunities by removing 
obstacles that disproportionally affect practicing Muslims, not to actively enable believers 
to practice their faith by creating space for prayers.277  
The Government also followed the jurisprudence of the ETC regarding religious 
dress in private (but fully state-funded) schools, organised on grounds of a specific 
religious denomination. The ETC has argued several times that private Christian schools 
have the right to discriminate on grounds of religion by requiring pupils or teachers to 
remove symbols that express a different religion than the one practiced by the school, such 
as Islamic headscarves.278 In its advice, it referred to Article 23 of the Dutch Constitution 
and Article 7 of the Dutch Equal Treatment Law, which stipulates that private schools have 
the right to discriminate on grounds of faith to preserve their specific denominational 
character. Also orthodox Islamic schools have the right to make clothing rules that require 
pupils and staff to conform to their particular religious identity and mission, by demanding 
them to cover their hair. And if parents want their children not to be exposed with the 
religious beliefs of others, the ETC argued that they may establish their own (state-funded) 
private schools that are allowed to demand of pupils to visibly hide their particular beliefs. 
It referred to the European Treaty of Human Rights, which stipulates that the right to 
religious freedom also comprises the right not to adhere to any belief.279  
However, the ETC has only endorsed such discrimination if schools have clearly 
embedded this particular denominational identity in their school laws and regulations, and 
practiced their policy in a non-discriminatory way. Moreover, they have to prove that such 
dress requirements are necessary for the fulfilment of the duties attached to the job of that 
teacher. Since most Dutch Christian schools today have become multi-ethnic and multi-
religious schools, only few Christian orthodox schools will fall under the strict 
proportionally test of the ETC that was repeated by the Government in its Directive.280 
When it came to a conflict in 2005 between an Islamic school and a woman who had been 
refused for the job of Arabic teacher because she did not want to wear a headscarf, the 
Commission ruled in favour of the woman in question who identified herself as Muslim. It 
argued that the school had not been able to illustrate that the wearing of headscarves was 
necessary for the function of an Arabic teacher, because the school had not required non-
Muslim teachers to cover their hair who taught Arab. Although the school had the right to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
extra internship positions for teacher-trainees with headscarves in order to increase their visibility 
and help combating prejudices: E.g. ETC 2006-70 (April 14, 2006); ETC 2005-91 (May 30, 2005) 
277
 ETC 2000/51 (August 3, 2000). The State Secretary of Education Karin Adelmund (PvdA) also 
responded that public schools are free but not obliged to offer opportunities to pray or to follow 
religious education: TK 547 (December 14, 1999). 
278
 E.g. ETC 2003-112 (August 5, 2003); ETC 2008-121 (October 15, 2008); ETC 2007-61 (April 
16, 2007); ETC 2007-96 (November 20, 2007). 
279
 ETC 2005-19 (February 11, 2005). Although the ETC members ruled that in principle, a private 
school based on secularism may discriminate people on grounds of (non-)religion, this particular 
school in question had not sufficiently specified its identity in its statues in order to legitimize its 
refusal of a teacher-trainee wearing a headscarf.  
280 
 The secondary school City College St Franciscus in Rotterdam and the St Gregorius College in 
Utrecht have, for instance, introduced clothing rules that forbid headscarves in order to avoid 
identity politics and peer pressure, but this seems legally untenable: ‘Op het Citycollege is een 
hoofddoek verboden. Het hoofddekselverbod in Vlaanderen leidt tot discussie op Nederlandse 
scholen’, NRC Handelsblad (October 10-11, 2009). 
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stipulate in its statutes that its foundations were based on the Soenna and the Qu’ran, and 
that according to its interpretation of those religious sources women had to cover 
themselves, it could not treat Muslims and non-Muslims differently in this dress code.281  
In short, headscarves are largely accommodated in public schools and, in line with 
Dutch pillarised traditions of equal treatment and religious freedom; Islamic schools have 
an equal associational freedom as Christian schools to organize on grounds of their 
religious beliefs. Only in regard to face veils, policy responses have become more 
restrictive (see below). 
 
Policy responses to the hijab in public service functions 
In a policy document of 2004, called ‘Constitutional Rights in a Pluriform Society’, the 
Balkenende II Government (CDA, VVD, D66) stipulated its policy response to religious 
symbolism in civil service functions.282 In the document, the Government repeated its 
stance regarding the right of teachers to wear headscarves in public schools. It also 
confirmed the individual right of civil servants to wear symbols expressing their personal 
religious affiliations. Only in case of safety problems or functional obstacles were clothing 
restrictions on religious dress deemed legitimate, like face veils hindering communication 
between officer and client. Again, local conflicts in the city of Rotterdam had been 
occasion for the Government to respond to the issue, where the Fortuynists had won 
victories in local elections and mainstream parties reacted by prohibiting certain types of 
hijab for civil servants.283 
In its policy report, the Government differentiated between, on the one hand, 
regular civil servants and, on the other hand, officers working in the judiciary (including 
court-clerks) and law-enforcement (such as the police force or public prosecutors). While it 
argued that the former did not necessarily need to appear neutral, the latter had to avoid 
any appearance of partiality to maintain people’s trust in the authority and independence of 
the state, by removing all symbols of personal religious, philosophical or political 
affiliations. This differentiation between regular and authoritative public servants had been 
advised by the Commission Blok, officially named the ‘Temporary Commission Research 
Integration Policy’, which had been established by the Parliament to study why the 
integration of migrants in Dutch society had failed.284 It consisted of seven members of 
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 ETC 2005-222 (November 15, 2005).  
282 TK 29614, no. 2, 1-6-2004 ‘Grondrechten in een pluriforme samenleving’ (June 1, 2004).  
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 The affair started locally, when the Social Democrats and Christian-Democrats in the district 
Charlois of the municipality of Rotterdam asked the council to set rules for women to wear long 
headscarves and chadors as public servants, because they thought these conflicted with ‘Dutch 
norms and values’, particularly gender equality. Because Dutch tolerant practices of secularism 
would give leeway to religious fundamentalism, the parties argued in favour of strict neutrality for 
public servants, requiring that they remove all religious signs. Yet, a bandana was considered 
tolerable. ‘Charlois wil geen hoefddoekjes achter loketten; Rotterdamse PvdA'er Dominic Schrijer 
timmert opnieuw aan de weg in debat over allochtonen’, Volkskrant (February 19, 2004). 
284 TK 28 689, nr. 8, ‘Bruggen Bouwen’ (Tijdelijke Commissie Onderzoek Integratiebeleid), 
(March 2004). The commission had been initiated by Jan Marijnissen of the Socialist Party SP who 
had submitted a motion on 19th September 2002 (28600, no. 24,) to execute research into why the 
integration of migrants in Dutch society had failed, which was the dominant problem analysis at 
that time. The commission’s report was discussed at length in Parliament, because deputies did not 
share its conclusion that the integration of migrants in Dutch society had predominantly been 
successful (see Scholten & Nispen, 2008).  
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different parliamentary parties, and was headed by Stef Blok (VVD).285 One of the 
conclusions of the Commission was that the wearing of the headscarf was a matter of 
individual choice and one’s own responsibility. It could only be curtailed for functional 
reasons, such as the duty of neutrality for officers working in law-enforcement or the 
communication between pupil and teacher.286  
The Government’s policy response to public officers departed from the 
jurisprudence of the ETC. In a 2001 case brought forward by a court clerk who had been 
forbidden to wear a headscarf by a local court in the town of Zwolle, the Committee 
members ruled in favour of the woman in question.287 They argued that even though the 
aim of neutrality was legitimate, it was too disproportionate to demand of clerks to 
privatise their religious affiliations. Unlike a judge, the function of a clerk did not 
necessarily require a neutral appearance. The effects of a full ban on religious symbols, 
which would indirectly discriminate against practicing Muslim women, therefore did not 
outweigh the aim of public neutrality. Minister of Justice, Benk Korthals (VVD), however, 
argued that all personnel in the judiciary had to appear neutral in order to maintain 
people’s trust in the independence and impartiality of the judiciary (Saharso & Verhaar, 
2006).  
In 2004, then-Minister of Interior Johan Remkes (VVD) also stated that police 
officers had to appear neutral if they had contact with citizens.288 With that, Remkes 
differed from his predecessor Bram Peper (PvdA) - Minister of Interior from 1998-2000 - 
who had investigated the option to design special headscarves for prison guards and police 
officers to increase their safety during work. The occasion for the policy response was a 
report that had been sent to Remkes by the internal advisory committee of the National 
Board of Chief Commissioners of Police (‘Raad van Hoofd Commissarisen’, RHC).289 It 
advised the Minister to create national regulations that police officers should appear ‘life-
style neutral’ by removing all personal affiliations of religion, (political) ideology or 
belief.290 After having received the report, Remkes asked the ETC for an advice about the 
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legal feasibility of such national regulations that would oblige police officers to appear 
neutral.  
In 2007, the ETC issued its report in which it repeated that the aim of public 
neutrality was legitimate, but it questioned whether a neutral and representative appearance 
necessarily meant that all expressions of personal beliefs had to be privatised. Referring to 
the legal practice in the United Kingdom and Canada, the Commission argued that the 
Government could also consider the inclusion of a headscarf in the police uniform, 
particularly because ‘in a pluriform society tolerance and broad-mindedness are important 
values’.291 But there was no political will to pursue such a multicultural stance. Deputies of 
the Conservative Liberals (VVD) and the populist Right (PVV) raised objections to the 
advice of the Equal Treatment Committee. When the PVV submitted a motion to forbid 
headscarves in the police force it was supported by a majority of Parliament, on the 
condition that other religious symbols would also be prohibited.292 On 14th November 
2008, the new Minister of Interior, Guusje ter Horst (PvdA), declared that her Government 
had agreed that, in consultation with police unions, it would develop new regulations about 
police uniforms. In order ‘to radiate authority and respect’ and ‘to appear impartial and 
objective’ all police employees working with citizens had to remove political, religious and 
philosophical signs that illustrated someone’s ‘private identity’, such as headscarves, 
crucifixes and kippahs, and also the pink triangle (which can indicate someone’s sexual 
preference).293 The current Government of VVD and CDA, which depends on the support 
of the PVV, announced in its coalition agreement that it will proceed with the idea of 
prohibiting headscarves in the police and judiciary, without mentioning other religious 
expressions.294 
 
New policy responses to the face veil 
In its Clothing Directive of 2003, the Dutch government for the first time responded to the 
wearing of face veils in public schools. It argued that in certain circumstances, schools 
could forbid pupils to cover their faces, referring to a ruling of the ETC of April 16, 2003 
about face covers in public secondary schools.295 This case had been brought forward by 
two students of a public secondary school in Amsterdam who were being educated to 
become schoolteachers at kindergartens and had been asked to remove their face veils at 
school. The two adolescents told the school directory that they would only be willing to 
remove their niqabs in class or when working with women and children during their 
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traineeships. But the school insisted upon them removing face veils in the building, and 
subsequently the two girls brought their case to the Equal Treatment Commission. They 
argued that they wore the niqab for avoiding the male gaze, which they considered a 
religious duty and thus they felt discriminated against on grounds of religion. When the 
girls understood that one of the members of the commission was deaf and could not lip-
read what the girls said, the girls showed their flexibility by removing their niqabs, despite 
one male member of the commission being in the same room (see also Prins & Saharso, 
2008).  
This time, the ETC argued in favour of the secondary vocational school in question. 
It considered its aims for a general dress-code on face covers legitimate and a ban both 
necessary to fulfil those aims and proportional. The motivations of the school to prohibit 
face veils, which had convinced the ETC and which were repeated in the clothing 
directive, were: first, to safeguard public safety at school, because the wearing of face veils 
hindered the necessary identification of people in and around the school; and second, to 
advance didactic communication, because teachers cannot assess whether pupils 
understand their teaching if they wear face veils; and third, to comply with the school’s 
pedagogic duties to train pupils to become assistants in schools and kindergartens. If pupils 
insisted on wearing face veils, it could not find appropriate internships for them. It did not 
elaborate whether the claim for sex-specific treatment infringed upon the principle of 
gender equality. With this ruling, the ETC departed from previous advice of 2000, in 
which it had concluded that schools could not prohibit face covers, because it was not 
proven that they really impeded interpersonal communication between teachers and pupils 
(see also: Loenen, 2006; Moors, 2009).296 After the Government’s Directive, some schools 
created clothing rules that prohibited the wearing of face veils. Also some universities 
chose to ban face veils, such as Leiden University (2003), Utrecht University (2003) and 
the VU University in Amsterdam (2004), while other universities continued to allow 
students to cover their faces during lectures.297 
The parliamentary debate about face veils flared up when Geert Wilders proposed a 
motion in a parliamentary debate on terrorism in 2005, calling for a ban on the burqa in 
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public spaces.298 Wilders was then running as an independent candidate, having left the 
VVD because of his discontent with the party’s lenient stance on Turkey’s EU 
membership. In February 2006, Wilders established his Freedom Party PVV. In addition to 
the populist Right (Groep Wilders, LPF and former Fortynists Groep Nawijn, Groep 
Eerdmans/Van Schijndel, Groep van Oudenallen) and the conservative Liberal party VVD, 
the confessional parties CDA and (in a second round) SGP also voted in favour of Wilders’ 
motion in 2005.299 However one of the cabinet’s coalition partners, Liberal Democrat party 
D’ 66, was hesitant to implement such a ban. Minster of Justice Piet-Hein Donner (CDA) 
also objected to the constitutionality of such a law (Moors, 2009).  
In light of this political impasse, Minister of Integration, Rita Verdonk, installed a 
legal committee in August 2006 to opine about the legal options and possible social 
consequences of a full ban. The Commission, headed by Professor of Law (and current 
member of the Council of State) Ben Vermeulen, consisted of various legal scholars, 
theologians and an imam.300 The Commission Vermeulen argued that a prohibition of only 
the burqa was discriminatory, and that a general prohibition on all types of face covers 
infringed upon human rights to religious freedom. Only in case of public security were 
prohibitions of religious dress legitimate, but current legislation already provided sufficient 
means for authorities to demand face-to-face visibility in specific circumstances. The only 
lacuna it observed was in public transportation (Vermeulen, 2006). 
Shortly after the Government received the commission’s report, the cabinet fell, 
due to an internal coalition conflict. New elections were held on 23rd November 2006. 
Three months later, in February 2007, the new centre-Left coalition Cabinet of PvdA, CDA 
and the orthodox Christian Union CU took office. While the CDA favoured a general 
prohibition of face covers, the PvdA and CU were hesitant. The new Minister of 
Integration, Ella Vogelaar (PvdA), and her State Secretary, Nebahat Albayrak (PvdA), 
were against a full ban. In its coalition agreement, which must be read as a compromise, 
the Government announced its willingness to prepare a ban on all types of face covers only 
in certain domains for security reasons.301 Not waiting for the Government’s proposal, two 
deputies submitted their own law proposals, one by Henk Kamp of the VVD wanting a ban 
on all types of face covers, and another by Geert Wilders and Sietze Fritsma of the PVV 
that advocated a specific prohibition of the burqa.302 The Parliament sent the latter’s 
proposal to the Council of State for legal advice, which also argued that a full ban on only 
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the burqa discriminated on grounds of religion. It also considered a full ban in public space 
too disproportionate to reach the (legitimate) aim of public safety.303  
In a letter to the Parliament on 8th February 2008, the centre-Left Government 
Balkenende IV (PvdA, VVD, CU) announced its plans to introduce legislation that 
prohibits all kinds of face covers in primary and secondary educational establishments, 
both in private and public, and both for pupils or teachers and for parents and visitors. The 
Government repeated that such a ban was necessary to identify people in and around the 
school, as well as to enable the communication between pupils and teachers. It added that 
face veils were incompatible with the ‘active citizenship and social integration’ schools 
needed to teach to pupils, and further impeded the equal opportunities of men and women 
by complicating women’s social participation.304 The Government also sent a new clothing 
Directive to civil servants in the Federal Government forbidding face covers, and 
encouraging local governments to follow suit.305 
The Government’s ideas were discussed with several Parliamentary Commissions 
on 24th April 2008. All parties except the Christian Union agreed with the Government’s 
plans.306 In September 2008, the Government sent a letter to the Parliament to explain its 
upcoming regulations,307 which were discussed with the Parliamentary Commission of 
Education on 24th November 2008.308 Even though higher educational establishments 
objected to legislation and had not been included in the initial plan, the Minister of 
Education Ronald Plasterk (PvdA) accepted the wish of the Commission to extend the ban 
to (private) higher educational institutions for adults as well. The PVV had successfully 
presented the tolerance of face covers by some Islamic universities as a dangerous form of 
Dutch pragmatism that would gradually change Dutch society into an Islamic country 
where women’s rights were bashed.309 In 2009, the Government’s law proposal was sent to 
the State Council for a legal advice. On 21st May 2010, the Council of State sent its 
unpublished advice to the new Government (VVD, CDA, supported by PVV) about its 
proposal.310 In its coalition agreement of September 2010, the Government returned to the 
initial motion of Geert Wilders, announcing its plan to ban all face covers in public space, 
including burqas.311 
 
8.3 Diagnoses and prognoses in the parliamentary debates on the hijab  
Six frames structured the parliamentary debate on the hijab. The debate in the late-1990s 
regarding teachers’ right to wear headscarves was framed in terms of a discrimination and 
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participation frame, as well as religious freedom and pluralism frame. Not the hijab itself 
was problematised, but the obstacles that headscarf-wearing women faced while 
participating in Dutch society, such as discrimination. This was seen as hindering their 
emancipation and integration in Dutch society, as well as conflicting with Dutch principles 
of religious freedom. In contrast, a conflict with neutrality frame structured debates on 
headscarves in the judiciary and the police force.  The face veil was also framed in terms of 
participation, but the causal logic of the previous participation frame changed when the 
face veil itself became seen as the main obstacle to women’s emancipation and integration, 
rather than discrimination or institutional obstacles in society. Moreover, three new frames 
appeared when the debate shifted to the face veil after 2003. One problematised the 
oppression of hijab-wearing women, locating the problem in a patriarchal Muslim culture; 
another discussed the problem of face veils jeopardising social cohesion, illustrating a 
segregation and rejection to integrate; a final sub-frame discussed face veils as conflicting 
with public security. While the frame that the hijab was a symbol of a politicised Islam at 
odds with Dutch culture was also put on the agenda by the far-Right, it only indirectly 
structured Dutch policy debates. 
 
1. State church frames 
When the pupils’ headscarf first appeared on the agenda in 1985, it was mainly framed in 
terms of religious freedom and pluralism. The municipality of Alphen aan de Rijn, which 
had forbidden headscarves in public schools, initially consulted a legal scholar in Islam to 
ask whether veiling constitutes a religious doctrine. When the scholar argued it was not a 
religious duty to cover, the municipality concluded that headscarves could be forbidden, in 
order to relieve young girls from religious pressure to cover. This was challenged by the 
Dominican priest David van Ooiijen, who was an MP for the PvdA. He argued that it was 
not up to governors to interpret religious doctrines, and since headscarves do not hinder 
any pupils’ educational development, the Minister of Education agreed that headscarves 
should be allowed in public schools.312  
In contrast to France, very few deputies argued that the headscarf needed to be 
banned from public schools in order to protect girls’ falling victim to patriarchal 
community pressure. Only one question was found by a member of the Socialist Party (SP) 
in 2004, concerning images of women with headscarves in so-called ‘pre-school’ (age 4-6) 
textbooks. Vergeer argued that covered women provide wrong role models to young 
children, who should instead learn that ‘men and women are equal and emancipated’ and 
receive education according to a ‘Dutch framework’.313 Without addressing the claim that 
the headscarf symbolised gender-inequality, the Minister of Education Maria van der 
Hoeven (CDA) argued that children had to learn about multicultural and religious 
differences in Dutch society. Moreover, it would help ‘allochtones’ to recognise 
themselves in the educational material. Becoming a Dutch citizen thus did not, as in 
France, require one to take a distance from their particular religious and cultural identities 
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in public schools. In contrast, public school material had to represent the multicultural 
society.  
Furthermore, teachers’ right to express their personal religious beliefs in public 
schools was hardly disputed. This issue emerged on the agenda in 1997 from a 
participation and discrimination frame (see below on gender equality frames). Except for 
the PVV in 2008, no party has ever challenged the Government’s accommodative stance 
regarding pupils’ and teacher’s headscarves in public schools. In a response to the PVV, 
Minister of Education Ronald Plasterk (PvdA) repeated that a ban on religious symbols for 
teachers discriminated against people on grounds of religion. Removing headscarves was, 
moreover, not deemed necessary in building a relation of trust between pupils and teachers, 
or to guarantee neutral and authoritative appearance.314 There was slightly more 
parliamentary resistance to the policy that private religious schools may discriminate on 
grounds of religion, from, among others, the Greens, who in 2003 raised questions about 
Christian schools forbidding pupils to wear headscarves315, and from the Social Democrats 
who in 2005 objected to the fact that Islamic schools may demand girls to cover.316 So far, 
these attempts have borne no fruit: Minister of Education, Maria van der Hoeven (CDA), 
responded that religious schools in the Netherlands have the constitutional right to require 
pupils and staff to conform to the denominational foundations of the school. 
With the emergence of the Fortuynists in the Parliament after 2003, headscarves in 
public functions were politicised. In 2004, the LPF requested a parliamentary debate about 
religious symbolism in public service. It argued that the wearing of headscarves in public 
functions undermined the separation between church and state, and even endangered Dutch 
liberal democracy: “my fraction worries about the gradual Islamisation of the Dutch 
society. Some of our fundamental values are undermined: the equal treatment of men and 
women, of homosexuals and heterosexuals, and last but not least the separation of church 
and state. The LPF fraction thinks that the Dutch citizen has a right to a neutral state. This 
right, derived from modernity, is one of our basic citizenship rights.”317 Referring to the 
French example, the LPF requested the codification of secularism in the Dutch constitution 
and advocated for a ban on all religious expressions in the overall public service.318  
Members of the governing parties VVD, D66 and CDA, as well as of the 
oppositional parties PvdA, SP, CU and SGP all agreed, however, that the neutrality of the 
state was not necessarily at stake if civil servants wore headscarves.319 Hence, they 
primarily viewed the headscarf a personal religious expression that was in line with Dutch 
secularism, although the SGP agreed with the Fortuynists that it worried from its Christian 
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foundations about the increasing Islamisation of Dutch society. In fact, deputies contrasted 
the French approach to religion with the Dutch approach.  
Nevertheless, deputies also disliked the UK approach that the Equal Treatment 
Committee had advocated towards religious dress in public functions. All parties, except 
the Greens, objected the idea that police officers could wear headscarves. They argued that 
police, customs officers and army personnel executed such particular authoritative 
functions that they had to privatise personal (religious) affiliations for reasons of public 
neutrality.320 Jeroen Dijsselbloem of the PvdA had suggested that exceptions could be 
made for police officers.321 But Boris van der Ham of the D66 fraction considered this an 
infringement upon the non-institutionalised principle of separation between church and 
state, if the state would pay for headscarves for prison guards or police officers. Also in 
December 2007, when the debate about headscarves in police officers flared up again, a 
majority of Parliament argued that religious symbols needed to be prohibited in the 
police.322 Even the small orthodox Christian Union argued that police officers should not 
express their personal beliefs, in order to maintain citizens’ trust in the independence of the 
state.323 Also the ideas of Minister of Transportation Karla Peijs (CDA) did not gain 
support, when she publically stated in 2006 that a Minister with a headscarf would increase 
the representativeness of the Government.324 
The Greens were the only party who continued to discuss the issue from the religious 
rights and discrimination frames. In 2001 already, the Greens had challenged the decision 
of the Minister of Justice, Benk Korthals (VVD) of the second Purple Cabinet, to disregard 
the advice of the ETC allowing court-clerks to cover. Making a race analogy by comparing 
the headscarf to skin colour, MP’s Halsema and Rabbae argued, “We would never demand 
of a judge to hide his skin colour; he is not able to. Certain characteristics belong to people 
and can’t be removed. If the women in question experience it like this, we should accept 
that.”325 Halsema thus contested the concept of neutrality underlying the decision of the 
Government. According to her, it would relegate ‘neutrality’ to the eye of the beholder, 
whose perception is coloured by personal and cultural experiences: “it is nonsense to 
assume that a woman with a headscarf per definition appears non neutral, whereas an 
autochtonous (native Dutch) man of fifty years old with dandy shoes from the Gooi per 
definition is.”326 According to Halsema, someone’s suitability for the function of a clerk 
(but also police officer) should be decided on grounds of her education, not her religious 
dress. Relegating religious symbolism out of the public realm was not neutral but actually 
prioritised secular and atheist world views: “a neutral state means that all citizens are 
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equally allowed to express their religion. Atheism should not be prioritised as a state 
religion”.327 In vain, the Greens cited the (existing) possibility of ‘wraking’ (objection) in 
case citizens did not trust the independence of the clerk, which means that they can 
demand the court to replace personnel in a certain case. But a parliamentary majority 
ranging from the SP and the PvdA to the Confessional parties to the Liberal and Populist 
Right considered it one bridge too far to also accommodate headscarves in the police force 
and the judiciary.  
 
2. Social cohesion and public order frames 
The Dutch debate about hijabs not only focused on the meanings and practices of public 
neutrality and religious freedom. The debate about the Islamic face veil introduced another 
frame that problematised hijabs as symbols of segregation that fragmented the nation in 
separate groups, as well as of a radical Islam at odds with Dutch culture. It was used by 
members of the PVV, VVD and the CDA to argue in favour of a ban on face veils in 
public. Like the Fortuynists before, Geert Wilders (PVV) politicised the burqa through a 
Political Islam frame, emphasising gender equality as a core Dutch value instead of 
secularism. This was clearly a more successful angle to frame the problem of a value clash. 
According to Wilders, Islam was a political ideology that conflicted with a Christian 
Jewish ‘Dutch Leitkultur’ into which migrants needed to assimilate.328 This Dutch culture 
was marked by the equal rights and freedoms of women and homosexuals. According to 
Wilders, Dutch multiculturalism had fostered an Islamic fundamentalism in parallel 
societies where women and sexual minorities were deprived of equal rights: 
“Multiculturalism is the purest apartheid!”329  
Also the LPF had referred to the rights of ‘minorities within minorities’ when it 
pled for a ban on headscarves and other religious symbols in public functions (Eisenberg & 
Spinner-Halev, 2005).330 In 2005, it had argued: “What would a homosexual think if he 
would be confronted with a public servant wearing a headscarf? Doesn’t the Minister agree 
that this undermines the neutrality of the state?”.331 
Without confirming the idea that the burqa stood for a Political Islam, the 
conservative Liberals did frame face veils as symbols of segregation and clashing 
civilizations. Minister of Integration, Rita Verdonk (VVD), explained in 2006 why she 
favoured a full ban on burqas: “We, in the Netherlands want to live in a free society, where 
everyone can look each other in their eyes, where people can meet each other and 
communicate with each other in the public sphere. […] The English Prime Minister Tony 
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Blair characterised the burqa last week as a ‘marker of separation’, a symbol of 
diversification or of two different worldviews, while we are seeking in our integration 
policy for binding factors in our society and for social cohesion”.332 Nonetheless, in the 
UK debate333, both majority and minority communities were called upon to make efforts to 
mutual understanding, the former by having an open mind to new religions and cultures, 
the latter by removing face veils in certain situations. In the Dutch debate, the emphasis lay 
on immigrants having to ‘integrate more’ by adopting Dutch norms and values, while 
majorities were not addressed (see for this point: Verhaar, 2006). 
 Not seeing someone’s face was seen as triggering feelings of unease among the 
(majority) population, subsequently undermining ‘shared citizenship’. The majority of 
Parliament considered it necessary that women showed their faces in public. “In public 
life”, Wim van de Camp (CDA) argued, “I want to see people’s faces”.334 When the new 
centre-Left Government (CDA, CU and PvdA) took office in 2007, the terms of the debate 
shifted from ‘shared’ citizenship to ‘active’ citizenship. In its letter to Parliament in 2008, 
the Government argued ‘face covers form a barrier to active citizenship and social 
integration’, because ‘open communication is essential for a smooth social interaction 
between people in society. Mutual acceptance of differences and commonality only 
emerges when people are unimpeded to get to know each other and to interact. The 
Government therefore considers this type of clothing undesirable and will, where needed, 
discourage it.’335 It also explained that the Dutch feel uncomfortable by the face veil, 
because they link it to fundamentalist streams of Islam and female oppression.  
Hence, rather than calling upon Dutch majorities to revise their prejudices, the 
Government appealed on (immigrant) citizens to integrate more ‘actively’ by removing 
face veils when meeting other citizens in public institutions. Here the Government clearly 
departed from its policy stance towards headscarves, which had been elaborated in the 
2003 policy report on Constitutional Rights in pluriform society. The Report had valued 
the principle of tolerance as “the willingness to accept the choices and behaviour of others 
that take place within the boundaries of the Dutch law, even if these are considered 
incomprehensible”.336 Moreover, while the government had then still argued that religious 
signs could not be forbidden because others considered them ostentatious, it now seemed 
to argue the opposite by obliging women to remove face covers because the majority finds 
them compelling. 
The Commission Vermeulen (2006), which had been established to study the legal 
and social consequences of a full ban on burqas, recognised the problem of face veils 
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triggering feelings of unease. It argued that concealing someone’s face can be interpreted 
as a lack of mutual respect and creates a power imbalance between two communication 
partners, which can feel intimidating and even offending.337 It therefore concluded that 
face veiling touches upon third persons’ right to a discrimination-free (labour) environment 
(Vermeulen, 2006: 45). But it challenged the prognosis that a full ban on burqas would 
contribute to social cohesion, arguing that such a law could be perceived as stigmatic by 
(moderate parts of) the Muslim community, which would subsequently turn their backs on 
Dutch society. Moreover, the Chair of the Commission, Hans Vermeulen, argued that 
feelings of unease, even though understandable, could never be grounds for a ban.338  
Another diagnosis that emerged on the agenda when the debate shifted to face 
veiling was that of public security. This frame argues that when people conceal their face 
in public, they cannot be identified, which leads to possible security concerns. The terrorist 
attacks in Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005), and the murder of film director 
Theo van Gogh by Mohammad Bouyeri (November 2, 2004) have contributed to the 
saliency of this frame which represented the burqa as a security problem. Geert Wilders 
used it in his motion to ban the burqa in a debate about Islamic radicalism, successfully 
drawing a link between face covers and Islamic terrorism.  
The VVD, CDA and SGP supported his motion to ban burqas in public space for 
security and public order reasons, because of the problem of recognising and identifying 
face veiled women. MP Weekers of the VVD compared the face cover to other non-
religious forms of face covers like balaclavas which seemed to broaden thescope of the 
debate debate, although the target clearly remained the Islamic face cover: “when people 
cover their face in public, whether this is with a burqa or with a balaclava, this seriously 
affects other people’s feelings of safety, and the care for a civil public order involves that 
we do not tolerate such face covers” (TK 15, 19-10-2006, 1073). While the Government 
was scrutinising possibilities for bans in specific contexts, Henk Kamp of the VVD 
launched a law proposal to ban all types of face covers in public space, and Geert Wilders 
and Sietze Fritsma of the PVV specifically proposed prohibiting the burqa.339 The VVD 
argued that face veiling forms a security threat both objectively (people are unrecognisable 
for camera surveillance) and subjectively (other people feel uncomfortable and threatened). 
The PVV added that burqas created real safety problems because terrorists could hide 
underneath them, giving several examples like that of a terrorist suspect of the bombings in 
the United Kingdom who had tried to escape in a burqa in Juli 2005.  
Parliament sent the latter’s proposal to the Council of State for legal advice which, 
unlike the French Constitutional Court, argued that the burqa did not cause such a serious 
threat to public security that it could legitimise a full ban in all domains. Doing so would 
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also contravene national and international religious freedom rights and equality 
principles.340 The legal Commission Vermeulen (2006) had also argued that there already 
existed sufficient means for local authorities to prohibit in certain circumstance dress that 
made people unrecognisable for cameras. Only in domains where safety concerns were 
particularly high, such as public transportation, were prohibitions of all types of face 
covers considered reasonable. The Minister of Transportation subsequently announced 
discussions with public transportation services to encourage them to prohibit face covers 
for users and staff. They would later declare not to see any need for such legislation.341 
Public security remained an important argument in banning all types of face veils in 
educational establishments. According to the centre-Left Government of CDA, PvdA and 
CU, the necessity to guarantee safety in schools via identification legitimised the 
prohibition on face covers for both pupils and visitors. In addition to public order in the 
sense of security, also public order arguments in a wider sense shaped policy responses 
when the face veil was framed as an affront to values of shared citizenship that had to be 
taught in public schools. Interestingly, safety and security remained a ‘right-wing’ theme, 
as it was not taken up by the Left that, however, did emphasize –together with the 
confessional parties –public order in the sense of social and national cohesion. If one 
wanted to belong to the Dutch nation, a minimal fundament of reciprocity could be 
expected from citizens. 
 
3. Gender equality and women’s emancipation frames 
Female deputies of the Green Party, often themselves from ethnic minority backgrounds, 
had problematised prohibitions of headscarves for teachers, nurses or public servants from 
a discrimination and participation frame, arguing that bans hindered the emancipation of 
migrant women and their equal opportunities and rights to participation.342 A ban would 
only augment their isolation and maintain existing traditional gender roles among migrants 
which these women challenged by embarking upon careers in Dutch society.343 Hence, 
underlying their plea for accommodation was the idea that some migrant girls and women 
wore the headscarf to combine the restrictive requirements of home with their desire to 
participate in modern Dutch society (since they ‘already found themselves between two 
cultures’ and could then function as role models for their community).344 According to the 
Green Party, the state needed to enable women’s own strategies of emancipation by 
removing obstacles to participation in the public sphere and help them ‘integrate’. In this 
light, Deputy Sing Varma (GL) submitted a motion in 1998, accepted by the majority of 
Parliament, to combat discrimination and Islamophobia in order to increase the integration 
of migrant women in Dutch society. She also successfully asked the Minister of 
Integration, Roger van Boxtel, to create internship positions for headscarf-wearing women, 
and called for positive action measures to increase minorities’ numbers in representative 
functions and advisory bodies. 
With the rise of the LPF in 2003 and the entrance of Ayaan Hirsi Ali on the 
political stage, the diagnosis of oppression became visible in the Dutch debate about 
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veiling. Even though Hirsi Ali never politicised the headscarf in Dutch Parliament where 
she agitated against issues like female genital cutting and forced marriages, she spoke out 
elsewhere against veiling, which she perceived as a symbol of women’s submission to 
Islam. Hirsi Ali favoured a ban on headscarves for pupils to lift them from fundamentalist 
patriarchal pressure, but was more ambivalent about a ban on headscarves in public 
functions.345 Recently, even Femke Halsema of the Green Party came out in favour of 
schools’ right to create clothing rules in order to lift pressure on girls to cover, saying ‘a 
girl of ten years old does not have a free choice’.346 Nonetheless, whereas the French 
debate centred on the limited autonomy of children to cover, in the Netherlands the debate 
mostly focused on adult women’s position within Muslim migrant communities. An MP of 
the Liberal Democrat party D66, Bert Bakker, was convinced that ‘as soon as they will feel 
safe enough to emancipate, many allochtonous women (i.e. non-Western migrants) will 
remove their headscarves. Those who claim to freely cover only have a small range of 
options to choose off, regarding the small margins of some cultures and religions.’347 
The diagnosis of oppression did not result in a call for a ban on pupils’ or teachers’ 
headscarves to liberate them from possible patriarchal pressure. In contrast, the policy 
report of 2003-2004 of the Balkenende II Cabinet (CDA, VVD, D66) framed a ban on 
headscarves as a form of gender discrimination, jeopardising women’s equal chances of 
participation. It stated that due to its multiple meanings (of religious conviction, identity, 
pride and emancipation), the headscarf cannot be reduced to a symbol of patriarchy. 
Although the report recognises that some women could feel pressured to cover, it insisted 
that a general ban only renders gender-inequality invisible and infringes upon the principle 
of individual choice that the Dutch state values: “In cases of force or pressure of others to 
conform to religious duties, we must be alert. The freedom of choice and right to self-
determination that women in Holland conquered holds equally applicable for them (i.e. 
Muslim women). Exactly because of that reason, a general ban on such cloths conflicts 
with this conquered freedom. It results in an inequality before the law in regard to religion 
and sex, which has consequences in many other realms, such as labourmarket participation 
and education. Also women with headscarves have the right to unlimited participation in 
Dutch society.” 348  
The Government thus presented Dutch women as having achieved gender equality, 
framing individual autonomy as a core Dutch value that conflicted with a ban on 
headscarves. Instead of a ban, in 2004 Minister of Integration Verdonk suggested to launch 
talks with immigrant communities to discuss ‘Dutch’ norms of gender equality and liberty, 
in order to prevent forced veiling, domestic violence, honour killings, arranged marriages 
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and girls’ lack of sexual self-determination.349 The Christian orthodox party SGP was the 
only party to object to the Government’s plans.350 According to SGP foreman Bas van 
Vliet Muslim, women found themselves in an oppressive Islamic community, in contrast to 
Christian women.351 Yet, he considered it undesirable that the Government presented 
liberal norms of sexuality as exemplary for migrants, arguing, “of course there exist many 
allochtonous women who find themselves in a complicated situation and don’t have a free 
choice within their community. We should help them by means of several projects, of 
which good examples exist. But we are in a grey area. We need to realise this. And act 
with prudence. After all, also the wearing of belly-showing t-shirts, to name something 
controversial, is not a free choice but the result of peer pressure and thus implicit 
community force. From a moral point of view, one could thus well argue that the 
Government should also discuss this type of clothing with autochtonous girls.”352 In other 
words, without challenging the diagnosis of oppression, the SGP objected to the prognosis 
that the state should emancipate women according to a secular gender model marked by 
liberal sexual values. It rejected the states’ control of women’s sexuality, replacing it with 
another gender ideology that emphasises female modesty and women’s motherhood roles. 
When the debate shifted to face veils, however, the idea that women needed to be 
liberated through restrictive legislation did find legitimacy. When in 2005 Geert Wilders of 
the PVV submitted a motion to ban the burqa in public space, (male) deputies of the Right 
agreed that the burqa and niqab were symbols of women’s oppression that should be 
prohibited, locating the problem in a misogynous Islamic culture. Both Conservative 
Liberal and populist right-wing deputies argued that “the burqa is a symbol of submission. 
This does not fit into our value-system” (Frans Weekers, VVD) or it is “the worst kind of 
women-unfriendly clothing” (Joost Eerdmans, former-LPF).353 Also when Wilders and 
Fritsma (PVV) launched a law proposal of 2007 to ban burqas and niqabs in public space, 
it was partly motivated by the reason that face veils were symbols of women oppression 
that hindered women’s emancipation.354   
The left-wing parties Groen Links, SP, PvdA and the Liberal Democrat Party D66 
did not agree with the idea of a general ban on burqas as a solution to fostering gender 
equality. Instead of legislation, the Left rather chose to ‘emancipate the burqa away’355 by 
stimulating women’s (labourmarket) participation. Moreover, even though the problem of 
oppression was recognised, a ban continued to be seen as conflicting with the individual 
choice and self-determination of women. This does not mean that the Left was not wary of 
gender inequality within migrant communitiers. Members of the Social Democrats had 
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already warned in 2000 against too much accommodation of ‘other value systems’ under 
the pretext of religious freedom, such as female genital mutilation, honour killings, and the 
face veil.356 Also in 2008, MP Kraneveldt-van der Veen (PvdA) argued that “members of 
the PvdA would like to live in an open and emancipated society. Burqas and niqabs don’t 
fit in such a society. But there is also such a thing as individual freedom in that same 
society, which grants the right to everyone to wear what she deems right or desires”.357 In 
2008, the leader of the Green Party, Femke Halsema, also stated that she was worried 
about orthodox streams of Islam forcing women into submissive gender roles like veiling. 
She hoped that one day “women would throw off their headscarves and be completely 
free.” Nonetheless, she also said that she would always defend women’s individual choice 
to wear a headscarf and her equal rights and opportunities to participate.358 
The Christian Union Party was the only remaining party to seriously challenge the 
diagnosis that face veils indicated a lack of emancipation. Former Minister of Family 
Affairs André Rouvoet (CU) argued in a debate on the Government’s new proposal to ban 
face covers in schools that the state could not act as a ‘theologian’ by concluding that all 
women who cover are oppressed and needed to be liberated.359 Hence, the CU challenged 
the normative parameter of gender equality and sexual liberty as a shared value. It argued 
that the state should not evaluate the content of a woman’s choice, who may also desire to 
submit herself to religiously inspired gender different roles of female modesty as an act of 
piety and a dictate of their faith (Fernando, 2010; Mahmood, 2005; Vakulenko, 2007). 
The Commission Vermeulen (2006), which had been installed to study the burqa 
ban in 2006, had likewise pointed out how a ban to liberate women from an oppression that 
they did not perceive as such could be seen as a form of paternalism that ‘did not fit liberal 
democratic principles’ and, moreover, did not help tackling gender inequality. Moreover, 
the Commission members questioned whether a full ban on face veils would contribute to 
women’s integration and emancipation, because they possibly enabled women to partake in 
social life. The Commission (2006: 20; 45-46) did, however, acknowledge that face veils 
form a hindrance for women’s social and labourmarket participation by impeding face-to-
face communication. And it rejected the advice of the ETC to search for female social 
workers or public officers when face veiled women refused to uncover in front of the 
opposite sex. It pointed at the sex-segregation that may result from policies that 
institutionalize the right to demand sex—specific treatment (‘equal but different’). Also the 
Council of State, which reviewed the 2007 law proposal of the PVV for a full ban on 
burqas and niqabs in public space360, argued that a full ban would possibly augment the 
social isolation of women rather than contribute to emancipation and integration.361   
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Minister of Interior Guusje ter Horst (PvdA) conceded with this view that it was not 
reasonable to expect that a full ban on burqas in public space improved women’s 
position.362 Nonetheless, she considered a partial ban in schools desirable, because face 
veils obstruct women’s equal opportunities to participation, one of the ‘essential values of 
Dutch society and our democratic constitutional state’ that needs to be communicated to 
pupils.363 The Minister of Education Ronald Plasterk (PvdA), also responsible for women’s 
emancipation, explained in a discussion with the Parliamentary Commission of Education 
in December 2008 that, “the burqa and niqab are pieces of trunk. They are women-
unfriendly and hinder integration. We all agree upon that.”364  
Moreover, in its letter to Parliament in February 2008, the Government explained 
that it was not discriminatory if employers requested women remove face veils, if this was 
in the interests of the firm or for public safety reasons. Women on social welfare would 
lose their benefits if they refuse to uncover for a job.365 This was largely the result of the 
Right reacting to a local affair, where a face veiled woman had won her case in court for 
being discriminated against when she was refused social welfare, after being unable to find 
work.366 The PVV asked the Government ‘why Dutch judges prioritized the Sharia over 
Dutch norms and values’. It submitted a motion to deprive niqab-wearing women of social 
welfare367, which was followed by another motion of Nicolaï and Spekman of the VVD to 
restrict benefits. The latter’s motion was accepted with a general vote on 26th June 2007.368 
In fact, one of the (three) principal reasons for the Conservative Liberal party VVD to vote 
for Wilders’ initial motion in 2005 to ban the burqa in public space was that face veils 
hinder inter-personal communication and contact in public life, and subsequently form an 
obstacle to women’s social and labourmarket participation.369  
 
8.4 Analysis and conclusion 
Cleavages 
Headscarves have so far not become a contentious issue in the Dutch political arena. Both 
Liberal and Christian (orthodox) parties framed the headscarf as a religious right which in 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
verbod op het dragen van gezichtsbedekkende kleding in het openbaar en in voor het publiek 
openstaande gebouwen (January 24, 2008). 
361
 Raad van State, Wo3.07.0219/II (September 21, 2007).  
362
 TK 31 200 VII, no. 67 (April  28, 2008): 4. 
363
 TK 31 200 VII, no. 48 (February 8, 2008): 2.  
364
 TK 31 700 VIII, no. 127 (November 26, 2008). 
365
 TK 31 200 VII, no. 48 (February 8, 2008). 
366
 The municipality of Diemen cut a woman off on social welfare when she could not be employed 
by the state’s employment agency due to her face veil (a form of ‘culpable unemployment’). The 
court declared the decision illegitimate. The judge reasoned that the state agency had discriminated 
her on grounds of religion by not sufficiently attempting to find her an alternative job, where her 
face veil did not constitute a hindrance for her work: BA6917, Court of Amsterdam, AWB 07/1635 
WWB (May 24, 2007). 
367
 TK 31 200 VII, no. 38 (29th November 2007). See also written question TK 2137 (June 14, 
2007). 
368
 TK 30545, no. 25, ‘Uitkering Wet Werk en Bijstand’ (June 20, 2007). 
369
 MP Frans Weekers (VVD) argued: “You cannot communicate with someone whose facial 
expressions you cannot see. You do not dare to ask those people anything, because you do not 
know who is hiding behind a face cover. No employer will hire a job-applicant with a burqa”: TK 
15 (October 19, 2006): 1073. 
  
178 
principle fell beyond the regulatory scope of the state, except for certain public functions. 
The pacification over religion in education may explain why it proved fruitless to call for a 
secularised public school to liberate girls from religious peer pressure. School education 
was (and is) supposed to link not with the state, but with the first socialisation milieu - the 
family. The state could therefore not deprive Muslim parents of the right to educate their 
children according to their religious beliefs and impose its secular liberal values (Lettinga 
& Saharso, 2009). The pacification of religious cleavages can explain this low contingency 
of headscarves. 
However, hijabs did become contentious when the debate shifted to face veils, 
which was largely framed in terms of social cohesion and public order, and secondary in 
terms of gender equality. Muslim women were required to ‘integrate’ more by removing 
face veils in public, as well as to emancipate by breaking with Islamic norms of female 
modesty and become sexually liberated like the Dutch. Deputies deliberated the extent to 
which the state should and could draw boundaries to the accommodation of Islam, and 
what norms bind the citizenry. The saliency of the face veil points at a culturalisation of a 
national identity that was long imagined as pluralistic and civic rather than ethnic. 
In contrast to my expectations, this gendering of the nation also turned gender into 
a rather contested issue, which in turn re-politicised a religious cleavage. Orthodox Muslim 
minorities were framed as outsiders who first have to ‘integrate’ into a contested majority 
culture marked by sexual liberalism before they are seen as full citizens like 
‘autochtonous’ Dutch. This gendering of the debate on face veils triggered the mobilisation 
of conservative Christian parties, which feared the intrustion of the secular liberal state into 
hitherto ‘private’ domains of the family and religious schools.  
In other words, historical cleavages regarding religion start to become salient again 
due to the culturalisation of Dutch nationality in gendered terms. So far, however, secular 
liberals and confessionals still seem to be hesitant to challenge the status quo in the 
educational realm, which may explain the low contentiousness of pupils’ and teachers’ 
headscarves compared to the French debate.   
 
State-church patterns 
We have seen how headscarves were largely accommodated in public schools and that 
Islamic private schools have the right to conform to its orthodoxy by requiring pupils and 
teachers to wear headscarves. Similar to what Fetzer & Soper (2005) or Monsma & Soper 
(2009) have found, secularism was seen as just one of the worldviews that citizens can 
hold. In line with Dutch state-church traditions as a principled pluralism of religious and 
other worldviews, religious minorities had an equal right to express their religious 
affiliations in public school. Muslims also had an equal associational right to establish 
private schools based on pedagogy, on grounds of their particular religious beliefs. This 
policy was formulated in line with previous educational laws like Article 23 of the Dutch 
Constitution regulating public and private education. Although this was slightly contested 
by left-wing parties who objected to the right of religious schools to discriminate on 
grounds of religion and sex, they never mobilised sufficient support to change these 
institutional patterns.  
While Dutch pillarised notions of equal accommodation was hardly contested in the 
realm of education, the bans on religious dress in certain authoritative functions like the 
police and judiciary can not be explained as a path-dependent, lock in effect of institutional 
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traditions of pillarisation. Deputies successfully argued that such state officials had to hide 
personal affiliations to maintain the neutrality of the state. Several non-governmental 
actors have also rejected the accommodation of headscarves in the judiciary in public 
media, for instance the professors of law Paul Cliteur370 and Herman Philipse,371 or the 
legal scholars and publicists Afshan Ellian372 and Sylvian Ephimenco373 (Saharso & 
Lettinga, 2009). Public opinion was also shifting.374 The principel of (financial) separation 
between state and church, that has occurred with the constitutional reform of 1983 (van 
Bijsterveld, 2005), clearly obstructed frames that called for special, state-funded 
headscarves for police officers. Only the Green Party still pleaded in favour of an 
interpretation of neutrality as even-handed accommodation of all religious symbols, 
together with the Dutch Equal Treatment Committee and few legal scholars.375 State-
church relations thus varied from one domain to another, with non-institutionalised 
principles of a strict separation, rather than even-handed accommodation, shaping the 
headscarf debate in public domains like the police and courts.  
Moreover, the context-specific bans on the face veil in the educational realm depart 
from previous policy regarding religion in the educational realm in two fundamental ways. 
First, while the 2003 clothing directive left it up to schools to decide upon face veils, the 
Government now intends to oblige both public and private religious schools to prohibit 
face veils. This restricts the educational freedom that private Christian orthodox schools 
have historically enjoyed in deciding pedagogic and didactic policies for themselves. 
Second, the law will also forbid parents and other visitors of schools to wear face veils. By 
contrast, the ETC argued that schools cannot require parents to remove face veils. It even 
advised schools to find other solutions to communicate with mothers of children who 
refuse to remove face covers in front of the opposite sex, for instance by asking a female 
member of its staff to talk to them.376 There was hardly any mobilisation against the 
pending law, perhaps because it does not challenge the vested interests of Christian 
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churches and organisations. In contrast to Islamic school organisations, their associational 
freedom to organise schools on ground of their denominational beliefs is not at stake.  
Muslim religious organisations were, moreover, divided about face veils. The 
Union of Moroccan Mosque Organisations (UMMO)377 and the Turkish Milli Görüs, for 
instance, defended the religious freedom rights of pupils and teachers to wear headscarves, 
but supported the Government’s plan to prohibit face covers in public schools. Both 
Islamic organisations were invited to policy debates by the Commission Blok, together 
with other Muslim associations.378 In short, in line with my expectations, Dutch state-
church patterns provided several opportunities to claim recognition for religious practices 
as the headscarf and for religious actors to be involved in policy debates. Yet, some new 
boundaries to religious freedom could be drawn that were not the result of lock-in effects 
of previous policy decisions, rather of new meaning given to institutional patterns. 
 
Citizenship and migrant integration policies 
Changing Dutch citizenship and integration policy legacies can explain why deputies 
initially managed to frame a ban on teachers’ and civil servants’ headscarves as 
discriminatory and hindering integration, but later found support for a ban on burqas to 
foster shared citizenship. When the first debates about teachers’ headscarves flared up in 
the late 1990s, the Netherlands had been recognised as a defacto multicultural society. The 
Green party managed to frame a ban on headscarves as an obstacle for migrant women’s 
participation in Dutch society, from where emancipation was deemed to follow. This 
emphasis on integration as a two-way direction fit the policy paradigm of the then Purple 
governments.  
The Dutch Equal Treatment Law functioned as an important institutional venue for 
headscarf-wearing women who faced discrimination in the labourmarket. The ETC clearly 
advocated a multicultural stance by encouraging employees and the state to create space 
for diversity, framing even neutrally formulated laws as disproportionally hindering the 
equal opportunities of practicing Muslim minorities. In later verdicts the ETC also ruled 
that headscarf bans indirectly discriminate on grounds of sex, hence treating it as an 
intersectional equality claim.379 Dutch anti-discrimination movements and trade-unions 
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also functioned as institutionalised allies for headscarf-wearing girls and women, helping 
them bring their case forward to the ETC and criticising, in vain, the right of Christian 
schools to discriminate against Muslims on grounds of religion. In contrast to French 
organisations, they univocally supported the accommodation of headscarves in public 
schools.380 Education ministers agreed that the religious and cultural pluralism of Dutch 
society should be reflected in the educational realm. The French idea that a ban on 
‘symbols of difference’ would contribute to social cohesion and inter-ethnic peace did not 
even appear. 
Nonetheless, we have seen how deputies increasingly contested the jurisprudence 
of the ETC, which resulted in boundaries to multicultural accommodation. Although there 
were no institutional constraints, the Government did not accommodate police officers’ 
and court clerks’ headscarves, but was in favour of a difference-blind concept of equality 
requiring all citizens to privatise their faith in such public functions. In contrast to the ETC, 
it did not discuss the indirect discriminatory effects of such strict neutrality duty for 
practicing Muslim women to embark upon careers in high state functions. It clearly 
rejected a visibly pluralist police force, which had to stand above, rather than reflect, the 
diversity of Dutch society in order to sustain social peace. Later, the Government even 
endorsed the right of employers to discriminate against face veiled women, and initiated a 
law to prohibit face veils in public and private schools for conflicting with ‘shared’ and 
later ‘active’ Dutch citizenship. A visibly pluralist society was clearly no longer a policy 
aim. In line with the shift observed in Dutch citizenship and integration policies towards 
assimilationism, conforming to certain Dutch values and norms and actively participating 
in the labour market became a precondition for full citizenship.  
There was surprisingly little extra-parliamentary mobilisation against the increasing 
restrictive demands placed upon Muslim minorities in the Netherlands. Higher-educated 
headscarf-wearing women organised meetings and actions drawing attention to the 
obstacles they faced in the labourmarket.381 Despite the existence of ethnic minority 
councils, neither hijab-wearing women’s new organisations nor established migrant 
minority associations were invited to policy debates. Lacking institutional venues, young 
Muslim women sought allies outside the political arena, such among as anti-discrimination 
offices and trade-unions to problematise the discrimination they faced.382 As we have seen 
however, trade-unions appeared ambivalent allies. Police officer unions successfully 
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lobbied authorities to create regulations for a strict neutral appearance for police personnel 
that excluded headscarves.  
In short, multicultural policies had initially coincided with state-church patterns of 
evenhanded accommodation of different worldviews in the educational realm, with the 
result that headscarves were easily accommodated in this domain. When a shift occurred in 
immigrant integration patterns to a liberal-egalitarian and later assimilationist citizenship 
(Scholten, 2008), opportunities emerged for actors to push for restrictions on religious 
dress. This also changed patterns and logics of state-church relations.   
 
Gender machinery and women’s emancipation policies 
In line with Dutch women’s emancipation policies that have long institutionalised 
women’s gender different roles as mothers and caretakers, choosing for gender different 
ways of managing the body was initially not considered problematic, as long as it was 
women’s choice. In contrast, the Government’s policy report of 2004 framed prohibitions 
of headscarves as gender discrimination by hindering women’s equal access in the 
labourmarket, viewing women’s self-determination as a core Dutch value that obstructed 
any bans. Femocrats within the Green Party managed to draw attention to the obstacles that 
hijab-wearing women faced in their emancipation struggles, when they framed prohibitions 
of headscarves as a hindrance to migrant women’s labourmarket participation and 
independence. 
In line with the shift observed in Dutch emancipation policy paradigms, which 
increasingly focus on Muslim culture as the principal obstacle to migrant women’s 
emancipation, face veils were framed as symbols of Islamic oppression which was 
juxtaposed with an ostensibly gender-egalitarian Dutch culture. This fits the Government’s 
tendency to differentiate between an unemancipated ‘migrant minority’ and nearly 
emancipated native Dutch ‘majority’ women (Roggeband & Verloo, 2007). Even though 
the Government continued to emphasize labour market participation as a goal – instead of 
a means to gaining autonomy and structural gender equality - it simultaneously created 
obstacles to women’s participation by initiating context-specific bans to ‘emancipate’ 
migrant women. A paradox subsequently occurred that face veiled women were seen as 
oppressed by their religious culture yet increasingly made self-responsible for their 
emancipation.  
In contrast to France, this gendering of the debate was not a result of a greater 
involvement of women’s movements in policy debates. In line with the decay of the Dutch 
gender-equality machinery, women’s organisations have had no access to policy debates. 
Neither feminist critics of the hijab nor opponents of restrictions were invited to any policy 
debate. Furthermore, only scant feminist opposition to the headscarf existed. The platform 
for black, migrant and refugee women Tiye International, as well as the Dutch Women’s 
Council (NVR) never addressed the issue of headscarves, which they generally perceive to 
be a woman’s choice.383 Editors of the feminist monthly Opzij, in contrast, agitated against 
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the headscarf as a sign of female oppression.384,385 They compared women’s choice to veil 
with a slave’s voluntarily submission to serfdom, drawing attention to unequal gender 
power-relations within Islamic culture.386 Chief Editor Ciska Dresselhuys declared on 
International Women’s Day in March 2001 that she would never hire editors who wore 
headscarves because it would tap into female oppressive religious doctrines. Nonetheless, 
Dresselhuys objected to the French law of 2003 because it would further isolate Muslim 
girls who are in need of civic education.387 Even with regard to the face veil, the gendered 
nature of which was more disputed among feminists388, Dutch feminists never mobilised 
for a restrictive legislation. 
When Hirsi Ali entered Dutch Parliament, Opzij feminists gained procedural (not 
substantive) access to gender policy debates. Ayaan communicated their critique that 
pillarised traditions of religious accommodation were detrimental for women’s rights by 
giving leeway to Islamic fundamentalists.389 As we have seen, however, Ayaan never 
politicised headscarves in Parliament. Instead, male deputies of populist and liberal right-
wing parties gendered the debate on face veils, juxtaposing the oppression of Muslim 
women with an ostensibly Dutch egalitarian culture, which legitimised restrictive measures 
that do not in themselves tackle cultural, economic and institutional gender inequality.  
Remarkably absent from the political debates were the targets of state policies - the 
Muslim migrant women who had to be emancipated. Not a single migrant women’s 
association was consulted in policy debates. In line with dominant governing strategies of 
gender, migrant women were thus approached as agents of change and as educators of their 
communities but not as equal discussion partners (Roggeband & Verloo, 2007). As we 
have seen in France, this seems to contribute to an increasing organisation and mobilisation 
                                                           
384
 Opzij was established by second wave feminists, and predominantly focuses on issues like equal 
pay/equal share, discrimination at the labour market, child-care arrangements, and domestic 
violence. Only since the late 1990s has it started paying attention to minority women, 
predominantly as victims of patriarchal communities. In 2008, a new chief editor Magriet van der 
Linden replaced former chief editor Ciska Dresselhuys. She is more receptive for Muslim women’s 
own strategies of emancipation and even hired an editor wearing a headscarf as a columnist. 
385
 Opzij editor Jolande Withuis advocated a ban on headscarves in pharmacies or for public school 
teachers already in 1996 for as symbols of women’s (sexual) submission to men. Withuis, J., ‘De 
huisarts en de assistente’, column Opzij (May 1, 1996); Withuis, J. ‘Onverdeeld naar de Openbare 
School’ (November 1, 1998). She has fiercely criticized the jurisprudence of the Equal Treatment 
Committee, arguing that it was illustrative of a “sneaky racism” that allowed “a Holland full of 
headscarves, veils and yet even chadors, where homosexual teaches have to hide their way of life 
and their loves and where doctors waste time and knowledge healing hymens.”: Withuis, J., 
‘Liberaal?’, Opzij (February 1, 2003). Withuis, J., ‘Handjeklap met seksisme’, Opzij (January 1, 
2007). 
386
 Pauline Sinnema, ‘Het nieuwe Kuisheidsuniform’ (‘The new Dutch chastity uniform’) (May 1, 
2001). See also Withuis, J., ‘Lijden, strijden, heilig worden’, Letter & Geest, Trouw (May 26, 
2007).   
387
 Dresselhuys, C. ‘Van die dingen dus’, Opzij (April 1, 2001). 
388
 See for instance: Kraus, S. (2003), ‘Verbod niqaab laat vraag onbeantwoord’, Volkskrant 
(March 24). 
389
 Both Ayaan Hirsi Ali and the Dutch-Egyptian Nahed Selim received Opzij’s award ‘Harriet 
Freezerring’ in 2004 and 2005, which is attributed to women who have contributed much to 
women’s emancipation. Selim, N. , ‘Ik eis rechten van Moslimvrouwen op!’, Trouw (February 26, 
2005). Selim, N., ‘Maar de Sharia wordt intussen volop toegepast’ NRC Handelsblad (July 8, 
2009). 
  
184 
of veiled women who objected to (pending) proposals to ban hijabs, calling for more space 
to determine their own feminist project within an Islamic framework, with their own 
strategies of emancipation.390  
Their claim for self-determination and individual choice to wear Islamic head and 
body covering nonetheless resonated among second wave feminists, both within and 
outside the state. Some feminist scholars391 and left-wing femocrats publicly responded by 
defending hijab-wearing women’s own choice and space for emancipation within religious 
frameworks.392 State-Secretary responsible for emancipation, Jet Bussemaker (PvdA), 
answered for instance in a reply to members of the PVV in 2008 that the burqini (a bathing 
suit that covers the legs, arms and hair of women) is not necessarily female oppressive and 
can even enable women to partake in public life and to gain independence.393 We have also 
seen how feminist expertise within legal bodies as the Commission Vermeulen pointed at 
the negative effects of bans for the emancipation of women. With the decay of the Dutch 
gender machinery, such femocrats have nonetheless had only a limited influence on actual 
policy decisions, forced to forge compromises with Ministers holding more weighty 
portfolios.  
   
General political opportunity structures  
Institutional structures can explain why, despite the increasing radicalisation of policy 
debates, headscarf policies have largely remained accommodationist. The necessity to form 
coalition governments and the constant shift in governments since the turn of the century 
decreased their capacity to act. We have seen how the need to forge consensus between 
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coalition partners led to slow and incremental processes of policymaking regarding the 
face veil (Duyvendak & Koopmans, 1992). Moreover, the Council of State and other legal 
expertise bodies such as the ETC and the Commission Vermeulen renounced policy 
proposals that directly discriminated against Muslims. Depending on the Government’s 
will to follow the jurisprudence of the ETC and the Council of State, these bodies have 
functioned as institutional obstacles to pass legislation that conflicted with constitutional 
and international human rights principles. Nonetheless, we observed an increasing 
discrepancy between the accommodative jurisprudence of the Equal Treatment and the will 
of the legislature to prohibit headscarves in certain public institutions and the Islamic face 
veil all together. 
 
Power constellations  
The shift in framing and policy responses can largely be explained by the entrance of far-
Right parties that problematised face covers as symbol of a radical Islam in conflict with 
Dutch values of gender equality and gay rights. Established parties responded to this 
challenge of the populist Right. The ruling parties VVD and the CDA adopted some 
elements of its discourse, framing face veils as problems for social cohesion and public 
security, and hindering to migrant women’s participation in Dutch society. Also Social 
Democrats, Socialists and smaller Christian parties discussed the face veil as problematic 
for social cohesion and integration. The populist Right successfully blamed Social 
Democrats for having supported multicultural policies that had contributed to a 
radicalisation and disintegration of Islamic migrant communities, even though this party 
actually participated in the Purple cabinet that abandoned the multicultural policy 
paradigm in the 1990s. Nonetheless, the PvdA did respond to the challenge of the Right by 
adopting some elements of the Right’s discourse that ‘we’ as a nation no longer tolerate 
excessive cultural differences of ‘them’, and came out in favour of a law that would ban 
face veils in certain domains. The PvdA leader and Vice President of the Cabinet, Wouter 
Bos, explained why in an interview in 2008: “I find it important that the Cabinet clearly 
speaks out: the burqa is undesirable and will be forbidden for reasons of public order. Of 
course I know that there are in the Netherlands only 150 cases, but what matters is to lay 
down the norm”394 (Lettinga & Saharso, 2009).  
Alliance structures also shifted during the policy process. In contrast to what was 
expected from Christian parties, the CDA and the SGP favoured legislation prohibiting 
religious symbols for police officers, as well as legislation obliging private religious 
schools to prohibit the wearing of face veils for reasons of public safety and social 
cohesion. They joined the secular Liberals and Liberal Democrats in a plea for a strict 
secularism. In contrast to what was expected from pro-immigrant left-wing parties, the 
Social Democrats and the Socialist Party came out in favour of a ban on face veils, albeit 
only in certain domains. In addition to social cohesion, the Left considered such a ban 
legitimate in order to foster Muslim women’s participation and emancipation. They joined 
the conservative Liberals and CDA in an emphasis on a shared national identity that 
required more cultural integration of Muslim immigrants. Finally, parties not known for 
feminist agendas were now using gender equality arguments to reassert a national identity 
that was gendered in monoculturalist terms, such as the populist Right. Only the Green 
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Party responded to the instrumentalisation of the LPF of women’s and gays’ rights for their 
own anti-immigrant aims.395 Also the conservative Liberal party VVD became a 
protagonist of gender equality concerns and an ally for egalitarian feminists like 
Dresselhuys, even though its neoliberal market agenda helped dismantle the gender 
machinery of the 1990s, affecting negatively the resources of women’s for their claims of 
gender justice.  
 
To conclude, Dutch cleavages and institutionalised policy pasts regarding religious, gender 
and ethnic differences have clearly shaped policy-formation processes for the hijab. Dutch 
state-church and antidiscrimination frameworks provided opportunities to frame the 
accommodation of headscarves in terms of equal rights, religious freedom, and social 
recognition. Changes in Dutch immigrant integration policies created new opportunities for 
actors to push for frames that focused on the burqa as a sign of ethnic and religious 
otherness. New right-wing political parties seized opportunities provided by new 
immigrant integration policies to frame the recognition of Islam as a threat to the gender 
egalitarian nation, and the hijab as a sign of failing integration. Opportunities were also 
created by international and national events like Islamic radicalism in the polder. This 
framing (re)politicised cleavages that were deemed pacified. Due to the intersection of 
cleavages new alliance structures emerged that provided opportunities for opponents of 
multiculturalism. Nonetheless, despite the radicalisation of the debate, only minor changes 
occurred in Dutch headscarf policies, which have so far remained largely 
accommodationist. Legal constraints, backed by the court and by some parties in coalition 
governments, halted the passing of laws that directly discriminate and exclude certain 
categories of citizens. Institutional patterns, particularly of state-church relations in the 
educational domain, thus appeared harder to change than discourse. 
  
                                                           
395
 TK 59 (March 17, 2004): 3887. Naima Azough (GL) draws here a parallel between the LPF and 
lord Cromer, a British consul in Egypt in the early 20th century who objected to women’s suffrage 
at home while advocating the unveiling of Muslim women to increase their freedom and equal 
rights. She argued that the use of gender in a clash of civilisation discourse would only be 
counterproductive, in politicising group identities and jeopardising women’s chances to criticise 
patriarchal pressure in communities. 
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Chapter 9. Germany: debates and policies on the hijab (1997-2007) 
 
9.1 Introduction  
This chapter analyses the political debate on the hijab in four federal states (‘Länder’) - 
Schleswig-Holstein, Rhineland-Palatinate, Baden-Württemberg and Berlin – selected 
because of the different outcomes of their policy debates. While the former two states are 
paradigmatic examples of continued tolerance of teachers’ headscarves, the latter two 
exemplify states that have introduced legislation that either forbids the display of all 
religious and political symbolism by public school teachers and civil servants (Berlin) or 
that prohibits only symbols in conflict with ‘Christian-occidental’ values and traditions, 
meaning the teacher’s headscarf (Baden-Württemberg) (see table 7). This begs the question 
of how we can account for such regional differences in German headscarf policies. In this 
chapter, it will become particularly clear that even though national institutions and policy 
legacies have shaped parliamentary and legal debates on the hijab, political actors can 
interpret these differently, and even circumvent institutional constraints through the ways 
they frame issues. Through the political process, including the framing contest between 
different state-actors, institutional patterns were affirmed, renegotiated and changed. 
Regional differences in the constellation of power in parliament, as well as in policy 
legacies of immigrant integration, state-church relations, and gender equality, can explain 
the different ways in which the hijab issue was deliberated in federal states’ parliaments. 
This resulted in contradictory outcomes within one national policy, a fact that challenges 
the heuristic validity of ‘national models’ of state-church and citizenship.    
This chapter starts with an analysis of the timeline, the saliency and the actors 
involved in the politicisation of the hijab, elaborating upon the policy responses that have 
resulted from the frame competition between actors in the four states of Baden-
Württemberg, Berlin, Schleswig-Holstein and Rhineland-Palatinate. A particularity of 
Germany is that legislators strongly referred to the rulings of the Federal Administrative 
Court (FAC) and Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) when deliberating the issue. For, 
even though Länder have a substantial autonomy in certain policy fields, such as 
education, their policies must still conform to national constitutional law. In this light, I 
will first elaborate upon the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court on the famous 
‘Ludin’ case, before discussing the framing of the parliamentary debates on the hijab in the 
four Länder. In the Ludin case, the Court ruled that the federal legislatures have the 
authority to prohibit religious signs for public school teachers, but that they must introduce 
adequate, non-discriminatory legislation. Paradoxically, this verdict contributed to the 
further politicisation of the issue and resulted in several restrictive laws, mostly in former-
West-German states. After I have elaborated upon the framing contest in the judiciary and 
the parliament, I will conclude this chapter by addressing the extent to which historical 
cleavages, policy legacies of state-church relations, immigrant incorporation and gender 
equality, and party constellations can explain the politicisation of the hijab in Germany. 
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9.2 Debates and policy responses 
9.2.1 Time line and saliency  
Figure 6 illustrates the amount of parliamentary debates (both plenary and within 
designated parliamentary commissions), motions, law proposals and written and oral 
questions found concerning the hijab in the four federal states between 1997 and 2007.396 
The figure shows that the hijab only became a salient topic after the ruling of the Federal 
Constitutional Court in 2003. A quick scan through the databases of the other federal 
parliaments also reveals that hijabs were not yet much politicised before 2003. One conflict 
over teachers’ headscarves emerged in the federal state of Lower Saxony in 2000 and one 
in Baden-Württemberg in 1997/8, upon which I will elaborate below.  
The German debate has primarily focused on a teachers’ right to wear a headscarf. 
In Berlin and Hesse the debate has also extended to other public service functions, 
resulting in restrictive bans. Pupils’ headscarves have never been contentious. When, in 
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 In Germany, deputies can put issues on the agenda by submitting a motion (‘Antrag’) (if it is 
supported by at least five members of their faction) or by writing questions to the government, 
either individually or as a faction (respectively ‘kleine’ or ‘grosse Anfrage’). Deputies can also 
raise questions during a weekly question hour. Motions can be rejected, adopted, answered, or sent 
to one of the parliamentary commissions for further scrutiny, whereas questions can be put on the 
agenda for a plenary debate (‘Plenarprotokol’) before they are sent to a parliamentary commission. 
Finally, deputies may submit law proposals, which are plenary discussed in two rounds before they 
are adopted or rejected. Law proposals can also be introduced by the government or per 
referendum. 
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1998, the right-wing party Die Republikaner in Baden-Württembergsubmitted a motion to 
ban headscarves for both teachers and pupils, the Government argued such a ban to be 
disproportional, as pupils have the right to express their religion in public schools.397 This 
right has not been challenged in Germany, and in cases when school directors expelled 
pupils with headscarves, authorities corrected them.398 
So far, the hijab has hardly been politicised in Eastern German states. This low 
saliency in Eastern Germany can partly be explained by the different state-church legacies 
and immigration histories of the BRD and GDR, with the former recruiting migrant 
workers from Islamic countries such as Turkey, and the latter recruiting immigrants from 
non-Muslim, Communist-allied countries. Only in Berlin are there a significant number of 
Muslim immigrants. Here, and in Brandenburg, politicians did launch policy proposals to 
ban religious dress for public servants. Nonetheless, the visibility of headscarf-wearing 
teachers is in itself no sufficient explanation for the political contentiousness of the issue. 
The Central Council for Muslims (‘Zentralrat der Muslime’) in Germany estimated that 
before 2003, 40 teachers had worn a headscarf, primarily in the federal state of North 
Rhine-Westphalia. No conflict with any parents and pupils had emerged. In other words, 
the hijab controversy in Germany did not start as a response to local conflicts but was 
politically manufactured, particularly after the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that 
legislatures were allowed to create regulations to prevent potential conflicts in the future. 
Recently politicians have politicised the Islamic face cover. Some deputies in the 
Federal Parliament asked for a full ban on the Islamic face cover in public, referring to the 
legislation in the Netherlands, Belgium and France. Lale Akgün of the SPD fraction, for 
instance, argued in January 2010 in the daily ‘Frankfurter Rundschau’ that face covers 
should be forbidden in schools, universities and public places like banks and airports, 
stating that “the burqa is a full body prison, which deeply contravenes human rights. It 
would be an important sign to ban the burqa in Germany”. Her party, however, objected to 
legislation, with the SPD expert on interior affairs Dieter Wiefelspütz arguing that soft 
measures would be a better way to develop an ‘Enlightenment Islam’.399 The Greens also 
objected, labelling such laws as symbolic politics that do not target real problems. The 
FDP and CDU argued that a ban on headscarves was already sufficient grounds to expel 
pupils with face veils. In some federal states, politicians have already stated that this type 
of religious dress can be forbidden in public schools for reasons of public safety, 
communication and interests of pedagogy.400 So far, no legislation has been proposed.  
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 BW 12/2931 (June 9, 1998). Followed by a parliamentary debate: BW 12/51 (July 15, 1998). 
State Secretary Rudolf Köberle in a reply to die Republikaner: BW 12/36, 1997 (December 10, 
1997): 2710 
398
 Some school directors in North Rhine-Westphalia have used the new school-law that was 
introduced in 2004 to expel pupils with headscarves, e.g. in Düsseldorf, Salzgitter and in 
Dortmund. The Ministry of Education of Lower Saxony publically declared in 2008 that the 
neutrality clause in the new school-law did not cover pupils but only school teachers. Also in the 
federal states of Saarland and Baden-Würtemberg, cases are known where directors sent pupils 
away because of their headscarf. See: Bernd Dicks, “Wie Rektoren das Kopftuchverbot ausweiten 
wollen’, der Spiegel Online  (October 16, 2008).  
399
 'Akgün fordert Burka-Verbot', online at Süddeutsche.de (January 28, 2010).  
400
 One case occurred in 2006, when two pupils at a public secondary school in Bonn, North Rhine-
Westphalia, started wearing face veils against the wishes of their parents. They were dismissed for 
two weeks, after which an agreement was reached between the school and the two girls’ laywer, 
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The analysis of German hijab debates will therefore primarily focus on teachers’ 
headscarves. In total, there were twenty-two documents for Baden-Württemberg (seven 
motions, five law proposals, seven plenary debates and two in commissions). Twenty 
documents were found for Berlin (seven questions, four motions, one law proposal, five 
plenary parliamentary debates and four debates within parliamentary commissions). The 
issue received scant attention in Rhineland-Palatinate (ten in total: four questions, one 
motion, two plenary and two parliamentary commission debates) and even less in 
Schleswig-Holstein (four in total: one motion, two plenary and one parliamentary 
commission debate). 
9.2.2 Actors 
Figure 7 makes clear that the CDU has been a particularly important player in putting the 
teacher headscarf on the agenda. Before 2003, the right-wing party Die Republikaner 
initiated the debate in Baden-Württemberg, calling for a prohibition on teachers’ 
headscarves. But after the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in 2003, Die 
Republikaner was no longer represented in the parliaments of the Länder. The CDU took 
over the initiative, launching 7 of the 11 law proposals in Germany’s 16 federal 
parliaments to change school laws, either as government party (e.g. with the SPD in 
Saarland) or as parliamentary faction. These all specifically addressed Muslim women’s 
headscarves by making Judeo-Christian religious and cultural expressions exempt. One 
law proposal aimed at prohibiting only the headscarf was submitted by the right-wing party 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
that they would no longer cover their faces in school. One girl left the school: 'Streit über verhüllte 
Schülerinnen beigelegt', Frankfurter Allgemeine (May  10, 2006). 
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German People’s Union DVU.401 It was rejected by the CDU, SDP and PDS/die Linke. 
The populist right-wing party Law and Order Offensive Party in Hamburg (PRO), which 
ruled at that time with the CDU and FDP in a coalition government, submitted a neutrally 
formulated law proposal in 2004.402 But the coalition partners did not agree upon the need 
for regulations, neither did the SPD and PDS fractions in parliament support this law 
proposal. The then-spokesperson of the Government, Alexander Luckow, declared in 2003 
that the headscarf constituted no problem ‘for a global and growing city as Hamburg’, 
especially because there had not been any complaints of pupils, parents or teachers.403  
Left-wing parties have also played a role in the politicisation of the issue in 
Germany. On the one hand, deputies of the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen or PDS/Die Linke 
raised few questions before 2003 about the discrimination that headscarf-wearing women 
faced when participating in the labour market. Moreover, the Greens in Baden-
Württemberg in vain submitted law proposals to allow headscarves for public school 
teachers or kindergarten governesses. On the other hand, the Left submitted several 
motions or law proposals aimed at banning headscarves for teachers. As a government 
party, the SPD introduced a neutrally-formulated ban in the city states Bremen (with the 
CDU) and Berlin (with PDS/Die Linke).   
 
9.2.3 Policy responses of Länder governments  
The first political debate about the hijab in Germany occurred in the South-Western Land 
of Baden-Württemberg in 1997. Compared to the national average of 19.2%, Baden-
Württemberg has high numbers of inhabitants with immigrant backgrounds - in 2008, 
25.5% of its 10 million inhabitants came from a migration background, 11 % being foreign 
nationals.404 Baden-Württemberg is religiously divided in two Christian denominations: 35 
% belong to one of the two Protestant churches and 39 % are Roman-Catholic. 
Approximately 5.7 % are Muslim and 0.2 % Jewish.405  
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 Brandenburg 3/6487 ‘Gesetzentwurf zur Änderung des Beamtengesetzes für das Land 
Brandenburg’ (October 15, 2003), followed by a parliamentary debate: Brandenburg 3/84 
(November 5, 2003). 
402
 Hamburg 17/4150 ‘Gesetz zur Änderung des Hamburgischen Schulgesetz’ (January 28, 2004), 
followed by a parliamentary debate: Hb 17/55 (February 12, 2004).  
403
 ‘Kopftuchurteil spaltet die Hamburger Regierung’, Die Welt (September 25, 2003). In addition 
to the multicultural standing of the city government, parties may also have been motivated to reject 
the proposal to isolate the right wing populist party PRO (Henkes & Kneip, 2009). PRO had 
entered a coalition government with the CDU and the FDP, after it had won 19.4 % of the vote in 
the 2001 elections. This cabinet fell prematurely in 2004 after a political controversy, when party 
leader Ronald Schill was expelled from the party and removed from office as Senator of Interior. In 
the 2005 elections it participated under a new name, Offensive D, but this party could not enter 
Parliament with 0.4 % of votes. 
404
 All percentage of immigrants are retrieved from the Länder’s statistical offices that are based on 
the 2006 census of the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (‘(Microzensus 2006, Statistisches 
Bundesamt Deutschland’). ‘Immigrants’ include both people who are born abroad and have 
migrated to Germany and people who are born in Germany but whose parents have a migration 
background, irregardless of nationality. 
405Http://www.baden-
wuerttemberg.de/de/Kirchen_und_Konfessionen/85753.html;Http://www.baden-
wuerttemberg.de/fm7/1899/Muslime_in_BW.pdf  (Both retrieved January 13, 2011). 
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The case that triggered policy debates concerned Fereshta Ludin, a woman of 
Afghani descent, daughter of a diplomat, who had spent most of her life in Saudi Arabia 
and Germany and had received German citizenship in 1995. She was a teacher-trainee at a 
middle school (‘Hauptschule’) where she had long worn a headscarf without any complaint 
from parents. When she finished her traineeship and applied for a placement as a teacher in 
a public elementary school in Stuttgart in July 1998, she was rejected by the Upper School 
Authority of the city district. The Authority argued that Ludin lacked the personal 
qualifications (‘Eignung’) for the status of civil servant, even though she had successfully 
finished her education to teach German, English and social studies. It supported its 
decision with the reasoning that the headscarf not only conflicted with the principle of state 
neutrality, but was also a political symbol of ‘cultural limitation’. Young schoolchildren 
were easily influenced and could thus be negatively impacted. Moreover, because it could 
provoke strong reactions of rejection, the headscarf also had to be considered a danger to 
the pedagogical climate of the school (Altinordu, 2004). All parties in parliament agreed 
with the decision of Minister of Education of Baden-Würrtember Anette Schavan that 
Ludin’s dismissal had been legitimate. With financial support from the Islamic 
organisation Milli Görüs, Ludin embarked upon a legal battle against the federal state to 
win her right to teach in public schools while wearing a headscarf.406 After three years of 
legal battles in different courts, her case was eventually heard by Federal Constitutional 
Court in 2003, which ruled her dismissal for the function of public school teacher as 
unconstitutional, and yet simultaneously allowed federal states to introduce legislation to 
prohibit religious expressions (see below). 
 After 2003, the legislatures in half of (Western) Germany’s states enacted laws 
banning public school teachers from wearing religious symbols and clothing in school 
(Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, Bremen, Bavaria, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, 
Hesse and Saarland). Even though the laws do not explicitly mention the Muslim 
headscarf, the debates illustrate that laws were clearly intended to target this religious dress 
only. In two states, the ban was extended to other public servants who exercised 
governmental functions in the field of justice, police and law-enforcement (Berlin and 
Hesse). Because judges are not civil servants (‘Beamte’) in a strict sense of the definition, 
the laws of Berlin and Hesse do officially not apply to judges. But so far, not a single judge 
has operated wearing a headscarf (Berghahn, 2008). In Baden-Württemberg and Berlin, 
legislation exists for kindergarten personnel also, who are not civil servants but do have a 
pedagogic function.  
All states’ laws exclude teachers of Islamic religious courses in public schools. All, 
except Bremen, also allow for exemptions for teacher-trainees wearing headscarves, 
because prohibitions would infringe too disproportionally upon citizens’ freedom to choose 
their profession. Because the state has the educational monopoly over training teachers, it 
cannot prohibit trainees to wear headscarves. Then they would be unable to finish their 
education, hence to work as a teachers in private Islamic schools (of which only few exist 
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 The whole legal procedure was partly paid by the Islamic religious organisation Milli Görus 
which is under criminal investigation of the Ministry of Justice and which contributed to public 
speculation that Ludin was working for fundamentalist groups to undo the German democratic 
system. 
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in Germany), or else in public schools in states that still allow the display of religious 
symbolism.407  
Following Rostock & Berghahn (2009), I differentiate between three types of 
policy regimes that now exist in Germany: the laic model, the Christian-occidental model 
and the case-to-case model. Fogel (2007) makes a similar distinction between so-called 
‘category A laws’ (the Christian-Occidental model) and ‘category B Laws’ (the laicist 
model), but further differentiates Bremen (that forbid symbols that have an effect on the 
pupils’ feelings) from Berlin (forbidding all ‘visible’ religious symbols). Table 7 lists the 
policy responses for all German states.  
  
Table 7 German policy responses to the hijab  
(Based on Rostock & Berghahn (2009); Henkes & Kneip (2009)) 
Neutrally 
formulated 
ban  
government 
Specific ban: 
exemption for 
Christian-
occidental 
cultural values 
and traditions 
government 
Specific ban 
rejected: 
context 
specific 
approach 
government 
No law 
proposal 
introduced: 
context 
specific 
approach 
Bremen 
(2005)  CDU-SPD 
Baden-
Württemberg*,*
*, *** 
(2004) 
CDU-FDP 
Rhineland 
Palatinate 
(2005) 
SPD-FDP Saxony 
Lower-
Saxony 
(2004) 
CDU-FDP Bavaria (2004) CSU 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
(2004) 
SPD-
Greens 
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 
Berlin*,** 
*** 
(2005) 
SPD-die 
Linke 
Hesse*,** 
(2004) CDU 
Hamburg 
(2004) 
CDU-FDP-
PRO Thuringia 
  
North Rhine- 
Westphalia 
(2006) 
CDU-FDP Brandenburg (2003) SPD-CDU 
Saxony-
Anhalt 
  
Saarland 
(2004) CDU    
* The neutrality law of Hessen concerns both teachers and regular civil servants. The neutrality law 
of Berlin concerns teachers and civil servants, as well as other public functions in the judiciary and 
the police. 
** These laws make an exemption for teacher-trainees (except the law of Bremen); teacher-trainees 
may, ‘in principle’, express personal religious affiliations. 
*** The law of Baden-Württemberg also forbids the wearing of hijabs for personnel working in 
kindergartens. The law of Berlin allows this ‘in principle’, until parents complain. Then the rights 
of parents take precedence over the rights of the kindergarten governesses. 
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 See the ruling of the Federal Administrative Court in 2008: BVerwG 2 C 22.07 (June 26, 2008). 
The federal judges argued in this case that teacher-trainees could not be forbidden to wear 
headscarves under the new school laws of Bremen.  
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Baden-Württemberg was the first state to enact Christian-occidental legislation on 1st April 
2004. After a motion of the SPD in October 2003 to respond to the Federal Constitutional 
Court’s verdict408, the FDP-CDU Government introduced its law project in April 2004409, 
supported by the FDP, SPD and the CDU.410 Only the Greens rejected it and launched, in 
vain, an alternative proposal that tolerated religious expressions for teachers until a real 
conflict occurred.411 Two years later, on 2nd February 2006, a parliamentary majority 
consisting of the CDU and FDP voted in favour of a new government law proposal to ban 
also headscarves for personnel in kindergartens and for social workers specialising in 
education.412 
The law of Baden-Württemberg (BW)413 is taken as a paradigmatic example of 
‘Christian-occidental’ legislation that was also introduced in Saarland414, Hesse415, 
Bavaria416 and North Rhine-Westphalia417 (Rostock & Berghahn, 2009; Henkes & Kneip, 
2009; HRW, 2009). These states’ laws do not ban religious symbols for teachers per se, but 
symbols or clothing that endanger the peace at school or the neutrality of the state, or else 
conflict with the basic rights of parents and/or pupils, or with the ‘free, democratic order’ 
(or a combination of these). The laws of Bavaria do not refer to neutrality or school peace 
                                                           
408
 BW 13/2466 (October 1, 2003). 
409 BW 13/2793, Gesetz zur Änderung des Schulgesetzes (January 14, 2004), followed by the 
parliamentary debates: BW 13/62 (February 4, 2004) and BW 13/67 (April 14, 2004).  
410 BW 13/67 (April 1, 2004). There were three abstentions: Christine Rudolf of the SPD was 
against the law; Heike Dederer and Thomas Oelmayer of the Greens were in favour. 
411 BW 13/2837, Gesetz zur Änderung des Schulgesetzes (January 27, 2004). 
412 Gesetz zur Änderung des Kindergartengesetzes (February 14, 2006). A parliamentary majority 
adopted the law proposal of the governing parties CDU and FDP/DVP that forbids headscarves for 
staff in kindergartens and in other care and educational preschools: BW 13/4869 (November 25, 
2005). Another SPD proposal was rejected that had allowed headscarves for women who had 
already been working as kindergarten governesses without any problems: BW 13/4803, Gesetz zur 
Änderung des Kindergartengesetzes (November 3, 2005). A motion of the Greens to not launch a 
law project was rejected by the parliamentary commission: BW 13/4658 (September 21, 2006).  
413
 BW 13/3091, Gesetz zur Änderung des Schulgesetzes (April 14, 2004). 
414
 Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes zur Ordnung des Schulwesens im Saarland 
(Schulordnungsgesetz) (June 23, 2004). The legislator explicitly stated that the regulation is not 
limited to headscarves, but the educational law mentions that schools should educate pupils 
according to ‘Christian educational and cultural values’ (HRW, 2009). 
415
 Gesetz zur Sicherung der staatlichen Neutralität (October 18, 2004). The law in Hessen 
mentions that any ban should reckon with the Christian and humanistic traditions of its state. Hesse 
also forbids religious expressions for civil servants in other public service functions than those of 
teachers (namely those who execute governmental functions and enforce law, including judges, 
prosecutors, police officers, and court and prison officials) (HRW, 2009). 
416
 Gesetz zur Änderung des Bayerischen Schulgesetzes über das Erziehungs- und 
Unterrichtswesen (November 23, 2004). Bayern defines ‘Christian-occidental educational and 
cultural values’ as part of the federal state’s constitutional values (HRW, 2009). 
417
 Erstes Gezetz zur Änderung des Schulgesetzes für das Land Nordrein-Westfalen (June 13, 
2006). The law of North Rhine-Westphalia is similarly formulated as the one of Baden-
Württemberg and mentions that symbols displaying Christian and occidental educational and 
cultural values or traditions don’t conflict with the states’ educational duties of neutrality (HRW, 
2009). Before the elections of May 22, 2005, when an SPD government ruled, the opposition party 
FDP had still rejected the law proposal of the oppositional CDU fraction that exempted Christian 
symbolism. After the elections, when an FDP-CDU government entered office, it supported the 
government’s law project that was largely based upon the CDU proposal (Henkes & Kneip, 2009: 
265).  
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as an objective, but only ban public school teachers from wearing dress that conflicts with 
the constitutional values and/or educational objectives of the state. All five laws have 
formulated value references or exception clauses stating that the display of ‘Christian-
Occidental’ values and traditions corresponds to the educational mandate of the state, or 
forms part of constitutionally embedded values. The new school act of Baden-
Württemberg, for instance, argues that public school teachers are not allowed to exercise 
political, religious, ideological or similar manifestations that may endanger or disturb the 
neutrality of the Land towards pupils or parents or the political, religious or ideological 
peace at school. The act deems as ‘particularly illegitimate’ any ‘behaviour that can appear 
to pupils or parents to be a teachers’ demonstration against human dignity, gender equality 
according to Article 3 [of the Basic Law], the rights of freedom or the free and democratic 
order of the constitution.’ Then the exception clause follows: ‘[t]he respective exhibition of 
Christian and Western educational and cultural values or traditions does not contradict a 
(teacher’s) duty of behaviour,’ and corresponds to the educational mission of the state 
(quoted from HRW (2009): 26).  
Although this or any other law does not explicitly mention that headscarves (can 
appear to) conflict with such (constitutional) Christian and Western values, the effect is 
that headscarf-wearing teachers have been fired, while nuns are still allowed to teach and 
crucifixes on public school walls are pretty normal. When the Minister of Integration of 
North Rhine-Westphalia, Aygül Özkan (CDU), insisted in 2010 upon the removal of 
crucifixes from public school walls for reasons of state neutrality, she was forced to 
withdraw her remark by her fellow party members. Also the Federal Officer for 
Integration, Maria Böhmer (CDU), argued that crucifixes belonged to the German culture 
and tradition.418 
Berlin is taken as a paradigmatic example of the ‘Laic’ legislation. In addition to 
Berlin419, laic laws were passed in Lower Saxony420 and Bremen.421 Their laws ban all 
personal expressions of political, religious and philosophical beliefs for reasons of public 
neutrality (Bremen and Berlin) or of teaching in light of the educational mandate of the 
state (Lower Saxony), without explicitly mentioning that expressions of a Christian 
Western value-system are allowed. The educational laws of Bremen and Lower Saxony 
focus on the effect that the outer appearance of the teacher may have on pupils, whereas 
the Berlin law strictly prohibits all religious symbols or cloths in public service, regardless 
of effect. Only the laws of Berlin and Bremen contain a strictly secular interpretation of 
neutrality. The educational law of Lower Saxony is neutrally formulated by demanding 
that the ‘outer appearance of school teachers, even if chosen by a teacher due to religious 
or ideological reasons, may not create any doubts concerning the teachers’ qualification to 
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 While the CDU criticised her position, she found support in the FDP, die Linke, Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen, as well as from the Turkish Community Germany (‘Türkischen Gemeinde in 
Deutschland’, TGD). The Central Councils of Muslims (‘Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland’, 
ZMD), in contrast, supported the visibility of all religions in public space: ‘Deutschland: Debatte 
um Kruzifixe’, Migration and Bevölkerung 5/2010 (May 2010).  
419
 Gesetz zur Schaffung eines Gesetzes zu Artikel 29 von Berlin und zur Änderung des 
Kindertagesbetreuungsgesetzes (January 27, 2005). 
420
 Gesetz zur Änderung des Niedersächsischen Schulgesetzes und des Niedersachsischen 
Besoldungsgesetzes (April 29, 2004).  
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convincingly fulfil the educational mandate of the schools’. Article 2 of the school law 
explains that the state’s educational objective is grounded in Christianity (HRW, 2009: 36). 
Also the parliamentary debates on the law in Bremen illustrate that the main target was 
likewise the Islamic headscarf, with both the CDU faction and the SPD Educational 
Minister stating that the wearing of Christian and Jewish symbols remained possible 
(Henkes & Kneip, 2009: 259). 
The city state of Berlin also has significant numbers of inhabitants with immigrant 
backgrounds. In 2008, 24 % of the 3.4 million inhabitants had an immigration background, 
including ethnic German immigrants, Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe and Turkish 
labour migrants, and their descendants. Berlin is a secular city, with 59 % of the 
inhabitants not belonging to any church 21.5 % of its inhabitants belong to the Protestant 
Church, 9.3 % are Catholic, 0.3 % Jewish and 6.3 % Islamic. Here, the hijab was 
mentioned for the first time in a parliamentary question in January 2003. A member of 
PDS/Die Linke drew attention to the exclusion of a trainee with a headscarf from 
functioning as a preschool teacher.422 But the headscarf only became a political issue nine 
months later when the CDU submitted a motion in October 2003 asking the Government to 
ban headscarves in all public service functions.423 It was followed by a new bill in 
February 2004 explicitly aimed at exempting Christian symbolism.424 The FDP also 
submitted a motion in December 2003 to ban all religious symbolism.425 Hereafter the 
Red-Red coalition Government (SPD-PDS/Die Linke, 2002-present) presented its own law 
project in January 2005.426 It aimed to reformulate Article 29 on rights to religious freedom 
of the Berlin Constitution in a more narrow sense. It prohibited all religious, philosophical 
and political symbolism for public school teachers and social workers specialising in 
education (‘social pedagogues’), as well as in the realms of justice administration (only 
civil servants who exercise governmental functions), penal law enforcement (public 
officers and prison guards) and police.  
The law was passed by the PDS/SPD parliamentary majority. The Greens objected 
to the Government’s proposal, because it also wanted a full ban in kindergartens to prevent 
religious indoctrination of children. But because kindergartens constitute semi-public 
domains, the Government argued that the law could not extend to this domain.427 Instead, it 
created possibilities for parents in kindergartens to insist on their negative right of freedom 
of religion with the ombudsmen.428 The FDP abstained from voting, because it considered 
the proposal not clear enough. It also wondered whether administrative and supporting 
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personnel (like cooks) in the justice administration had to remove religious dress and 
symbols, even after the Minister of Interior had explained that the law did not apply to staff 
who are not working as government officials. Some confusion existed about court-clerks. 
The law forbids the wearing of headscarves by court clerks with contracts under civil law, 
but not trainee judges. Senator of Justice, Gisela von der Aue (SPD), later explained, in 
response to a written question from the CDU concerning a court clerk with a headscarf in a 
Berlin court, that due to the independence of the judiciary, courts have the authority to 
decide upon the headscarf of court-clerk with no such contract.429 Several headscarf-
wearing trainees have been denied access to some training roles (HRW: 2009: 47). Very 
recently, a higher Berlin court has also interpreted the new law as impeding the creation of 
special rooms for Muslim prayers in public schools.430   
Schleswig-Holstein and Rhineland-Palatinate are taken as paradigmatic examples 
of the eight states continuing their case-by-case approach in determining whether someone 
teaches in accordance with their public duties to public neutrality. Here the wearing of 
headscarves by teachers can be prohibited if there is evidence that they contravened their 
duty to neutrality or endangered the peace of school. In both states, the numbers of Muslim 
immigrants is lower than the national average. In 2008, 18.2 % of the 4.1 million 
inhabitants of Rhineland-Palatinate had a migration background, but only an estimated 
100,000 are Muslim (0.25 %). The majority of the population belongs either to the 
Catholic Church (46.5 % of the population) or the Protestant Church (31.2 %).431 Of the 
2.8 million inhabitants of the rural Northern Land of Schleswig-Holstein in 2008, the 
percentage of immigrants was 12.1 %. Schleswig-Holstein also officially recognises 
national minority groups, like the Danes, Friesians, the Sinti and Roma, whose cultures and 
languages are constitutionally protected. The majority of the population in Schleswig-
Holstein is Protestant. In addition to Rhineland-Palatinate and Schlesig-Holstein, also 
Hamburg and the Eastern states (where the issue has not yet been politicised) of 
Mecklenburg-Lower Pomenaria, Saxony, Sacxony-Anhalt and Thuringa belong to this last 
category in which teacher headscarves are tolerated.  
In Rhineland-Palatinate, the first teacher-trainee with a headscarf was accepted in 
1999 for her training in a public elementary school in Koblenz.432 Six years later, in 2005, 
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 B 16/1149 (November 22, 2007). Here Senator of Justice, Gisela von der Aue, explains in a 
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CDU deputy Christian Baldauf raised questions about this,433 which was followed by a law 
proposal of his party to pass legislation to ban teachers’ headscarves in public schools.434 
On 30th November 2005, the proposal was rejected with 55 to 24 votes by the fractions of 
governing parties SPD and FDP, as well as the oppositional party Bündniss/die Grünen.435 
In 2009, the CDU launched a new law proposal to ban headscarves for school teachers, 
followed by an amendment of the small FDP faction that asked for a ban on all kinds of 
religious symbolism.436 But both were rejected by the governing SPD majority in 
parliament.437  
Also in Schleswig-Holstein (SH), the hijab did not trigger much political 
controversy. The issue was first mentioned in 2002 in the annual report to the Government 
of the then-Commissioner of Integration, Helmut Frenz, when the city of Kiel forbid a 
social pedagogue with a headscarf to work in a kindergarten. This issue did not trigger any 
response from the Red-Green Government.438 In October 2004, a motion of the CDU to 
ban headscarves for public school teachers was rejected by the governing parties SPD and 
Bündniss/die Grünen, as well as by the oppositional parties FDP and SSW.439 After a 
cabinet change in 2006, when a Grand Coalition of SPD-CDU took office, the CDU asked 
for a response about the teacher-trainee who had worn a headscarf at a secondary school in 
Kiel without any complaints of the school council.440 The Minister of Education, Erdsiek-
Rave (SPD) now argued that the wearing of headscarves was not allowed for public school 
teachers. But because the two coalition partners CDU and SPD could not agree upon the 
content of neutrality that had to be included in the new school law in 2007, no legislation 
was passed and debates calmed down again.441 The new school law writes in paragraph 4, 
section 6/7, that, first, public schools have the duty to tolerance and openness to the 
different worldviews according to which parents want to educate their children and that, 
secondly, teachers must also observe in their appearance the philosophical and religious 
neutrality of the state. The Minister of Education explained in its background information 
to the law that the religious dress, including the wearing of headscarves, will not be 
prohibited for school teachers and that only concrete cases can reveal whether teachers 
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have not acted in accordance to their duties by disrespecting the religious beliefs of third 
persons.442   
  
9.3 The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court and present-day jurisprudence 
The decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 24th September 2003 is characterised 
by a frame-conflict between a conflict with neutrality frame that prioritises the religious 
freedom right of pupils over those of teachers, and a religious rights and pluralism frame 
that values Germany’s tradition of open neutrality. The first frame structured the 
jurisprudence of the first two local administrative courts in Baden-Württemberg where 
Ludin appealed to, as well as of the Federal Administrative Court (FAC) in Leipzig (but 
not that of a local court in Lower Saxony in another case where a teacher had initially won 
her right to wear a headscarf, see: Karakasoglu, 2002; Henkes & Kneip, 2008).443  
The first lower administrative court (in Stuttgart) that Ludin appealed to in 2000 
agreed with the decision of the school authority of Baden-Württemberg that Ludin lacked 
the personal qualifications (‘Eignung’) for the status of civil servant by refusing to remove 
her headscarf as a public school teacher. According to the court, teachers had to 
compromise their religion in order to protect the freedom of beliefs of children and the 
rights of parents to raise them according to their religious beliefs. Moreover, the judges 
emphasised that both the Federal Constitution and the Constitution of the Land of Baden-
Württemberg were based on Christian values. In this light, the court argued, “the 
expression of religion by teachers who adhere to non-Christian faiths is more restricted 
than when it concerns teachers who adhere to Christian belief-systems” (quoted from 
Henkes & Kneip, 2008: 10).444 When Ludin appealed to the higher administrative court (in 
Mannheim) in 2001, it turned down her appeal.445  
Hereafter, Ludin appealed to the Federal Administrative Court (FAC) in 2002, but 
it likewise declared her appeal unsuccessful for reasons of state neutrality.446 The judges of 
the FAC argued that even if Ludin herself did not engage in missionary activities, she 
could still exert (unintended) influence on young children who are particularly vulnerable 
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to religious indoctrination (Altinordu, 2004). Without differentiating between Christianity 
and Islam, the judges argued that the right of pupils to be free from undue influence of the 
personal belief of a teacher outlawed the right of a teacher to display her religion. Also the 
right of parents to determine the content of education for their children would be infringed 
by her wearing a headscarf (Mahlmann, 2003: 1102; Fogel, 2007: 633-634).  
The Federal Constitutional Court reasoned differently. On 24th September 2003447, 
it declared that Ludin had been denied placement without sufficient legal grounds and 
concluded that the School Authority of Baden-Würtenmberg had violated her 
constitutional rights, that is, under the existing laws of federal states. Yet, it noticed that 
federal states were free to create new laws in light of Germany’s changing society that 
restricted teachers’ rights to express their religion (Fogel, 2007; Saharso, 2007). The Court 
reaffirmed that the wearing of a headscarf is a fundamental religious freedom right that 
must be balanced with other constitutional rights, and that nobody may be discriminated 
against on grounds of religion for a civil service function. In regard to public neutrality, it 
argued that the state did not necessarily become partial if it allowed teachers to wear 
headscarves. Germany’s understanding of secularism was an ‘open and comprehensive 
neutrality’ that allows the state to encourage, protect and sustain religious pluralism, both 
in society and in school (‘offene und übergreifende Neutralität) (Henkes & Kneip, 2008: 
13). 
According to the court, the state merely created space for visible religious 
difference among its staff when it allowed the wearing of headscarves. It did not identify 
with a particular religion, as was the case with a crucifix on the wall (see for the crucifix 
case: chapter 4 on Germany’s state-church relations). Because unlike the crucifix, the 
teacher’s headscarf simply illustrated the personal allegiance of the woman in question 
who, furthermore, could mitigate the influence on children by explaining the significance 
of the headscarf to them. Furthermore, drawing on the research of the sociologist Yasemin 
Karakaşoğlu448, the judges concluded that the headscarf in itself cannot be reduced to a 
sign of proselytism or of suppression of women, but c an carry many meanings, among 
them a means to live an autonomous life while remaining attached to one’s own cultural 
background (Gould, 2008). The court thus concluded that the Civil Service Law of Baden-
Württemberg did not contain sufficient provisions to justify a restriction on Ludin’s right 
to wear a headscarf while teaching. It even argued that federal states could decide to allow 
headscarves in public schools, “using it as a means to practice reciprocal tolerance, and in 
this way to contribute towards the efforts being made to promote integration” (§65 of 
verdict, quoted from Could, 2008: 8). 
The Court could did not reach the conclusion from here that teachers have the right 
to express their personal beliefs. Instead, it acknowledged the ‘abstract’ danger that pupils 
may be confronted with religious arguments contrary to their will, and that the headscarf 
subsequently endangers fundamental rights of third persons and educational peace. Even 
though it had not found empirical evidence that a headscarf-wearing teacher had a 
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(negative) influence on children, the court took into account the meaning that the headscarf 
may have for third persons (‘objektiver Empfängerhorizont’). The judges, who had been 
internally divided on the case449, argued that - unlike the Christian cross, which only has a 
religious meaning – the headscarf could be interpreted by others as a sign of 
fundamentalism and women’s oppression.450 It thus concluded that headscarf-wearing 
teacher causes a potential danger of conflict with students, parents or other teachers, and 
that Länder would therefore be entitled to interpret the public duty to neutrality in the 
educational system in a ‘stricter and more distanced way’ (Altinordu, 2004).  
The court explicitly referred to Article 9 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human rights, which stipulates that member-states have a margin of 
appreciation to decide upon the relation between state and church, when it argued that 
Länder were allowed to “reckon with the school traditions, confessional composition of the 
population, and the more or less rootedness of religion”. But whatever option legislators 
would choose, they had to treat different faiths equally, which contains both “the 
justification and the practical application of such job requirements” (quoted from Fogel, 
2007: 637). In short, the Federal Constitutional Court strongly reaffirmed the principle of 
religious freedom and freedom of conscience, but also framed the headscarf as a potential 
source of conflict. This legitimised the passing of new legislation that would prohibit the 
display of religion by teachers.  
 
On 24th June 2004, after Baden-Württemberg had changed its school law, the Federal 
Administrative Court came to the conclusion that Ludin’s dismissal (a case still pending) 
was now legitimate under the state’s new legislation. The abstract danger of religious 
indoctrination was sufficient grounds to require teachers to compromise their positive right 
to freedom of religion. Important is that the FAC judges argued that they did not allow 
exceptions for particular forms of religiously motivated clothing, as the attorney of the 
state had attempted. According to the judges, the reference to ‘Christian’ values and 
traditions in the school law of Baden-Württemberg merely meant recognition of a 
formative cultural value-system of western civilisation, detached from a particular 
religious connotation. It did not refer to the actual display of an individual religious 
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denomination but to values that every public servant should be able to agree with. The 
spirit of the law in itself therefore did not create an illegal preferential treatment of the 
Christian religion.451  
Hereafter, the Federal Government interfered in the debate. The then-Federal 
Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration, Marieluise Beck, sent a memo to 
the legislature of Schleswig-Holstein (and North Rhine-Westphalia) after the ruling of the 
Federal Administrative Court.452 It wrote that if legislation was desired, the court had been 
clear that all religious symbols needed to be forbidden. According to Beck, the new school 
law of Baden-Württemberg, as well as the bills that had been presented by Bavaria, Berlin, 
Hesse, Lower Saxony and Saarland, conflicted with the jurisprudence of the Federal 
Constitutional Court. The constitutional principle of equal treatment had also been 
communicated by former Federal Commissioner for Foreigner of Berlin Barbara John in a 
round table in Rhineland-Palatinate about religious symbolism in public schools. In 
addition to the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court, she had referred to the 
new EU anti-discrimination Directives that Germany has passed to argue that partial laws 
contravened equality norms (EC/2000/78 en EC/2000/43).453 This forced deputies to 
choose between banning on all religious symbols, or to leave things as they were by 
allowing the expression of all religions by teachers. 
Nonetheless, all attempts have failed to dispute the Christian Occidental legislation 
that has been implemented in five federal states. The effect is that only headscarf-wearing 
teachers are fired or not hired for teaching jobs, while nuns are still allowed to teach. Even 
hijab-wearing teacher-trainees, who are formally excluded from the laws, have experienced 
difficulties finding traineeship positions in states that have passed such legislation, and 
have moved to federal states that have not passed legislation, like Hamburg, to finish their 
education (HRW, 2009: 47). Several teachers or social pedagogues specialising in 
education brought their cases to court when they were fired or dismissed as applicants in 
states that had passed such laws. Some of them had, in vain, replaced their headscarves 
with a bandana454 or a pink woollen bonnet455 to retain their jobs (HRW, 2009). But local 
judges concluded that they still displayed their personal religious affiliations to pupils and 
parents, subsequently forming an abstract danger to public neutrality that legitimised her 
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dismissal. Only the wearing of wigs was suggested as an option for Muslim women that 
could be in line with their duty of neutrality (Berghahn, 2008).  
In fact, of all thirteen cases that were brought to court by teachers between 2004 
and 2009 to challenge their dismissal, only one local court (in Baden Würtemberg) ruled in 
favour of the woman in question (Henkes & Kneip, 2009: 24). It declared that the 
expulsion of a Muslim convert for the job of public school teacher comprised a form of 
discrimination, as long as nuns were still allowed to teach.456 But this decision was 
overruled by a higher court, whose judges considered the two nuns ‘historical exceptions’ 
that did not comprise a systematic discrimination for Islamic religious communities.457 
This line of reasoning was followed by several other courts (Berghahn, 2008).  
Two attempts were made at challenging the constitutionality of the Christian-
Occidental laws, one by the attorney of the Land of Hesse (the legal feminist scholar Ute 
Sacksofsky) to the constitutional court of Hesse and another one by the Islamic Religious 
Community of Berlin to the constitutional court of Bavaria. In 2007, both courts argued 
that the actual texts of the law conformed with constitutional values, because they merely 
referred to a Christian value-system rather than a particular religious expression. The 
courts left it up to specialised (labour or administrative) courts to determine in individual 
cases whether it was within the scope of the law to continue to tolerate the nuns’ habit in 
public schools. It suggested that this could be in line with the spirit of the law (Berghahn, 
2008; Sacksofsky, 2009).  
Because courts have so far legitimised the dismissal of teachers under the new laws, 
women must again start a new (expensive) legal trajectory, and appeal to the Constitutional 
Court to conclude on the legality of the new laws. But considering the fact that the FCC 
considers restrictions of teachers’ freedom rights constitutional if they do not discriminate 
between religions, the chance exists that states will then reformulate existing laws in 
neutral terminology. Also Germany’s new Equal Treatment Committee does not offer 
many opportunities, which cannot sanction federal authorities or file complaints to the 
court. Moreover, it considers the Berlin law to be in line with Equality legislation. The 
only institutional opportunity left to dispute headscarf bans therefore lies outside the 
national arena: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Brussels. For this to happen, a 
national court must first depart from the existing jurisprudence and request a preliminary 
ruling of the ECJ to conclude whether national regulations are conforming to European 
Equality Directives (Berghahn, 2011). So far, courts have not expressed any doubts about 
the regulations of the federal states.  
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9.4 Diagnoses and prognoses in the Länder parliamentary debates on the hijab 
Seven frames structured the debates in German Parliament. Differences existed in the 
extent to which these frames resonated, as well as in the prognosis offered to the identified 
problem. A first Christian Occidental frame identified the headscarf as conflicting with the 
cultural and educational objectives of the state to teach pupils the values of a secularised 
Christian, Western culture. It went hand-in-hand with a conflict with neutrality frame that 
identified headscarves as undermining teachers’ duty to neutrality, and a Political Islam 
frame that problematised the headscarf as a symbol or tool of an extremist Islamic ideology 
at odds with German values like religious tolerance and gender equality. While in Baden-
Württemberg this Christian Occidental frame representing Germany as a Christian nation 
resonated and found legitimacy, it was challenged by most parties in Berlin, Schleswig-
Holstein and Rhineland-Palatinate. Nonetheless, the conflict with neutrality frame 
structured the political debate in Berlin, as well as an oppression frame that identified 
Muslim girls at risk of patriarchal community pressure to veil by fundamentalist peers. In 
Schleswig-Holstein, the Political Islam and oppression frames also structured the debate, 
but a religious rights and pluralism frame was visible with deputies arguing that an 
individual case-by-case assessment was a better means of balancing conflicting religious 
freedom rights. In Rhineland-Palatinate, deputies clearly wanted to maintain Germany’s 
open neutrality tradition, using this religious rights and pluralism frame to legitimise the 
accommodation of teacher’s headscarves. Moreover, they argued from a segregation frame 
that a ban would only halt the integration process of moderate Muslim immigrants and 
drive them in the hands of Islamic fundamentalists. A discrimination and participation 
frame also resonated in Rhineland-Palatinate and Berlin, problematising structural 
obstacles of discrimination and social-economic discrepancies that hindered the integration 
and emancipation of headscarf-wearing women.  
 
1. State church frames 
In 1997, in the legislature of Baden-Württemberg, Die Republikaner politicised the 
headscarf from a neutrality and Christian Occidental frame, which was later taken up by 
the CDU. According to this frame combination, teachers who refuse to remove 
headscarves are disrespecting the rights of pupils and their parents to religious freedom. 
Their duty to neutrality requires that teachers moderate their personal beliefs, out of respect 
for the different beliefs of children and their parents. In the words of CDU member 
Hermann Seimetz: “Miss Ludin wanted to test our tolerance, instead of showing tolerance 
herself by paying tribute to our neutral state. For wearing a headscarf is incompatible with 
the principle of confessional neutrality”.458  
Nonetheless, not all religious expressions were seen as problematic. By contrast, in 
their plea for a ban on headscarves in 1997, deputies of the CDU and Die Republikaner 
referred to Article 16, §1 of the federal state’s constitution, which writes that pupils in 
Christian interdenominational schools must be raised according to the ‘Christian occidental 
educational and cultural values’.459 By choosing to wear headscarves, seen as signs of an 
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intrinsically different value-system, Muslim teachers excluded themselves from public 
teaching functions. When in February 2004 the then-Minister of Education Anette Schavan 
of Baden-Württemberg (CDU) presented her Government’s bill to the parliament460, she 
also emphasised that Christianity was a postulate of German culture on which social 
cohesion was based: “from us is to be expected that we know and defend the religious 
roots of our German culture […] and not that we do as if all expressions of our own 
traditions and related cultures is problematic in a religiously pluralistic society.”461 She 
made clear that symbols that reflected this Christian Western culture, such as crucifixes or 
nuns’ habits, did not need to be banned. Also Jewish kippahs were sometimes included as 
expressions of this cultural value system.462  
One month later, on 12th March 2004, a public hearing was held on the draft-bill of 
the FDP/CDU Government, to which were invited several legal experts, representatives of 
the church and a feminist lawyer of Turkish descent known for her anti-headscarf stance.463 
Most legal experts, such as former judge of the Federal Constitutional Court Ernst-
Wolfgang Böckenforde464, argued that the bill illegally discriminated between religions 
and conflicted with the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court. The 
constitutional judge and attorney of Baden-Württemberg, Ferdinand Kirchhof, argued 
however that the exemption-clause in the law proposal referred to secularised Christian 
values, such as brotherly love, that were detached from a particular religious doctrine. The 
transmission of such values in public schools had been allowed by the Constitutional Court 
in previous cases. The nun’s robe was, so he pleaded, part of ‘a national identity’ rather 
than an expression of religious identification and could thus be worn in public schools. In 
order to make his point, he compared it to the city blazon of Munich that shows a monk in 
a habit, which likewise merely had a ‘historical value’ (Joppke, 2009). By representing the 
kippah and the nun’s habit as cultural rather than religious symbols, Baden-Württemberg’s 
law aimed at only prohibiting the headscarf. 
In Baden-Württemberg, the CDU found support from the SPD and the FDP for this 
policy frame. SPD fraction leader Peter Wintruff argued that: “different from the 
headscarf, the crucifix belongs to our Western culture, to our tradition and has here a high 
standing as a religious evidence of brotherly love, tolerance and human dignity […]. We 
acknowledge the mandate of our federal constitution to educate our children according to 
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Christian and Western cultural values. The state neutrality in our public schools may – 
unlike a Laic state – recognise religious expression, but only those that don’t contravene 
the embedded human rights”.465 Even though SPD members wondered whether nuns’ 
habits could actually be exempted, they voted in favour of the Government’s law 
proposal.466 Also deputy Kleinman of the Liberal party argued: “We prohibit the headscarf 
and simultaneously affirm symbols that have shaped our Occident.”467 Only the Greens 
disputed that constitution values were embedded in a Christian value-system that visible 
Muslim teachers could not transmit or that legitimised the discrimination of Islam. Deputy 
member Kretschmann (Greens) argued: “Your law actually says, in the vocabulary of 
sports: ‘it is not allowed to play ball sports in the school yard’. But then comes the second 
phrase: ‘football is not a ball sport’.”468  
The CDU faction in Berlin even argued that the unequal treatment of Islam was 
legitimised because, “in a Christian-moulded society, it cannot be a constitutionally 
derived duty to treat all religions equally. Privileging of Christian educational and cultural 
values would generally be acceptable. The conception that religion should be separated 
from the political realm is not maintainable for the CDU.”469 Deputies of the SPD, Greens, 
PDS and the FDP fiercely objected to the CDU’s proposal to privilege Christianity over 
other religions. The SPD refuted the idea that Germany’s value-system had evolved from 
Christianity and was at odds with Islam.470 Özcan Mütlu of the Greens argued that the 
CDU had to give up its ‘Christian-Occidental dream of the nation’.471 The PDS/Die Linke 
and the Greens pointed at the large number of atheists in Berlin to contest the idea that 
Germany was a Christian country,472 and the FDP emphasised the multi-religious character 
of the city.473  
Nonetheless, the conflict with neutrality frame resonated in Berlin. Even though no 
actual conflicts had occurred with teachers being found guilty of proselytising their 
religion, all parties (except the CDU) argued that the privatisation of all personal religious 
affiliations by teachers was the best guarantee to safeguard religious freedom rights and 
religious peace. The faction of PDS/die Linke had initially opted for the toleration of 
teachers’ headscarves, but the SPD convinced its coalition partner to vote for a law that 
forbids all political and religious symbols on equal footing, not only for teachers but also 
for other civil servants. No-one differentiated between teachers (who are in direct contact 
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with children) and public officers (who execute a certain authority function from a 
distance) in their claim for a neutral state.  
Also the small opposition party SSW in Schleswig-Holstein had argued that the 
outer effect on children was sufficient grounds to ban religious dress for teachers. It 
likewise considered it unnecessary to take into account the subjective intentions of the 
teacher in question. “Regardless whether it concerns a headscarf or a crucifix, religious 
symbols have nothing to seek in public schools – except for religious courses”. Yet it 
accused the CDU of ‘continuing annoying Leiktultur debates with other means’ and 
proposed a full ban on all religious symbols instead.474 The FDP, Green party and SPD, by 
contrast, argued that headscarf-wearing women could only be fired in case they propagated 
fundamentalist ideologies or in case actual conflicts between parents and teachers 
occurred. The mere fact of displaying their personal religious beliefs was not seen to 
undermine their duty to neutrality. Furthermore, the current civil law already contained 
sufficient guarantees in firing those headscarf-wearing teachers who were found guilty of 
proselytising their faith.475 In 2006, however, when the SPD ruled together with the CDU 
in a new coalition Government, the SPD fraction came out in favour of a law that banned 
all religious sigs for teachers in order to protect the religious freedom of minors. In its 
press release, it explained that Christian values were still transmitted in school, with 
churches continuing to be involved in religious courses.476 The CDU, however, rejected a 
law that would also ban Christian symbols. Due to this political impasse, with the CDU 
trying to maintain a privileged position of Christian churches and the SPD favouring a ban 
on all religious symbols, Schleswig-Holstein maintained the status quo.  
Deputies in Rhineland-Palatinate likewise rejected the unequal treatment of Islam. 
In contrast to their colleagues in Schleswig-Holstein and Berlin, however, the governing 
SPD fraction here rejected any move towards strict secularism. Jochen Hartloff of the SPD 
faction pleaded in favour of the status quo by tolerating headscarves, arguing: “and what 
follows next? We have a separation between state and church. This is traditionally 
regulated differently than in France. We have also a separation. But the boundaries are 
much more blurred in light of our Occidental-Christian background.”477 Also the Greens 
argued that Germany’s state-church relations meant that the neutral state of Germany was 
open for the expression of all religions, while the FDP voiced to the fear of churches that a 
law against headscarves would move Germany in the direction of a Laic state. 
Nonetheless, their prognosis was slightly different from the Dutch approach. They chose 
for a case-by-case approach that would tolerate religious expressions, unless the teachers’ 
behaviour proved disrespectful to the beliefs and equality of pupils and parents. In contrast 
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to the Netherlands, children’s and parents’ negative religious freedom rights would 
outweigh the positive religious freedom rights of teachers when no compromises could be 
found.478  
 
2. Social cohesion and public order frames 
A central argument in the German debate was that the headscarf was not merely an 
individual religious expression but stood for a collective political ideology conflicting with 
constitutional values of human dignity, religious freedom, gender equality and democracy. 
This Political Islam frame was put on the agenda by the CDU in Baden-Württemberg in 
1997, and again after 2003, to construct the difference between the crucifix and kippah on 
the one hand and the headscarf on the other hand. While the former would express 
Christian and Western educational and cultural values or traditions, the latter expressed a 
political ideology that contravened constitutional values (Gould, 2008).479 This Political 
Islam frame went hand-in-hand with a segregation frame that problematised the headscarf 
as a form of cultural segregation and disintegration on behalf of the Muslim community. 
Baden-Württemberg’s Minister of Education Anette Schavan (CDU), for instance, said that 
the headscarf ‘functioned as a sign of cultural and civilisational segregation and thus 
worked disintegrating’.480 Immigrants were called upon to conform to majority society’s 
cultural norms and values by removing symbols like the headscarf that ‘can mean they 
hold on to traditions of their home societies.’481 According to the CDU in Rhineland-
Palatinate, the headscarf also stood for a ‘civilisational self-ethnicisation’, which was in 
conflict with integration.482 
The contested nature of the headscarf in Islam was taken as a proof that veiling was 
not a religious duty but (also) a political statement of Islamic fundamentalists encroaching 
upon Germany’s modern democracy. In its press release of 1998, the Ministry of 
Education explained that the headscarf was a political symbol that had to be removed by 
school teachers: ‘the wearing of the headscarf is not part of the religious duties of a 
Muslim woman. This is recognisable, for example, in that a majority of Muslim women 
worldwide do not wear the headscarf”.483 Even though it was recognised that for some 
women the headscarf could also convey a personal religious meaning, Minister of 
Education Schavan considered it legitimate to curtail their individual rights in order halt 
the threat of Political Islam for Germany’s democracy: “using the right to freedom of 
religion cannot be so exhaustive, that our liberal democratic basic order will crack legally. 
To protect its freedoms, one must also restrict them”.484 Wolfgang Reinhart of the CDU 
fraction in Baden-Württemberg added that the law: “does not forbid the headscarf as a 
religious symbol, but rather as a symbol for the intrusion of a theocracy, of Sharia law that 
dishonours all human rights, of fundamentalism and a subordinated position of a woman’s 
role”.485 In Baden-Württemberg, the CDU found support from the SPD and the FDP for 
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this framing. SPD deputy Ulrich Maurer drew parallels with Muslim countries as Turkey 
where Islamists would use the headscarf to overthrow the secular state486, while the FDP 
considered it right to draw boundaries to tolerance in order to protect Western democracies 
from Islamist intrusion.487  
In the three other states, the problem that the headscarf could symbolise a Political 
Islam was recognised, but the prognosis of a partial ban on only the headscarf was 
contested. In Berlin, the CDU faction linked the threat of Islamic fundamentalism to the 
failing integration of immigrants to German culture. Similar to what we have seen in the 
French debate, it referred to the Netherlands as a counter-example by suggesting that its 
multicultural policies had contributed to the murder of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh.488 
Senator of Interior Affairs, Ehrhart Körting (SPD), considered legislation necessary to 
prevent ‘aggressive and ostensible religious expressions’ in public services. The headscarf 
was not only a religious expression but also ‘a statement of a political attitude against 
certain values, particularly of fundamentalist organisations like Milli Görüs and others’ 
(that had funded the legal trajectory of Ludin). He referred to the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights in the Dahlab vs Swiss case to sustain its position that 
the headscarf was hard to reconcile with values of tolerance, equal treatment, non-
discrimination and respect for different-mindedness489, similar to the SSW in Schleswig-
Holstein.490 Also the SPD, Greens and FDP argued that the state had to draw boundaries to 
claims of religious fundamentalists intruding public institutions, like Milli Görus.491 It 
would be a false tolerance to accommodate signs and symbols that could be interpreted as 
expressions of oppression and segregation.492 Despite the clear focus being the headscarf, 
Berlin deputies favored a ban on all religious symbols and objected the discrimination of 
Islam. A neutrally formulated law would facilitate the integration of Muslim immigrants 
by signalling that the state treated them as equals, subsequently preventing their 
segregation and possible attraction to religious radicalisation.493 MP Özcan Mütlu 
(Grünen) countered the argument that a ban would stigmatise immigrants and comprise a 
veiled racism, by arguing that this argument disregard that most Turkish immigrants were 
in favour of a strict secularism and falsely assumes that all Turks are Muslims.494  
In Rhineland-Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein, the Leftist majority used the same 
frame as the PDS/Die Linke in Berlin that had initially objected to legislation against the 
headscarf, because it would only drive moderate Muslims into the hands of 
fundamentalists by further marginalising and stigmatising them, and contributing to their 
withdrawal in parallel societies.495 The Greens in Rhineland-Palatinate argued that 
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reducing the headscarf to a political symbol that conflicted with German culture would 
only contribute to the problem of a ‘clash of civilisations’ rhetoric which Islamic 
fundamentalists could exploit.496 In the words of Deputy Nils Wiechmann (Bündniss 90/ 
Die Grünen), who responded to the CDU: “Your law proposal does not serve social peace, 
but rather encourages fundamentalist groups in their rejection of our Constitution. It can 
lead to a withdrawal of minorities and serve as a breeding ground for fundamentalist 
organisations and their convictions.”497 Instead of using symbolic and repressive tools, 
deputies argued in favour of dialogue and trust in the rule of law to bolster the threat of 
Islamic radicalism. Deputy Jochen Hartloff of the SPD fraction in Rhineland-Palatinate 
insisted that politicians should not fight intolerance with intolerance but needed to believe 
in Germany’s ‘wehrafte Democratie’ (a militant democracy, in the sense of a democracy 
that is able to defend itself against extremist threats: Koopmans, 1995: 41).498  
To sum up, the idea that the headscarf stood for a politicised and possibly dangerous 
Islam within segregated migrant communities for Germany’s modern democracy clearly 
structured policy debates into a restrictive direction. However, the prognosis of legislation 
against headscarves was also contested by some left-wing deputies who argued that 
discriminatory laws would only stigmatise and further estrange Muslim migrant minorities. 
The SPD in both Schleswig-Holstein and Rhineland-Palatinate, for instance, feared that 
bans would halt integration processes of Muslim immigrants whose religion would be 
modernised if the state allowed headscarf-wearing teachers to participate in German 
society.499 Also, the Liberals and the SSW in Schleswig-Holstein feared that a partial ban 
would only estrange moderate Muslims.500 While challenging the reduction of the hijab to 
a symbol of Political Islam, this counter-frame actually illustrates the resonance of the 
Political Islam and segregation frames in these federal states as well.  
 
3. Gender equality and women’s emancipation frames 
The hijab figured high on the agenda as a symbol of women’s oppression conflicting with 
Germany’s constitutional values of gender equality. In the 2003-2004 debates, this 
diagnosis was extended to other gender-unequal practices that were linked to Islam, such 
as forced marriages and honour killings, resulting in a frame extension (Benford & Snow, 
2000). Moreover, the diagnosis of gender-oppression was linked to the problem of Islamic 
extremism (frame-bridging). The Baden-Württemberg Minister of Education, Anette 
Schavan, for instance, legitimised her Government’s law project as a defence of Western 
achievements of gender equality: “the headscarf constitutes, as a political symbol, a part of 
a female oppressive history. It can symbolise an interpretation of Political Islamism, which 
conflicts with the principle of equality between men and women. In that sense, it is also 
incompatible with a fundamental value embedded in our constitution.”501  
Proponents of a ban argued that veiling illustrated an inherent conflict between an 
Islamic, patriarchal culture and constitutional rights of gender equality that teachers needed 
to educate and embody. In the words of CDU fraction leader Hermann Seimetz in Baden-
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Württemberg: “the equality of women and other values of European Enlightenment are 
alien to Muslim thought. Whoever wants to work in civil service must accept these 
values.”502 The fraction leader of the Social Democrats, Ulrich Maurer, wondered: “what 
would it mean for a young girl, who is born in this country and who grows up with our 
cultural values, who has conflicts with her family, if she is confronted with a teacher who 
embodies the opposite value system, supported by the German state?”503 By suggesting 
that only unveiled teachers could embody gender equality, rather than problematising the 
nun’s habit as gender-oppressive, women’s bodies became markers of intrinsically 
different cultures and functioned to create boundaries between insiders and outsiders of the 
German nation (see also: Rostock & Berghahn, 2007). The Greens contested this framing 
by argueing that veiled teachers who had managed to become school teachers actually 
proved that emancipation within Islam was possible, enabling Muslim women to show that 
they can teach in accordance with ‘German’ values of gender equality. But in this counter 
framing, Muslim women are likewise seen as culture bearers and as agents of change, 
charged with the double responsibility to emancipate their community and to disprove that 
all Muslims are fundamentalist patriarchs (Weber, 2004). 
In Schleswig-Holstein, deputies of the CDU successfully presented a multicultural 
policy that accommodated minority’s cultural practices as a bad policy for girls and 
women.504 Instead of propagating ‘a false tolerance’ that segregated ‘foreigners’ in parallel 
societies, the CDU in Schleswig-Holstein argued that the state had to demand immigrants’ 
acceptance of Germany’s constitutional values and principles, notably gender equality, and 
propagated a ban on headscarves for teachers.505 Also Social-Democrat Minister of 
Education, Ute Erdsiek Rave, warned against “a naïve multiculturalism” that would close 
the eyes for patriarchal practices in Muslim communities and leave girls vulnerable pawns 
of Islamists who instrumentalised the headscarf to propagate unequal doctrines.506 Only the 
Greens disputed that a law would be the right means to tackle this problem.   
The oppression frame was contested in Rhineland-Palatinate. Deputies of the Green 
party and the SPD successfully challenged the idea that the hijab symbolised women’s 
oppression. They referred to the work of Yasemin Karakasoğlu - who had testified before 
the Federal Constitutional Court - to insist that women may have varied motivations to 
cover, and to argue that the headscarf could also be seen as a way to express a ‘neo-Islamic 
femininity’.507 When they voiced Muslim women’s claims that they felt naked if they had 
to teach bare-headed, SPD deputies used a similar argument as the Dutch Left in 
advocating for a women’s right to choose for religiously modest dress.508 
In Berlin, some members of the FDP shared the diagnosis of the CDU that 
‘integrated and modern women’ should be protected against fundamentalist peers.509 
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Fraction leader Mieke Senftleben, for instance, argued that young girls should not be 
confronted with teachers expressing women-unfriendly ideologies.510 The SPD also 
worried about the influence of Islamic fundamentalism on the liberty of young girls. Fritz 
Felgentreu (SPD) argued that: “the city of Berlin, where so many Muslims live, should 
particularly protect those from authoritarian influences that are the focus point of Islamist 
ambitions: the common people in the inner cities, the children and youth that are just in 
lower and middle schools.”511 Similarly, the Greens argued that only a secular school could 
foster the emancipation and freedom of young girls. The governing party PDS/Die Linke, 
however, that a ban would not solve the problem of forced covering, or other problematic 
practices such as forbidding girls to participate in swimming, sexual education courses, 
gender-mixed gymnastic courses, or school trips.512 In fact, PDS deputies argued, in vain, 
against a ban because it would deprive migrant women of ‘free spaces’ (‘Freiräume’) 
where they could work and gain (more) autonomy. The PDS managed to include 
alternative solutions to tackle identified problems of gender inequality among Muslim 
migrant communities. In 2007, the SPD-PDS Government formed a working group ‘Islam 
and the School’ to discuss ‘religious and cultural’ problems. The working group engaged 
with community organisations, families, and experts, including Seyran Ateş and Necla 
Kelek.513  
The problem of gender inequality was thus clearly linked to Islam and the realm of 
the family, with the state now interfering in hitherto considered ‘private’ domains. In 
contrast to France and similar to the Netherlands, some deputies of the Left pointed at 
structural sources of inequality by introducing a participation and discrimination frame. 
This frame argues that a (partial) ban in the labour-market is a form of discrimination that 
would in the long term result in further social-economic marginalisation and inequality of 
migrants. Moreover, this frame was gendered with deputies arguing that a ban on 
headscarves would halt the emancipation processes which migrant women had embarked 
upon by impeding their equal chances to participate. Winfried Kretschmann of the Greens 
in Baden-Württemberg, for instance, argued in vain that a ban on headscarves for teachers 
and in kindergartens would reduce hijab-wearing women to guest-workers who could only 
work in cleaning jobs. He also warned that a ban in the public service might result in 
discrimination in other areas of the labour-market, arguing that instead of a ban, the state 
had to actively create space for hijab-wearing women in German society to foster their 
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emancipation.514 Finally, the Greens pointed to the gender-discriminatory effects of a ban, 
by excluding headscarf-wearing Muslim women from public teaching jobs (whose 
attitudes were possibly compatible with the constitution) but allowing bearded Muslim 
men (possibly holding radical thoughts).515 In Rhineland-Palatinate, this frame was used by 
the Bündniss/Die Grüne and the SPD to advocate for the inclusion of the few hijab-
wearing women present in their state schools. Some of them drew a parallel to Christianity, 
arguing that German culture had historically ‘likewise’ propagated gender inequality. Like 
their French counterparts, they suggested that Muslim women would become ‘free’ and 
‘equal’ if they would be able to participate in German society and modernise their religious 
culture. Muslim men were no policy targets, and no structural solutions were offered to 
remove socioeconomic obstacles for women to participate. 
In Berlin, in contrast, the PDS/die Linke took up the claim of the Berlin 
Commissioner of Integration, Günther Piening (Bündniss/die Grünen), to push for anti-
discrimination projects to improve hijab-wearing women’s access to the labour market to 
support their integration.516 Like the Green Party in the Netherlands, PDS deputies 
identified discrimination as an obstacle to migrant women’s participation in German 
society. It successfully lobbied for integration programmes, that focused on combatting 
discrimination, enhancing multi-linguistic staff in public services, and offering educational, 
language, and skills trainings for immigrant women.517 In 2008, the Berlin left-wing 
Government issued a folder warning that headscarf-wearing women could not be excluded 
from private sectors of the labour market on grounds of religion.518 The folder aimed to 
‘decrease prejudices, to prevent discrimination and to encourage women to defend 
themselves against hindrances’. The folder immediately triggered a response from the SPD 
members Seyran Ateş and Serap Cileli, who argued that it conveyed a ‘knee fall for 
fundamentalists’. Moreover, they argued that the choice to wear a headscarf was as a form 
of self-exclusion rather than discrimination.519 The new law that prohibited religious 
symbols in public institutions was, however, not recognised as (gender) discriminatory, or, 
this was at least outweighed by the aim of public neutrality.  
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9.5 Analysis and conclusion 
Cleavages 
Contrary to my expectations, historical cleavages around religion reappeared in the 
headscarf debate and intersected with the centre-periphery cleavage. When the Federal 
Constitutional Court gave leeway to the Länder to decide upon relations between state, 
religion, and citizenry, political actors seized this opportunity to freeze the privileged 
position of the Christian church in their Land, by banning only Islamic expressions. In 
other states, like Berlin, the verdict was used to ban religious expressions altogether from 
public schools and institutions. The secularist stance of the Greens and Social Democrats 
in Berlin contrasts with their counterparts in the South-Western Länder. This may be 
explained by the different role of religion in the East of Germany, where churches lost their 
institutionalised ties with the state during the Communist era, and where religious courses 
have never been part of public school education. Others have argued that the rejection of 
organised collective identities after the Communist era may have shaped the Left’s 
hesitancy in accommodating the headscarf (Saharso, 2007). Their plea for bans on 
religious dress in public service functions triggered the mobilisation of churches wanting to 
maintain Germany’s open neutrality tradition.  
This politicisation of the teacher’s headscarf can only be understood through 
analyzing salient cleavages over the nation and ethnic differences. As spouses of 
immigrants or as labour-migrants, headscarves did not constitute a problem. The 
ideological debates about national self-conception occurred only after women embarked 
upon public school teaching careers, actively shaping children’s worldview. The visible 
Islamisation of Germany’s public institutions triggered responses by Union parties which 
framed the nation as a Christian Occidental nation, at odds with symbols illustrating a 
‘conflicting’ Islamic culture. Left-wing politicians challenged the representation of the 
nation as an ethno-cultural community based on a shared Christian Judeo culture. They 
emphasised the equal treatment and integration of Muslim minorities, but were divided on 
the religious cleavage.  
In contrast to my expectation, gender cleavages also reappeared when 
multiculturalism was framed as endangering women’s rights and giving leeway to 
extremist Islamic ideologies that threatened achieved values of gender equality. Both the 
Left and the conservative Right stood up to defend gender equality, although they 
sometimes differed on the course of action. 
The intersection of cleavages around gender and nationality may explain why the 
headscarf became a contentious issue after all in German policy debates. 
 
State-church patterns  
Accommodating pupils’ headscarves fit Germany’s state-church relations. The FCC clearly 
stipulated that pupils’ and teachers’ headscarves did not conflict with Germany’s open 
neutrality tradition. In the public school, the state had to reckon with (Muslim) parents’ 
rights to educate their children according to their own religious beliefs. This was hardly 
challenged. Nonetheless, the Constitutional judges allowed states to depart from this open 
neutrality tradition in regard to teachers. Particularly in light of Germany’s changed social 
relations, legal limitations on the religious freedom rights of teachers were seen as 
legitimate means to sustain religious peace, even in the absence of actual conflicts. We 
have seen how deputies seized this opportunity to frame teachers’ headscarves as 
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conflicting with state neutrality and pupils’ and parents’ rights. Eight states have passed 
laws restricting the right to religious freedom of teachers, which are clearly at odds with 
and illustrate a change in Germany’s historic state-church traditions.   
A closer look of the legislation reveals, however, that five states still allowed for 
the religious expressions of Christian and Jewish communities. By framing these as 
expressions of a cultural tradition marked by human rights, deputies linked their frames 
with institutionalised anchors in federal states’ constitutions which held that public schools 
had to teach such values. Due to the historically close cooperation between secular state 
authorities and Christian churches, Enlightenment values such as religious tolerance, state 
neutrality and (gender) equality were seen as having evolved from Christianity, rather than 
from a revolutionary break with religion as in France (Amir-Moazami, 2007). By arguing 
that crucifixes and nun’s habits were not religious but cultural expressions of a superior 
civilization, they managed to circumvent the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court 
insistent upon the equal treatment of religions. By only banning headscarves, they both 
used and reaffirmed an open neutrality tradition that has historically privileged Christianity 
over minority religions. In states with a more secular and Protestant tradition, like 
Schleswig-Holstein and Berlin, no such institutionalised anchors could be found. Regional 
differences in state-church patterns and school education thus determined which frames 
were privileged over others.  
In contrast to the thesis of Monsma & Soper (2009), churches were ambivalent 
allies for religious Muslims in claiming public recognition for their practices. The 
representatives of the Protestant Evangelical and Catholic Churches to the Baden-
Württemberg Government, for instance, favoured the Government’s new school law, 
which prohibited headscarves but allowed Christian symbols.520 Only when the Federal 
Administrative Court had made clear that the unequal treatment between religions was not 
possible, and the SPD came out in favour of a strict secularism, did churches lobby for the 
toleration of teachers’ headscarves. The representative of the Catholic Church to the 
Government of Schleswig-Holstein,521 the Federal Council of the Protestant Church,522 and 
the German Bishop’s conference,523 all successfully lobbied against a law that would also 
further relegate Christianity to a privatised notion. Deputies of the FDP and the CDU in the 
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legislatures of Rhineland-Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein voiced their concerns and 
objected to full bans on all religious symbols.   
Churches thus played a strong role in the political debate, lobbying for the 
maintenance of Germany’s state-church relations when it became clear that also their status 
could be undermined when religion was privatised in public school functions. In line with 
my expectation, formal and informal ties with the Government safeguarded their venues 
and material and symbolic resources to influence policy debates. In contrast, only few 
Muslim religious organisations were invited to policy debates, such as the Central Council 
of Muslims (‘Zentralrat der Muslime’) (considered an enlightenment example of a 
moderate, nationally domesticated Islam). More orthodox Muslim organisations like Milli 
Görüs, in contrast, were represented as fundamentalist and possibly dangerous, 
discrediteding their legitimate voice in parliamentary debates. The charter of the Central 
Council of Muslims from 20th February 2002 is telling, in that it states that Islamic law 
demands the acceptance of the German constitution and that it won’t try to establish a 
theocracy.524 In a letter to the legislature of Schleswig-Holstein, its chairman, Nadeem 
Elias, insisted upon the compatibility of Islam with Germany’s tradition of open neutrality, 
and defended Muslim women’s right to adhere to what the Central Council considered 
religious duties. His claim that the headscarf expressed personal faith rather than a 
fundamentalist Islam was sometimes taken up by the secular Left to plea against a ban.525 
Also the Central Council of Jews, which rejected the co-optation of Judaism by anti-Islam 
discourse, emphasised the equal treatment of religions and the recognition of Germany’s 
multi-religious society.526  
In other words, the path-dependent effect on Germany’s state-church relations can 
explain why legislation against the headscarf was blocked: rather than moving in the 
direction of a secularist state when institutional obstacles constrained partial bans, deputies 
accepted the toleration of Islamic minorities’ religious practices in public schools. In the 
words of Federal President Johannes Rau (SPD) in a speech on religious freedom and 
Islam in Germany: “I am convinced that we cannot forbid one religious symbol, which the 
headscarf also is without doubt, and still believe to leave things the way they were”.527 
Germany’s state-church relations of an open neutrality that cherished an ‘active’ right to 
religious freedom, rather than a privatised notion, enabled frames that pleaded in favour of 
accommodating headscarves as a religious freedom right. The attempts to prohibit the 
headscarf but allow the expression of religious symbols can likewise be interpreted as a 
path-dependent effect, with institutionalised actors trying to maintain a state-church system 
that privileged majority religions. Only in Berlin did deputies depart from historical 
traditions, which illustrates the feed-back effects of the political process on institutional 
patterns. 
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Citizenship and migrant integration policies 
The five laws prohibiting symbols of ‘foreign’ religions yet tolerating those of ‘native’ 
German culture are in line with Germany’s citizenship policy legacies, which have long 
excluded ethnic minority migrants from formal citizenship. They reaffirm an ethnic self-
conception of the nation that excludes migrants from full citizenship or requires the 
assimilation of migrants to a dominant culture, albeit that their otherness was now 
constructed on grounds of religious (instead of ethic) differences. Two states only 
reformulated laws in neutral terms when it became clear that Christian expressions also 
had to be relegated to a designated private sphere if the state wanted to prohibit 
headscarves. In line with Germany’s weak anti-discrimination framework, headscarf-
wearing teachers had few opportunities to claim rights equal to nuns’ in expressing their 
religion. Several judges considered the wording of Christian Occidental laws to be 
constitutional, illustrating they also continued to retain a rather mono-culturalist national 
self-understanding. Moreover, neither the Federal Constitutional Court nor the German 
Equal Treatment Committee problematised the indirect discriminatory effects neutrally 
formulated laws have for Muslim minorities, many of whom are ethnic minorities. In 
contrast to the Dutch ETC, the FCC argued that because “the prohibition is limited to 
teachers in public schools,” headscarf-wearing women could still teach at (very few) 
private religious schools and were thus not discriminated against (HRW, 2009: 32).  
I expected that the changes in German citizenship laws would create a more 
favourable structure for hijab-wearing women to claim equal rights and recognition. This 
expectation was only partially met. Deputies still managed to push for partial bans on 
headscarves only, which directly discriminate against Muslims, by framing headscarves as 
symbols that could be interpreted by third persons as symbolising an Islamic 
fundamentalism at odds with constitutional values. Native religious symbols, in contrast, 
were represented as being in line with liberal democratic values that had emerged out of a 
Christian culture. Nonetheless, we have also seen how actors referred to institutionalized 
principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination, both in national and international 
law, which discredited nativist frames that demanded the assimilation of migrants to a 
Christian Leading culture. Still, even though there were no institutional constraints to opt 
for multicultural recognition of the headscarf, only few states have accommodated 
headscarves (particularly if we take into consideration that most states are Eastern German 
states where the issue has not –yet - been politicised). This seems to point at a path-
dependent effect of Germany’s citizenship and immigrant integration patterns, which 
continue to emphasize the assimilation of immigrants to a German (secularised) majority 
culture in public institutions rather than multiculturalism. 
The deeply institutionalised logic that immigrants have to integrate and modernise 
according to a European framework privileged those migrant actors who echoed the 
dominant view that headscarves were not (only) religious symbols, but also political 
symbols of an ideology conflicting with a European civilisation. Such was the case of 
Bassam Tibi, a prominent political scientist of Turkish descent who had informed the 
Minister of Education of Baden-Württemberg in 1998 that headscarves were no religious 
duty in Islam, and advocated fostering a secularised Islam.528 Several other migrants’ self-
organisations warned against the tolerance of the headscarf as an expression of a 
fundamentalist stream of Islam, at odds with European values of gender equality, such as 
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the German Turkish community (‘Turkische Gemeinde Deutschland’, TGD)529, the 
Turkish federation Berlin-Brandenburg (‘Türkische Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg’, 
TBB)530, and the Turkish Islamic umbrella organisation DITIB.531 Their claim for a fully 
secularised neutral state resonated in Berlin, where deputies of the SPD, FDP and the 
Green Party voiced the concerns of the representative of the Alevi community 
(‘Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland’) that young girls from liberal Muslim homes fall 
victim to a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam and are in need of a secular public 
school.532 Yet while their frames resonated in the political debate, they could not prevent 
that parties like the CDU co-opted their frames to push for a partial ban on only 
headscarves.  
Non-governmental actors that pleaded for the inclusion of hijab-wearing women as 
teachers were the Foreigner Council (Ausländerbeirat) in Rhineland-Palatinate533 and the 
Intercultural Council of Germany (an NGO working on cultural diversity), who were 
invited to parliamentary debates in Rhineland-Palatinate.534 Integration Officers working 
within state institutions communicated their views to politicians, subsequently providing 
procedural access to policy debates. Only in left-wing Berlin - generally considered one of 
the more liberal cities in regards to immigrant integration (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004) - did 
they manage to rally support for policy measures to protect hijab-wearing women from 
discrimination, and then only in the private sector of the labour market. Regional 
differences in immigrant integration policies and processes can therefore explain the 
differences in policy responses to the hijab, together with differences in party 
constellations (see below). 
 
Gender machinery and women’s emancipation policies 
Germany’s emancipation policies have largely dealt with women in their roles as mothers 
and caretakers. The weakly institutionalised gender equality approach of German 
emancipation patterns may explain why deputies managed to pass laws that directly 
discriminated against Muslim women, on intersecting grounds of religion, gender and sex. 
Even though the Federal Constitutional Court had refuted the claim that headscarves 
conflicted with principles of gender-equality, relying upon the insights of a feminist 
ethnographer that women can voluntarily choose to cover, it argued that teachers’ 
headscarves could be forbidden because of the potential conflict that emerges when third 
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persons interpret the headscarf as gender-oppressive. Deputies seized this opportunity to 
push for bans on teachrs’ headscarves, framing these as symbols of oppression from which 
children needed to be shielded. The FCC did not consider the gendered effects of (neutrally 
formulated) laws that prevent practicing Muslim women from embarking upon public 
school careers.  
Traditional women’s lobby organisations or grass roots associations were not 
invited to any policy debate. Moreover, the targets of the policy debates were fully 
neglected. Not a single headscarf-wearing woman was represented at decision-making 
moments. Secular liberal Muslim feminists, in contrast, did manage to be invited to policy 
debates as authorities on Islam to explain the gendered meanings of the headscarf in Islam 
and Muslim culture. Feminist lawyer Seyran Ateş (SPD) was invited to a public hearing in 
Baden-Württemberg,535 and (the Kurdish) Necla Kelec and (the Alevi) Serap Cileli to a 
hearing in Rhineland-Palatinate.536 The latter argued that the headscarf was not a religious 
duty, but rather a cultural patriarchal tradition and a tool of Islamic fundamentalists to 
spread gender-unequal doctrines, arguing in favour of a neutral public school to protect 
Muslim girls. They found support within the German women’s movement, such as the 
well-known feminist activist Alica Schwarzer who compared the headscarf to the yellow 
star that Jews were forced to carry during the Nazi regime,537 or Halina Bedowski who 
drew a parallel with patriarchy within Christian churches but nonetheless objected to a ban 
(Berghahn & Rostock, 2009: 482). Conservative Union parties co-opted such feminist 
frames to push for bans on headscarves that exempted Christian signs, in order to sustain 
the status quo rather than improving women’s rights.  
This resulted in a rather hegemonic representation of Muslim migrant women’s 
interests and identities, with secular women defining the path to emancipation in terms of a 
break with Islam. The paradox is that this exclusion seems to contribute to their 
mobilisation, as we have also seen in France and the Netherlands. Lacking institutional 
venues, various Muslim women demonstrated in Berlin against the ban in civil service in 
January 2004, with women carrying banners stating ‘No force in Islam’ or ‘My head 
belongs to me’.538 New Muslim women’s associations emerged that critiqued stereotypical 
images of hijab -women as oppressed victims or fundamentalists in online appeals and 
letters to newspapers.539 After the first Islam Conference of September 27, 2006, where 
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secular Muslim feminists like Necla Kelec were invited together with a wide range of 
(male-dominated) moderate Islamic organisations but only one headscarf-wearing 
woman540, several women within male-dominated Muslim umbrella organisations in 2007 
created the first national Muslim women’s organisation, the Action Alliance 
(‘Aktionzbündniss’).541 The Green and the Social Democrat parties have supported the 
Alliance and organised a conference on Islam and feminism.542    
In contrast to what state feminist theories suggest, it were not gender equality 
officers but female Commissioners of Integration and Women’s Commissioners for the 
Islamic Community (to the government of Hessen)543 who communicated their frames. 
They pointed to the gendered effects of legislation and pled for the self-determination of 
Muslim women over their strategies of emancipation.544 Furthermore, they pointed at the 
counterproductive effects of bans for the emancipation process of Muslim women, such as 
former Berlin Commissioner on Foreigners, Barbara John (CDU), in a hearing on the hijab 
for the parliament in Rhineland-Palatinate. She argued that a ban not only limited migrant 
women’s access to the labour market, but would also pressure women to choose side of 
their communities, surrendering to gender-oppressive community norms rather than 
criticizing them.545 Together with Berlin Integration Officer Marieluise Beck (Greens) and 
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the CDU politician Rita Süssmuth546, John launched a petition in 2003 to argue against 
bans on headscarves and for solidarity with all those who combat Islamism, including 
those with headscarves.547 The appeal was signed by more than seventy prominent women 
working in different sectors including high state functions. The appeal also triggered 
counter reactions of secular feminists who considered accommodating gender oppressive 
practices within religion, such as the headscarf, an offense to their secular feminist 
project.548  
We have seen how only in Berlin, generally categorised as a gender-equal friendly 
state (Lang, 2009), feminist claims for equal opportunities in the labour-market and 
economic independence as means to tackle gender inequalities shaped actual policy 
responses. This was the result of the active lobby of PDS/die Linke, whose Fraction leader 
Udo Wolf referred to the call of Marielouise Beck in a parliamentary debate on the hijab in 
2004. It pushed for anti-discrimination measures to foster hijab-wearing women’s 
acceptance in society, together with its coalition partner SPD and Integration officer 
Günther Piening (Bündniss/die Grünen).549 In the Berlin integration report of 2005 of the 
SPD/PDS government it was written that “family often means also a submission to father 
and brother”, which illustrates the predominant view that gender inequality was situated in 
the realm of the family and Muslim culture. But it also represented hijab-wearing women 
as ‘often highly educated and qualified young Turkish’ women who chose to cover to 
emphasize their individuality but can’t find a job due to societal prejudices.550 The 
combination of its immigrant integration regime and gender machinery may explain why 
the participation and discrimination frame resulted in anti-discrimination policies, even 
though Berlin simultaneously passed Germany’s most far-reaching law that not only 
forbids religious symbols for teachers but also for other civil servants. 
 
General political opportunity structures 
Germany’s federal state system, and the subsequent decentralisation of certain policies like 
education, explains why different policy responses could emerge within Germany. The 
Federal Government was hesitant to correct states that did not conform to the jurisprudence 
of the Federal Constitutional Court. Some FDP members of the Bundestag asked the 
Federal Government for a response to the new legislation that was introduced by Baden-
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Württemberg.551 Nonetheless, both the Red-Green coalition (1998-2005) and the Grand 
Coalition CDU-SPD (2005-2009) argued that it was up to the federal states to decide upon 
the place of religion in public schools and institutions.  
Contrary to the expectation that the Federal Constitutional Court functioned as an 
institutional constraint, it actually created opportunities by decentralising the question of 
conflicting rights to the legislatures of federal states. In line with my expectation, it had no 
power to correct states that ignored its jurisprudence of equal treatment. Also in line with 
my expectations, Germany’s proportional electoral system only constrained the capacity of 
the state to act in case the two largest parties, SPD and CDU, ruled together (e.g. in 
Schleswig-Holstein). When one of the parties ruled alone, or with a small party like the 
FDP or the PDS, states’ governments had much capacity to act upon policy frames of the 
majority in the legislature.  
  
Power constellations  
Table 7 illustrates that Christian-Occidental legislation was passed every time a 
conservative government of the CDU ruled, either alone or together with the FDP. When 
assessing the voting behaviour of parties at the federal state level (see: Henkes & Kneip, 
2009), it becomes clear that the CDU factions always voted in favour of such legislation. 
The FDP and the SPD appeared more divided about the desirability of a law. The FDP 
always supported restrictive legislation if it formed a coalition with the CDU, but rejected 
it when it was an opposition party (Henkes & Kneip, 2009). In the former case it framed 
the discrimination between faiths as unconstitutional; whereas in the latter case it endorsed 
a frame that the headscarf conflicted with a Christian-Occidental cultural tradition and 
neutrality. The SPD generally rejected legislation that differentiated between Christian and 
Islamic religious symbolism (as an opposition party in Bayern, Hesse, Lower-Saxony and 
North Rhine-Westphalia, and as part of the Government in Schleswig-Holstein and 
Rhineland-Palatinate). Only in Saarland and in Baden-Württemberg, it voted in favour of 
Christian-Occidental legislation (as an opposition party), but this can be explained by the 
fact that the Federal Administrative Court had not yet concluded that such legislation was 
unconstitutional.  
Nonetheless, the SPD appeared an ambivalent ally for hijab-wearing woman, 
initiating bans on all religious expressions in public functions (e.g. as a government party) 
in the city-states Bremen and Berlin, and eventually also favouring restrictions on religious 
dress in Schleswig-Holstein. As we have seen in the Netherlands and France as well, the 
Social Democrats increasingly adopted certain elements of the discourse of the 
conservative Union parties in regard to immigrant integration. The then-Federal Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder (SPD), for instance, said on 22nd November 2004 that ‘immigrants’ had 
to conform to constitutional values by removing their headscarves when teaching in public 
schools, also to prevent parallel societies.552 Migrants should not get the impression that 
they could be exempt from such citizenship duties (enjoying a so-called ‘extra-Recht’), 
implicitly linking Muslim migrant minorities with Islamic extremists that threaten the 
German constitution.553 The President of the Federal Bundestag, Wolfgang Thierse (SPD), 
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similarly argued that migrants had to conform to the ‘free democrat order’ of Germany by 
removing headscarves in public service functions and respecting gender equality.554  
Only PDS/die Linke in Berlin and Bündniss ‘90/Die Grünen defended a 
multicultural citizenship, but its institutionalised power was too small to shape policy 
outcomes. The Greens always rejected law proposals targeting headscarves, except for 
Berlin. From my data, it appears that the Left faced a dilemma: while it wanted to include 
migrant minorities in the German nation and continue to defend gender equality, several of 
their own constituents with Turkish immigrant background called for bans on headscarves 
to liberate young girls from religious patriarchal peer pressure. This dovetails with the 
finding that the SPD was largely left in limbo when conservative right-wing parties 
managed to appropriate gender equality frames in order to sustain a monoculturalist idea of 
a Christian Occidental nation, co-opting frames of secular Turkish immigrants in favour of 
a strict secularism.  
 
I must conclude with Christian Joppke (2009) that the last word on headscarves has not yet 
been said in Germany. This chapter has shown that institutional structures and policy pasts 
are not static, but can change because of framing by actors. The hijab debate in Germany 
illustrates that actors can use institutional trajectories of state-church and citizenship to 
favour different and sometimes conflicting paths. Different institutional settings interact in 
such framing contests, which are dynamic and evolving. As we have seen, this framing 
contest led in some states to some significant changes and breaks with historical 
trajectories of state-church patterns, while other states sustained the status quo. The path-
dependent and intersecting effect of state-church, citizenship and gender regimes is 
therefore mediated through the political process, with shifting power constellations being 
significant explanations of how institutions shaped policy outcomes. The analysis also 
showed that actors seized international events as opportunities to frame their claims for 
policy reform, such as the murder on Theo van Gogh in the neighbouring Netherlands. 
Finally, international jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights enabled actors 
to push for policy changes that have moved Germany, even unwanted, closer to France 
with regard to its state-church relations. Actors also used the EC Equality Directives to 
dispute partial bans on the headscarf only, but they could not prevent the passing of 
discriminatory laws in five German states that continue to propagate an the ideal of a 
Christian-Judeo nation that excludes Muslim minorities.   
 
                                                           
554
 Thierse, Wolfgang (2004), ‘Auf der Waagschale – das Verhältnis von religiöser Identität und 
demokratischem Rechtsstaat. Rede des Präsidenten des Deutschen Bundestages Wolfgang Thierse 
auf der Frühjahrstagung des Politischen Clubs der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing’ (March 19, 
2004). To be retrieved from the archive of the Bundestag. 
  
224 
Chapter 10. Comparative analysis and conclusion 
 
10.1 Introduction  
This study has examined the politicisation of the hijab in the Netherlands, France and 
Germany from 1985 until 2007. In all three countries, the Islamic headscarf, and later the 
face veil, became contentious issues in political debates, but at different moments of time, 
in different domains, and each country has developed different policies in response. My 
research analysed and compared the policy-formation and policy-making processes on this 
issue in the three countries over time. The starting premise was that three divergent 
historical policy legacies and their underlying cleavages - state-church relations, 
citizenship and migrant integration, and gender equality - influence the ways in which 
actors frame this particular issue and subsequently structure policy responses. By taking 
into account the influence of shifting power constellations and institutional characteristics 
of each country’s political system on the policy-making process, I linked the political-
process theory with institutional regime theories to explain country-specific policy 
responses.  
Two questions were addressed in this study, one descriptive and one explanatory: 
What differences and similarities existed in the framing of and policy responses to the 
hijab in France, the Netherlands, and Germany from 1985 until 2007? To what extent can 
general and issue-specific political opportunity structures explain differences in the 
framing and regulating of the hijab? I will discuss my findings regarding these questions 
in sections 10.2 and 10.3 respectively. In section 10.4 I will conclude with some reflections 
on the strengths and shortcomings of my theoretical framework, ending with suggestions 
for further research.  
 
10.2 Findings: cross-national differences and similarities in politicisation of the hijab  
In France, debates over pupils’ headscarves flared up in 1989, and remained salient until 
2004, when a law was passed prohibiting headscarves and other signs that ‘clearly display’ 
someone’s religious affiliation in public schools. From the outset of the debate, pupils’ 
headscarves have been framed in terms of a religious manifestation in conflict with French 
neutrality, ‘laïcité’. Deputies deliberated whether, by displaying their religious beliefs, 
headscarf-wearing girls infringed upon the separation between church and state and 
endangered the freedom of conscience of other pupils. The idea that the headscarf was not 
only an expression of personal religious faith but also an instrument used by Islamic 
fundamentalists was also visible, but initially countered with the representation of the 
headscarf as a symbol of immigrants’ marginalisation. As long as the state would integrate 
immigrants socially and economically, their cultural emancipation followed naturally, as it 
was believed. Moreover, a segregation frame structured policy debates, portraying the 
headscarf as a divisive symbol of politicised ethno-religious difference that introduced 
discrimination into the public school. Over time, this diagnostic frame was extended with 
the emerging problem of anti-Semitism and sexual violence. The headscarf became a 
symbol for an emblematic problem of Islamic fundamentalism encroaching on core 
Republican values of individual liberty, equality and solidarity.  
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Up until 2004, the Government had allowed schools to expel headscarf-wearing 
girls, in case it was proven they had worn their headscarves in such an ‘ostentatious’ way 
as to constitute proselytising or provocation. In 1993, it established a headscarf mediator 
within the Ministry of Education to mediate in case of conflict between schools and pupils 
or parents. Ten years later, both the Socialist Left and the Right came to favour a 
Secularism Law forbidding the display of all conspicuous religious signs in public schools, 
arguing that the law would enable pupils to see each other as equal members of the French 
nation, protecting visible Jewish minorities from discrimination as well as unveiled 
Muslim girls who fell victim to the sexual policing of female modesty in French migrant-
populated suburbs by orthodox peers. The Clothing Directive, sent to public schools after 
the law was implemented, noted that forbidden items included large crucifixes, kippahs 
and headscarves. The law does not apply to parents or university students.  
Public school teachers and civil servants in France must keep their personal 
religious affiliations private during work for reasons of public neutrality, a policy which 
has never been challenged by any deputy. In French courts, not only judges and public 
prosecutors but even defendants, members of the public jury and clerks can be asked to 
remove headscarves if the judge considers them a threat to the order in the courtroom, or 
believes that they will jeopardise the impartiality and independence of the jury. French 
decrees also officially stipulate that people’s pictures for official identification purposes 
must be taken bare-headed. On two occasions the French State Council found it legitimate 
to require women to remove headscarves on identity cards because.555 
In 2008, the French debate shifted to Islamic face veils. The State Council had 
argued that a Moroccan spouse of a Frenchman who wore a face veil was legitimately 
refused French nationality. The burqa was framed firstly as a problem conflicting with 
Republican values of human dignity and women’s rights, even when voluntarily chosen, 
and secondly, as a social-cohesion and public-order problem. Concealing one’s face 
conflicted with the Republican civic pact of solidarity and, moreover, constituted a public-
security problem by turning wearers unidentifiable. In 2010, the French Parliament and 
Senate passed a law project banning all kinds of face veils in all public spaces, against the 
advice of the State Council that had only considered contextual bans legitimate. Women 
who continue to conceal their faces will be fined or sent to a citizenship course, while men 
forcing their wives to cover can be sent to prison or receive a €30,000 fine. The 
Constitutional Council has declared the law proposal to be consistent with national and 
international human rights principles. Only in houses of worship can the law not apply. 
In the Netherlands, in contrast, both pupils and teachers have been allowed to cover 
without significant controversy. In 1985, the Dutch Minister of Education stipulated that 
pupils have the religious-freedom right to wear headscarves in public schools. In 2003, the 
coalition Government of CDA, VVD and D66 confirmed this position in a clothing 
directive, referring to religious-freedom and non-discrimination rights. Public school 
teachers are also allowed to cover. Prohibitions on teachers’ headscarves were framed as 
obstacles to migrant women’s equal access to the labour market, hindering their 
emancipation and integration in Dutch society. In contrast to French private schools, Dutch 
private denominational schools, both Christian and Islamic, gained the right to create 
clothing rules that discriminate on grounds of religion in order to protect their particular 
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denominational philosophy or belief. The hijab only became a controversial topic in the 
Netherlands after 2003, when politicians questioned public judicial and police officers’ 
right to wear headscarves. Similar to France, a majority of Parliament considered the 
display of religious symbols and dress to jeopardise people’s trust in the independence and 
impartiality of the state. One year later, the Government agreed that although regular civil 
servants should have the right to wear religious dress, restrictions on the judiciary and law 
enforcement were legitimate for reasons of neutrality.  
When the debate shifted to face veils in 2005, a change occurred in the framing of 
the issue. While participation was initially seen as a means of emancipation, with the state 
being responsible for removing cultural obstacles, participation now became the goal. 
Veiled women were seen as excluding themselves, rather than as being discriminated 
against, for by wearing face veils they hindered face-to-face communication and social 
interaction. Face veils were also discussed as symbols of oppression in conflict with Dutch 
values of gender equality, as well as an impediment to social cohesion and public order by 
symbolising Muslim’s segregation from society and creating feelings of alienation among 
citizens. As France, this segregation frame also included a security frame. In 2005, the 
majority of Dutch Parliament voted in favour of a full burqa ban, which was advised 
against by the Council of State as a violation of equality and religious freedom. In 2009, 
the Dutch Government announced a context-specific ban on all types of face covers in the 
realms of education and civil service. The subsequent year, the new Government 
announced its plans to ban face covering in public. 
In Germany, the hijab did not trigger any political debates except for some regional 
debates about teachers’ headscarves in 1997. As in the Netherlands, pupils’ right to cover 
in public schools has been largely uncontroversial, as it is generally interpreted as a 
religious freedom right and the educational right of parents to raise children according to 
their own beliefs. Before 2003, there had been no laws prohibiting the wearing of religious 
dress in any public-service function. All over Germany, civil servants (including teachers) 
and other public employees had to behave moderately, impartially and neutrally. Neither 
the laws concerning public officers (both national and federal) nor the corporate contracts 
regulating public employees mentioned anything that would imply that the expression of 
personal religious affiliations would contravene these duties.  
After 2003, regulation of this matter shifted to the Länder level, due to the ruling of 
the Federal Constitutional Court that held that legislatures were free to reformulate 
teachers’ duties of neutrality in a stricter way in order to prevent conflicts. The negative 
right of pupils to be free from religious indoctrination was allowed to outweigh the positive 
right of teachers to express their religious belonging. Deputies seized the opportunity and 
called for bans. They portrayed headscarves as conflicting with state neutrality and the 
negative freedom of pupils. This was linked to an oppression frame that argued that a ban 
on teachers’ headscarves would lift pressure on liberal Muslim girls to conform to 
patriarchal gender roles, thereby fostering their integration. Headscarves were also framed 
as symbols of cultural segregation and of a Political Islam. Crucifixes and kippahs, by 
contrast, were framed as cultural symbols expressing a ‘Christian Occidental’ value-system 
that had shaped Germany’s modern democracy.  
Eight of Germany’s sixteen federal states introduced new school or neutrality laws. 
Three of these laws forbid teachers from wearing any sign of religious, philosophical or 
political affiliation (Berlin, Bremen and Lower Saxony). In the remaining five states, laws 
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contain exception or value-reference clauses for the display of ‘Christian Occidental’ 
cultural values and traditions. In practice, nuns’ habits and yarmulkes are still tolerated 
while teachers who insist upon wearing headscarves are fired or dismissed (Baden-
Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia and Saarland). In Baden-
Württemberg and Berlin, restrictions on religious dress exist for personnel in kindergartens 
as well, and Hesse and Berlin have introduced laws that also require regular civil servants 
to appear neutral by removing religious signs and dress. In Germany’s remaining eight 
states, no laws have been introduced. Five of these are Eastern German states, where 
headscarves remain a scarce phenomenon and have not (yet) triggered any debates. In the 
three remaining states, law proposals failed to pass, either because prohibitions on religious 
dress were considered to conflict with Germany’s open neutrality tradition, or because 
bans were seen as negative for migrant women’s emancipation and integration.  
To summarise, different frames have clearly structured the policy responses in all 
three countries. Even though deputies sometimes discussed similar problems of neutrality, 
gender equality or social cohesion, these diagnostic frames resonated differently and 
resulted in different prognostic frames. Table 8 lists all policy responses that resulted from 
the framing contest in the three countries in question. The differences are largest in the 
educational domain, with France prohibiting all religious expressions in public schools for 
reasons of secularism, while these are accommodated in the Netherlands and Germany for 
reasons of religious freedom. Moreover, the fact that five German states passed neutrality 
laws that exempt Christian and Jewish religious expressions can be explained by the 
resonance of the Christian Occidental frame that did not appear in the French and Dutch 
policy debates. Comparing policy responses in other civil service functions, a difference is 
that the Netherlands accommodates religious dress for most public functions, while this 
has not even been considered a viable policy alternative in France, and two German Länder 
have already introduced restrictive laws to prevent claims in these domains. This 
difference is mostly a result from the greater resonance of a participation and 
discrimination frame in the Netherlands, where discrimination was framed as an obstacle 
to Muslim women’s emancipation and integration.  
But there are also similarities between the three countries, where the hijab has 
increasingly been politicised after the turn of the century in terms of social cohesion, 
public order and security. This legitimised calls upon the state to act on behalf of its 
citizens by drawing boundaries to cultural tolerance and using legislation to solve social 
conflicts. More recently, in all three countries face covers have become contentious issues, 
framed in terms of public order and security and, to a lesser extent, gender oppression. In 
France, they will now also be completely forbidden in public spaces, an option that may be 
followed by Germany and even the Netherlands if the current government proceeds with 
its plans. Another similarity is the discrepancy that has emerged in all three countries 
between the judicial and legislative branches of the state, with the judiciary often taking a 
more tolerant stance towards the hijab than the legislature. Consequently, a trend can been 
detected towards a ‘politicisation of the law’ and a ‘juridification of politics’, which went 
hand-in-hand with the move from a legal tradition of codification (law mostly following 
social change or jurisprudence) towards a tradition of modification (in which the law has 
the instrumental function of forging social change) (see Koopmans, 1970 in Loth and Mak 
2007: 83). To what extent can political opportunity structures explain these differences and 
similarities? 
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Table 8 Cross-national differences and similarities in policy responses to the hijab 
 Netherlands Germany France 
Face veils 
Public 
space 
Restrictive clothing 
directive for pupils and 
teachers in 2003, for 
civil servants in 2009; 
law pending to prohibit 
face veils in all 
educational 
establishments. Not 
allowed on identity 
pictures. 
Some local policy statements 
that face veils can be forbidden 
in educational establishments. 
Not allowed on identity pictures. 
In 2010 law project 
passed that will prohibit 
face veils in public space, 
except in houses of 
worship. Fine and/or 
compulsory citizenship 
test for women; fine 
and/or imprisonment for 
people forcing women to 
cover. Not allowed on 
identity pictures. 
Headscarves 
Pupils Tolerant interpretation 
of law since 1985 
Tolerant interpretation of law 
since 1998 
In 2004 law implemented 
that prohibits all 
‘ostensible’ religious in 
public schools. Not in 
universities or private 
schools.  
Teachers  Tolerant interpretation 
of law since 1998  
In 2003/4 laws implemented in 8 
federal states. In other 8 federal 
states tolerant interpretation of 
law or non-regulated. 
Prohibitive interpretation 
of law since 1989 for all 
public servants 
Laic 
regulations: 
Berlin, 
Bremen, 
Lower-Saxony 
 
Christian-
occidental 
legislation: 
Baden-
Württemberg 
(also 
kindergartens), 
Bavaria, 
Saarland, 
Hesse, North-
Rineland 
Westphalia 
Civil 
servants 
Tolerant interpretation 
of law since 2004, 
except for police and 
judiciary (since 2001) 
In 2004 laws implemented in 
Hesse/Berlin that forbid display 
of religious, political and 
philosophical expressions for all 
civil servants, including police 
and judiciary  
Prohibitive interpretation 
of law since 1989 for all 
public servants 
Passports Tolerant interpretation 
of law  
Tolerant interpretation of law  Prohibited in decrees 
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10.3 Comparing the influence of national POS on the politicisation of the hijab 
10.3.1 Cleavages 
In all three countries, religious cleavages structured the debates about the hijab, which may 
explain its varying degree of contentiousness. In Germany and the Netherlands, where such 
cleavages were pacified, debates about pupils’ headscarves were not contentious. Both 
states have historically granted religious groups a large autonomy in the realm of 
schooling. There was little contestation of the right of families to socialise their children in 
public schools according to their own religious beliefs. This contrasts with the saliency of 
this issue in France, where religious conflicts between the secular Republic and the 
Catholic Church have historically been fierce (particularly in the realm of education and 
childcare), and only calmed down in the second half of the 20th century. With the 
increasing visibility of Muslim pupils displaying their religious beliefs in public schools, 
an old-school conflict reappeared between secular hardliners and moderates. This cleavage 
intersected with new conflicts over nationality and ethnic diversity, as well as with a 
lingering gender cleavage. Secular Republicans adhering to the ideal of non-differentialist 
citizenship, and women’s groups that had long agitated against the public power of the 
Catholic Church, now mobilised for a Secularism Law that, however, indirectly targeted 
the headscarf and Muslim immigrants. Multicultural feminists, in turn, now found 
themselves mobilising against the law together with conservative Islamic groups whose 
agenda they did not necessarily share.  
Religious cleavages in Germany have been pacified for nearly a century, but 
conflicts about the place of religion flared up during the hijab debates when framed in 
terms of the nationality cleavage. When Germany opened up citizenship for ethnic 
minority migrants, conservative parties tried to preserve a homogenous ethnic conception 
of the nation by framing the headscarf as antithetical to national values, notably of gender 
equality. They mobilised for legislation to protect the public role of Christianity as an 
intrinsic part of German culture, while simultaneaously relegating practices of ‘foreign’ 
religions to a private realm. This triggered the mobilisation proponents of a civic concept 
of the nation, who were, however, divided about the role of religion in public life. 
Furthermore, the Federal state appeared hesitant to repoliticise regional cleavages by 
intervering with the autonomy of the Länder regarding this issue. Due to the gendering of 
the debate in nationalistic terms, also scant mobilisation of women’s groups occurred. In 
order to protect Muslim girls from religious oppression, some of these paradoxically allied 
together with conservatives and Christians for a ban on headscarves.   
The low saliency of the headscarf in the Netherlands can similarly be explained by 
the pacification of historical cleavages around religion, the nation and gender. The public 
visibility of headscarves was initially not considered to be a threat to the old pillarised 
notions of the nation, in which religious group differences had been recognised and 
institutionalised. However, religious cleavages reappeared when the burqa debate was 
framed as a threat to intercommunity relations and to Dutch national characteristics of 
sexual liberty and equality. Secular liberals, populist right-wing and Christian democrats 
came out in favour of a full ban on burqas in public space that required some degree of 
assimilation of Muslim immigrants. This in turn triggered the mobilisation of orthodox 
Christian minorities, who feared the intrusion of the secular state in hirtherto ‘private’ 
domains of the family and education, as well as of some feminists and multiculturalists 
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who opposed this gendering of the nation in mono-cultural terms. So far, however, the 
pupil’s headscarf has not yet become a salient issue, which may be explained by the 
pacification of historical conflicts over religion in the realm of education. 
 
In short, the headscarf played a strong symbolic role of outsized importance, 
representing contests over national identity related to the intersection of fault lines around 
religion, the nation, and gender/sexuality. Each of these three cleavages has shaped the 
others in nationally specific ways, resulting in a particular constellation of opportunities 
that enabled and constrained the mobilisation of proponents of bans on hijabs in varying 
ways. While this constellation of cleavages particularly explains the saliency of pupils’ 
headscarves in France, we have seen how Muslim women’s religious dress also became 
contentious in the other two countries when related to national identity, sexuality and 
ethno-religious diversity. Historical conflicts about religion that were deemed pacified 
reappeared when the headscarf was used to draw cultural boundaries between national 
insiders and outsiders. In all three countries, women’s unveiled bodies became markers of 
alleged gender-egalitarian national cultures that Muslim immigrants did not (yet) share, 
whether represented as ‘laic’, ‘Christian Occidental’ or ‘liberal’ nations. My analysis of the 
hijab debates thus corroborates the theory that women and their bodies function as markers 
of (national) communities (Longman, 2003; Yuval-Davis, 1997). Moreover, it shows that 
cleavages deemed pacified can flare up again when new issues implicate the same frames 
that were used in the old debates, resulting in historically unexpected alliances between 
opponents and proponents of bans on hijabs (see 10.3.3). 
 
10.3.2 General and issue-specific institutions and policy legacies  
State-church patterns: 
Differences in countries’ institutionalisation and regulation of religion can, to a large 
extent, explain differences in policy responses to the hijab in the realm of education. 
French deputies successfully framed the accommodation of pupils’ headscarves as 
conflicting with the separation between state and church, referring to the educational laws 
of the 1880s and the 1905 law on laïcité. In the Netherlands and Germany, actors could not 
refer to such institutionalised policy pasts of separation. But even French politicians 
disagreed whether the display of religious symbols by pupils conflicted with laïcité. While 
laïcité historically meant that only teachers had to privatise their faith, the new law requires 
that pupils now also remove religious symbols. The current law thus actually indicates a 
shift towards a more combative laïcité than had hitherto been practiced. The same holds 
true for the ban on burqas, framed in terms of public security rather than secularism, and 
thus restricting certain religious practices based on a much wider notion of the public 
sphere than had previously existed.  
By contrast, Dutch policy debates about pupils’ and teachers’ headscarves were 
clearly shaped by the institutional logics of Dutch pillarisation. Donning the headscarf in 
public schools was interpreted as an individual religious freedom right for both pupils and 
teachers, whereas orthodox religious schools (both Islamic and Christian schools) gained 
the right to create dress codes that discriminate against pupils on grounds of religion. This 
confirms Monsma & Soper’s (2009) description of Dutch state-church relations as an 
‘even-handed’ treatment of different religious and non-religious worldviews. However, 
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this pillarisation logic did not extend to the police force and the courts, where religious 
symbols are forbidden for reasons of state neutrality and the separation between church 
and state. In other words, different logics shaped state-church patterns in different 
domains, with neutrality gaining a different meaning in public office functions than in the 
educational realm (see also Maussen, 2009).  
Finally, Germany’s headscarf policies challenge the theory most that policy 
responses necessarily arise from the constraints or lock-in effects of past state-church 
patterns. On the one hand, the policy responses of eight German states fit the ‘open and 
cooperative neutrality’ character of German secularism by accommodating and tolerating 
pupils’ and teachers’ headscarves. On the other hand, legislation in eight states forbidding 
headscarves for teachers clearly departs from this tradition. Five states tried to combine an 
open neutrality tradition with a law that prohibited religious dress but exempted Christian 
and Jewish symbols by referring to their federal constitutions and educational laws. This 
fits Germany’s state-church patterns that grant a privileged, institutionalised status to 
Christian churches which close cooperation with the state in the domain of education. But 
the laws passed by three other states, which take a strictly secular approach, clearly depart 
from historical traditions. 
 
Citizenship and migrant integration policies: 
We have seen how French deputies framed headscarves as a communitarian drift and a 
rejection of Republican individual citizenship. Muslim migrants were expected to prioritise 
their national identities over their particular Islamic identities, as if they were mutually 
incompatible. Although deputies differed about the means – gradual assimilation through 
inclusion or a priori exclusion - the Republican school as an instrument to ‘integrate’ girls 
and transition them from group members to individual French citizens was hardly 
challenged in Parliament. When the headscarf was linked to ethnoreligous conflicts 
between Arab and Jewish minorities, Republican non-differentiated citizenship was again 
juxtaposed with multiculturalism as a motor of integration. The fact that Socialist 
politicians initially objected a law project that bans hijabs as ‘ostentatious’ religious signs 
and instead favoured a law that would ban all visible religious signs only illustrates the 
persistency of the colour-blind ideal of French Republicanism. The burqa was also 
univocally framed as conflicting with Republican citizenship values and as undermining 
national unity, even though PS members would eventually abstain from voting. In other 
words, while taking different stances on actual bans on the hijab, all actors referred to and 
hence institutionalised a Republican model of citizenship as a normative and cognitive 
frame of reference.  
In the Netherlands, visible group identities were not problematised as conflicting 
with Dutch citizenship until the turn of the century. In contrast, being forced to interact 
with a diverse cross-section of society in public schools was considered desirable for social 
integration. Furthermore, we have seen how the Green Party successfully framed the 
accommodation of headscarves for teachers and civil servants as enhancing immigrants’ 
participation in Dutch society, from which emancipation was expected to follow. The 
Equal Treatment Commission functioned as an important institutional venue to facilitate 
claims of equal rights and recognition, enabling actors to frame even neutrally formulated 
bans as indirect discrimination. This all fits Dutch integration policy paradigms of the 
1990s, when the government emphasised the inclusion of ‘diversity’ and the social-
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economic integration of individual immigrants. Moreover, in line with changes in Dutch 
citizenship and immigrant integration policies, we have seen how burqas later became 
politicised as conflicting with Dutch norms and values. Context-specific bans on face 
covers aimed to foster ‘shared’ and later ‘active’ citizenship, public security and social 
cohesion. Even though there were no institutional constraints, multicultural recognition 
was no longer considered an appropriate policy to deal with ethnic differences. The shift 
from multiculturaklism to assimilationism in Dutch integraton policies is thus in line with 
the shift in the framing and regulating of the hijab, although clear differenes with France 
remain. 
Finally, the political incorporation of migrants into the organisation of the state, 
which Germany embarked upon in 2000 by opening up citizenship for non-ethnic German 
migrants, did not go hand in hand with the symbolic incorporation of Islam as part of the 
imagined national community (see also Koenig, 2003: 159). We have seen how in five 
states, laws were passed that constructed the nation as a Judeo-Christian homogenous 
entity, accommodating ‘cultural’ symbols of ‘native’ religions like Christianity and 
Judaism and banning the allegedly political ‘religious’ symbols of Islam. This points at 
path-dependent effects of an exclusionary citizenship regime, albeit that immigrants’ 
outsider status now resulted from religious rather than ethnic differences, with Islam being 
contrasted with national ‘constitutional’ values. In several states, however, deputies 
rejected such laws as a form of discrimination and stigmatisation of Muslim minorities, 
which is indicative of new opportunities created by the institutional changes in Germany’s 
citizenship policies. Three states moved in the direction of the French ‘model’ by passing 
bans on all religious signs for teachers, even though no institutional constraints existed to 
opt for the Dutch ‘model’ of evenhanded accommodation. Moreover, the fact that no 
restrictive bans have (yet) been implemented in eight German states is not a result of an 
active pluralisation of public space, but rather of the absence of debates about the 
multicultural society, or of the lack of political will to change Germany’s state-church 
patterns that continue to privilege Christianity in the public realm. To conclude, the 
patterns of convergence that were observed between the three countries’ immigrant 
incorporation policies are only partly reflected in policy responses to the hijab: in all three 
countries, ethnic minority migrants are indeed expected to assimilate to a national 
community bound by universal yet typical French, German or Dutch liberal values (see 
also Joppke, 2009), but the degree and modes of assimilation still differ between countries.  
 
Gender machinery and women’s emancipation policies: 
In contrast to Germany and the Netherlands, the French debate strongly focused on the 
pupil’s headscarf as a symbol of oppression and hardly on the status of adult Muslim 
migrant women. Proponents of bans, including (new) feminist movements that benefited 
from the consolidated gender machinery in France, argued that the headscarf conflicted 
with gender equality principles and could not be accommodated by a Republic that does 
not differentiate between citizens on grounds of sex. Recently, the burqa has also been 
problematised as a symbol of sex inequality and human indignity that the Republic cannot 
endorse, even if women voluntarily choose to veil. At first sight, this rejection of 
recognising gender differentiated practices like veiling seems to be in line with Republican 
ideals of citizenship and strict equality that has also shaped French gender equality 
policies. However, Chapter six showed that French tax and social welfare policies have 
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long indirectly institutionalised gender differences of women’s motherhood. Moreover, in 
2000, the state passed a parity law that requires an equal number of seats for both sexes in 
Parliament, hence requiring the explict recognition of sexual difference. Consequently, a 
paradox occurred that sexual differences are both denied and naturalised; while Islamic 
gender specific practices of veiling are equated with sex discrimination, majority’s gender 
practices are seen as normal and even liberatory (Scott, 2005).  
Dutch parliamentary debates, in contrast, have not focused on children’s limited 
autonomy to (un)veil and hardly on adult women’s headscarves as symbols of oppression. 
In contrast to France, Dutch femocrats within left-wing parties framed the accommodation 
of the teachers’ hijab as a means for women to gain autonomy as well as a right to self-
determination, even when the women ended up choosing non-liberal lifestyles. While it 
could be argued that this is a result of the greater tradition of recognising gender difference 
in Dutch emancipation policies (Lettinga & Saharso, 2009), the framing of the German 
debate contradicts this thesis. After all, here the frame did resonate that the teacher’s 
headscarf symbolises gender inequality within Islam, whereas German social welfare 
policies have even longer been shaped by the breadwinner logic and underlying gender 
different roles than Dutch policies. In order to explain this difference in the gendering of 
pupils’ headscarves, country-differences in state-church patterns seem more important. In 
the Netherlands and Germany, schoolgirls wearing a headscarf are not perceived as a 
problem as school education was and is supposed to link up with the first socialization 
milieu: the family. The fact that in some German states teaching nuns were not viewed 
with suspicion in the public school points at the close relation that exists here between 
Christian churches and the state in the realm of education. In contrast, the aim of the public 
school in French republicanism is to free children from their communal ties and to install 
in them an idea of universal citizenship that does not differentiate according to gender or 
religion. Muslim girls covering and wanting to conceal and thus mark their gendered body 
fundamentally contradicted the Republican ideology in both ways. 
Moreover, we have seen how Dutch deputies did frame the face veil as a symbol of 
gender inequalities within immigrant cultures. The increasing focus on gender inequalities 
within the three countries’ emancipation policies that were observed in Chapter six may 
explain this similarity in the gendering of policy debates on the hijab that represent hijab-
wearing women as victims of their religious culture. Nonetheless, in contrasts to the 
Netherlands and Germany, gender arguments featured dominantly in French claims to ban 
pupil’s headscarves already well before this convergence in the three countries’ 
emancipation policies. Furthermore, differences persisted in the policy responses to this 
diagnosis, with Dutch and Berlin policies also focusing on labour-market discrimination as 
an obstacle for hijab-wearing women to attain gender inequality. This has not even been 
addressed as a problem in parliamentary debates in France, despite its consolidated gender 
machinery and the focus of French emancipation policies on women’s labour-market 
participation. National gender politics and institutions can, by themselves, not well explain 
these differences in the gendering of the policy debates and responses between the three 
countries.   
 
Comparing the effects of institutional settings, we can conclude, that country-specific 
institutions, policies and governing strategies of state-church relations, immigrant 
integration and women’s emancipation were important in enabling and constraining certain 
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policy frames that were more or less in line with previously enacted policies and 
institutions. Yet, firstly, these different institutional logics interacted in the context of 
policy debates and cannot by themselves explain policy outcomes. In contrast, different 
settings simultaneously shaped how rights and values were interpreted and balanced in the 
debates about hijabs. Changes in one institutional setting subsequently influenced the 
opportunities that another setting offered for actors to advocate or oppose rights to wear 
hijabs, and even resulted in changes of these other settings. We have seen, for instance, 
how the opening up of German citizenship laws discredited (but not impeded) laws that 
directly discriminated between the religions of natives and newcomers. This resulted in 
laws that moved Germany closer in the direction of French state-church relations, where all 
religious expressions are forbidden in state institutions. Conversely, changes in Dutch and 
French integration policy paradigms towards assimilation increasingly enabled restrictive 
frames that enabled the passing of bans on hijabs that, albeit in different domains and on 
different types of veiling, have consequences for their national state-church patterns. In 
other words, together, rather than independently, institutional frameworks - that are 
themselves subject to change - create path-dependent opportunities and constraints that can 
be used by actors to push for certain policies. 
Secondly, the impact of national institutional repertoires and policy paradigms on 
policy outcomes depends on the ways in which actors interpret and use such laws and 
policies as opportunities and constraints, as well as on their institutional capacity and 
power to act upon policy frames. The analysis shows that significant leeway exists to 
extend or change policies and their underlying institutional logics through framing 
strategies. Actors referred to similar principles and ‘models’ but attributed a different 
content to them, and reached different conclusions. For instance, both proponents and 
opponents of bans on pupils’ headscarves in France referred to Republican principles of 
laïcité, with the former arguing that this implied the privatisation of all conspicuous 
religious expressions in public schools and the latter that such a ban conflicted with the 
hands-off approach of a truly colour-blind state. Contra the theory of national citizenship 
models, moreoever, the Socialists in France once interpreted the Republican tradition as 
persuasive and welcoming instead of oppressive and excluding, while later they invoked 
the same French Republican tradition to legitimise bans on ‘ostentatious’ religious signs in 
schools and face covering in public. Through the ways in which actors framed the issue of 
the headscarf and interpreted their institutional environment, they managed to mobilise 
others and sustain, expand or change institutional logics. Hence, actors and institutions 
interact in a dynamic way, rather than that institutions determine actors’ mobilising 
strategies top-down.  
Thirdly, general state characteristics mediate the influence of policy frames on 
policy outcomes. The institutional capacity of governments to act upon policy frames can 
explain why, despite a radicalising debate, hijab policies sometimes remained rather stable 
and accommodative, for instance in the Netherlands. The Dutch Government has still not 
implemented even a light version of the initial proposal to ban burqas in public space, 
despite a parliamentary majority supporting this idea. French authorities, in contrast, 
managed to quickly pass restrictive legislation on the hijab due to the existence of majority 
cabinets, despite the negative advice of the French State Council regarding restrictions on 
the pupil headscarf (2004) or the burqa in pubic space (2009). Country differences in the 
political systems, with low electoral thresholds and minority cabinets in the Netherlands, 
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can explain why there was more frame competition in the Netherlands than in France and 
more need to forge compromises; disagreement between the coalition partners D66 and 
VVD about the course of action, falling cabinets, and the negative advice of a legal expert 
committee and the State Council have all led to Dutch policy making remaining 
incremental. The constraining role of coalition governments on policy making also 
manifested itself in Schleswig-Holstein in Germany, where the two coalition partners CDU 
and SPD could not agree upon the content of regulations and eventually sticked to the 
status quo of religious tolerance. 
 
10.3.3 Power constellations and alliance structures 
National power constellations have strongly impacted the contentiousness and the framing 
of the debates within the three countries. Shifting governments and the emergence of new 
right-wing challengers can explain some cross-national similarities in the framing and 
saliency of the issue over time. We have seen how in France, the timing of the 
politicisation of the headscarf issue can be related to the strength of the right-wing Front 
National. Each time the FN won elections, the Right politicised the headscarf, adopting 
certain elements of the FN’s anti-immigrant discourse and pushing for more restrictive 
policies (a Directive in 1994, a Secularism Law in 2004). Nonetheless, the Left also 
changed position. In 2003, after the Socialist Prime Minister Jospin lost the Presidential 
election to Le Pen of the FN, who had defended the inclusion of headscarf-wearing pupils 
in schools in 1989, the party came out in favour of a ban. While the Communist Party had 
already been internally divided about the 2003 law, by 2009 it became an important 
advocate of a full ban on burqas in public space. The framing of the hijab issue in terms of 
defending key nationalist values and restoring public order was now adopted by the full 
political spectrum. 
As in France, the rise of strong right-wing populism that challenged the position of 
Dutch mainstream parties can explain the shift in framing, and the move towards 
legislation. In 2002 the Dutch political landscape had changed significantly - new right-
wing parties in Dutch politics challenged the position of established right-wing parties, 
which in turn adopted a more restrictive discourse in regard to immigration and integration 
issues. A majority of Parliament came out in favour of a ban in the police force and in the 
judiciary, reasoning that it would guard the strict boundary between church and state. With 
the rise of the populist parties of Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders, the governing right-wing 
party VVD and the Christian Democrat party CDA adopted their frame of restoring public 
order and security in the burqa debates, but also the PvdA came out in favour of a partial 
ban that would draw some normative boundaries around multiculturalism.  
Finally, in Germany we see a similar development. The right-wing Die 
Republikaner managed to politicise headscarves in the late 1990s in Baden-Württemberg, 
and the established parties CDU, FDP and SPD endorsed the idea of prohibiting teachers’ 
headscarves. When Die Republikaner ceased to exist, the CDU filled the void by framing 
the headscarf issue in culturally differentialist terms. Laws that banned headscarves but 
excepted Christian and Jewish symbols were all passed under governments ruled by the 
CDU or CSU, either alone or with the FDP. The Greens (excepting those in Berlin) were 
the only ones defending the accommodation of headscarves as a way to integrate 
immigrants. The SPD highly valued constitutional principles of equality and non-
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discrimination, but was more hesitant to accommodate ethno-religious diversity. In some 
federal states, like Schleswig-Holstein where it ruled together with the CDU in a Grand 
Coalition, it adopted some elements of its Conservative competitors’ discourse on restoring 
law and order and defending gender equality by favouring restrictions on headscarves as 
expressions of Islamic fundamentalism. In Berlin, the SPD convinced its coalition partner 
PDS to pass a ban on all religious symbols in public-service functions, mainly for reasons 
of public neutrality. But in Rhineland-Palatinate, where it ruled with the FDP that was keen 
to maintain Germany’s state-church relations, it favoured the recognition of religious 
pluralism to foster migrant women’s emancipation. This shows that, in addition to the 
relation between parties in power at the Länder level, regional differences in institutional 
frameworks shaped the framing of the hijab in Germany. 
 
In short, in all three countries’ shifting power constellations can explain the resonance of 
policy frames and, together with institutional state characteristics, their (non) 
implementation in actual policies. Frames became politically influential if actors and 
parties that supported the direction of that frame held important positions of power. 
Politically weak actors had few chances to change the course of the debate if their counter-
framing strategies did not convince the powerful. Nonetheless, the challenge of the far-
Right clearly affected the framing of established parties in all three countries, which 
adopted certain elements of its discourse that hijabs symbolised an Islamic fundamentalism 
that conflicted with national values, or that multiculturalism endangered liberal rights or 
social cohesion. My analysis of the headscarf controversy therefore corroborates the thesis 
that the electoral successes of the far-Right played an important role in the shift of both the 
Left and the Right towards a more restrictive stance towards the hijab, an adaptation that 
they hoped would restore their popularity with voters now attracted to the populist and far-
Right (Cf. Schain 2006: 287; Givens & Luedtke 2004: 152).  
 
10.3.4 Conclusion  
I conclude with the question of to what extent general and issue-specific political 
opportunity structures can explain differences in the framing and regulating of the hijab 
between countries. My answer is that country-specific cleavages, institutional structures 
and policy legacies clearly created a set of opportunities and constraints for actors to push 
for certain policy frames. Institutionalised histories of interpreting and governing religious, 
ethnic, and gender differences together constituted a particular ‘constellation’ of path-
dependent opportunities and constraints that shaped political debates in intersecting ways 
(see also Ferree, 2009: 86). This constellation explains why Germany, France and the 
Netherlands developed different policies to the issue of the hijab. We have seen how 
institutionalised policy legacies are intrinsically related to vested interests that mobilised to 
sustain certain historic traditions, laws and institutions. The differences that existed 
between parties of the same family across countries corroborate the thesis that institutional 
policy legacies create path-dependent effects because they are backed by powerful actors. 
The Dutch and German Christian Democrats, for instance, clearly held different positions 
in regard to teachers’ headscarves: while the German CDU/CSU tried to maintain the 
privileged position of the Christian church in the public domain, their Dutch counterparts 
were informed by the Dutch tradition of even-handed accommodation, favouring the equal 
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accommodation of all personal religious expressions in this domain. In a similar vein, the 
French, German and Dutch Left clearly held different positions on the pupils’ headscarf. 
These stable policy preferences can only be explained by countries’ different historical 
cleavages and policy legacies, which are reflected in the party system itself. 
Nonetheless, my empirical material also illustrates two shortcomings of the theory 
that political opportunity structures shape policy debates and policy outcomes. Firstly, 
institutionalised policy legacies not only shaped policy frames, but actors in turn began to 
shape such institutional arrangements and national self-imaginations through their framing 
strategies. By attributing certain meanings to the hijab, they invoked different elements of 
their institutional environment and subsequently managed to create and seize opportunities 
to push for policy reforms that helped legitimize, expand and sometimes change existing 
institutional repertoires. This dynamic framing contest resulted in policy responses that 
changed over time (France and the Netherlands), or that differed within one country 
(Germany).  
For instance, we have seen how German nationalistic politicians managed to 
circumvent institutional constraints of equal treatment and non-discrimination by arguing 
that the headscarf, in contrast to the crucifix and kippah, was a politicised symbol that 
conflicted with constitutional values like gender equality that were allegedly rooted in a 
Judeo-Christian cultural heritage. This historical anomaly of presenting the German nation 
as partly Jewish and partly Christian enabled five states to pass neutrality laws that 
exempted the crucifix and kippah as cultural symbols, consequently sustaining a privileged 
position of Christianity in the public realm. Moreover, by framing the hijab as a symbol of 
oppression that conflicted with national values of gender equality, cleavages around gender 
re-erupted and historical unexpected alliances emerged between conservative parties and 
feminist movements that both favoured a ban on headscarves for different reasons and 
interests. Other German actors primarily discussed the hijab as a religious symbol, and 
seized opportunities provided by the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court to 
either push for a ban on all religious symbols or for the recognition of the headscarf.  
In other words, national policy legacies do not create unilateral and unmovable 
incentives or constraints. Their impact on policy outcomes is mediated through a dynamic 
policy process in which actors and (intersecting) institutions interact (see also Béland, 
2009). During this process, actors with different relations of power, resources, and 
interests, construct and negotiate policy frames that help sustain or change historical policy 
traditions. Due to the interplay between actors who enter in relations of cooperation and 
competition, historical fault lines can flare up, new alliance structures can emerge, and 
public policy legacies can eventually change during the course of the policy process. The 
theoretical model that I presented in Chapter 2 should therefore be amended to account for 
the interactions between actors and institutions, as well as among actors themselves. This 
makes the model less deterministic, and creates more space for the dynamic process of 
constructing and negotiating frames that, moreover, can have feedback effects on national 
institutional repertoires and policy paradigms.   
Secondly, my empirical material illustrated a similarity in the saliency and the 
framing of the hijab in terms of social cohesion, public order and security. This similarity 
can only partly be explained by parallels in the political opportunity structure, namely in 
the rise of the populist Right that challenged the established position of other parties that 
adopted some elements of its discourse. In order to explain the saliency of the frames used 
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by the Right itself, linking the headscarf to Islamic extremism and a security threat, the 
theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 should integrate structural and non-structural 
elements that exceed the level of the nation-state yet provide opportunities for nation-state 
actors’ framing struggles.  
 
10.4 Beyond the nation-state 
Politicians not only negotiated with their national institutional environment. They also 
seized media coverage of international events as opportunities for their policy frames, as 
well as transnational institutional frameworks like European jurisprudence and law. 
Nonetheless, because the nation-state still remained the main domain in which headscarf 
policies were constructed and implemented, such international opportunities and structures 
did not necessarily result in a convergence in actual policies. 
Firstly, after 2001 the media representation of violence by Islamic extremists 
created international opportunities for actors to push for restrictions of Islamic dress. In 
France, headscarves had been linked to Islamic radicalism since the mid-1990s, when the 
country faced several domestic terrorist attacks by Algerian fundamentalists. The idea of 
the headscarf as a political symbol or tool became increasingly visible in all three countries 
after September 11, and in the Netherlands particularly after the murder of filmmaker Theo 
van Gogh in 2004. German politicians also referred to the murder as evidence that 
multiculturalism led to parallel societies in which violent Islamic fundamentalism was 
flourishing. In all three countries, the idea that a radical Islam was becoming a public order 
and security threat shaped policy debates on hijabs. This framing of Islam as a threat to 
national security and public order went together with calls for stricter norm-setting in all 
three countries.  
While comparable diagnoses emerged on the political agenda, politicians still had 
to translate international discourses on Islamic extremism to nationally specific languages, 
which resulted in rather different prognoses and strategies for tackling the identified 
problem. In France, the emphasis lay on the headscarf symbolising a rising Islamism in the 
suburbs that challenged secular Republicanism, resulting in a law that banned all 
conspicuous religious symbols in public schools. In Germany, Islamists would use the 
headscarf to infiltrate the state and undermine constitutional democracy, resulting in laws 
that prohibited political and/or religious symbols in public functions. The diffusion of 
policy frames linking Islam to violence thus created similarities in the saliency and framing 
of policy debates, but not necessarily in the content of actual policies. 
Second, nation-state actors not only referred to (distortions of) their own 
institutional practices but also used rather crude images of other countries’ policy legacies 
to push for policy reform. Chapter 4 described how the French Stasi Commission visited 
other European countries, including the Netherlands, to learn about their methods of 
managing cultural and religious differences. Even though the Commission members had 
spoken with several scholars who had defended the accommodation of religious difference 
in public space556, their report only quoted one scholar who has long criticised Dutch 
multicultural policies for contributing to segregation and radicalisation, in order to 
legitimise French Republicanism and a Secularism law in public schools. Conversely, the 
Dutch Commission Block referred to the French example of laïcité as something that 
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conflicted with Dutch traditions of religious tolerance and accommodation. However, in 
2009 the Dutch Minister of Interior also referred to the United Kingdom as the wrong way 
to go. Rather than accommodating headscarves and turbans in the police force as does the 
UK, the Minister pleaded for a fully secularised police force, a policy that diverged from 
Dutch state-church patterns of pillarised accommodation. Even though there were not 
necessarily institutional obstacles in the Netherlands to accommodating headscarves in the 
police force, or in France to accommodating pupils’ headscarves, actors used other 
countries’ policy paradigms to legitimise their policy alternative. In other words, actors 
used national models as ideological resources to push for certain policies, mostly to extend 
certain national distinctive paths they favoured and to discredit others (see also: Bertossi, 
2009; Bowen, 2007b; and Duyvendak & Scholten, 2009).    
Third, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights functioned as a 
normative resource to legitimise restrictions on the right to wear religious dress in rather 
national particular ways. In Chapter 3, we saw how the court left nation-states a certain 
‘margin of appreciation’ to assess whether a pressing social need existed in light of their 
own national constitution and political systems. Nation-state actors used this margin of 
appreciation to push for bans on headscarves. The Stasi Commission (2003: 15) seized the 
opportunity to legitimise a ban on ‘ostensible’ religious symbolism in the name of French 
laïcité. The Commission represented laïcité not only as a practice necessary to guarantee a 
separation between religion and politics, but also to maintain public order and basic values 
that keep the nation together, notably sex equality. Because the Court had noted several 
times that the Quranic duty for women to cover was ‘hard to reconcile’ with the principle 
of gender equality, a Secularism law that revived the constitutional principle of laïcité in 
order to protect girls from unwanted pressure to cover, would certainly pass the Court’s 
scrutiny (Bowen, 2007a: 138-9). Also, in Schleswig-Holstein and in Berlin, actors referred 
to EU jurisprudence on the headscarf in their calls for a ban. In other words, although the 
European Convention of Human Rights protects citizens’ right to religious freedom, the 
European Court gives significant space to national actors to interpret and balance this right 
in light of their national context and traditions. This transnational institutional structure 
thus paradoxically creates opportunities for politicians to reaffirm and extend institutional 
logics of historical state-church relations (in France)557 or change these in a direction that 
actually restricts citizenship rights to religious freedom (in Germany).  
Fourth, the reforms of the EU Equality Directives provided new – discursive- 
opportunities for advocates of equal treatment for Muslims. In Chapter 9, we saw how 
Germany’s federal and local integration officers argued that the law of Baden-
Württemberg contravened Germany’s new anti-discrimination legislation based on EU 
Equality Directives, protected by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Also the FCC had 
argued that if states wanted to introduce neutrality laws, they either had to tolerate the 
headscarf or had to ban Christian and Jewish symbols too.558 Two Länder subsequently 
chose to reformulate Christian Occidental legislation in neutral terms by banning all 
religious symbolism. Other Länder, like Schleswig-Holstein, chose to maintain the status 
quo of religious pluralism. Nonetheless, the EU Directives only impacted national policy 
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decisions if sufficient political will existed to implement them. In five federal states of 
Germany, school laws still discriminate against practicing Muslim women by exempting 
the display of ‘Christian Occidental’ values. In practice, hijab-wearing teachers are fired or 
rejected as applicants, while nuns are still allowed to teach in their habits. As we have seen 
in Chapter 9, all appeals to contest this discrimination have failed, because conservative 
judges have continued to affirm the Christian roots of the German nation. Legal scholars 
have good reason to believe that if this case will be brought forward to the ECJ, it will 
overrule national policies (Berghahn, 2011). Some scholars even believe that the ECJ will, 
in contrast to the ECHR, consider even neutrally formulated prohibitions on all religious 
dress in schools to conflict with EU Equality Directives. Because the Court has reviewed 
exceptions to sex discrimination very strictly, obliging member-states to protect women 
from both direct and indirect discrimination, it may consider such laws to infringe upon 
principles of non-discrimination on grounds of sex, religion and race/ethnicity (Loenen, 
2009: 323). So far, however, the actual impact of EU law on national headscarf policies 
has been limited. 
To conclude, the nation-state has remained a key actor in headscarf policies, despite 
the diffusion of European policy frames across borders or windows of opportunities 
provided by international events. My analysis of the impact of European institutions on 
national hijab debates confirms the thesis of Mathias Koenig (2007), that international 
human rights law has contradictory implications for Muslim immigrants. While European 
human rights conventions firmly establish equal rights to religious freedom, they also 
empower national state actors in the field of religious governance, because they “give new 
legitimacy to historical institutional arrangements by reframing them as expressions of 
national identity. […] Transnational institutional forces may actually facilitate both 
convergence and divergence of national models of religious governance, and may thereby 
complicate public-claims making of Muslim minorities” (Koenig, 2007: 913). 
 
10.5 Theoretical reflections and suggestions for further research 
In this final section, I will reflect upon the theories used in this dissertation and some of the 
limitations of this study, and give suggestions for future research.  
Firstly, this study highlights the need to combine an analysis of general and issue-
specific aspects of political opportunity structures, and the need to look at the cumulative, 
interactive impacts of different institutions and policy legacies on policy-making 
processes. In this research, the three institutional policy frameworks of state-church 
relations, migrant incorporation and women’s emancipation were analytically separated to 
discern their autonomous and independent effects on policy processes. My empirical 
material made clear, however, that differences in the saliency, framing and regulation of 
the hijab between the three countries could not be explained by only one institutional 
setting. Merely comparing countries’ state church regimes to explain how countries 
responded to the hijab as a religious symbol, or countries’ citizenship and immigration 
regimes to explain how they responded to hijab-wearing women as (descendants of) 
immigrants, appeared of limited use. The analysis showed that historical cleavages and 
institutional frameworks did not merely have additive, autonomous effects on policy 
debates and policy outcomes, but that they also interacted in the policy process around the 
hijab. Because contested notions of gender, ethnicity and religion intersected and gave 
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each other meaning in the debates, changes in one of the three institutional settings had 
effects on the opportunities and constraints another setting offered, subsequently changing 
the overall political opportunity structure.  
Future comparative research studying policy responses to intersectional claims for 
equality and recognition would therefore benefit from an intersectional theoretical 
framework. This means it should scrutinise how institutional and social structures of 
ethnicity, gender, religion and class (the last of which was under-analysed because of the 
limited scope of this research) not only create independent and autonomous but also 
interactive effects on policy debates and outcomes. Several attempts have already been 
made within comparative gender studies to incorporate ‘intersectionality theory’ into cross-
national analysis of states’ policies (see particularly the edited volume of Lombardo, Meier 
& Verloo, 2009).559 I think this is a promising incipient research field for cross-national 
comparative analysis, which could be further developed into theoretical models. Based 
upon my own findings, it appears useful to examine how issue-specific policies, 
institutions and political histories define the particular group whose claim is being studied. 
But rather than stipulating independent expectations for each institutional setting 
separately, future research should try to formulate expectations how such social and 
political structures have both independent and interactive logics that together shape policy-
formation processes (see also: Choo & Ferree, 2010; Weldon, 2005). 
Secondly, by paying attention to shifting power constellations and the institutional 
setting in which framing struggles take place, this study was able to explain when and why 
policy frames appeared, resonated and were politically influential. Analysts such as Carol 
Bacchi (1999), Deborah Stone (1989) or Marten Hajer (1995), to name but a few, have 
already shown that frames structure policy outcomes. Frame theories would be enriched if 
they were more strongly linked to political opportunity structure theories. We have seen 
how the institutionalised power and resources of actors and parties affected their 
opportunities to influence the dominant discourse and push for policy reform. Shifts in 
power constellations and the emergence of new political parties that challenged the 
position of established actors could explain shifts in framing. Institutional constraints, such 
as the power of intervening courts or the need to forge consensus among coalition partners, 
meant that a change in framing did not always result in actual policy reform. 
Thirdly, a shortcoming of my research is that I have paid only scant attention to the 
strategies of hijab-wearing women trying to make states responsive to their particular 
concerns (but see cf. Longman, 2003; Roggeband, 2010). I took the frames of non-
governmental actors into account only if they were represented in political debates. I would 
therefore encourage future research to focus on public debates in the media and on the 
internet, as well as on debates that take place in institutions other than the state, such 
schools, women’s and other NGOs, or religious institutions. This would show which 
voices and frames were actually represented in key decision-making arenas, and which 
remained marginalized. Moreover, since this study was limited to the national and (in 
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Germany) federal levels, it would also be valuable to study debates that take place more 
locally, along with the actual implementation of policies. Such an analysis would enable us 
to obtain a clearer understanding of the differences between the interests and concerns in 
local and context-specific debates and those reflected in national policy debates, as well as 
which other institutional dynamics interfere in the formation and implementation of 
policies.  
Fourthly, the comparative perspective used in this study has shown that certain 
policies considered normal in one country, such as civil servants wearing headscarves, may 
still be considered completely unimaginable in other countries. Analysing and comparing 
policy debates in their particular political, institutional and historical settings enabled a 
better understanding of how national ‘models’ were interpreted and used by vested 
interests as resources of mobilisation that lead to processes of path-dependency. 
Nonetheless, the findings of this research also provided some indications that transnational 
opportunity structures and the diffusion of policy frames across borders led to similar 
trends in national policy debates. Actors linked international discourses on Islamic 
extremism to headscarves to push for bans, or to international jurisprudence. The 
availability of opportunities at the transnational level did not always lead to a convergence 
in the prognosis - the goals and the means of reaching that goal- or in actual policy 
responses. This draws attention to the relation between the transnational diffusion of policy 
frames and specific national constellations of opportunities and constraints provided by 
institutions and constellations of power (Béland, 2009). Future research could scrutinise 
more closely the impact of international discourses and institutions on national policy 
making processes. 
Finally, this study points towards the importance of including and enriching 
comparative gender policy studies. Comparative feminist policy studies that compare the 
gendered nature of state institutions have broadly enhanced our understanding of the extent 
to which gender machineries and female MPs provide access to women’s movements to 
gender policy debates in a feminist way. But my findings suggest that they need to focus 
more on whose feminist project gender-machineries and political actors support, and 
recognise the diversity among women regarding interests and perspectives (cf. Siim and 
Skjeje, 2008; Squires, 2007). Despite being the targets of policies, headscarf-wearig 
women were mainly talked about or talked for - both by advocates and by opponents of 
restrictive legislation. Moreover, even when feminists gained access to policy debates, they 
could not prevent that their frames were sometimes coopted for other purposes than 
fostering gender-equality. Nonetheless, my analysis also corroborates the finding of Zippel 
(2006: 216) that gender machineries are not necessarily the only institutional venues for 
women to gender policy debates. The Equal Treatment Committee in the Netherlands and 
Integration Officers in Germany – the latter formally not charged with gender equality - 
did provide procedural access for hijab-wearing women and their allies. Analyzing and 
comparing the institutional and ideological opportunities that exist for women situated at 
intersecting axes of inequality would greatly enhance our understanding of why certain 
feminist voices are more successful than others in shaping policy formation, and why this 
differs between countries.  
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Appendix  
List of sensitizing questions to code frames560  
 
I. Information on the document  
Full citation 
Occasion of publication  
Date/Place of publication  
Type of document 
 
II. Voice/standing  
Who is speaking?  
From which position does the voice speak or is given voice?  
Which actors/ documents/ events are referred to? 
 
III. Diagnosis 
What is represented as the problem and why? (which type of clothing is perceived as a 
problem? At which site(s) did the problem occur? Why is the clothing seen as a problem?) 
Legitimization of non-problem(s) (what is not seen as a problem, why?) 
Causality (what is seen as a cause of what? What is seen as the location of the problem? 
Which mechanisms reproduce the problem?) 
Roles (who causes the problem? Who is made responsible for the problem? Who is seen as 
the victim?)  
Normativity (what is a norm group if there is a problem group? Which values and norms 
are referred to?)  
 
IV. Prognosis 
Which solutions are suggested and why is action necessary?  
Is there any hierarchy in goals? 
How to achieve goals/aims? (strategy, instruments, means) 
Roles (who should solve the problem? Who should act?) 
 
V. Call for action 
Call for action or non-action (what is seen as right and what is seen as wrong?) 
Who is acted upon? (target group) 
Legitimization of non-action (why is action not necessary? Which boundaries are set to 
action?) 
                                                           
560
 Based on the analytical matrix used for the VEIL-project (2006-2009), which itself was based 
on the matrix developed by Verloo (2005) for the Mageeq-project (2003-2007). 
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Nederlandstalige Samenvatting 
Framing de hijab. The regulering van kruisende religieuze, etnische en gender 
verschillen in Frankrijk, Nederland en Duitsland 
Dit proefschrift gaat over de politieke debatten en het beleid omtrent vrouwelijke 
Islamitische kledij in Frankrijk, Nederland en Duitsland, oftewel de hijab. Hoewel er al 
veel onderzoek is gedaan naar de vraag waarom de hijab in het publieke en politieke debat 
zo veel stof doet opwaaien, bestaat er maar weinig internationaal vergelijkend onderzoek. 
Dit is opmerkelijk, aangezien landen nogal uiteenlopend beleid hebben gevormd ten 
aanzien van de hijab. Zo verbiedt Frankrijk het dragen van hoofddoeken en andere 
‘opzichtige’ religieuze tekens op openbare scholen, terwijl hoofddoeken inmiddels een 
bekend fenomeen zijn op de meeste Nederlandse scholen. Door de beleidsprocessen rond 
de hijab in drie Europese landen systematisch met elkaar te vergelijken, probeert dit 
onderzoek de verschillen in beleid te verklaren, en zodoende een bijdrage te leveren aan 
het wetenschappelijke debat over dit onderwerp. Hiervoor heb ik alle parlementaire 
debatten rondom de hijab bestudeerd die zich voordeden tussen 1985 en 2007 (en in 
minder detail ook latere debatten). Daarnaast heb ik de jurisprudentie en verschillende 
mediastukken rondom dit thema bestudeerd, mede om de actoren te achterhalen die 
geprobeerd hebben het beleid te beïnvloeden. 
 Internationaal vergelijkende studies naar de regulering van Islam in Europa wijzen 
uit dat nationale tradities van staat-kerk verhoudingen en van burgerschap doorwerken in 
de manier waarop landen omgaan met hedendaagse multiculturele vraagstukken. Dit 
onderzoek bouwt voort op deze theorie, maar levert ook twee centrale punten van kritiek: 
1. een statisch begrip van nationale beleidstradities kan niet verklaren waarom de hijab 
soms binnen hetzelfde land verschillend wordt gereguleerd, of waarom er zich over de tijd 
heen verschuivingen voordoen in het beleid. Blijkbaar zijn deze nationale tradities zelf ook 
aan verandering onderhevig en voor meerdere interpretaties vatbaar. Daarom stel ik een 
dynamischere verklaring voor die rekening houdt met de rol van actoren in 
beleidsvormingsprocessen, en de betekenissen die zij geven aan deze historische tradities. 
2. De hoofddoek is niet alleen een uitdrukking van een religie die (voornamelijk) door 
nakomelingen van migranten wordt aangehangen, maar ook een genderspecifieke praktijk 
die alleen voor vrouwen geldt. Daarom heb ik niet alleen gekeken naar de mogelijke 
invloed van nationale staat-kerk tradities en immigratie- en integratiebeleid op politieke 
debatten over de hijab, maar ook naar het emancipatiebeleid van de verschillende landen.  
 In dit onderzoek wordt een theoretisch model ontwikkeld en getoetst dat de drie 
genoemde beleidsterreinen opvat als ‘politieke mogelijkheidsstructuren’ (POS). De thesis 
is dat nationale verschillen in beleid en instituties van invloed zijn op de mate waarin, en 
manier waarop, Franse, Nederlandse en Duitse actoren de hijab kunnen thematiseren als 
een beleidsprobleem. Naast deze drie specifieke elementen van de POS, en de historische 
breuklijnen die daaraan ten grondslag liggen, heb ik onderzocht in hoeverre verschillen in 
het politieke systeem tussen de drie landen doorwerken op beleidsprocessen, inclusief 
politieke machtsverhoudingen. De totstandkoming van beleid wordt breed opgevat als het 
resultaat van een dynamisch proces tussen actoren die, gekenmerkt door verschillende 
machtsposities, ideologieën en belangen, twisten over de definitie van het ‘probleem’ van 
de hijab en de manier waarop de staat daarop zou moeten reageren (‘framing’). 
 Deze kenmerken van de politieke context vergelijk ik tussen de drie landen in 
hoofdstuk 3 tot en met 6. Er blijken een aantal duidelijke verschillen te bestaan in de 
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manier waarop Frankrijk, Nederland en Duitsland in het verleden om gegaan zijn met 
religieuze, etnische en genderverschillen. Zo laat hoofdstuk 4 zien dat in Frankrijk 
historische conflicten tussen secularisten en de Katholieke kerk slechts recentelijk zijn 
gepacificeerd, en dat het overheidsbeleid er nog steeds op gericht is om religie zo veel 
mogelijk uit openbare instellingen te weren. In Duitsland en Nederland daarentegen, 
bestaat er al geruime tijd een vreedzame verhouding tussen verschillende religieuze en/of 
niet-religieuze groeperingen. De openbare rol van religie in de samenleving wordt hier 
erkend en gewaardeerd, met het verschil dat in tegenstelling tot Nederland kerken in 
Duitsland een publiekrechtelijke status hebben die hun verschillende voordelen verleent 
boven minderheidsreligies.  
Hoofdstuk 5 toont aan dat, ondanks recente trends van convergentie, er eveneens 
verschillen bestaan in het type integratiebeleid dat de drie landen hebben gevoerd. Terwijl 
Frankrijk al meer dan een eeuw geleden, en Nederland een halve eeuw geleden, het 
staatsburgerschap openstelde voor afstammelingen van migranten, wierp het Duitse 
burgerschapsbeleid tot 2000 hoge grenzen op voor niet-etnisch Duitse migranten en hun 
nakomelingen. Daarbij speelt mee dat, in tegenstelling tot Frankrijk en Nederland, 
conflicten over de letterlijke en symbolische grenzen van de Duitse natie tot voor kort nog 
niet waren gepacificeerd, mede vanwege de scheiding tussen Oost en West. Ook kennen 
Frankrijk en Nederland een sterkere antidiscriminatie wetgeving dan Duitsland, met het 
verschil dat Nederland in de jaren ’80 heeft gespeeld met het multiculturalisme als 
beleidsparadigma en Frankrijk juist huiverig staat tegenover de erkenning en 
institutionalisering van etnische verschillen.  
Op basis van deze elementen van de POS verwachtte ik dat in Frankrijk de 
hoofddoek het meeste controversieel zou zijn in instellingen als de openbare school, en dat 
er daar meer discursieve ruimte zou bestaan om te pleiten voor een verbod op alle 
religieuze uitingen dan in de andere twee landen. In Duitsland verwachtte ik op basis van 
zijn staat-kerk verhoudingen een grote tolerantie voor religieuze uitingen, maar alleen 
zolang deze de religie van etnische meerderheden uitdrukken. Het exclusieve burgerschap 
en integratiebeleid dat Duitsland jarenlang heeft gehanteerd zou kunnen betekenen dat de 
hoofddoek juist wordt geweerd uit het openbare leven. In Nederland verwachtte ik dat de 
institutionele mogelijkheden minder kansen zou bieden om voor een verbod te pleiten, 
hoewel recente veranderingen in het immigratiebeleid en in politieke machtsverhoudingen 
weer nieuwe mogelijkheden scheppen voor tegenstanders van de hijab.  
Tenslotte heb ik in hoofdstuk 6 de gender instituties en het emancipatiebeleid van 
de drie landen vergeleken. Alle drie landen hebben impliciet en expliciet genderrollen van 
moederschap geïnstitutionaliseerd, met als koploper Duitsland en dan Nederland. Frankrijk 
heeft een sterker gelijke kansenbeleid ontwikkeld dan Duitsland, maar in de Franse politiek 
zijn vrouwen juist weer minder sterk vertegenwoordigd dan in Nederland en Duitsland. 
Vanwege de nog steeds sterke mobilisering rondom gendergerelateerde kwesties in 
Frankrijk, waar inmiddels een uitgebreide emancipatie infrastructuur bestaat, verwachtte ik 
hier een grotere invloed van de vrouwenbeweging op het debat over de hijab dan in 
Nederland en Duitsland, waar de beweging is gefragmenteerd en de infrastructuur 
afgebrokkeld.  
In hoofdstuk 7, 8 en 9 ben ik nagegaan of deze aannames kloppen door per land in 
detail en door de tijd heen te onderzoeken hoe de hijab als probleem werd gepresenteerd in 
het parlementaire debat, en welk beleid er is ontstaan. In hoofdstuk 10 heb ik de 
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verschillen en overeenkomsten nog eens naast elkaar gezet. Het blijkt dat de politisering 
van de hijab en beleidsreacties in grote mate overeenstemmen met de verwachtingen op 
basis van de POS. In Frankrijk was de hoofddoek van leerlingen inderdaad al vroeg 
controversieel. Hoewel deze aanvankelijk werd getolereerd, mede vanuit de verwachting 
dat zodra migrantenkinderen zouden integreren ze hun hoofddoek zouden afleggen, kregen 
scholen al snel toestemming de hoofddoek te verbieden. In 2004 is er een wettelijk verbod 
op religieuze kledij doorgevoerd, mede met het argument om meisjes te beschermen tegen 
religieuze druk en om de eenheid van de natie te bewaken. In tegenstelling tot Frankrijk, 
waar de mogelijkheid om hoofddoeken voor leraressen en ambtenaren niet eens werd 
overwogen, zijn deze in Nederland toegestaan. Een verbod werd lange tijd als 
discriminatoir en contraproductief gezien voor de emancipatie en integratie van 
migrantenvrouwen. Recent zijn er slechts in bepaalde domeinen als de school verboden op 
de gezichtssluier ingevoerd, welke als een obstakel voor integratie en gendergelijkheid 
wordt beschouwd, net als in Frankrijk waar gezichtssluiers zijn verboden in de gehele 
openbare ruimte. Duitsland neemt een bijzondere positie in: vijf deelstaten verbieden de 
hoofddoek, maar nonnen en joodse leerkrachten wordt wel toegestaan om in hun kleding 
uitdrukking te geven aan hun religie. De argumentatie is dat hoofddoeken een uitdrukking 
zijn van een extremistische Islam, dus een politiek statement dat conflicteert met Joods-
christelijke waarden. 
Toch blijken er binnen landen verschillende beleidsreacties ten aanzien van de hijab 
te bestaan, welke moeilijk vanuit ‘nationale’ beleidstradities zijn te verklaren. Niet alleen 
laat het Franse voorbeeld zien dat er beleidsverschillen over de tijd ontstaan, ook de 
verschillen in beleid tussen de deelstaten in Duitsland roepen om aanvullende verklaring (3 
andere deelstaten verbieden alle religieuze uitingen in plaats van alleen de hoofddoek, en 8 
deelstaten hebben geen of accommoderend beleid). Daarnaast bestaan er overeenkomsten 
tussen de landen die moeilijk te verklaren zijn vanuit de POS. Zo blijkt dat de hijab in alle 
landen steeds meer wordt gepolitiseerd. Hoewel de controverses zich per land op 
verschillende vormen van sluiering richten en op verschillende domeinen, is de trend naar 
restrictief beleid overal zichtbaar. Ook zien we overeenkomsten tussen landen in de 
probleemanalyse, namelijk dat de hijab wordt gerelateerd aan segregatie en publieke orde, 
Islamitisch extremisme, of aan vrouwenongelijkheid.  
Deze overeenkomsten kunnen slechts gedeeltelijk worden verklaard aan de hand 
van twee met elkaar samenhangende elementen van de POS: enerzijds spelen 
veranderingen in beleidsparadigma’s van burgerschap mee, anderzijds verschuivingen in 
machtsconstellaties. De opkomst van Rechts in Frankrijk en Nederland, en de sterke positie 
van nationalistische partijen in Duitsland, is van invloed op de framing van bestaande 
partijen, die gedeeltelijk meegaan in de probleemanalyse dat de hijab staat voor 
vrouwenonderdrukking, religieus extremisme en segregatie. Echter, om de resonantie van 
dit soort frames te begrijpen spelen niet alleen nationale mogelijkheidsstructuren een rol, 
zoals de bedreiging die uitgaat van populistische c.q. rechtse partijen voor bestaande 
machthebbers, maar ook incidenten binnen en buiten de nationale grenzen zijn van belang, 
zoals de moord op Theo van Gogh of de aanslag op het WTC in 2001. De diffusie van een 
internationaal vertoog dat geweld linkt aan Islam en aan de falende integratie van 
migranten creëert nieuwe mogelijkheden voor voorstanders van een verbod op ‘politieke’ 
symbolen, zoals de hijab. De uiteindelijke beleidsreactie blijft echter vrij landenspecifiek. 
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In het conclusie hoofdstuk betoog ik daarom dat beleidsprocessen weliswaar 
plaatsvinden in een nationale context, en daardoor mede worden beïnvloed door 
institutionele repertoires en historische beleidstradities, maar dat deze processen 
dynamischer en veranderlijker zijn dan statische, structuralistische theorieën suggereren. 
Allereerst, de dynamiek tussen actoren en de opkomst van nieuwe uitdagers blijkt van 
groot belang in de discursieve strijd rondom thema’s als de hijab en is daarmee, naast 
beleid en instituties, van groot belang om de uitkomst van beleidsprocessen te verklaren.  
Ten tweede laat mijn analyse zien dat actoren verschillende betekenissen kunnen 
geven aan hun institutionele omgeving. Terwijl Duitse conservatieve partijen zichzelf als 
een Christelijke natie beschouwen en daarom partiele verboden op de hoofddoek in lijn 
vinden met hun tradities van staat-kerk, beargumenteren de meeste linkse partijen hier dat 
dergelijke verboden indruisen tegen het geïnstitutionaliseerde principe van strikt gelijke 
behandeling. Vanuit datzelfde principe van (gender)gelijkheid, pleiten sommigen echter 
voor een verbod op de hoofddoek. Door de manier waarop actoren de hoofddoek 
thematiseren, spreken ze dus andere elementen van hun institutionele omgeving aan en 
andere actoren die als partners kunnen fungeren in hun strijd. Zodoende creëren actoren 
zelf mogelijkheden om een bepaald beleid door te voeren. Kortom, de invloed van 
instituties op beleid wordt bemiddeld door het politieke proces, waarin er volop ruimte 
bestaat voor de ‘agency’ van actoren. Er bestaat dus een interactie tussen instituties en 
actoren, waarbij framing als de lijm fungeert.  
Ten derde, in hun mobilisering rondom een thema vinden actoren ook 
mogelijkheden buiten de grenzen van de natiestaat. Naast de diffusie van internationale 
vertogen rondom Islamitisch extremisme, blijkt dat vertogen over internationale 
mensenrechten als normatief raamwerk hebben gefungeerd in de strijd rondom de hijab. 
Tegelijkertijd laat mijn analyse zien dat de invloed van instituties als de EU op nationaal 
beleid ten aanzien van de hijab beperkt is gebleven. Het onderzoek toont aan dat het 
Europese Hof van de Rechten van de Mens een behoorlijke ruimte aan lidstaten laat om 
beleid te voeren dat past binnen hun nationale beleidskaders, waardoor geïdealiseerde 
tradities van burgerschap en van staat-kerk verhoudingen de inzet worden van een strijd 
om cultuur en machtbehoud. 
Tenslotte laat mijn analyse zien dat de uitkomsten van de discursieve strijd rondom 
de hoofddoek niet verklaard kunnen worden door alleen één van de drie beleidsterreinen. 
Zo zou je immers tolerant beleid verwachten in Duitsland waar religie een openbare rol 
heeft genoten. Door de hoofddoek als een symbool van segregatie en 
vrouwenonderdrukking te presenteren dat botst met nationale waarden, kwamen ook 
andere beleidsparadigma’s in het geding, zoals het restrictieve naturalisatie- en 
integratiebeleid en het zwakke gendergelijkheidsbeleid van Duitsland. Bovendien 
ontstonden er door deze representatie van het probleem historisch onverwachtse allianties 
tussen conservatieve partijen en feministen die beiden voor een verbod op de hoofddoek 
pleitten, welke in 8 deelstaten werd doorgevoerd. In andere woorden, door de specifieke 
manier waarop gender, etniciteit/‘ras’, nationaliteit en religie aan elkaar worden gelinkt, 
worden er instituties, actoren en beleidsstrategieën aangesproken die samen mogelijkheden 
creëren voor actoren om zich hard te maken voor een bepaalde beleidsreactie. Deze 
bevinding pleit voor een dynamischere, procesmatigere en een ‘intersectionele’ benadering 
van beleidsanalyses rondom een thema als de hijab, een paradigmatisch voorbeeld van een 
gelijkheidsclaim waarin religieuze, etnische en gender verschillen elkaar kruisen. 
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